Menachot 9a

(במדבר יח, י) בקדש הקדשים תאכלנו “Every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may render unto Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons. In the Sanctuary you shall eat them” (Numbers 18:9–10). This indicates that although the mitzva is to consume offerings of the most sacred order in the courtyard, in certain instances the priests may consume these offerings inside the Sanctuary, the most holy place.

והא למה לי קרא לימא בחצר אהל מועד יאכלוה ולא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר The Gemara explains its objection: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, why do I need this verse? Let him say here as well that as the verse states: “In the court of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:9), i.e., in the Temple courtyard, it is logical that the halakha with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the halakha with regard to the major one, i.e., if one may consume a peace offering in the Temple courtyard then all the more so may he consume it in the Sanctuary.

עבודה דאדם עובד במקום רבו אמרינן שלא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר אכילה שאין אדם אוכל במקום רבו טעמא דכתב קרא הא לא כתב קרא לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר לא אמרי' The Gemara explains: Consuming an offering is not the same as slaughtering it. The slaughter of an offering is part of the sacrificial service, and it is not considered disrespectful for a person to serve his master in the place of his master, i.e., within the Sanctuary as well as in the courtyard. Therefore, we say that the halakha with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the halakha with regard to the major one. By contrast, with regard to the consumption of an offering, since a person may not eat in the place of his master, the only reason that it is permitted to consume an offering inside the Sanctuary is that it is written in the verse: “In a most holy place you shall eat them.” Had this not been written in the verse explicitly, we would not say that the halakha with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the halakha with regard to the major one.

איתמר בללה חוץ לחומת עזרה ר' יוחנן אמר פסולה ר"ל אמר כשרה ר"ל אמר כשרה דכתיב ויצק עליה שמן ונתן עליה לבונה והדר והביאה אל בני אהרן הכהנים וקמץ § It was stated: If one mixed the oil of a meal offering into it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is disqualified, and Reish Lakish says that it is valid. Reish Lakish says: It is valid, as it is written: “And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense upon it” (Leviticus 2:1), and then it is written: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove” (Leviticus 2:2).

מקמיצה ואילך מצות כהונה לימד על יציקה ובלילה שכשרין בזר ומדכהונה לא בעיא פנים נמי לא בעיא Reish Lakish explains: The Sages derived from here that from the removal of the handful onward the rites performed with the meal offering are solely a mitzva of the priesthood. Accordingly, the verse taught about pouring and mixing that they are valid when performed by a non-priest. And from the fact that the priesthood is not required for the mixing, it may be derived that it is also not required that its performance be inside the walls of the Temple courtyard.

ורבי יוחנן אמר פסולה כיון דעשייתה בכלי הוא נהי דכהונה לא בעיא פנים מיהת בעיא תניא כוותיה דר' יוחנן בללה זר כשרה חוץ לחומת העזרה פסולה: And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This meal offering is disqualified, since a meal offering’s performance is in a service vessel. Therefore, granted that the priesthood is not required, yet in any event its performance inside the Temple courtyard is required. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If a meal offering was mixed by a non-priest it is valid. But if it was mixed outside the wall of the Temple courtyard it is disqualified.

איתמר מנחה שחסרה קודם קמיצה ר' יוחנן אמר יביא מתוך ביתו וימלאנה ריש לקיש אמר לא יביא מתוך ביתו וימלאנה § It was stated: With regard to a meal offering that became lacking in its full measure before the removal of the handful, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the owner shall bring additional flour from within his home and shall fill the missing part of the measure of the meal offering. Reish Lakish says: He shall not bring flour from within his home and fill it. Instead, he must bring a new meal offering.

ר' יוחנן אמר מביא מתוך ביתו וימלאנה קמיצה קבעה ליה ריש לקיש אמר לא יביא מתוך ביתו וימלאנה קדושת כלי קבעה ליה The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he brings flour from within his home and he fills it, as the removal of the handful establishes it as a meal offering to the extent that it may become disqualified. Before the removal, one may always add flour to the meal offering. Reish Lakish says: He shall not bring flour from within his home and fill it, as the sanctity of the service vessel establishes it as a meal offering. Therefore, once the meal offering was placed in a service vessel and sanctified, it is disqualified if it becomes lacking.

איתיביה ר' יוחנן לרשב"ל חסר הלוג אם עד שלא יצק ימלאנו תיובתא: Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, Reish Lakish, from a mishna (Nega’im 14:10) discussing the log of oil brought by a leper: In a case where the log lacked a full measure, if it became lacking before the priest poured from it into his palm in order to place it on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, he shall fill it. Clearly the service vessel containing the log does not sanctify the oil to the extent that it can become disqualified. The Gemara notes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.

איתמר שירים שחסרו בין קמיצה להקטרה רבי יוחנן אמר מקטיר קומץ עליהן וריש לקיש אמר אין מקטיר קומץ עליהן אליבא דר' אליעזר כ"ע לא פלוגי כי פליגי אליבא דר' יהושע § It was stated: With regard to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one burns the handful on account of such a remainder, and that the remainder is then permitted for consumption. And Reish Lakish says that one does not burn the handful on account of the remainder. The Gemara notes: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that the handful is burned on account of the remainder. In other words, both amora’im, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, concur that this is the halakha according to the tanna Rabbi Eliezer. When they disagree, it is concerning the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

דתנן נטמאו שיריה נשרפו שיריה אבדו שיריה כמדת ר' אליעזר כשרה כמדת רבי יהושע פסולה The Gemara cites the dispute in question. As we learned in a mishna (26a): If, after the handful was removed, the remainder of the meal offering became ritually impure, or if the remainder of the meal offering was burned, or if the remainder of the meal offering was lost, according to the principle of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling even if there is no meat that can be eaten, the meal offering is fit, and the priest burns the handful. But according to the principle of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling only if there is meat that can be eaten, it is unfit and the priest does not burn the handful, as the handful serves to render the remainder permitted.

מאן דפסל כר' יהושע ומאן דמכשר עד כאן לא אמר רבי יהושע התם אלא דלא אישתייר אבל היכא דאישתייר אפי' ר' יהושע מודה ליה The one who disqualifies the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, i.e., Reish Lakish, holds in accordance with the plain meaning of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And the one who deems that remainder fit, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, maintains that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that the remainder is unfit, he says so only there, in a case where nothing remained from the meal offering other than the remainder. Since the handful is intended to render permitted for consumption the remainder of the meal offering, if there is no remainder at all then the handful is not burned. But in a case where there remained a portion of the remainder, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabbi Eliezer that the handful is fit to be burned.

דתניא ר' יהושע אומר כל הזבחים שבתורה שנשתייר מהם כזית בשר או כזית חלב זורק הדם כחצי זית בשר כחצי זית חלב אינו זורק את הדם The Gemara cites a proof for Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is clear that this is Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to any of the offerings that are mentioned in the Torah from which there remains either an olive-bulk of meat or an olive-bulk of fat, the halakha is that the priest sprinkles the blood of that offering and thereby permits either the remaining meat for consumption or the remaining fat for sacrifice upon the altar. But if there remains only half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, he does not sprinkle the blood, as the consumption or burning of anything less than an olive-bulk is not significant enough to warrant the sprinkling of the blood. The volumes of the meat and the fat do not combine to form a whole olive-bulk.

ובעולה אפי' כחצי זית בשר וכחצי זית חלב זורק את הדם מפני שבעולה כולה כליל ובמנחה אף על פי שכולה קיימת לא יזרוק The baraita continues: And in the case of a burnt offering, even if there remains only half an olive-bulk of flesh and half an olive-bulk of fat, he sprinkles the blood, because in the case of a burnt offering it is entirely consumed, i.e., as the flesh and fat are both burned upon the altar, there is in fact an olive-bulk of the offering that is designated for burning upon the altar. And with regard to a meal offering, even though it remains entirely intact, he shall not sprinkle.

(דהא כתב על דם האשם) חד להכשיר צדדין וחד לפסול צידי צדדין After all, a verse already indicates that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe, as it is written: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:17). Since the Torah has already specified that the blood is placed upon the right thumb and big toe (Leviticus 14:14), it is clear that the oil is placed there as well. Similarly, why must the verse specify with regard to a poor leper that the oil is placed on the right thumb and big toe? Isn’t already clear from the verse where the oil must be placed, as it states: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:28)? The Gemara responds: One specification, stated with regard to a wealthy leper, serves to permit the placement of the oil on the sides of the thumb and sides of the big toe in addition to the nail side of the thumb and big toe, and one, stated with regard to a poor leper, serves to disqualify the sides of sides, i.e., their undersides.

(ויקרא יד, יז) על דם האשם על מקום דם האשם למאי אתו The Gemara inquires with regard to the verse: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:17), stated with regard to the purification of a wealthy leper, and the verse: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:28), stated with regard to the purification of a poor leper. For what purpose do they come, i.e., why are both verses necessary?

הני צריכי אי כתב רחמנא על דם האשם הוה אמינא איתיה אין נתקנח לא כתב רחמנא על מקום The Gemara responds: These verses are necessary, because if the Merciful One had written only: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering,” I would say: If the blood is still on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, yes, the priest places the oil upon the blood. But if it was wiped from there, he does not place the oil. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” indicating that the oil is placed upon the location of the blood, not necessarily upon the blood itself.

ואי כתב רחמנא על מקום הוה אמינא דוקא נתקנח אבל איתיה אימא הוי חציצה קמ"ל על דם האשם: And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” I would say: The oil is placed on his right thumb and big toe specifically when the blood was wiped from there. But if the blood is still there, I will say that the blood is an interposition between the oil and the thumb or toe. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the oil is placed “upon the blood of the guilt offering,” and the blood is not considered an interposition.

אמר רבא מאחר דכתיב על דם האשם ועל מקום [דם] האשם וכתיבא ימנית בדם על בהן ידו הימנית ועל בהן רגלו הימנית וכתיבי בשמן דמצורע עשיר ועני למה לי Rava said: Since it is written that the priest places the oil “upon the blood of the guilt offering,” and: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” and it is also written with regard to a wealthy leper (see Leviticus 14:14) and a poor one (see Leviticus 14:25) that the right hand and foot are required for the placement of the blood, as the verses state: “Upon the thumb of his right hand, and upon the big toe of his right foot,” and this is also written with regard to the oil of a wealthy leper (see Leviticus 14:17) and a poor one (see Leviticus 14:28), one can ask: Why do I need all of these verses?

אלא אמר רבא יד יד לקמיצה Rather, Rava said: The verses that specify that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe do not teach a halakha with regard to a leper, as it is clear that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe, as it states: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering.” Rather, these verses are the source of verbal analogies for other halakhot. When the verse states with regard to a wealthy leper: “Of his right hand” (Leviticus 14:17), this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “hand” written here and “hand” written with regard to the removal of a handful, as the verse states about the removal of a handful: “And he filled his hand from it” (Leviticus 9:17). The verbal analogy teaches that the removal of the handful must also be performed with the right hand.

