Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within Their Jurisdiction 1

אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין בֵּין בִּגְדוֹלָה בֵּין בִּקְטַנָּה אֶלָּא אֲנָשִׁים חֲכָמִים וּנְבוֹנִים. מֻפְלָגִין בְּחָכְמַת הַתּוֹרָה בַּעֲלֵי דֵּעָה מְרֻבָּה. יוֹדְעִים קְצָת מִשְּׁאָר חָכְמוֹת כְּגוֹן רְפוּאוֹת וְחֶשְׁבּוֹן וּתְקוּפוֹת וּמַזָּלוֹת וְאִצְטַגְנִינוּת וְדַרְכֵי הַמְעוֹנְנִים וְהַקּוֹסְמִים וְהַמְכַשְּׁפִים וְהַבְלֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּהְיוּ יוֹדְעִים לָדוּן אוֹתָם. וְאֵין מַעֲמִידִין בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין אֶלָּא כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּים וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים הַמְיֻחָסִים הָרְאוּיִים לְהַשִּׂיא לִכְהֻנָּה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר יא טז) "וְהִתְיַצְּבוּ שָׁם עִמָּךְ" בְּדוֹמִין לְךָ בְּחָכְמָה וּבְיִרְאָה וּבְיַחַס: We appoint to a Sanhedrin - both to the Supreme Sanhedrin and to a minor Sanhedrin - only men of wisdom and understanding, of unique distinction in their knowledge of the Torah and who possess a broad intellectual potential. They should also have some knowledge concerning other intellectual disciplines, e.g., medicine, mathematics, the fixation of the calendar, astronomy, astrology, and also the practices of fortune-telling, magic, sorcery, and the hollow teachings of idolatry, so that they will know how to judge them.
We appoint to the Sanhedrin only priests, Levites, and Israelites of lineage of fine repute who can marry into the priesthood. This is derived from Number 11:16: "And they shall stand there with you." Implied is that they should resemble you, Moses in wisdom, the fear of heaven, and in lineage.

וּמִצְוָה לִהְיוֹת בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין גְּדוֹלָה כֹּהֲנִים וּלְוִיִּים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יז ט) "וּבָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם". וְאִם לֹא מָצְאוּ אֲפִלּוּ הָיוּ כֻּלָּם יִשְׂרְאֵלִים הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר: It is a mitzvah for there to be priests and Levites in the Supreme Sanhedrin, as Deuteronomy 17:9 states: "And you shall come to the priests and to the Levites. If appropriate ones are not found, it is permissible for all the judges to be Israelites.

אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בְּכָל הַסַּנְהֶדְרִין לֹא זָקֵן מֻפְלָג בְּשָׁנִים וְלֹא סָרִיס מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן אַכְזָרִיּוּת. וְלֹא מִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּנִים כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא רַחֲמָן: We should not appoint to a Sanhedrin a man of very old age or one who does not possess male physical attributes, for they possess the trait of cruelty, nor a man who is childless, so that the judges should be merciful.

ואֵין מוֹשִׁיבִין מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין שֶׁאָסוּר לַחְלֹק עָלָיו וְלַמְרוֹת אֶת דְּבָרוֹ. אֲבָל מוֹשִׁיבִין כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל אִם הָיָה רָאוּי בְּחָכְמָה: A king of Israel may not be included in the Sanhedrin, for we are forbidden to disagree with him and repudiate his words. The High Priest, by contrast, may be included in the Sanhedrin if his knowledge makes him fitting.

מַלְכֵי בֵּית דָּוִד אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוֹשִׁיבִין אוֹתָם בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין יוֹשְׁבִין וְדָנִים הֵם אֶת הָעָם. וְדָנִים אוֹתָם אִם יֵשׁ עֲלֵיהֶן דִּין. אֲבָל מַלְכֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵין דָּנִין וְאֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָם לְפִי שֶׁאֵין נִכְנָעִים לְדִבְרֵי תּוֹרָה שֶׁמָּא תָּבוֹא מֵהֶן תַּקָּלָה: Although the kings of the House of David may not be included in the Sanhedrin, they may sit in judgment over the people. Conversely, they may be called to judgment if a person has a complaint against them. The Kings of Israel, by contrast, may not serve as judges, nor may they be called to judgment. The rationale is that they do not humble themselves before the words of the Torah, and letting them serve as a judge or issuing a judgment against them may lead to a disaster.

כְּשֵׁם שֶׁבֵּית דִּין מְנֻקִּין בְּצֶדֶק כָּךְ צְרִיכִין לִהְיוֹת מְנֻקִּין מִכָּל מוּמֵי הַגּוּף. וְצָרִיךְ לְהִשְׁתַּדֵּל וְלִבְדֹּק וּלְחַפֵּשׂ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כֻּלָּן בַּעֲלֵי שֵׂיבָה. בַּעֲלֵי קוֹמָה. בַּעֲלֵי מַרְאֶה. נְבוֹנֵי לַחַשׁ. וְשֶׁיֵּדְעוּ בְּרֹב הַלְּשׁוֹנוֹת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא סַנְהֶדְרִין שׁוֹמַעַת מִפִּי הַתֻּרְגְּמָן: Just as the judges of a court must be on the highest level of righteousness; so, too, must they be unsullied by any physical blemishes.
An effort should be made that they all be white-haired, of impressive height, of dignified appearance, men who understand whispered matters, who understand many different languages so that the Sanhedrin will not need to hear testimony from an interpreter.

בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהֶן בְּכָל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים צָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּהֵא בְּכָל אֶחָד מֵהֶן שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. חָכְמָה. וַעֲנָוָה. וְיִרְאָה. וְשִׂנְאַת מָמוֹן. וְאַהֲבַת הָאֱמֶת. וְאַהֲבַת הַבְּרִיּוֹת לָהֶן. וּבַעֲלֵי שֵׁם טוֹב. וְכָל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים מְפֹרָשִׁין הֵן בַּתּוֹרָה. הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברים א יג) "אֲנָשִׁים חֲכָמִים וּנְבֹנִים" הֲרֵי בַּעֲלֵי חָכְמָה אָמוּר. (דברים א יג) "וִידֻעִים לְשִׁבְטֵיכֶם" אֵלּוּ שֶׁרוּחַ הַבְּרִיּוֹת נוֹחָה מֵהֶם. וּבַמֶּה יִהְיוּ אֲהוּבִים לַבְּרִיּוֹת בִּזְמַן שֶׁיִּהְיוּ בַּעֲלֵי עַיִן טוֹבָה. וְנֶפֶשׁ שְׁפָלָה. וְחֶבְרָתָן טוֹבָה. וְדִבּוּרָן וּמַשָּׂאָן בְּנַחַת עִם הַבְּרִיּוֹת. וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר (שמות יח כא) "אַנְשֵׁי חַיִל" אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֵן גִּבּוֹרִים בְּמִצְוֹת וּמְדַקְדְּקִים עַל עַצְמָם וְכוֹבְשִׁין אֶת יִצְרָן עַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא לָהֶן שׁוּם גְּנַאי וְלֹא שֵׁם רַע וִיהֵא פִּרְקָן נָאֶה. וּבִכְלַל אַנְשֵׁי חַיִל שֶׁיִּהְיֶה לָהֶן לֵב אַמִּיץ לְהַצִּיל עָשׁוּק מִיַּד עוֹשְׁקוֹ כָּעִנְיָן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות ב יז) "וַיָּקָם משֶׁה וַיּוֹשִׁעָן". וּמָה משֶׁה רַבֵּנוּ עָנָו אַף כָּל דַּיָּן צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עָנָו. (שמות יח כא) "יִרְאֵי אֱלֹהִים" כְּמַשְׁמָעוֹ. (שמות יח כא) "שֹׂנְאֵי בָצַע" אַף מָמוֹן שֶׁלָּהֶם אֵינָן נִבְהָלִין עָלָיו. וְלֹא רוֹדְפִין לְקַבֵּץ הַמָּמוֹן. שֶׁכָּל מִי שֶׁהוּא נִבְהָל לַהוֹן חֶסֶר יְבוֹאֶנּוּ. (שמות יח כא) "אַנְשֵׁי אֱמֶת" שֶׁיִּהְיוּ רוֹדְפִין אַחַר הַצֶּדֶק מֵחֲמַת עַצְמָן בְּדַעְתָּן. אוֹהֲבִין אֶת הָאֱמֶת וְשׂוֹנְאִין אֶת הֶחָמָס וּבוֹרְחִין מִכָּל מִינֵי הֶעָוֶל: We are not careful to demand that a judge for a court of three possess all these qualities. He must, however, possess seven attributes: wisdom, humility, the fear of God, a loathing for money, a love for truth; he must be a person who is beloved by people at large, and must have a good reputation.
All of these qualities are mentioned explicitly in the Torah. When relating Moses' statements concerning the appointment of judges, Deuteronomy 1:13 mentions: "Men of wisdom and understanding." This refers to wisdom.
The verse continues: "Beloved by your tribes." This refers to those who are appreciated by people at large. What will make them beloved by people? Conducting themselves with a favorable eye and a humble spirit, being good company, and speaking and conducting their business with people gently.
When relating Jethro's advice to Moses to appoint judges, Exodus 18:21 speaks of "men of power." This refers to people who are mighty in their observance of the mitzvot, who are very demanding of themselves, and who overcome their evil inclination until they possess no unfavorable qualities, no trace of an unpleasant reputation, even during their early manhood, they were spoken of highly. The phrase "men of power" also implies that they should have a courageous heart to save an oppressed person from the one oppressing him, as Exodus 18:21 continues: "God-fearing" - the intent is obvious. It mentions: "men who hate profit," i.e., people who do not become overly concerned even about their own money. They do not pursue the accumulation of money, for anyone who is overly concerned about wealth will ultimately be overcome by want.
The verse continues: "men of truth," i.e., people who pursue justice because of their own inclination; they love truth, hate crime, and flee from all forms of crookedness.

אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁמִּבֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל הָיוּ שׁוֹלְחִים בְּכָל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבוֹדְקִין כָּל מִי שֶׁיִּמְצָאוּהוּ חָכָם וִירֵא חָטָא וְעָנָו וְשָׁפוּי וּפִרְקוֹ נָאֶה וְרוּחַ הַבְּרִיּוֹת נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ. עוֹשִׂין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּן בְּעִירוֹ. וּמִשָּׁם מַעֲלִין אוֹתוֹ לְפֶתַח הַר הַבַּיִת וּמִשָּׁם מַעֲלִין אוֹתוֹ לְפֶתַח הָעֲזָרָה. וּמִשָּׁם מַעֲלִין אוֹתוֹ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל: Our Sages relate: From the Supreme Sanhedrin, they would send emissaries throughout the entire land of Israel to seek out judges. Whenever they found a person who was wise, sin-fearing, humble, modest, with a good reputation, and beloved by people at large, they have him appointed as a judge in his own city. From there, they promote him to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Mount. From there, he is promoted to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Courtyard, and from there, to the Supreme Sanhedrin.

בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן גֵּר הֲרֵי זֶה פָּסוּל. עַד שֶׁתִּהְיֶה אִמּוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. הָיָה אֶחָד מַמְזֵר אֲפִלּוּ שְׁלָשְׁתָּן מַמְזֵרִים הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן. וְכֵן אִם הָיָה כָּל אֶחָד מֵהֶם סוּמָא בְּאֶחָד מֵעֵינָיו כָּשֵׁר מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין. אֲבָל הַסּוּמָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֵינָיו פָּסוּל לַכּל: When one of the judges of a court of three is a convert, the court is disqualified. His mother must be a native-born Jewess. If, by contrast, one of the judges is a mamzer, even if all three of them are mamzerim, they are acceptable to pass judgment.
Similarly, if all of the members of a court of three were blind in one eye, it is acceptable. This does not apply with regard to a Sanhedrin. If, however, a judge is blind in both eyes, he is unacceptable to serve on all courts.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה מֻתָּר לְאֶחָד לָדוּן מִן הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא יט טו) "בְּצֶדֶק תִּשְׁפֹּט עֲמִיתֶךָ". וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה. וּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ אֵין דִּינֵיהֶן דִּין: Although a court requires no less than three judges, it is permissible for one judge to adjudicate a case according to Scriptural Law, as Leviticus 19:15 states: "Judge your fellow countryman with righteousness." According to Rabbinic Law, however, there should be three judges. When two judges adjudicate a case, their ruling is not binding.

אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה מֻמְחֶה לָרַבִּים אוֹ שֶׁנָּטַל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לוֹ לָדוּן יְחִידִי אֲבָל אֵינוֹ חָשׁוּב בֵּית דִּין. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מֻתָּר מִצְוַת חֲכָמִים הוּא שֶׁמּוֹשִׁיב עִמּוֹ אֲחֵרִים שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרוּ אַל תְּהִי דָּן יְחִידִי שֶׁאֵין דָּן יְחִידִי אֶלָּא אֶחָד: When a judge is an expert and he is known by many to possess such knowledge or if he was granted permission by the court, he may adjudicate a case alone. Nevertheless, he is not considered as a court.
Even though it is permitted for such a person to issue judgments alone, it is a mitzvah from the Sages for him to have others sit in judgment with him, for our Sages said: "Do not act as a judge alone, for there is only One who judges alone."