רגל רגל לחליצה Similarly, when the verse states: “Of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:17), with regard to a wealthy leper, this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “foot” written here and “foot” written with regard to the ritual through which the yavam, a man whose married brother died childless, frees his brother’s widow, the yevama, of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], as the verse states with regard to ḥalitza: “And remove his shoe from upon his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9). The verbal analogy teaches that the shoe is removed from his right foot.

אוזן אוזן לרציעה Additionally, when the verse states: “Upon the tip of the right ear of him that is to be cleansed” (Leviticus 14:17), with regard to a wealthy leper, this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “ear” written here and “ear” written with regard to the piercing of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl, as the verse states: “And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl” (Exodus 21:6). The verbal analogy teaches that the slave’s right ear is pierced.

שמאלית (העני) למאי אתא אמר רב שישא בריה דרב אידי ליפסול ימין דכהן במצורע שלא תאמר ומה במקום שלא נתרבתה שמאל נתרבתה ימין במקום שנתרבתה שמאל אינו דין שנתרבתה ימין The Gemara asks: With regard to the additional mention of the left hand in the verse dealing with the poor leper, for what purpose does it come? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It comes to disqualify the right hand of a priest for the purification of a leper. This teaches that you should not say: And if in a place where the left side is not included, as sacrificial rites in general are disqualified when performed with the left hand, the right hand is included, i.e., those rites must be performed with the right hand, then in a place where the left hand is included, in the case of a leper, isn’t it logical that the right hand should also be included? Therefore, the verse repeats that the oil is poured into the priest’s left hand, in order to disqualify the right hand.

ואידך שמאלית ויד ורגל ימנית דעני למאי אתא לכדתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל כל פרשה שנאמרה ונשנית לא נשנית אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש בה The Gemara asks: And concerning the other verses that specify the left hand of a poor leper (Leviticus 14:26–27) as well as the right hand and foot of a poor leper (Leviticus 14:25–28), for what purpose do they come? The Gemara responds: These verses come for that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Any passage that was stated in the Torah and was then repeated, was repeated only for the sake of a matter that was introduced for the first time in the repeated passage. That is, sometimes the Torah repeats an entire passage just to teach a single new detail. In this case, the verses that discuss the purification of a poor leper were repeated only for the sake of the differences in the offerings between a wealthy leper and a poor one. No additional halakha should be derived from them.

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר' שמעון בן לקיש כל מקום שנאמרה אצבע וכהונה אינה אלא ימין § Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Any place in the Torah in which it is stated that an action is performed with a finger or by the priesthood, i.e., that one uses his finger to perform the action or that a priest performs it, this teaches that it is performed only with the right hand.

קס"ד אצבע וכהונה בעינן כדכתיב (ויקרא ד, כה) ולקח הכהן מדם החטאת באצבעו וגמר ממצורע דכתיב (ויקרא יד, טז) וטבל הכהן את אצבעו הימנית הרי קמיצה דלא כתיבא בה אלא כהונה ותנן קמץ בשמאל פסול The Gemara comments: It might enter our mind to say that this means that we require both a finger and the priesthood to be stated together in the verse in order to mandate use of the right hand, e.g., as it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:25). And the fact that this verse is referring to a finger from his right hand is derived from a leper, as it is written: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). This cannot be correct, as there is the verse that addresses the removal of a handful from a meal offering, in which only the priesthood is written, and yet we learned in a mishna (6a): If the priest removed the handful with his left hand the meal offering is unfit.

אמר רבא או אצבע או כהונה Therefore, Rava said: This statement means that if the verse mentions either a finger or the priesthood, only the right hand may be used.

אמר ליה אביי הרי הולכת אברים לכבש דכתיב בהו כהונה דכתיב (ויקרא א, יג) והקריב הכהן את הכל המזבחה ואמר מר זו הולכת אברים לכבש ותנן הרגל של ימין בשמאל ובית עורה לחוץ Abaye said to Rava: But this is contradicted by the verse discussing the conveyance of the limbs of the daily burnt offering to the ramp of the altar, as priesthood is written with regard to it, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13), and the Master said that this verse is referring to the conveyance of the limbs to the ramp. And yet we learned in a mishna (Tamid 31b): When the priest conveys the limbs to the ramp, the foot of the right side of the offering is carried in the left hand of the priest, and the place of its skin, i.e., the side of the limb covered in skin, is held facing outward. Clearly, use of the left hand does not disqualify the conveyance of the limbs.

כי אמרי' או אצבע או כהונה בדבר המעכב כפרה The Gemara responds: When we say that if the verse states either finger or priesthood then the left hand is disqualified, this is only with regard to a matter that precludes atonement, i.e., a rite whose performance is indispensable to the atonement, similar to the sprinkling of the oil on the leper (see Leviticus 14:16). The conveyance of the limbs, by contrast, is not indispensable to atonement.

והרי קבלה דבר המעכב כפרה הוא וכתב בה כהונה דכתיב (ויקרא א, ה) והקריבו בני אהרן הכהנים את הדם זו קבלת הדם ותנן קבל בשמאל פסל ורבי שמעון מכשיר The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the collection of the blood in a service vessel, which is a matter indispensable to atonement, and about which priesthood is written? As it is written: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), and this is referring to the collection of the blood. And yet we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 15b): If one collected the blood with his left hand, the blood is disqualified for offering, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit, despite the fact that priesthood is mentioned in the verse.

לר' שמעון קאמרת ר"ש תרתי בעי The Gemara responds: You are saying that there is a difficulty according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon requires that both matters appear in the verse, i.e., both finger and priesthood.

ומי בעי רבי שמעון תרתי והתניא ר"ש אומר כל מקום שנאמרה יד אינה אלא ימין אצבע אינה אלא ימין אצבע לא בעיא כהונה כהונ' בעי' אצבע The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon really require both? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: In any place in the Torah in which the word hand is stated, the verse is referring only to the right hand, and whenever a verse mentions the word finger, it is referring only to a finger of the right hand? The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Shimon, if the verse mentions only the word finger, it does not require a mention of the priesthood as well for the limitation to apply. But if the verse mentions only the priesthood, it requires mention of the term finger for the limitation to apply.

אלא כהן למה לי בכהונו The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, if the mention of the priesthood alone does not suffice to disqualify the right hand, then why do I need the superfluous reference to a priest with regard to the collection of the blood? After all, the verse already states that the collection must be performed by the sons of Aaron. The Gemara responds: The additional mention of the priesthood indicates that a priest must perform the collection of the blood in his priestly state, i.e., while wearing the priestly vestments.

או קורט לבונה פסול: כל הני למה לי or a pinch of frankincense emerged in his hand, the meal offering is unfit, as the handful lacks a full measure on account of these items. The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these examples? Any one of them would convey the fact that the handful must contain a full measure.

צריכא דאי תנא צרור משום דלאו בת הקרבה היא אבל מלח דבת הקרבה היא אימא תתכשר The Gemara explains: All of the cases are necessary. Because if the mishna had taught only the example of a stone, it might have been thought that only a stone diminishes the measure of the handful, because it is not fit for sacrifice. But with regard to salt, which is fit for sacrifice, as the priest places salt on the handful before burning it upon the altar, one might say that the handful should be fit, as the salt should not subtract from the handful’s measure.

ואי תנא מלח דלא איקבע בהדי מנחה מעיקרא (שאינו מולח אלא הקומץ בלבד) אבל לבונה דאיקבע בהדי מנחה מעיקרא אימא תתכשר קמ"ל: And if the mishna had taught only the example of salt, it might have been thought that the salt diminishes the handful’s measure as it was not initially fixed together with the entire meal offering. The reason is that the priest salts the handful alone. But with regard to the frankincense, which was initially fixed together with the entire meal offering, i.e., it is placed upon the meal offering before the priest removes a handful from it, one might say that the handful should be fit and the frankincense should not diminish from the handful’s measure. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that in any of these instances the meal offering is unfit.

מפני שאמרו הקומץ החסר או היתר פסול: מאי איריא משום חסר ויתר ותיפוק ליה משום חציצה א"ר ירמיה מן הצד § The mishna teaches that if a stone, or a grain of salt, or a pinch of frankincense emerged in the priest’s hand together with the handful, the meal offering is unfit due to the fact that the Sages said: The handful that is lacking or that is outsized is unfit. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna explain that the offering is not valid specifically because it is lacking or outsized? But let the tanna derive that such a handful is not valid due to the fact that there is an interposition between the priest’s hand and the handful. Rabbi Yirmeya says: Since there are certain instances where these items do not interpose between one’s hand and the handful, e.g., when they are located on the side of the handful, the mishna teaches that they disqualify the handful due to the fact that they reduce its measure.

אמר ליה אביי לרבא כיצד קומצין אמר ליה כדקמצי אינשי איתיביה זו זרת זו קמיצה § Abaye said to Rava: How do the priests properly remove the handful from a meal offering? Rava said to him: They remove it as people normally remove handfuls, by folding all of their fingers over the palm of the hand. Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a baraita discussing the mitzva function of each of the fingers: This small finger is for measuring a span (see Exodus 28:16), i.e., the distance between the thumb and the little finger. This fourth finger is used for removal of a handful from the meal offering, i.e., the measurement of a handful begins from this finger, as the priest removes a handful by folding the middle three fingers over his palm.

זו אמה זו אצבע זו גודל Furthermore, this middle finger is used for measuring a cubit, the distance from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger. This forefinger, next to the thumb, is the finger used to sprinkle the blood of offerings on the altar. And finally, this thumb is the one on which the blood and oil is placed during the purification ritual of a leper (see Leviticus 14:17). Evidently, the little finger is not used in the removal of a handful.

אלא להשוות (כלומר קומץ מלא היד כדי שלא יהא חסר ואחר כך מוחק באצבע קטנה מלמטה) The Gemara responds: The little finger is used only for the purposes of leveling the handful, that is to say, the priest first removes a handful with a full hand, i.e., all of his fingers, so that it should not be lacking in measure, and then he wipes away the protruding flour with his little finger from the bottom, and with his thumb from the top.

היכי עביד אמר רב זוטרא בר טוביה אמר רב חופה שלש אצבעותיו עד שמגיע על פס ידו וקומץ The Gemara asks: How is the removal of the handful performed? Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: When the priest places his hand in the meal offering, he bends his middle three fingers until the tips of his fingers reach over the palm of his hand, and he then removes the handful.

תניא נמי הכי מלא קומצו יכול מבורץ ת"ל בקומצו The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita. From the verse that states: “And he shall remove from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2), one might have thought that the handful should be overflowing. Therefore, another verse states: “And he shall take up from it with his handful [bekumtzo]” (Leviticus 6:8). The prefix that means “with” can also mean: In, indicating that the proper measure of a handful is that which is contained within one’s fingers alone.

אי בקומצו יכול בראשי אצבעותיו ת"ל מלא קומצו הא כיצד חופה שלש אצבעותיו על פס ידו וקומץ The baraita continues: If the measurement of a handful is determined by the term “with his handful,” one might have thought that the priest removes a handful with his fingertips, i.e., that a handful consists of that which the priest removes by folding his fingers onto themselves. Therefore, the verse states: “His handful,” indicating that the handful must be full and not merely that which is contained within his fingers. How so? He scoops by closing his three fingers over the palm of his hand, and in this way takes a handful from the flour of the meal offering.

במחבת ובמרחשת מוחק בגודלו מלמעלה ובאצבעו קטנה מלמטה וזו היא עבודה קשה שבמקדש The baraita continues: In the case of a pan meal offering and that of a deep-pan meal offering, when the flour was fried before being scooped and was therefore hard, the priest wipes away with his thumb any flour that was overflowing above his handful, and with his little finger he wipes away the flour that was pushing out below. And this precise taking of the handful of a meal offering is the most difficult sacrificial rite in the Temple, as the priest must wipe away any protruding elements without removing any flour from the handful itself.

זהו ותו לא והאיכא מליקה והאיכא חפינה אלא זו היא אחת מעבודות קשות שבמקדש The Gemara asks: This one is the hardest sacrificial rite, and no other? But isn’t there pinching the nape of the neck of a bird offering, which is also considered extremely difficult to perform, and isn’t there the scooping of the handful of incense by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, another rite that is extremely difficult to perform? Rather, the baraita means that this taking of the handful of a meal offering is one of the most difficult sacrificial rites in the Temple.

א"ר פפא פשיטא לי מלא קומצו כדקמצי אינשי בעי רב פפא קמץ בראשי אצבעותיו מאי Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me that the term “his handful” means that the removal of the handful from a meal offering should be performed ab initio in the manner that people usually remove a handful, with their fingertips angled to the side. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: What is the halakha if the priest removed a handful with his fingertips, i.e., if he placed his hand horizontally over the meal offering and filled his palm with flour by closing his fingers to his palm? Does this disqualify the taking of the handful or not?

מן הצדדין מאי ממטה למעלה מאי תיקו Similarly, if the priest took a handful from the sides, by passing the back of his hand back and forth over the flour in the vessel so that the flour collected in his palm by way of the side of his palm, what is the halakha? Furthermore, if he took the handful with the back of his hand placed downward in the vessel, and with his fingers he collected the flour upward into his palm, what is the halakha? Are the handfuls removed in this manner fit for sacrifice? The Gemara states: These dilemmas shall standunresolved.

אמר רב פפא פשיטא לי מלא חפניו כדחפני אינשי בעי רב פפא חפן בראשי אצבעותיו מהו מן הצדדין מהו חפן בזו ובזו וקרבן זו אצל זו מהו תיקו Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me that when the Torah states: “His handful” (Leviticus 16:12), in the context of the scooping of handfuls of incense by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, it means in the manner that people usually scoop a handful, by placing the backs of their hands into the vessel and bringing their hands together. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: What is the halakha if the High Priest scooped a handful with his fingertips? What is the halakha if he took a handful from the sides? What is the halakha if he scooped a handful with this hand and with that hand separately and then brought them together? The Gemara states: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב פפא דבקיה לקומץ בדפניה דמנא מאי תוך כלי בעינן והאיכא או דלמא הנחה בתוכו בעינן וליכא תיקו Rav Pappa raises yet another dilemma: If the priest took the handful from the vessel containing the meal offering and stuck the handful onto the side of the second vessel in order to sanctify it, i.e., the handful was not placed directly into the vessel, what is the halakha? Do we require that the handful be inside the vessel, and that is the case here? Or perhaps we require that the handful be placed properly inside the vessel, and that is not the case in this instance. No answer is found, and the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי מר בר רב אשי הפכיה למנא ודבקיה לקומץ בארעיתא דמנא מאי הנחה בתוכו בעינן והאיכא או דלמא כתיקנו בעינן וליכא תיקו: Mar bar Rav Ashi raises a similar dilemma: If the priest overturned the vessel and stuck the handful to the underside of the vessel, in a case where there was an indentation on the underside, what is the halakha? Do we require that the handful be placed inside the vessel, and that requirement is fulfilled here, as the handful is within the indentation? Or perhaps we require that it be placed properly in the vessel, and that is not the case here. The Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מתני׳ כיצד הוא עושה פושט את אצבעותיו על פס ידו ריבה שמנה חסר שמנה חיסר לבונתה פסולה: MISHNA: How does the priest perform the removal of a handful? He extends his fingers onto the palm of his hand. If one increased its oil, decreased its oil, or decreased its frankincense, beyond the appropriate measures, the meal offering is unfit.

גמ׳ היכי דמי ריבה שמנה א"ר אליעזר כגון שהפריש לה שני לוגין ולוקמה כגון דעריב בה שמן דחולין ושמן דחבירתה GEMARA: What are the circumstances of a case where the meal offering is disqualified due to the fact that one increased its oil? Rabbi Eliezer says: The circumstances are a case where he separated two log of oil for the meal offering instead of one log, and mixed them into a tenth of an ephah of flour. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And let Rabbi Eliezer interpret the mishna as referring to a case where he mixed non-sacred oil or the oil of another meal offering into the meal offering.

וכי תימא שמן דחולין ושמן דחבירתה לא פסל מתקיף לה רב זוטרא בר טוביה אלא מעתה מנחת חוטא דפסל בה שמן היכי משכחת לה And if you would say that non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering do not disqualify a meal offering, Rav Zutra bar Toviyya objects to this claim: If that is so, then with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, of which it is stated (59b) that oil disqualifies it, how can you find the circumstances where it is in fact disqualified?

אי דידה הא לית לה אי דחולין ודחבירת' הא אמרת לא פסל (ואי אמרת דאפריש לה שמן כיון דלית לה שמן כלל חולין נינהו) Rav Zutra bar Toviyya elaborates: If you suggest that he mixed its own oil into the flour, such a case does not exist, as the meal offering of a sinner does not have any oil. If he mixed non-sacred oil or that of another meal offering into the flour, the meal offering should not be disqualified, as you said that such oil does not disqualify a meal offering. And if you would say that he designated oil for his meal offering and mixed it into the flour despite the Torah prohibition against mixing oil into it, I say that since the meal offering of a sinner does not have oil at all, any oil that he separates and mixes into it is considered non-sacred, and you have already said that non-sacred oil does not disqualify a meal offering.

ור' אליעזר לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא דחולין ודחבירתה דפסיל אבל הפריש לה שני לוגין הואיל והאי חזי לי' והאי חזי לי' אימא לא ליפסיל קמ"ל The Gemara responds: In fact, non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering do disqualify a meal offering, and Rabbi Eliezer is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to say that non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering disqualify a meal offering. But in a case where one separated two log for his meal offering, since this first log is fit for the meal offering, and that second log is also fit for it, one might say that even when he mixes both log into the meal offering, it should not disqualify the meal offering. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer teaches us that the meal offering is disqualified in this case as well.

ומנא ליה לר' אליעזר הא אמר רבא מתני' קשיתיה מאי איריא דתני ריבה שמנה ליתני ריבה לה שמן אלא הא קמ"ל דאע"ג דהפריש לה שני לוגין: The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this conclusion? Rava said: The terminology of the mishna posed a difficulty for him, as one can ask: Why does the tanna specifically teach that the meal offering is disqualified if he increased its oil, which indicates that he increased it with oil belonging to the offering itself? Let the mishna teach simply: He increased the oil. Rather, this is what the mishna teaches us: That even though he initially separated two log of oil for the meal offering, its own oil disqualifies the offering when there is too much.

חיסר לבונתה: ת"ר חסרה ועמדה על קורט אחד פסולה על שני קרטין כשרה דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר על קורט אחד כשרה פחות מכאן פסולה § The mishna teaches that if one decreased its frankincense beyond its appropriate measure, the meal offering is unfit. Concerning this, the Sages taught in a baraita: If one decreased its frankincense to the point that the amount stood at only one pinch, it is disqualified, but if the decreased amount stood at two pinches, it is fit; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: If the decreased amount stood at one pinch, it is fit; less than that, it is disqualified.

והתניא (ר' שמעון אומר) קומץ ולבונה שחסר כל שהוא פסול תני קורט לבונה שחסר כל שהוא פסול ואיבעית אימא כאן בלבונה הבאה עם המנחה כאן בלבונה הבאה בפני עצמה The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: A handful of flour or frankincense that was decreased by any amount from its full measure is disqualified? The Gemara answers that one should teach the baraita as follows: A pinch of frankincense that was decreased by any amount is disqualified. And if you wish, say instead that here, the first cited statement of Rabbi Shimon, is referring to the case of frankincense that comes with a meal offering, and this frankincense is disqualified only when there is less than a pinch, whereas there, the second statement of Rabbi Shimon, is referring to the case of frankincense that comes by itself. Such frankincense is disqualified if it comprises any less than its full measure.

א"ר יצחק בר יוסף א"ר יוחנן ג' מחלוקת בדבר ר"מ סבר קומץ בתחילה וקומץ בסוף ורבי יהודה סבר קומץ בתחילה ושני קרטין בסוף ור"ש סבר קומץ בתחילה וקורט אחד בסוף Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are three disputes of tanna’im with regard to the matter. Rabbi Meir holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning, and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning, and ultimately at least two pinches from it must be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Shimon holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning and ultimately at least one pinch from it must be burned upon the altar.

ושלשתן מקרא אחד דרשו (ויקרא ו, ח) ואת כל הלבונה אשר על המנחה ר"מ סבר עד דאיתא ללבונה דאיקבעה בהדי מנחה מעיקרא ורבי יהודה סבר כל ואפי' חד קורט את לרבות קורט אחר ור"ש את לא דריש And all three of them interpret a single verse differently. The verse states: “And he shall take up from there his handful, of the fine flour of the meal offering, and of the oil of it, and [ve’et] all the frankincense that is upon the meal offering, and shall make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:8). Rabbi Meir holds that one may not make the offering smoke upon the altar unless there remains the entire measure of frankincense that was initially fixed together with the meal offering. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that when the verse states: “All [kol],” it is referring to any part of the frankincense, even a single pinch, as kol can mean any amount (see II Kings 2:4). And when the verse states: “Et,” this serves to includ-e another pinch. Accordingly, at least two pinches must remain to be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Shimon interprets the word “all” in the same manner as does Rabbi Yehuda, but he does not interpret and derive a halakha from the term “et,” and he therefore holds that only one pinch must remain to be burned.