יֵשׁ לְאָדָם לַעֲשׂוֹת דִּין לְעַצְמוֹ אִם יֵשׁ בְּיָדוֹ כֹּחַ הוֹאִיל וְכַדָּת וְכַהֲלָכָה הוּא עוֹשֶׂה אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לִטְרֹחַ וְלָבוֹא לְבֵית דִּין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה שָׁם הֶפְסֵד בִּנְכָסָיו אִלּוּ נִתְאַחֵר וּבָא לְבֵית דִּין. לְפִיכָךְ אִם קִבֵּל עָלָיו בַּעַל דִּינוֹ וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לְבֵית דִּין וְדָרְשׁוּ וּמָצְאוּ שֶׁעָשָׂה כַּהֲלָכָה וְדִין אֱמֶת דָּן לְעַצְמוֹ אֵין סוֹתְרִין אֶת דִּינוֹ: A person may execute judgment himself if he has the power to do so. If he acts according to the dictates of our faith and according to law, he is not obligated to take the trouble to come to the court. This applies even if he would not suffer any financial loss if he would delay and bring the matter to the court.
Consequently, should the other litigant lodge a complaint against him and bring him to court, if the court investigates and discovers that he acted according to law, i.e., the decision which he arrived at was true, we do not abrogate his decision.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה בֵּית דִּין שָׁלֵם הוּא כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהֵן רַבִּים הֲרֵי זֶה מְשֻׁבָּח. וּמוּטָב שֶׁיֵּחָתֵךְ הַדִּין בְּאַחַד עָשָׂר יוֹתֵר מֵעֲשָׂרָה וּצְרִיכִין שֶׁיִּהְיוּ הַיּוֹשְׁבִים כֻּלָּם שָׁם בְּבֵית דִּין תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים וּרְאוּיִין: Although a court of three is considered as a complete entity, whenever there are more judges, it is praiseworthy. It is preferable to make a decision with 11 judges than with ten. All the judges who sit in court must be Torah scholars and of appropriate character.

וְאָסוּר לְאָדָם חָכָם שֶׁיֵּשֵׁב בַּדִּין עַד שֶׁיֵּדַע עִם מִי יֵשֵׁב שֶׁמָּא יִצְטָרֵף עִם אֲנָשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן הֲגוּנִים וְנִמְצָא בִּכְלַל קֶשֶׁר בּוֹגְדִים לֹא בִּכְלַל בֵּית דִּין: It is forbidden for a wise man to sit in judgment until he knows with whom he will be sitting. This restraint is observed lest he be coupled with men who are unsuitable. Thus he will be part of "a band of traitors," and not part of a court.

עַד אֵימָתַי יוֹשְׁבִין הַדַּיָּנִים בְּדִין. סַנְהֶדְרִי קְטַנָּה וּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה יוֹשְׁבִין מֵאַחַר תְּפִלַּת הַשַּׁחַר עַד סוֹף שֵׁשׁ שָׁעוֹת בַּיּוֹם. אֲבָל בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל הָיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין מִתָּמִיד שֶׁל שַׁחַר עַד תָּמִיד שֶׁל בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם. וּבְשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים הָיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ שֶׁבְּהַר הַבַּיִת: Until when should the judges hold session? A minor Sanhedrin and a court of three should hold sessions from after the morning service until the end of the sixth hour of the day. The supreme Sanhedrin, by contrast, would hold sessions from the time of the slaughter of the morning sacrifice until the offering of the afternoon sacrifice. On Sabbaths and on festivals they would hold sessions in the House of Study on the Temple Mount.

אֵין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד צְרִיכִין שֶׁיִּהְיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין כֻּלָּן כְּאֶחָד בִּמְקוֹמָן שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ. אֶלָּא בְּעֵת שֶׁיְּהוּ צְרִיכִין לְהִתְקַבֵּץ מִתְקַבְּצִין כֻּלָּן. וּבִשְׁאָר הָעִתּוֹת כָּל מִי שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ עֵסֶק יֵצֵא לַעֲשׂוֹת חֶפְצוֹ וְחוֹזֵר וְהוּא שֶׁלֹּא יִפְחֲתוּ מֵעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה יוֹשְׁבִין תָּמִיד כָּל זְמַן יְשִׁיבָתָן. הֻצְרַךְ אֶחָד מֵהֶן לָצֵאת הֲרֵי זֶה מִסְתַּכֵּל בַּחֲבֵרָיו הַנִּשְׁאָרִים אִם יִשָּׁאֲרוּ שָׁם עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה יֵצֵא וְאִם לָאו לֹא יֵצֵא עַד שֶׁיָּבוֹא אַחֵר: The High Court of 71 judges was not required to sit all together in their place in the Temple. Instead, when it was necessary for them to gather together, they would all gather together. At other times, whoever had private affairs would tend to his concerns and then return.
The above applies provided there would be no less than 23 judges in attendance whenever they were sitting. If a judge needs to leave, he should look at his colleagues who remain. If there are 23 remaining, he may leave. If not, he should not leave until another comes.

אֵין מַתְחִילִין אֶת הַדִּינִין בַּלַּיְלָה. מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה לָמְדוּ שֶׁהַדִּינִין כִּנְגָעִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא ה) "כָּל רִיב וְכָל נָגַע" מָה רְאִיַּת נְגָעִים בַּיּוֹם בִּלְבַד אַף הַדִּינִין בַּיּוֹם בִּלְבַד: A court should not begin adjudicating a case at night. According to the Oral Tradition, this concept was derived as follows: Based on Deuteronomy 21:5 which mentions: "Every dispute and every blemish," an equation is established between the adjudication of disputes and blemishes. Just as blemishes are viewed only during the day; so, too, disputes should be adjudicated only during the day.

וְכֵן אֵין מְקַבְּלִין עֵדוּת וְאֵין מְקַיְּמִין שְׁטָרוֹת בַּלַּיְלָה. וּבְדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אִם הִתְחִילוּ בַּיּוֹם מֻתָּר לִגְמֹר הַדִּין בַּלַּיְלָה: Similarly, we do not listen to the testimony of witnesses or validate the authenticity of legal documents at night. With regard to cases involving monetary law, if the judges began hearing the matter during the day, it is permitted for them to conclude the judgment at night.