וא"ר יצחק בר יוסף א"ר יוחנן מחלוקת בלבונה הבאה עם המנחה אבל בלבונה הבאה בפני עצמה ד"ה קומץ בתחילה וקומץ בסוף להכי איצטריך אשר על המנחה דבהדי מנחה אין בפני עצמה לא And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef further says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between these tanna’im is with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering. But with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, agrees that the priest must bring a handful at the beginning, and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. For this reason it was necessary for the verse to state: “That is upon the meal offering,” as this indicates that together with a meal offering, yes, one may burn the frankincense even if there remains only a pinch or two, but with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, one may not burn it if it is in that state.

וא"ר יצחק בר יוסף א"ר יוחנן מחלוקת בלבונה הבאה עם המנחה אבל בלבונה הבאה בבזיכין דברי הכל שני קמצין בתחילה ושני קמצין בסוף And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between these tanna’im is with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering. But with regard to frankincense that comes in bowls together with the shewbread, everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, agrees that there must be two handfuls in the beginning, one handful for each bowl, and ultimately there must also be two handfuls.

פשיטא מהו דתימא כיון דבהדי לחם אתיא כאשר על המנחה דמיא קמ"ל The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the case, as with regard to this halakha the verse does not state the term: All, from which one might derive that it is referring to any part of the frankincense? The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that since the frankincense in the bowls comes together with bread, i.e., the shewbread, it should be considered as: “Frankincense that is upon the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:8), and therefore Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon claim that one may sacrifice it even if less than two handfuls remain. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef teaches us that this is not the case.

פליגי בה רבי אמי ורבי יצחק נפחא חד אמר מחלוקת בלבונה הבאה עם המנחה אבל בלבונה הבאה בפני עצמה דברי הכל קומץ בתחילה וקומץ בסוף וחד אמר כמחלוקת בזו כך מחלוקת בזו: The Gemara notes: Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa disagree with regard to the case of frankincense that comes by itself. One says that the dispute between the tanna’im with regard to whether or not a handful of frankincense that became lacking may be sacrificed upon the altar applies only with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering, but with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, everyone agrees that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. And one says: Just as there is a dispute in this case, so too, there is a dispute in that case.

חיסר לבונתה [פסולה]: הא יתיר כשרה והתניא יתיר פסולה אמר רמי בר חמא כגון שהפריש לה שני קמצין § The mishna teaches that if the priest decreased its frankincense beyond its appropriate measure, the meal offering is unfit. The Gemara infers from this statement that if he increased its frankincense, it is fit. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if he increased its frankincense the meal offering is disqualified? Rami bar Ḥama said: The baraita rules that the meal offering is disqualified in a case where he separated two handfuls of frankincense for the meal offering and placed both of them onto the meal offering.

ואמר רמי בר חמא הפריש לה שני קמצין ואבד אחד מהן קודם קמיצה לא הוקבעו אחר קמיצה הוקבעו And Rami bar Ḥama says: In a case where one separated two handfuls of frankincense for the meal offering and subsequently lost one of them, if it was lost before the removal of the handful of the meal offering, the additional frankincense was not fixed with the meal offering, and therefore it does not disqualify the meal offering. But if this occurred after the removal of the handful of the meal offering, since both handfuls were already fixed with the meal offering, it is disqualified, as he increased its frankincense by a large amount.

ואמר רמי בר חמא הפריש ארבעה קמצין לשני בזיכין ואבדו שנים מהן קודם סילוק בזיכין לא הוקבעו לאחר סילוק בזיכין הוקבעו And Rami bar Ḥama says: In a case where one separated four handfuls of frankincense for placement in the two bowls that accompany the shewbread, and two of them were subsequently lost, the halakha depends on when they were lost. If they were lost before the removal of the bowls from the Table of the shewbread, then the additional frankincense was not yet fixed with the shewbread, and the frankincense remains fit for sacrifice. But if they were lost after the removal of the bowls, then all four handfuls were already fixed with the shewbread, and therefore the frankincense is disqualified.

הא תו למה לי היינו הך The Gemara asks: Why do I also need this? This statement of Rami bar Ḥama is identical to that previous statement, as the burning of the frankincense permits the shewbread for consumption just as the frankincense permits the meal offering for consumption. Consequently, the removal of the bowls of frankincense is comparable to the removal of the handful from a meal offering.

מהו דתימא כיון דבריר קומץ דידה כיון שהגיע זמנה לפורקה כמאן דפריקה דמיא קמ"ל: The Gemara explains: The last statement of Rami bar Ḥama is necessary, lest you say that since the handful of frankincense of the shewbread is already considered designated for burning, as it is placed in a separate bowl and burned in its entirety, then once the time arrives for removing the bowls from upon the Table of the shewbread, it is considered as though the bowls were already removed, and the shewbread should therefore be disqualified on account of the additional frankincense. Therefore, Rami bar Ḥama teaches us that the additional handfuls disqualify the shewbread only if they were inside the bowls at the time of their actual removal from the Table.

מתני׳ הקומץ את המנחה לאכול שיריה בחוץ או כזית משיריה בחוץ להקטיר קומצה בחוץ או כזית קומצה בחוץ או להקטיר לבונתה בחוץ פסול ואין בו כרת לאכול שיריה למחר או כזית משיריה למחר להקטיר קומצה למחר או כזית מקומצה למחר או להקטיר לבונה למחר MISHNA: With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard, to burn its handful outside the Temple courtyard or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful outside the Temple courtyard, or to burn its frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, in all these cases the offering is unfit, but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of it. If one had the intent to partake of its remainder on the next day or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder on the next day, to burn its handful on the next day or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful on the next day, or to burn its frankincense on the next day,

פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת the offering is piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the remainder of that meal offering.

זה הכלל כל הקומץ [או] נותן בכלי המוליך המקטיר לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול ולהקטיר דבר שדרכו להקטיר חוץ למקומו פסול ואין בו כרת חוץ לזמנו פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת ובלבד שיקריב המתיר כמצותו This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the remainder, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, e.g., the handful or the frankincense, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it, provided that the permitting factor, i.e., the handful, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. If the permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, although the meal offering is unfit, the prohibition of piggul does not apply to it.

כיצד קרב המתיר כמצותו קמץ בשתיקה נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ לזמנו או שקמץ חוץ לזמנו נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר בשתיקה או שקמץ ונתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ לזמנו זהו שקרב המתיר כמצותו How is the permitting factor considered to have been sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful in silence, i.e., with no specific intent, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar in silence, with no specific intent; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of it due to piggul.

כיצד לא קרב המתיר כמצותו קמץ חוץ למקומו נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ לזמנו או שקמץ חוץ לזמנו נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ למקומו או שקמץ נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ למקומו זהו שלא קרב המתיר כמצותו How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense outside its designated area, or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

מנחת חוטא ומנחת קנאות שקמצן שלא לשמן נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר חוץ לזמנו או שקמץ חוץ לזמנו נתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר שלא לשמן או שקמץ ונתן בכלי והוליך והקטיר שלא לשמן זהו שלא קרב המתיר כמצותו The meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a sota that one removed their handful not for their sake and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time; or that one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake; or that one removed the handful, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

לאכול כזית בחוץ כזית למחר כזית למחר כזית בחוץ כחצי זית בחוץ כחצי זית למחר כחצי זית למחר כחצי זית בחוץ פסול ואין בו כרת If one performed one of these rites with the intent to partake of an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet.

א"ר יהודה זה הכלל אם מחשבת הזמן קדמה למחשבת המקום פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת אם מחשבת המקום קדמה למחשבת הזמן פסול ואין בו כרת וחכמי' אומרים זה וזה פסול ואין בו כרת: Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it. If the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. And the Rabbis say: In both this case, where the intent with regard to time was first, and that case, where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet.

גמ׳ איבעיא להו לדברי האומר שירים שחסרו בין קמיצה להקטרה מקטיר קומץ עליהן וקיימא לן דאותן שירים אסורים באכילה מהו דתיהני להו הקטרה למיקבעינהו בפיגול GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says that if the remainder of a meal offering became lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning of the handful on the altar the priest nevertheless burns the handful on account of such a meal offering, and as we maintain that despite the fact that the handful is burned on account of it that remainder is prohibited for consumption, what is the halakha with regard to piggul? Should the burning of the handful be effective in establishing such a remainder as piggul when the handful was burned with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day?

ולפקינהו מידי מעילה And similarly, is the burning of the handful effective in removing such a remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, just as a complete remainder is removed being subject to this prohibition after the burning of the handful, when it becomes permitted to the priests for consumption?

אמר רב הונא אפילו לר"ע דאמר זריקה מועלת ליוצא ה"מ יוצא Rav Huna said: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that the sprinkling of the blood of an offering, which renders its meat permitted for consumption and removes it from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, is effective in removing the meat of an offering that left the Temple courtyard from being subject to misuse of consecrated property despite the fact that such meat is prohibited for consumption, that statement applies only when the meat was disqualified by means of leaving.

דאיתיה בעיניה ופסול מחמת דבר אחר הוא אבל חסרון דפסולא דגופיה הוא לא מהני ליה הקטרה Rav Huna explains: The reason is that the meat remains as is, and the disqualification of the meat by means of leaving is on account of something else, i.e., a factor external to the meat itself. But in the case of a lack in the measure of the remainder of a meal offering, which is a disqualification on account of itself, the burning of the handful is not effective in removing the remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, nor to establish it as piggul.

אמר ליה רבא אדרבה אפי' לר"א דאמר אין זריקה מועלת ליוצא ה"מ יוצא דליתיה בפנים אבל חסרון דאיתיה בפנים מהניא ליה הקטרה Rava said to Rav Huna: On the contrary; even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that sprinkling is not effective in removing the meat that left the Temple courtyard from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, that statement applies only when the meat was disqualified by means of leaving, as the meat is not inside the Temple courtyard where the sprinkling could be effective for it. But with regard to a lack in the measure of the remainder of a meal offering that is inside the Temple courtyard, the burning of the handful is effective in removing the remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property as well as in establishing it as piggul.

אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דתנן הקומץ את המנחה לאכול שיריה בחוץ או כזית משיריה בחוץ ותני רבי חייא הקומץ את המנחה ולא תני או כזית Rava said: From where do I say that even remainders that lack a full measure can be rendered piggul? This can be inferred from that which we learned in the mishna: With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet, and if he removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder beyond the designated time or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder beyond the designated time the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the remainder of that meal offering. And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in his version of the mishna: One who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder, and he does not teach: Or an olive-bulk of its remainder.