הַנְּחָלוֹת כְּדִינִין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בָּהֶן לְחֻקַּת מִשְׁפָּט. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין מַפִּילִין נְחָלוֹת בַּלַּיְלָה: The division of an inheritance resembles a judgment, for with regard to them, Numbers 35:29 states: "For the statutes of judgment." Therefore inheritances are not divided at night.

שְׁנַיִם שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ לְבַקֵּר אֶת הַחוֹלֶה וְצִוָּה בִּפְנֵיהֶם. כּוֹתְבִים וְאֵין עוֹשִׂים דִּין. וְאִם הָיוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה רָצוּ כּוֹתְבִין רָצוּ עוֹשִׂין דִּין. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בַּיּוֹם. אֲבָל בַּלַּיְלָה כּוֹתְבִין וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין דִּין: When two people enter to visit a person who is deathly ill, if he makes statements dividing his estate in their presence, they may record his statements, but they may not adjudicate the division of the estate. They were three, if they desire, they may record his statements, or they may adjudicate the division of the estate.
When does the above apply? During the day. During the night, they may record his statements, but they may not adjudicate the division of the estate.

כָּל בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהוּא הָגוּן שְׁכִינָה עִמָּהֶם. לְפִיכָךְ צְרִיכִין הַדַּיָּנִים לֵישֵׁב בְּאֵימָה וְיִרְאָה וַעֲטִיפָה וְכֹבֶד רֹאשׁ וְאָסוּר לְהָקֵל רֹאשׁ אוֹ לִשְׂחֹק אוֹ לְסַפֵּר בְּשִׂיחָה בְּטֵלָה בְּבֵית דִּין אֶלָּא בְּדִבְרֵי תּוֹרָה וְחָכְמָה: Whenever a suitable court among the Jewish people sits in judgment, the Divine Presence rests among them. Accordingly, the judges must sit in awe and fear, wrapped in tallitot, and conduct themselves with reverence. It is forbidden to act frivolously, to joke, or to speak idle matters in court. Instead, one may speak only words of Torah and wisdom.

כָּל סַנְהֶדְרִין אוֹ מֶלֶךְ אוֹ רֹאשׁ גּוֹלָה שֶׁהֶעֱמִידוּ לָהֶן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל דַּיָּן שֶׁאֵינוֹ הָגוּן וְאֵינוֹ חָכָם בְּחָכְמַת הַתּוֹרָה וְרָאוּי לִהְיוֹת דַּיָּן. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא כֻּלּוֹ מַחֲמַדִּים וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ טוֹבוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה שֶׁהֶעֱמִידוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לֹא תַכִּירוּ פָנִים בַּמִּשְׁפָּט. מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה לָמְדוּ שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר כְּנֶגֶד הַמְמֻנֶּה לְהוֹשִׁיב דַּיָּנִין. אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁמָּא תֹּאמַר אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נָאֶה אוֹשִׁיבֶנּוּ דַּיָּן. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי גִּבּוֹר אוֹשִׁיבֶנּוּ דַּיָּן. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי קְרוֹבִי אוֹשִׁיבֶנּוּ דַּיָּן. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי יוֹדֵעַ בְּכָל לָשׁוֹן אוֹשִׁיבֶנּוּ דַּיָּן. נִמְצָא מְזַכֶּה אֶת הַחַיָּב וּמְחַיֵּב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא רָשָׁע אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ. לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר (דברים א יז) "לֹא תַכִּירוּ פָנִים בַּמִּשְׁפָּט". וְעוֹד אָמְרוּ כָּל הַמַּעֲמִיד לְיִשְׂרָאֵל דַּיָּן שֶׁאֵינוֹ הָגוּן כְּאִלּוּ הֵקִים מַצֵּבָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים טז כב) "וְלֹא תָקִים לְךָ מַצֵּבָה אֲשֶׁר שָׂנֵא ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ". וּבִמְקוֹם תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים כְּאִלּוּ נָטַע אֲשֵׁרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים טז כא) "לֹא תִטַּע לְךָ אֲשֵׁרָה כָּל עֵץ אֵצֶל מִזְבַּח ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ". וְכֵן אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים (שמות כ כ) "לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן אִתִּי אֱלֹהֵי כֶסֶף" אֱלוֹהַּ הַבָּא בִּשְׁבִיל כֶּסֶף וְזָהָב זֶה הַדַּיָּן שֶׁמִּנּוּהוּ מִפְּנֵי עָשְׁרוֹ בִּלְבַד: Whenever a Sanhedrin, a king, or an exilarch appoints a judge who is not fitting and/or is not learned in the wisdom of the Torah and is not suitable to be a judge - even if he is entirely a delight and possesses other positive qualities - the person who appoints him violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Do not show favoritism in judgment." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that this command is addressed to those who appoint judges.
Our Sages declare: "Perhaps a person will say: 'So and so is attractive, I will appoint him as a judge,' 'So and so is strong, I will appoint him as a judge,' 'So and so is my relative, I will appoint him as a judge,' or "So and so knows all the languages, I will appoint him as a judge.' This will lead to those who are liable being vindicated and those who should be vindicated held liable, not because the judge is wicked, but because he does not know Torah law. Therefore the Torah states: "Do not show favoritism in judgment."
Our Sages also declare: "Whoever appoints a judge who is not appropriate for the Jewish people is considered as if he erected a monument, as implied by Deuteronomy 16:22: "Do not erect a monument which is hated by God, your Lord." If he is appointed instead of a Torah scholar, it is as if one planted an asherah, as Ibid.:21 states: "Do not plant an asherah or any other tree next to God's altar."
And our Sages interpreted Exodus 20:20: "Do not make gods of silver and gods of gold together with Me" to mean "Do not appoint a judge because of silver and gold." This refers to a judge who was appointed because of his wealth alone.

כָּל דַּיָּן שֶׁנָּתַן מָמוֹן כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּתְמַנֶּה אָסוּר לַעֲמֹד מִפָּנָיו. וְצִוּוּ חֲכָמִים לְהָקֵל אוֹתוֹ וּלְזַלְזֵל בּוֹ. וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהַטַּלִּית שֶׁמִּתְעַטֵּף בָּהּ תְּהִי בְּעֵינֶיךָ כְּמִרְדַּעַת שֶׁל חֲמוֹר: Whenever a judge pays money in order to be appointed, it is forbidden to stand in his presence. Our Sages commanded that he be denigrated and derided. And our Sages declare: "Consider the tallit with which he wraps himself as the saddle blanket of a donkey."

כָּךְ הָיָה דֶּרֶךְ חֲכָמִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים בּוֹרְחִין מִלְּהִתְמַנּוֹת. וְדוֹחֲקִין עַצְמָן הַרְבֵּה שֶׁלֹּא יֵשְׁבוּ בַּדִּין עַד שֶׁיֵּדְעוּ שֶׁאֵין שָׁם רָאוּי כְּמוֹתָם וְשֶׁאִם יִמָּנְעוּ מִן הַדִּין תְּקַלְקֵל הַשּׁוּרָה. אַף עַל פִּי כֵן לֹא הָיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין בַּדִּין אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁמַּכְבִּידִין עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הָעָם וְהַזְּקֵנִים וּפוֹצְרִים בָּהֶן: This was the manner of conduct of the sages of the previous generations. They would flee from being appointed to a court and would undergo extreme pressure not to sit in judgment until they knew that there was no other person as appropriate as they were and that if they would refrain from participating in the judgment the quality of the legal system would be impaired. Even so, they would not sit in judgment until the people at large and the elders would compel them and implore them to do so.

אֵין מַעֲמִידִין מֶלֶךְ אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִי קְטַנָּה לְכָל שֵׁבֶט וְשֵׁבֶט וּלְכָל עִיר וְעִיר אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט שֶׁהֻדַּח כֻּלּוֹ וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל. אֲבָל דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת [שֶׁל כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל] בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וְכֵן אֵין עוֹשִׂין זָקֵן מַמְרֵא וְלֹא עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת וְלֹא מַשְׁקִין אֶת הַסּוֹטָה אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל. וְאֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת וְלֹא מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת וְלִמְדִידַת הֶחָלָל אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות יח כב) "כָּל הַדָּבָר הַגָּדל יָבִיאוּ אֵלֶיךָ": A king may not be enthroned except by the High Court of 71 judges. A minor Sanhedrin for every tribe and every city may be appointed only by the High Court of 71 judges. A tribe that has been led to apostasy in its entirety, a false prophet, or a case in which the High Priest might be liable for capital punishment, may be judged only by the High Court of 71 judges. Financial cases involving a High Priest, by contrast, may be adjudicated by a court of three.
Similarly, the determination of a rebellious elder or a city led to apostasy and the decision to cause a woman suspected of adultery to drink the waters which test her may only be done by the High Court. Similarly, the decisions to extend the city limits of Jerusalem and the limits of the Temple Courtyard, to enter a voluntary war, and to measure the distance between a corpse and the nearby cities may be done only by the High Court of 71 judges. These concepts are derived from Exodus 18:22: "All the major matters will be brought to you."

אֵין דָּנִין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהֵן סַנְהֶדְרִי קְטַנָּה בֵּין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם בֵּין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וְלֹא הַבְּהֵמָה הַנִּרְבַּעַת אוֹ הָרוֹבֵעַ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. אֲפִלּוּ אֲרִי וְדֹב וּבַרְדְּלָס שֶׁהֵן בְּנֵי תַּרְבּוּת וְיֵשׁ לָהֶן בְּעָלִים שֶׁהֵמִיתוּ מִיתָתָן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. אֲבָל נָחָשׁ שֶׁהֵמִית אֶחָד הוֹרֵג אוֹתוֹ: Cases involving capital punishment may not be judged by a court with less than 23 judges, i.e., a minor Sanhedrin. This applies not only to instances where humans are judged with regard to capital punishment, but also when animals face such judgment. Therefore an ox which is stoned to death and an animal used in bestial sexual practices is condemned to death only by a court of 23 judges. Even when a lion, a bear, or a cheetah that has been domesticated and which has owners kill a human, it is executed based on the judgment of a court of 23. When, however, a snake kills a human, even one ordinary person may kill it.

הַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ תְּחִלָּה אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּדִינוֹ צַד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת שֶׁמָּא יִהְיֶה הַדָּבָר אֱמֶת וְתִסָּקֵל הַבַּת. לֹא נֶאֶמְנוּ דִּבְרֵי הַבַּעַל וּבָא הָאָב לְתָבְעוֹ בִּקְנָס דִּינוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין דָּנִין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת אֶלָּא בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדִּבְרֵי קַבָּלָה הֵן הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר (במדבר לה כד) "וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה" (במדבר לה כה) "וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה" עֵדָה שׁוֹפֶטֶת וְעֵדָה מַצֶּלֶת. עֵדָה שׁוֹפֶטֶת וְהֵן הַמְחַיְּבִין. וְעֵדָה מַצֶּלֶת וְהֵן הַמְזַכִּין. וְאֵין עֵדָה פָּחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה הֲרֵי עֶשְׂרִים. וּמוֹסִיפִין שְׁלֹשָׁה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל וְיִהְיֶה בּוֹ אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת: When a person who spreads a malicious report concerning his wife, at the outset, the case is judged by a court of 23. For there is the possibility of a capital case arising if the husband's claim proves true and the woman is to be stoned to death. If the husband's claim is not substantiated, and the woman's father comes to demand payment of the fine, the matter may be judged by a court of three.
What is the source which teaches that capital cases may be judged only by a court of 23? Although this is a matter conveyed by the Oral Tradition, there is an allusion to it in the Torah. Numbers 35:24-25 states: "And the congregation shall judge... and the congregation shall save...." Implied is that there must be the possibility of a congregation judging - and condemning him to death - and a congregation saving - and seeking his acquittal. Now a congregation is no less than ten. Thus there are at least 20 judges. We add three judges so that there not be an equally balanced court and to allow the possibility of "following after the inclination of the majority."

מַכּוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיָּמוּת כְּשֶׁמַּלְקִין אוֹתוֹ: Lashes are decided upon by a court of three judges. Even though the person may die when lashes are administered to him.

עֲרִיפַת הָעֶגְלָה בַּחֲמִשָּׁה: Decapitating the calf is performed by five judges.

עִבּוּר הַחֹדֶשׁ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה: The enlargement of the month is decided upon by three judges.

עִבּוּר הַשָּׁנָה בְּשִׁבְעָה. וְכָל אֵלּוּ סְמוּכִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ: The enlargement of the year is decided upon by seven judges. All of the above must possess semichah as we explained.

דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת כְּגוֹן גְּזֵלוֹת וְחַבָּלוֹת וְתַשְׁלוּמֵי כֶּפֶל וְתַשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה וְהָאוֹנֵס וְהַמְפַתֶּה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָם אֶלָּא שְׁלֹשָׁה מֻמְחִים וְהֵם הַסְּמוּכִין בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. אֲבָל שְׁאָר דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת כְּגוֹן הוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת אֵינָן צְרִיכִין מֻמְחֶה אֶלָּא אֲפִלּוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה הֶדְיוֹטוֹת וַאֲפִלּוּ אֶחָד מֻמְחֶה דָּן אוֹתָן. לְפִיכָךְ דָּנִין בְּהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אֱלֹהִים שְׁלִיחוּת בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹשִׂין. וְאֵין לָהֶן רְשׁוּת לָדוּן דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת בִּשְׁלִיחוּתָן: Cases involving financial penalties, robbery, personal injury, the payment of double for a stolen article, the payment of four and five times the value of a stolen sheep or ox, rape, seduction, and the like may be adjudicated only by three expert judges who have received semichah in Eretz Yisrael,
Other cases of financial law, e.g., admissions of financial liability and loans, do not require an expert judge. Even three ordinary people, or even one expert judge may adjudicate them. For this reasons, cases involving admissions of financial liability, loans, and the like may be adjudicated in the diaspora. Although a court in the diaspora is not referred to as Elohim, they carry out the charge of the court of Eretz Yisrael. This charge does not, however, give them license to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties.

אֵין דָּנִין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים הַמְּצוּיִין תָּמִיד וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶן חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס. כְּגוֹן הוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת וּמַזִּיק מָמוֹן חֲבֵרוֹ. אֲבָל דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין מְצוּיִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס כְּגוֹן בְּהֵמָה שֶׁחָבְלָה בַּחֲבֶרְתָּהּ. אוֹ דְּבָרִים הַמְּצוּיִין אֲבָל אֵין בָּהֶן חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס כְּגוֹן תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶּפֶל. אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. וְכֵן כָּל הַקְּנָסוֹת שֶׁקָּנְסוּ חֲכָמִים בְּתוֹקֵעַ לַחֲבֵרוֹ וּבְסוֹטֵר אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתָן דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. וְכָל הַמְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֵזֶק אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ חוּץ מֵחֲצִי נֵזֶק צְרוֹרוֹת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מָמוֹן וְאֵינוֹ קְנָס: The courts of the diaspora adjudicate only cases that commonly occur and which involve financial loss, e.g., admissions of liability, loans, and property damage. Matters that occur only infrequently, by contrast, even though they involve financial loss, e.g., an animal that injures another, or events that commonly occur, but do not involve financial loss, e.g., a double payment for theft, are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.
Similarly, all the financial penalties which our Sages imposed against a person who punches a colleague, slaps a colleague, or the like are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora. Whenever a person is required to pay half the damages for the destruction of property the matter is not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora, with the exception of the half payment for damages caused by pebbles propelled by one's animals. For that is a reimbursement for financial loss and is not a financial penalty.

כָּל הַנִּשּׁוֹם כְּעֶבֶד אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. לְפִיכָךְ אָדָם שֶׁחָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אֵין גּוֹבִין הַנֵּזֶק וְהַצַּעַר וְהַבּשֶׁת שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בָּהֶן דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. אֲבָל שֶׁבֶת וְרִפּוּי גּוֹבִין מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס. וְכֵן הוֹרוּ הַגְּאוֹנִים וְאָמְרוּ שֶׁמַּעֲשִׂים בְּכָל יוֹם לִגְבּוֹת שֶׁבֶת וְרִפּוּי בְּבָבֶל: Whenever the injuries a person suffers are evaluated by calculating his worth as one calculates the worth of a servant, the payment is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Therefore if a person injures a colleague, compensation for the damages, the pain, and the embarrassment for which he is liable is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses is, by contrast, expropriated in the diaspora, because they involve a financial loss. The Geonim ruled in this manner and stated that it is a commonplace matter to expropriate compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses in the diaspora.

בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהִזִּיקָה אֶת הָאָדָם אֵין גּוֹבִין נִזְקוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָצוּי. אֲבָל אָדָם שֶׁהִזִּיק בֶּהֱמַת חֲבֵרוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם בְּכָל מָקוֹם כְּמִי שֶׁקָּרַע כְּסוּתוֹ אוֹ שָׁבַר כֵּלָיו אוֹ קִצֵּץ נְטִיעוֹתָיו. וְכֵן בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהִזִּיקָה בְּשֵׁן וְרֶגֶל הוֹאִיל וְהִיא מוּעֶדֶת לָהֶן מִתְּחִלָּתָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה דָּבָר מָצוּי וְגוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. בֵּין שֶׁהִזִּיקָה בְּהֵמָה אַחֶרֶת כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְחַכְּכָה בָּהּ אוֹ אָכְלָה פֵּרוֹת שֶׁדַּרְכָּהּ לְאָכְלָן וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. בֵּין שֶׁהִזִּיקָה אֳכָלִין וְכֵלִים שֶׁהִיא חַיֶּבֶת עֲלֵיהֶן נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם הַכּל גּוֹבִין דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. אֲבָל אִם הָיְתָה תַּמָּה וְהוּעֲדָה וְהִזִּיקָה כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּשְׁכָה אוֹ נָגְפָה אוֹ רָבְצָה אוֹ בָּעֲטָה אוֹ נָגְחָה אֵין גּוֹבִין הַנֵּזֶק הַזֶּה הַשָּׁלֵם דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ שֶׁאֵין מוּעָד בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. וַאֲפִלּוּ הוּעַד בָּאָרֶץ וְיָצָא לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ וְהִזִּיק אֵין גּוֹבִין נִזְקוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ דָּבָר מָצוּי: The judges of the diaspora do not exact payment when an animal injures a person, because this is an uncommon occurrence. When, by contrast, a person damages an animal belonging to a colleague, he must pay the complete damages to his colleague regardless of where this takes place, just as he is responsible if he ripped his garments, broke his utensils, or cut down his produce.
Similarly, when an animal causes damage by eating or by treading, since its owner is forewarned that this is its inherent natural tendency, it is a common matter and the damages are expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. This applies whether it damaged another animal, e.g., it rubbed against it, it consumed produce that it would naturally eat or the like, or it damaged food or utensils by treading upon them in which instance he is obligated to pay full damages. Payment for all of these damages can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora.
If, however, an animal was not prone to cause damage, then it caused damages to the extent that the owner was warned, and then it caused damage again, e.g., it bit, it butted with its body, it lay down, it kicked, or it gored, these damages are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. The rationale is that there is no concept of the owner of an animal being forewarned in the diaspora. Even if an animal caused its owner to be forewarned in Eretz Yisrael, and then it was taken to the diaspora where it caused damage, the damages are not expropriated, because this is an uncommon occurrence.

מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין מוּעָד בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. לְפִי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְהָעִיד בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְאֵין שָׁם בֵּית דִּין אֶלָּא הַסְּמוּכִין בָּאָרֶץ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם הָיוּ בֵּית דִּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהֵן דָּנִים דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ כָּךְ מְעִידִים אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה בִּפְנֵיהֶם בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ: Why is there no concept of warning an owner in the diaspora? Because testimony must be given against the owner in the presence of a court. And the concept of a court applies only with regard to judges who have been given semichah in Eretz Yisrael.
Accordingly, if a court of judges from Eretz Yisrael were in the diaspora, just as they have the authority to judge laws involving financial penalties in the diaspora; so, too, testimony regarding an animal can be delivered in their presence in the diaspora.

מִי שֶׁגָּנַב אוֹ גָּזַל גּוֹבִין מִמֶּנּוּ הַקֶּרֶן דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אֲבָל אֵין גּוֹבִין אֶת הַכֶּפֶל: When a person steals or robs, the principal can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. They do not, however, expropriate the double payment.

וְלֹא כָּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ גּוֹבִין מִמֶּנּוּ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ שֶׁהֲרֵי הַפְּגָם וְהַבּשֶׁת וְהַכֹּפֶר מְשַׁלֵּם אָדָם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר פִּתִּיתִי בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי וְהֵמִית שׁוֹרִי אֶת פְּלוֹנִי וְאֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ: The judges of the diaspora do not expropriate payment in every situation where a person would be liable to make compensation based on his own statements. For the payment to a maiden's father for blemishing her virginity and for the embarrassment she suffers, and a person who must pay an atonement fee because his ox killed another person are situations where a person must make compensation, because of his statements. For example, he said: "I seduced so-and-so's daughter," or "My ox killed so-and-so." Nevertheless, such payments are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora.

דִּינֵי גְּרָמוֹת אֵינָן כִּקְנָסוֹת וְגוֹבִין אוֹתָן וְדָנִין בָּהֶן בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ: Judgments involving situations where a person's actions served as a direct cause of damage are not equivalent to laws involving k'nasot and they may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

וְכֵן דִּין הַמּוֹסֵר מָמוֹן חֲבֵרוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ: Similarly, the laws applying to a person who gives money belonging to a colleague to gentiles - even if he merely threatens to do so - may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

מִנְהַג הַיְשִׁיבוֹת בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין גּוֹבִין שָׁם קְנָס מְנַדִּין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיְּפַיֵּס לְבַעַל דִּינוֹ אוֹ יַעֲלֶה עִמּוֹ לְדִין לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. וְכֵיוָן שֶׁיִּתֵּן לוֹ שִׁעוּר הָרָאוּי לוֹ מַתִּירִין נִדּוּיוֹ בֵּין שֶׁנִּתְפַּיֵּס בַּעַל דִּינוֹ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפַּיֵּס. וְכֵן אִם תָּפַשׂ הַנִּזָּק שִׁעוּר מַה שֶּׁרָאוּי לוֹ לִטּל אֵין מוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ מִיָּדוֹ: The custom of the yeshivot of the diaspora is that even though they do not expropriate money due as k'nasot, they place the person who causes the damage under a ban of ostracism until he satisfies the plaintiff or goes with him to Eretz Yisrael to have the case adjudicated.
Once the person who causes the damage pays the amount that he would be held liable for, the ban of ostracism is lifted whether the person who suffered the injury is appeased or not. Similarly, if the person who suffered the injury seizes an amount of property belonging to the person who causes the damage equivalent to the amount he would be awarded by the court, we do not expropriate it from his possession.

יָחִיד שֶׁהוּא מֻמְחֶה לָרַבִּים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא דָּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת יְחִידִי אֵין הַהוֹדָאָה בְּפָנָיו הוֹדָאָה בְּבֵית דִּין וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה סָמוּךְ. אֲבָל הַשְּׁלֹשָׁה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן סְמוּכִין וַהֲרֵי הֵן הֶדְיוֹטוֹת וְאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהֶם אֱלֹהִים הֲרֵי הַהוֹדָאָה בִּפְנֵיהֶם הוֹדָאָה בְּבֵית דִּין. וְכֵן הַכּוֹפֵר בִּפְנֵיהֶם וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים הֻחְזַק כַּפְרָן וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר וְלִטְעֹן כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר הֲרֵי הֵן לְעִנְיַן הוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן כְּבֵית דִּין הַסָּמוּךְ לְכָל הַדְּבָרִים: When one person is an expert judge and he is known by many to possess such knowledge, although he is allowed to judge cases involving financial law alone, an admission of liability made in his presence is not considered as an admission made in the presence of a court. This applies even if he possesses semichah.
When, by contrast, a court is composed of three judges, even though they do not possesses semichah, and even if they are ordinary men and are not referred to as Elohim, an admission made in their presence is considered as an admission made in a court of law. Similarly, if a person denies an obligation in their presence and witnesses come and testify against him, he is established as one who has lied. He cannot offer another claim, as we have explained.
The general principle is: With regard to the admission of financial responsibility, cases involving debts, and the like, their authority is the same as that of a court composed of judges possessing semichah with regard to all matters.

כָּל דַּיָּן שֶׁדָּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְטָעָה אִם טָעָה בַּדְּבָרִים הַגְּלוּיִים וְהַיְדוּעִים כְּגוֹן דִּינִין הַמְפֹרָשִׁין בַּמִּשְׁנָה אוֹ בַּגְּמָרָא חוֹזֵר הַדִּין וּמַחְזִירִין הַדָּבָר כְּשֶׁהָיָה וְדָנִין בּוֹ כַּהֲלָכָה. וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַחְזִיר כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָלַךְ זֶה שֶׁנָּטַל הַמָּמוֹן שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אַלָּם אוֹ שֶׁטִּמֵּא דָּבָר טָהוֹר אוֹ שֶׁהוֹרָה בִּכְשֵׁרָה שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה וְהֶאֱכִילָהּ לַכְּלָבִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּרַם לְהַזִּיק לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַזִּיק: The following laws apply whenever a judge adjudicates a case involving financial matters and errs. If his error involves matters that are revealed and known - e.g., a law that is explicitly stated in the Mishnah or the Gemara, the ruling is reversed. The situation is returned to its original status and the judgment required by halachah is rendered. If it is impossible to return the matter to its original status, e.g., the person who unwarrantedly received the money traveled overseas, or he was a stubborn and strong person, the judge is not liable. Although he caused a loss, he did not have the intent of doing so. Similar laws apply if a judge ruled that a substance that was pure was impure, that an animal that was kosher was unacceptable and had it fed to the dogs, or the like.