מ"ט לא תני או כזית לאו כגון שחסרו שירים וקמו להו אכזית וכיון דבמתן כלי בהילוך ובהקטרה לא מתני ליה Rava continues: What is the reason that Rabbi Ḥiyya diverged from the standard text of the mishna and did not teach: Or an olive-bulk? Is it not because his mishna is discussing a case where the remainder later became lacking and its measure stood at an olive-bulk? And therefore Rabbi Ḥiyya did not include the clause: Or an olive-bulk, since later in the mishna, with regard to the placement of the handful in a vessel, and with regard to the conveyance of the vessel to the altar, and with regard to the burning of the handful, he could not teach the phrase:

הא תו למה לי אי לאכול ולאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול קמ"ל דמצטרף מרישא (דסיפא) שמעת מינה (דקתני כחצי זית בחוץ כחצי זית למחר פסול הא כחצי זית למחר וכחצי זית למחר פיגול) According to Abaye, why do I also need this mishna here? If you will suggest that this mishna is necessary, as one can infer from it that if one intended to partake of half an olive-bulk the next day and then intended to partake of another half an olive-bulk the next day, both from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, the mishna teaches us that they join together in order to render the offering piggul, this suggestion can be rejected: But you already learn the halakha in this case from the first clause of the latter clause of the previous mishna, as it teaches: Half an olive-bulk outside and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is unfit. One can infer from this that if his intent was to consume half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk the next day, it is piggul.

אי לאכול ולהקטיר (דהיא גופא קמ"ל) מדיוקא דרישא שמעת מינה If you suggest that the mishna is necessary for a case where one intended to consume and to burn, i.e., that the mishna teaches us the matter itself, that intent to consume does not join together with intent to burn, this too cannot be. The reason is that from the inference of the first clause of the mishna you can already learn the halakha in this case, as it teaches: If one intended to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, the offering is rendered piggul. This indicates that if his intent was to consume an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, the offering is not rendered piggul.

דהשתא מה לאכול ולאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול אמרת לא מצטרף לאכול ולהקטיר מיבעיא The Gemara explains how the halakha that intent to consume and burn do not combine can be inferred from the mishna: Now consider, if when one intended to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, you say that his intentions do not join together, despite the fact that both of his intentions referred to consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together?

אין לאכול ולהקטיר איצטריכא ליה ס"ד אמינא התם הוא דלא כי אורחיה קמחשב The Gemara responds: Yes; although the mishna teaches the halakha of a case where one intended to consume an item typically consumed and to consume an item typically not consumed, it was necessary for the mishna to teach the halakha of a case where one intended to eat and to burn. As it might enter your mind to say that there, where one’s intentions referred solely to consumption, the halakha is that his intentions do not join together, as he intended to act not in accordance with its typical manner, since he intended to consume that which is not meant to be consumed.

אבל הכא דבהאי כי אורחיה קמחשב ובהאי כי אורחיה קא מחשב אימא לצטרף קמ"ל: The Gemara continues: But here, where his intent was to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk, where with regard to this half he intends in accordance with its typical manner, and with regard to this half he intends in accordance with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together, despite the fact that each intention concerns only half an olive-bulk. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that such intentions do not join together, and the mishna can be explained even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

מתני׳ הקומץ את המנחה לאכול שיריה או להקטיר קומצה למחר מודה רבי יוסי בזה שהוא פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת להקטיר לבונתה למחר רבי יוסי אומר פסול ואין בו כרת וחכ"א פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת MISHNA: In the case of a priest who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance that it is a case of piggul and he is liable to receive karet for partaking of it. But if the priest’s intent was to burn its frankincense the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: The meal offering is unfit but partaking of it does not include liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: It is a case of piggul and he is liable to receive karet for partaking of the meal offering.

אמרו לו מה שינה זה מן הזבח אמר להן שהזבח דמו ובשרו ואימוריו אחד ולבונה אינה מן המנחה: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: In what manner does this differ from an animal offering, where if one slaughtered it with the intent to sacrifice the portions consumed on the altar the next day, it is piggul? Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: There is a difference, as in the case of an animal offering, its blood, and its flesh, and its portions consumed on the altar are all one entity. Consequently, intent with regard to any one of them renders the entire offering piggul. But the frankincense is not part of the meal offering.

גמ׳ למה לי למיתנא מודה רבי יוסי בזו GEMARA: The Gemara questions the terminology of the mishna: Why do I need the tanna to teach that Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance? Let the tanna simply state: If one removes the handful from a meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn the handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the remainder.

משום דקא בעי למיתנא סיפא להקטיר לבונתה למחר ר' יוסי אומר פסול ואין בו כרת The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the tanna to teach that Rabbi Yosei concedes, because he wants to teach the latter clause of the mishna, that if his intent was to burn its frankincense the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the meal offering is unfit, but partaking of it does not include liability to receive karet.

מהו דתימא טעמא דר' יוסי משום דקסבר אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר ואפי' רישא נמי The Gemara elaborates: The reason the tanna links the two cases of the mishna is lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Yosei does not render the meal offering piggul is because he holds that one cannot render an offering piggul with intent that concerns only half of its permitting factors. And consequently, since the burning of the handful and the frankincense render the remainder of a meal offering permitted for consumption, then even in the first clause of the mishna, where one intends to burn the handful the next day, Rabbi Yosei should hold that the offering is not rendered piggul, as the intent does not refer to the frankincense as well.

קמ"ל דבהא מודה: Therefore, the tanna teaches us that in this case Rabbi Yosei concedes that if the handful is removed with the intent to burn only the handful on the next day, the offering is rendered piggul. Accordingly, Rabbi Yosei holds that one renders an offering piggul with intent that concerns only half of its permitting factors, and the offering is not rendered piggul in the case of the latter clause for a different reason, as the Gemara will discuss later.

להקטיר לבונתה למחר רבי יוסי אומר פסול ואין בו כרת: אמר ר"ל אומר היה ר' יוסי אין מתיר מפגל את המתיר § The mishna teaches that if one removed the handful from a meal offering with the intent to burn its frankincense on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the meal offering is unfit but partaking of it does not include liability to receive karet. Concerning this, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Yosei would say, i.e., this is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning: A permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul. In other words, if, while performing the rites of a permitting factor, one had intent to perform the rites of a different permitting factor outside its designated time, the offering is not rendered piggul on account of this intent.

וכן אתה אומר בשני בזיכי לבונה של לחם הפנים שאין מתיר מפגל את המתיר Reish Lakish adds: And you would say the same with regard to the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread, that a permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul, and therefore if the priest burned one of the bowls with the intent to burn the other bowl the next day, the shewbread is not rendered piggul.

מאי וכן אתה אומר מהו דתימא טעמא דרבי יוסי בלבונה משום דלאו מינה דמנחה היא אבל בשני בזיכי לבונה דמינה דהדדי נינהו אימא מפגלי אהדדי קמ"ל The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of the apparently superfluous statement: And you would say the same with regard to the two bowls of frankincense? Is there reason to assume that Rabbi Yosei would hold that the shewbread is rendered piggul in such a case? The Gemara responds that it is necessary, lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no piggul in the case of the frankincense is because it is not of the same type as a meal offering. But with regard to the two bowls of frankincense, which are of the same type as each other, one might say that they do render one another piggul. Therefore, Reish Lakish teaches us that in both instances one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul.

ומי מצית אמרת טעמא דר' יוסי בלבונה לאו משום דלאו מינה דמנחה היא והא קתני סיפא אמרו לו מה שינתה מן הזבח אמר להן הזבח דמו ובשרו ואימוריו אחד ולבונה אינה מן המנחה The Gemara asks: And can you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the case of the frankincense in the mishna is not due to the fact that the frankincense is not of the same type as a meal offering? But isn’t it taught in the latter clause of the mishna that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: In what manner does the frankincense differ from an animal offering, where if one slaughtered it with the intent to sacrifice the portions consumed on the altar the next day it is piggul; and Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: There is a difference, as in the case of an animal offering, its blood, and its flesh, and its portions consumed on the altar are all one entity, but the frankincense is not part of the meal offering? The mishna indicates that according to Rabbi Yosei the reason the meal offering is not piggul is because the frankincense is not of the same type as the meal offering.

מאי אינה מן המנחה אינה בעיכוב מנחה דלאו כי היכי דמעכב להו קומץ לשירים דכמה דלאו מתקטר קומץ לא מיתאכלי שירים ה"נ מעכב לה ללבונה אלא אי בעי האי מקטר ברישא ואי בעי האי מקטר ברישא The Gemara explains: What does Rabbi Yosei mean when he says that the frankincense is not part of the meal offering? He means that it is not part of the preclusion of the meal offering. The Gemara elaborates: This means that the halakha is not that just as the handful precludes the remainder, i.e., that as long as the handful is not burned the remainder may not be consumed, so too the handful precludes the frankincense from being burned upon the altar. Rather, if the priest wants, he burns this first, and if he wants, he burns that first, i.e., he may burn the frankincense before or after the burning of the handful. Accordingly, the frankincense is an independent permitting factor. For this reason, intent with regard to the frankincense that occurred during the removal of the handful does not render a meal offering piggul.

ורבנן כי אמרינן אין מתיר מפגל את המתיר (גבי שחט אחד מן הכבשים לאכול מחבירו למחר דאמרת שניהם כשרים) ה"מ היכא דלא איקבעו בחד מנא אבל היכא דאיקבעו בחד מנא כחד דמי The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who say that the meal offering is rendered piggul in such a case, what is their opinion? The Gemara responds: They hold that when we say that a permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul, this is with regard to the case taught in a mishna (16a) concerning one who slaughtered one of the lambs whose sacrifice permits the consumption of the two loaves meal offering brought on Shavuot, with the intent to partake of the other lamb the next day. The Gemara elaborates: When you said in the mishna that both permitting factors are fit, this statement applies only where they were not fixed in one vessel. But in a situation where they were fixed in one vessel, as is the case with regard to the handful and the frankincense, they are considered like one unit, and therefore they render one another piggul.

א"ר ינאי ליקוט לבונה בזר פסול מ"ט א"ר ירמיה משום הולכה נגעו בה קסבר הולכה שלא ברגל שמה הולכה והולכה בזר פסולה § With regard to the frankincense, Rabbi Yannai says: The collection of the frankincense from a meal offering, when performed by a non-priest, is not valid and disqualifies the meal offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is because the rite of conveying has touched it, i.e., the collection of the frankincense is considered part of the rite of the conveying of the frankincense to the altar for the purpose of burning. Even if the non-priest simply collected the frankincense and thereafter transferred it to a priest, Rabbi Yannai holds that conveying even without moving one’s leg is called conveying, and the halakha is that the performance of the rite of conveying by a non-priest is not valid.

אמר רב מרי אף אנן נמי תנינא זה הכלל כל הקומץ ונותן בכלי והמוליך והמקטיר Rav Mari said: We learn this halakha in the mishna on 12a, which discusses those sacrificial rites of a meal offering during which improper intent renders an offering piggul, as well. The mishna teaches: This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to perform any of these actions beyond their designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it, provided that the permitting factor, i.e., the handful, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

בשלמא קומץ היינו שוחט מוליך נמי היינו מוליך מקטיר היינו זורק אלא נותן בכלי מאי קא עביד Rav Mari analyzes the first part of this mishna: Granted, the removal of the handful from a meal offering is the same as, i.e., equivalent to, the slaughter of animal offerings. The conveying of the handful to the altar in order to burn it is also the same as the conveying of the blood of a slaughtered offering to the altar in order to sprinkle it. Similarly, the burning of the handful and frankincense of a meal offering is comparable to the sprinkling of the blood of a slaughtered offering upon the altar. But as for placing the handful in the service vessel, what rite is he performing that is comparable to a rite of slaughtered offerings?

אילימא משום דדמי לקבלה מי דמי התם ממילא הכא קא שקיל ורמי If we say that the meal offering is piggul because the placing of the handful into a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood of a slaughtered offering into a service vessel, one can ask: Are these rites in fact comparable? There, in the case of animal offerings, the blood enters the vessel by itself, whereas here, the priest takes the handful from the meal offering and casts it into the vessel.

אלא משום דכיון דלא סגיא ליה דלא עבד לה עבודה חשובה היא על כרחיך משוי לה כקבלה ה"נ כיון דלא סגיא לה דלא עבד לה עבודה חשובה היא על כרחיך משוי לה כי הולכה Rather, it must be due to the following reason: Since it is not possible to sacrifice the handful without first performing the act of placing it in a vessel, the placement of the handful in a vessel is considered a significant rite, and perforce this factor causes it to be considered like the collection of the blood. Here too, with regard to the collection of the frankincense, since it is not possible to sacrifice the frankincense without first performing the act of collecting it from the vessel, the collection of the frankincense is a significant rite that perforce causes it to be considered like the rite of conveying.

לא לעולם דדמי לקבלה ודקא קשיא לך התם ממילא הכא קא שקיל ורמי The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is not the reason, and one cannot prove from the mishna that the collection of the frankincense from a meal offering performed by a non-priest is not valid. Actually, the reason why intent during the placement of the handful renders the offering piggul is in fact because it is comparable to the collection of the blood of a slaughtered offering. And as for the difficulty you raised, that there the blood enters the vessel by itself, whereas here he takes the handful from the meal offering and casts it into the vessel, this is not a true difficulty.

מכדי תרוייהו קדושת כלי הוא מה לי ממילא מה לי קא שקיל ורמי: The Gemara explains: Now consider, both of them, i.e., the collection of the blood and the placing of the handful, involve the sanctity of a vessel, in which a service vessel sanctifies a permitting factor to the altar, either the handful or the blood. What difference is it to me if the permitting factor enters the vessel by itself or whether one takes the item and casts it into the vessel?

מתני׳ שחט שני כבשים לאכול אחת מן החלות למחר הקטיר שני בזיכין לאכול אחד מן הסדרים למחר רבי יוסי אומר אותו החלה ואותו הסדר שחישב עליו פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת והשני פסול ואין בו כרת וחכמים אומרים זה וזה פיגול וחייבין עליו כרת: MISHNA: If one slaughtered the two lambs that accompany the two meal offering loaves sacrificed on Shavuot with the intent to partake of one of the two loaves the next day, or if one burned the two bowls of frankincense accompanying the shewbread with the intent to partake of one of the arrangements of the shewbread the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: That loaf and that arrangement of which he intended to partake the next day are piggul and one is liable to receive karet for their consumption, and the second loaf and arrangement are unfit, but there is no liability to receive karet for their consumption. And the Rabbis say: This loaf and arrangement and that loaf and arrangement are both piggul and one is liable to receive karet for their consumption.

גמ׳ אמר רב הונא אומר היה רבי יוסי פיגל בירך של ימין לא נתפגל הירך של שמאל מאי טעמא איבעית אימא סברא ואיבעית אימא קרא GEMARA: Rav Huna says: Rabbi Yosei would say, in accordance with his opinion that intent of piggul with regard to one loaf or one arrangement does not render the second loaf or arrangement piggul, that if one had intent of piggul with regard to the right thigh, i.e., he slaughtered an offering with the intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, then the left thigh has not become piggul and one is not liable to receive karet for its consumption. What is the reason for this? If you wish, propose a logical argument, and if you wish, cite a verse.

איבעית אימא סברא לא עדיפא מחשבה ממעשה הטומאה אילו איטמי חד אבר מי איטמי ליה כוליה ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ז, יח) והנפש האוכלת ממנו עונה תשא ממנו ולא מחבירו Rav Huna elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Disqualifying intent is no stronger than an incident of ritual impurity, and if one limb of an offering became impure, did the entire offering then become impure? Accordingly, one limb can be rendered piggul without the other. And if you wish, cite a verse that addresses piggul: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The verse indicates that one who eats specifically “of it,” i.e., from one part, shall bear his iniquity, and not one who eats from the other part of the offering.

איתיביה רב נחמן לרב הונא (וחכמים אומרים) לעולם אין בו כרת עד שיפגל בשתיהן בכזית בשתיהן אין באחת מהן לא Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: And the Rabbis say that there is never liability to receive karet for partaking of the two loaves unless one has intent of piggul with regard to an olive-bulk of both of them, i.e., one’s intent renders both loaves piggul only if he slaughters the lambs with the intent to consume an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both loaves combined outside their proper time. One can infer from this that if he had intent with regard to both of them, yes, both loaves are piggul. But if his intent was with regard to only one of them, no, the other loaf is not piggul.

מני אילימא רבנן אפילו באחת מהן נמי אלא פשיטא רבי יוסי אי אמרת בשלמא חד גופא הוא מש"ה מצטרף Rav Naḥman continues: In accordance with whose opinion is the baraita? If we say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna, then even if his intent was with regard to only one of them, both loaves are rendered piggul. Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Now, granted, if you say that according to Rabbi Yosei the left and right thighs of an offering are considered one body, and consequently piggul intent with regard to one thigh renders the other thigh piggul as well, then due to that reason it is understandable that if the piggul intent was for an amount equal to one total olive-bulk from both of the loaves, then the intent with regard to each loaf is combined with the other.

אלא אי אמרת תרי גופי נינהו מי מיצטרפי But if you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs of an offering are considered two distinct bodies, and therefore piggul intent with regard to one does not render the other piggul, then in the case of the two loaves, would the intentions concerning both loaves combine to render them both piggul?

הא מני רבי היא דתניא השוחט את הכבש לאכול חצי זית מחלה זו וכן חבירו לאכול חצי זית מחלה זו רבי אומר אומר אני שזה כשר Rav Huna responds: One cannot infer anything from this baraita with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who slaughters one of the lambs brought as peace offerings on Shavuot with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from this loaf the next day, and similarly, he slaughtered the other lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from that second loaf the next day, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that this offering is valid, as his intentions do not combine.

טעמא דאמר חצי חצי אבל אמר כזית משתיהן מצטרף Rav Huna continues: It may be inferred that the reason why the priest’s intentions do not combine is that his intent was said with regard to a half and a half, i.e., he slaughtered each lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from one loaf the next day. But if he said during the slaughter of each of the lambs that he is slaughtering it with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from both of them, then the halves combine to render the offering piggul.

ורבי אליבא דמאן אי אליבא דרבנן אפי' באחת מהן נמי אי אליבא דר' יוסי הדרא קושיין לדוכתיה The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that the two loaves are piggul only if he has intent with regard to an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both of them combined, in accordance with whose opinion is his statement? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna, who hold that piggul intent with regard to one loaf renders both loaves piggul, then even if his intent was with regard to only one of them, both loaves should be piggul. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that piggul intent with regard to one loaf does not render the second loaf piggul, then our difficulty returns to its place: If Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs are considered two distinct bodies, how can intentions with regard to two halves of an olive-bulk combine to render both loaves piggul?

לעולם אליבא דרבנן ולא תימא עד שיפגל בשתיהן אלא [אימא עד שיפגל] בשניהן ואפילו באחת מהן The Gemara responds: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that the baraita states: It is not piggul unless one has the intent of piggul with regard to both of them [bishteihen], in the feminine form, whereby the baraita would be referring to the loaves. Rather, the baraita states: With regard to both of them [bishneihen], in the masculine form, i.e., unless he slaughters both lambs with piggul intent, and in such a case, even if his intent was with regard to only one of the loaves, the offering is piggul.

ולאפוקי מדר' מאיר דאמר מפגלין בחצי מתיר קמ"ל דלא The Gemara adds: And this baraita serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna on 16a: One renders an offering piggul by means of intent during the sacrifice of half a permitting factor, e.g., if one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to consume the two loaves the next day, the loaves are piggul. This baraita teaches us that this is not the halakha.

אי הכי מאי לעולם אי אמרת בשלמא בשתיהן ובשניהן ורבי יוסי היא ולאפוקי מדר"מ ומדרבנן קאתי היינו דקאמר לעולם The Gemara asks: If so, then what is the meaning of the emphasis in the baraita: There is never liability? Granted, this phrase is understandable if you say that the baraita means that the loaves are not piggul unless he has intent with regard to both of the loaves and both of the lambs, i.e., they are piggul only if he slaughters both lambs with the intention to partake of both loaves the next day. In that case the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it comes to exclude the statements of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, and this is the reason that the baraita states: There is never liability, to emphasize that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with both of these opinions.

אלא אי אמרת רבנן ולאפוקי מדר"מ מאי לעולם But if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and that it serves to exclude only the opinion of Rabbi Meir, for what reason does the baraita stress: There is never liability? The tanna would not use such a word to exclude merely one opinion. Rather, it must be that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. If so, then the difficulty raised against Rav Huna, who says that piggul intent concerning the right thigh does not render the left one piggul, remains unresolved.

ועוד הא אמר רב אשי ת"ש רבי אומר משום רבי יוסי פיגל בדבר הנעשה בחוץ פיגל בדבר הנעשה בפנים לא פיגל And furthermore, didn’t Rav Ashi say: Come and hear a refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says in the name of Rabbi Yosei that if, while performing the sacrificial rites for the bulls or goats which are burned as an offering, the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul with regard to a matter that is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, he has rendered the offering piggul. If his intention was with regard to a matter that is performed inside the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, he has not rendered the offering piggul.

כיצד היה עומד בחוץ ואמר הריני שוחט ע"מ להזות מדמו למחר לא פיגל שמחשבה בחוץ בדבר הנעשה בפנים היה עומד בפנים ואמר הריני מזה ע"מ להקטיר אימורין למחר ולשפוך שיריים למחר לא פיגל שמחשבה בפנים בדבר הנעשה בחוץ The baraita elaborates: How so? If he was standing outside when slaughtering the animal and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of sprinkling its blood tomorrow inside the Sanctuary, he has not rendered the offering piggul. The reason is that when one has an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside, he has not rendered the offering piggul. Likewise, if he was standing inside when sprinkling, and said: I hereby sprinkle the blood of the sin offering in order to burn its sacrificial portions on the external altar tomorrow and to pour out its remainder on the base of the altar tomorrow, he has not rendered the offering piggul, as he had an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.

היה עומד בחוץ ואמר הריני שוחט ע"מ לשפוך שיריים למחר ולהקטיר אימורין למחר פיגל שמחשבה בחוץ בדבר הנעשה בחוץ But if he was standing outside and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention to pour out the remainder of its blood tomorrow, or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered the offering piggul, as he had an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.

לשפוך שיריים לאיפגולי מאי אילימא לאיפגולי דם דם מי מיפגל והתנן אלו דברים שאין חייבין עליהן משום פיגול הקומץ והלבונה והקטורת ומנחת כהנים ומנחת נסכים ומנחת כהן משיח והדם The Gemara analyzes this baraita: With regard to the case where one slaughtered the offering with the intent to pour the remaining blood the next day, what could be rendered piggul? If we say the blood could be rendered piggul, one can ask: Does blood become piggul? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Zevaḥim 42b): These are the items for which one is not liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul: The handful; the frankincense; the incense; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering accompanying the libations brought with an animal offering; the meal offering of the anointed priest; and the blood?

אלא פשיטא לאפגולי בשר השתא ומה התם דלא חשיב ביה בבשר גופיה א"ר יוסי מיפגל הכא דחשיב ביה בזבח גופיה לא כ"ש דפיגל בירך ימין פיגל בירך שמאל Rather, it is obvious that the baraita means that it is the meat of the offering that could be rendered piggul. Now consider: And if there, in the baraita, where he did not have intent with regard to the meat itself, as his intention was not to partake of the meat the next day but to pour the remaining blood the next day, and yet Rabbi Yosei said that the meat is rendered piggul; then here, where he has intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, which is part of the offering itself, is it not all the more so that if he had intent of piggul with regard to the right thigh, he has rendered the left thigh piggul as well?

ועוד האמר רבינא תא שמע הקומץ את המנחה לאכול שיריה או להקטיר קומצה למחר מודה רבי יוסי בזו שפיגל וחייבין עליו כרת And furthermore, doesn’t Ravina say: Come and hear a refutation of the statement of Rav Huna from the mishna (13a): In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance that he has rendered the offering piggul and he is liable to receive karet for partaking of it.

להקטיר קומצה לאיפגולי מאי אילימא לאיפגולי קומץ קומץ מי מיפגל והתנן אלו דברים שאין חייבין עליהן משום פיגול הקומץ כו' אלא פשיטא לאיפגולי שיריים השתא ומה התם דלא חשיב בהו בשיריים גופיה Ravina continues: When one removes the handful with the intent to burn its handful, what could be rendered piggul? If we say that the handful could be rendered piggul, does the handful become piggul? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Zevaḥim 42b): These are the items for which one is not liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul: The handful, etc. Rather, it is obvious that the remainder could be rendered piggul. Now consider: And if there, in the mishna, where he did not have intent with regard to the remainder itself, i.e., to partake of the remainder the next day,

רבנן סברי הציץ מרצה על אכילות ורבי יהודה סבר אין הציץ מרצה על אכילות The Rabbis hold that the frontplate effects acceptance for items that are normally consumed by the priests but have become ritually impure. Consequently, the sprinkling of the blood in this case is an entirely valid act that is capable of rendering the remaining pure loaf permitted for consumption. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the frontplate does not effect acceptance for items that are consumed by the priests and have become impure. Accordingly, the sprinkling of the blood is ineffective in rendering the remaining pure loaf permitted for consumption.

א"ל רב הונא בריה דרב נתן לרב פפא והא עולין דהציץ מרצה על העולין ופליגי Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: Can this be the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis? But what about items that normally ascend upon the altar? Even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the frontplate effects acceptance for impure items that normally ascend the altar, and Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis nevertheless disagree with regard to the remaining item in a case of this kind.

דתניא נטמא אחד מן הבזיכין רבי יהודה אומר שניהם יעשו בטומאה לפי שאין קרבן ציבור חלוק וחכמים אומרים הטמא בטומאתו והטהור בטהרתו The Gemara provides the source for this claim. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the bowls of frankincense accompanying the shewbread, which are meant to be burned upon the altar, became impure, Rabbi Yehuda says that the rites of both of them may be performed in impurity, i.e., the priest may even render the second bowl impure and burn both of them together, as no communal offering is divided, and the mitzva to sacrifice communal offerings overrides the prohibition against rendering them impure. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its state of impurity and the pure one remains in its state of purity. Evidently, their dispute does not depend on whether the frontplate effects acceptance.

ועוד אמר רב אשי ת"ש ר' יהודה אומר אפילו שבט אחד טמא וכל השבטים טהורין יעשו בטומאה לפי שאין קרבנות ציבור חלוק והכא מאי הציץ מרצה איכא And furthermore, Rav Ashi said: Come and hear an additional proof that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis does not concern the frontplate, as we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 80a) with regard to the consumption of the Paschal offering in a state of impurity, that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one tribe is ritually impure and all the rest of the tribes are pure, all the tribes may perform the rite of the Paschal offering in a state of impurity, as no communal offerings are divided. Rav Ashi explains: But here, what relevance is there to the question of whether the frontplate effects acceptance? The frontplate effects acceptance for offerings that have become impure; but it does not render it permitted for one who is ritually impure to sacrifice an offering.

ועוד האמר רבינא ת"ש נטמאת אחת מן החלות או אחת מן הסדרין רבי יהודה אומר שניהם יצאו לבית השריפה לפי שאין קרבן ציבור חלוק וחכמים אומרים הטמא בטומאתו והטהור יאכל And furthermore, doesn’t Ravina say: Come and hear a proof that the matter of the frontplate cannot be the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, as the mishna teaches: If one of the two loaves brought on Shavuot or one of the two arrangements of shewbread became ritually impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both must be taken to the place of burning, as no communal offering is divided. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its impurity and the pure one may be eaten.

ואם איתא לפי שאין הציץ מרצה על אכילות מיבעי ליה אלא א"ר יוחנן למוד ערוך הוא בפיו של רבי יהודה שאין קרבן ציבור חלוק: The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the dispute between them concerns the frontplate, then Rabbi Yehuda should have said: They are both burned, because the frontplate does not effect acceptance for impure items that are consumed by the priests. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is a settled tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yehuda that no communal offering is divided, and if one part of an offering becomes impure, the entire offering is disqualified.

מתני׳ התודה מפגלת את הלחם והלחם אינו מפגל את התודה כיצד שחט את התודה לאכול ממנה למחר היא והלחם מפוגלין לאכול מן הלחם למחר הלחם מפוגל והתודה אינה מפוגלת MISHNA: The thanks offering renders the accompanying loaves piggul but the loaves do not render the thanks offering piggul. How so? If one slaughtered the thanks offering, which may be consumed only during the day it is slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and the accompanying loaves are rendered piggul. If he slaughtered it with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered piggul and the thanks offering is not piggul.

הכבשים מפגלין את הלחם והלחם אינו מפגל את הכבשים כיצד השוחט את הכבשים לאכול מהן למחר הם והלחם מפוגלין לאכול את הלחם למחר הלחם מפוגל והכבשים אינן מפוגלין: Likewise, the lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on Shavuot render the accompanying loaves piggul, but the loaves do not render the lambs piggul. How so? If one slaughtered the lambs, which may be consumed only during the day they are slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of them the next day, the lambs and the accompanying loaves are rendered piggul. If he did so with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered piggul and the lambs are not piggul.

גמ׳ מ"ט אילימא משום דרב כהנא דאמר רב כהנא מנין ללחמי תודה שנקראו תודה שנאמר (ויקרא ז, יב) והקריב על זבח התודה חלות GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a thanks offering renders its accompanying loaves piggul? If we say that it is due to that which Rav Kahana says, this is problematic. As Rav Kahana says: From where is it derived that the loaves of a thanks offering are themselves called a thanks offering? It is derived from that which is stated in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering loaves” (Leviticus 7:12). The juxtaposition of the words “thanks offering” and “loaves” indicates that the loaves are themselves called a thanks offering.

אי הכי איפכא נמי הא לא קשיא לחם איקרי תודה תודה לא איקרי לחם The Gemara explains why the halakha of the mishna cannot be derived from Rav Kahana’s exposition. If so, then the opposite should be the halakha as well, that intent of piggul with regard to the loaves should likewise render the thanks offering piggul. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not difficult, as the loaves are called a thanks offering, but a thanks offering is not called loaves.

אלא הא דקתני הכבשים מפגלין את הלחם והלחם אינו מפגל את הכבשים לחם היכא אשכחן דאיקרי כבשים אלא (לאו) היינו טעמא לחם גלל תודה ואין תודה גלל דלחם לחם גלל דכבשים ואין כבשים גלל דלחם The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which the mishna teaches: The lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on Shavuot render the accompanying loaves piggul but the loaves do not render the lambs piggul, where do we find that the two loaves are called lambs? Rather, is it not correct that this is the reason why the thanks offering renders the loaves piggul but not vice versa: The bread is brought on account of [gelal] the thanks offering, but the thanks offering is not brought on account of the bread, i.e., the thanks offering is the primary element of the sacrifice. Similarly, the two loaves of bread are brought on account of the lambs, and the lambs are not brought on account of the bread.

וצריכי דאי אשמעינן תודה התם הוא דכי מפגל בלחם לא מפגלא תודה משום דלא הוזקקו זה לזה בתנופה אבל כבשים דהוזקקו זה לזה בתנופה אימא כי מפגל בלחם ליפגלי נמי כבשים צריכא: The Gemara notes: And both of these halakhot are necessary, as, had the mishna taught us the halakha only in the case of a thanks offering, then one might say: It is only there, with regard to a thanks offering, that when one renders the loaves piggul the thanks offering is not rendered piggul, because they were not bound to one another by waving, i.e., the mitzva of waving the thanks offering may be fulfilled without the bread. But with regard to the lambs, in which the two items were bound to one another by waving, as the two loaves are waved together with the lambs, one might say that when he renders the bread piggul, the lambs should be rendered piggul as well. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha also with regard to the case of the lambs.

בעא מיניה ר"א מרב השוחט את התודה לאכול כזית ממנה ומלחמה למחר מהו לאיפגולי תודה לא מיבעיא לי השתא כולו מלחמה לא מיפגלא ממנה ומלחמה מיבעיא § Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: If one slaughters the thanks offering with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from it and from its loaves the next day, what is the halakha? Rabbi Elazar elaborates: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to rendering the thanks offering piggul, for the following reason: Now that in a case where his intent was to consume the entire olive-bulk from its loaves alone, the thanks offering is not rendered piggul, in accordance with the mishna’s ruling that piggul intent with regard to the loaves does not render the thanks offering piggul, then in a case where his intent is to consume half an olive-bulk from the thanks offering and half an olive-bulk from its loaves, in which case the offering is rendered piggul only if the two intentions of less than a full measure are combined, is it necessary to teach that the thanks offering is not piggul?

כי קא מיבעיא לי לאיפגולי לחם מי מצטרפה תודה לאיפגולי ללחם או לא Rather, when I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to rendering the loaves piggul, which can be rendered piggul via intent concerning the loaves alone. In this case, does the intention of the priest with regard to the thanks offering combine with his intention concerning the loaves to render the loaves piggul, or not?

אמר ליה אף בזו הלחם מפוגל והתודה אינה מפוגלת ואמאי לימא קל וחומר ומה (תודה) המפגל אין מתפגל הבא לפגל ולא פיגל אינו דין שלא יתפגל Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: Even in this case, the loaves are rendered piggul and the thanks offering is not rendered piggul. The Gemara asks: But why should the loaves be rendered piggul? Let us say the following a fortiori inference: And if the thanks offering, which in this case serves to render the loaves piggul, is itself not rendered piggul, then the loaves, which come to render the thanks offering piggul, but do not render it piggul, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the loaves does not combine with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the thanks offering to render the thanks offering piggul, is it not logical that the loaves themselves should not be rendered piggul?

ומי אמרינן קל וחומר כי האי גוונא והתניא מעשה באחד The Gemara asks: And do we say an a fortiori inference in this way? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving one

שזרע כרמו של חבירו סמדר ובא מעשה לפני חכמים ואסרו את הזרעים והתירו את הגפנים ואמאי לימא קל וחומר הוא ומה האוסר אינו נאסר הבא לאסור ולא אסר אינו דין שלא יתאסר who planted seeds in the vineyard of an another when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous a fortiori inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i.e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?

הכי השתא התם קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה (דתנן היתה שדהו זרועה קנבוס ולוף לא יהא זורע על גביהם שהן עושות לשלש שנים) שאר זרעים מדרבנן הוא דאסירי האי דעביד איסורא קנסוה רבנן האי דלא עביד איסורא לא קנסוה רבנן אבל הכא לימא ק"ו The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the baraita, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard, as we learned in a mishna (Kilayim 2:5): If one’s field was sown with hemp and arum, he should not sow above them, as they produce a yield only once every three years. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for that person who did not commit a transgression, i.e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of piggul, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an a fortiori inference.

ואיכא דמתני לה אכבשים בעא מיניה רבי אלעזר מרב השוחט את הכבשים לאכול כזית מהן ומלחמן מהו And there are those who teach the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar with regard to the lambs brought with the two loaves, and not with regard to a thanks offering. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: In a case where one slaughters the lambs with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from them and from their loaves the next day, what is the halakha?

לאיפגולי כבשים לא קא מיבעיא לי השתא כולו מלחם לא מפגלי מהן ומלחמן מיבעיא כי קא מיבעיא לי לאיפגולי לחם מי מצטרפי כבשים לאיפגולי ללחם או לא Rabbi Elazar elaborated: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to rendering the lambs piggul for the following reason: Now that in a case where his intent was to consume an entire olive-bulk from the loaves alone, the lambs are not rendered piggul, as the mishna teaches that piggul intent with regard to the loaves does not render the lambs piggul, then in a case where his intent is to consume half an olive-bulk from them and half an olive-bulk from their loaves, is it necessary to teach that the lambs are not piggul? Rather, when I raised the dilemma, it was with regard to rendering the loaves piggul. Does his intention with regard to the lambs combine with his intention with regard to the loaves to render the loaves piggul or not?

א"ל אף בזו הלחם מפוגל והכבשים אינן מפוגלין ואמאי לימא ק"ו ומה המפגל אינו מתפגל הבא לפגל ולא פיגל אינו דין שלא יתפגל Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: Even in this case, the loaves are rendered piggul and the lambs are not rendered piggul. The Gemara asks: But why should the loaves be rendered piggul? Let us say the following a fortiori inference: And if that which renders an item piggul, i.e., the lambs, since it is maintained that intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs assists to render the loaves piggul, is itself not rendered piggul, then with regard to the loaves, which come to render the lambs piggul, but do not render them piggul, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the loaves does not combine with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs to render them piggul, is it not logical that the loaves themselves should not be rendered piggul?

ומי אמרינן ק"ו כי האי גונא והתניא מעשה באחד שזרע כרמו של חבירו סמדר וכו' ואמאי לימא ק"ו מה האוסר אינו נאסר הבא לאסור ולא אסר אינו דין שלא יתאסר The Gemara asks: And do we say an a fortiori inference of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that there was an incident involving one who planted seeds in the vineyard of his friend when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous a fortiori inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i.e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?

הכי השתא התם קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה שאר זרעים מדרבנן הוא דאסירי האי דעבד איסורא קנסוה רבנן דלא עבד איסורא לא קנסוה רבנן אבל הכא לימא ק"ו The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the baraita, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for this person who did not commit a transgression, i.e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of piggul, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an a fortiori inference.

מאן דמתני לה אתודה כל שכן אכבשים ומאן דמתני לה אכבשים כבשים הוא דהוזקקו זה לזה לתנופה אבל תודה דלא הוזקקה זה לזה בתנופה לא The Gemara notes: The one who teaches that the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar was raised with regard to the thanks offering and the accompanying loaves, all the more so will hold that the dilemma may be raised with regard to the case of the lambs brought with the two loaves on Shavuot. But the one who teaches that Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma was raised with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, it is possible that he holds that the dilemma was raised only with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, as they were bound to one another by waving, since the priest waves the lambs and loaves together (see Leviticus 23:20). But with regard to a thanks offering and its loaves, as they were not bound to one another by waving, the dilemma was not raised, since it is obvious in this case that his intentions do not combine.

רבי אבא זוטי בעי לה הכי בעא מיניה ר' אלעזר מרב השוחט את הכבש לאכול כזית מחבירו למחר מהו חבירו כבש משמע ולא מפגל או דלמא לחם משמע ומפגל ליה Rabbi Abba the small taught that Rabbi Elazar raises the dilemma in this manner: Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: If one slaughters one of the lambs brought on Shavuot with the two loaves intending to consume an olive-bulk from the other the next day, what is the halakha? When this individual thinks of the other, does he mean the other lamb, and if so, the lamb is not rendered piggul, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul? Or perhaps when this individual thinks of the other he means the other part of the offering, i.e., the two loaves, and if so his intention renders it piggul, as taught in the mishna.

אמר ליה תניתוה שחט אחד מן הכבשים לאכול ממנו למחר הוא פיגול וחבירו כשר לאכול מחבירו למחר שניהם כשרים אלמא חבירו כבש משמע דלמא דפריש ואמר חבירו כבש: Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: You learned in a mishna (16a): If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul. Rav concludes: Evidently, in this context the term: The other, means the other lamb. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the mishna is discussing a case where he clarifies and says: The other lamb, but the mishna is not referring to a case where he merely thought: The other.

מתני׳ הזבח מפגל את הנסכים משקדשו בכלי דברי ר"מ הנסכים אינן מפגלים את הזבח כיצד השוחט את הזבח לאכול ממנו למחר הוא ונסכיו מפוגלין להקריב נסכיו למחר הנסכים מפוגלין הזבח אינו מפוגל: MISHNA: The animal offering renders the accompanying libations and meal offerings piggul from the moment that they were consecrated in the vessel, but not before; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The libations do not render the animal offering piggul. How so? In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and its libations are rendered piggul. But if one slaughters the offering with the intent to sacrifice its libations the next day, the libations are rendered piggul, while the offering is not piggul.

גמ׳ ת"ר נסכי בהמה חייבין עליהן משום פיגול מפני שדם הזבח מתירן לקרב דברי ר"מ GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the offering permits them to be offered on the altar, and any item that becomes permitted for consumption or for sacrifice through a permitting factor can be rendered piggul, and one who partakes of such an item after its permitting factors were sacrificed is liable to receive karet. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

אמרו לו לר"מ והלא אדם מביא זבחו היום ונסכיו עד י' ימים אמר להן אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בבאין עם הזבח א"ל אפשר לשנותו לזבח אחר The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his offering today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering and were already sanctified in a service vessel for that purpose. The Rabbis said to him: But it is possible to switch the libations for use with another offering. Clearly, then, they are not considered an indispensable part of that offering.

אמר רבא קסבר ר"מ הוקבעו בשחיטה כלחמי תודה Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the libations are fixed to this particular offering at the time of its slaughter, and one may not use them with another offering. Accordingly, these libations are rendered piggul on account of intent during the slaughter of the offering, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, which are fixed to a particular thanks offering upon its slaughter and become piggul on account of intent during the slaughter of that particular thanks offering.

ת"ר לוג שמן של מצורע חייבין עליו משום פיגול מפני שדם אשם מתירו לבהונות דברי רבי מאיר אמרו לו לרבי מאיר והלא אדם מביא אשמו היום ולוגו מיכן ועד י' ימים In a similar vein, the Sages taught: With regard to the log of oil of the leper (see Leviticus 14:10–20), one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became piggul, as the blood of the offering permits it to be placed on the right thumb and big toe of the leper. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his guilt offering today and the accompanying log of oil from now until even ten days later. Evidently, the log of oil is not considered part of the guilt offering, and therefore it should not be rendered piggul on account of it.

אמר להן אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בבא עם האשם [א"ל] אפשר לשנותו לאשם אחר אמר רבא קסבר רבי מאיר הוקבעו בשחיטה כלחמי תודה: Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about a log of oil that comes with the guilt offering. The Rabbis said to him: But even in this case, the oil should not be considered part of the offering, as it is possible to switch the oil for use with another guilt offering. Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the log of oil is fixed to this particular guilt offering at the time of its slaughter and is therefore rendered piggul on account of it, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, as the slaughter of the thanks offering fixes the accompanying loaves to that particular offering.