טָעָה בְּשִׁקּוּל הַדַּעַת כְּגוֹן דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מַחְלֹקֶת תַּנָּאִים אוֹ אָמוֹרָאִים וְלֹא נִפְסְקָה הֲלָכָה כְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן בְּפֵרוּשׁ וְעָשָׂה כְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא יָדַע שֶׁכְּבָר פָּשַׁט הַמַּעֲשֶׂה בְּכָל הָעוֹלָם כְּדִבְרֵי הָאַחֵר. אִם הָיָה זֶה דַּיָּן מֻמְחֶה וְנָטַל רְשׁוּת מֵרֹאשׁ גָּלוּת. אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה נוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת אֲבָל קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן. הוֹאִיל וְהוּא מֻמְחֶה חוֹזֵר הַדִּין. וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַחְזִיר פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. אֶחָד הַנּוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מֵרֹאשׁ גָּלוּת אוֹ הַנּוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָל לֹא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ: Different principles apply if the judge errs in a case requiring a decision to be made by using one's logic to weigh alternative positions, for example, a case arouse involving the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah or the Sages of the Gemara where it was not explicitly stated whose opinion the halachah follows. The judge decided to follow one opinion without knowing it had already been universally established practice within the Torah community to follow the other view.
In such a situation, if the judge was an expert who had been given license to adjudicate cases by the exilarch, or even if he had not been given such license, but the litigants voluntarily accepted him as their judicial authority, the ruling is reversed. The rationale is that he is an expert.
If the ruling cannot be reversed, he is not liable to make restitution. This applies both to a judge who received permission from the exilarch or one received permission from a Jewish court to adjudicate cases in Eretz Yisrael, but not to serve as judge in the diaspora, as explained.

הָיָה הַטּוֹעֶה מֻמְחֶה וְלֹא נָטַל רְשׁוּת וְלֹא קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן. אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מֻמְחֶה אֲבָל קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן לָדוּן לָהֶן כַּדִּין וְטָעָה בְּשִׁקּוּל הַדַּעַת. אִם נָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיַּד מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי וִישַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ. אִם לֹא נָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיָּד יַחְזֹר הַדִּין. וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַחְזִיר יְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ: Different rules apply if the person who erred in a question of logical deduction was an expert judge, but he had not received license to adjudicate cases, nor was he accepted by the litigants as an authority, or was not an expert, but was accepted by the litigants to adjudicate their case according to Torah law. If he personally took property from one litigant and gave it to the other, his actions are irreversible and he should pay the damages from his own resources. If, however, he did not personally take the property from one and give it to the other, the decision should be reversed. If the decision cannot be reversed, he should pay the damages from his own resources.

אֲבָל מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה וְלֹא קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּטַל רְשׁוּת הֲרֵי זֶה בִּכְלַל בַּעֲלֵי זְרוֹעַ וְאֵינוֹ בִּכְלַל הַדַּיָּנִין. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דִּינָיו דִּין בֵּין טָעָה בֵּין לֹא טָעָה וְכָל אֶחָד מִבַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין אִם רָצָה חוֹזֵר וְדָן בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין. וְאִם טָעָה וְנָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיָּד חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ וְחוֹזֵר וְלוֹקֵחַ מִבַּעַל דִּין זֶה שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ שֶׁלֹּא כַּהֲלָכָה. וְאִם אֵין לוֹ לְהַחְזִיר אוֹ שֶׁטִּמֵּא אוֹ שֶׁהֶאֱכִיל דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר לַכְּלָבִים יְשַׁלֵּם כְּדִין כָּל גּוֹרֵם לְהַזִּיק שֶׁזֶּה מִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַזִּיק הוּא: When, however, a person is not an expert and was not accepted by the litigants adjudicates a case, even though he was given permission to act as a judge, he is considered as one of the men of force and not as a proper judge. Therefore, the judgment he renders is of no consequence. This applies whether he erred or whether he did not err. Either one of the litigants may withdraw and have the case adjudicated by a proper court.
If such a judge erred and personally gave property from one litigant to the other, he is obligated to pay from his own resources. He may then regain the money from the litigant to whom he gave property unlawfully. If one litigant paid the other because of the ruling of such a judge and the recipient is unable to return the money or if the judge rendered an object ritually impure or gave meat that was kosher to the dogs to eat, the judge must bear the loss as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages. For such a person has the intent of causing damages.

דַּיָּן שֶׁטָּעָה וְחִיֵּב שְׁבוּעָה לְמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב בָּהּ וְעָשָׂה זֶה פְּשָׁרָה עִם בַּעַל דִּינוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׁבַע וְאַחַר כָּךְ יָדַע שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶּן שְׁבוּעָה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ עַל הַפְּשָׁרָה אֵינָהּ כְּלוּם שֶׁלֹּא קִבֵּל עָלָיו לִתֵּן לוֹ אוֹ לִמְחל לוֹ אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּפָּטֵר מִשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁחִיְּבוֹ בָּהּ הַטּוֹעֶה וְכָל קִנְיָן בְּטָעוּת חוֹזֵר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה: When a judge errs and obligates a person who is not required to take an oath to do so, and in order to free himself from the obligation to take the oath, this person negotiated a compromise with the other litigant, the compromise may be revoked. Even though he affirmed the compromise with a kinyan, it is of no substance. He agreed to pay or to waive the other person's liability only to free himself from the oath to which the person who erred obligated him. And whenever a kinyan is carried out on the basis of an error, it is annulled. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

שְׁנַיִם שֶׁנִּתְעַצְּמוּ בַּדִּין אֶחָד אוֹמֵר נָדוּן כָּאן וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר נַעֲלֶה לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁמָּא יִטְעוּ אֵלּוּ הַדַּיָּנִין וְיוֹצִיאוּ מָמוֹן שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ. וְאִם אָמַר כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לִי מֵאֵי זֶה טַעַם דַּנְתּוּנִי שֶׁמָּא טְעִיתֶם כּוֹתְבִים וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מוֹצִיאִין מִמֶּנּוּ. וְאִם הֻצְרַךְ לִשְׁאל דָּבָר מִבֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם כּוֹתְבִים וְשׁוֹלְחִין וְשׁוֹאֲלִין וְדָנִין לָהֶם בְּעִירָם כְּפִי מַה שֶּׁיָּבוֹא בִּכְתַב בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל: When two people are involved in a dispute concerning a judgment, one states: "Let us have the matter judged here," and the other says, "Let us ascend to the Supreme Court, lest these judges err and expropriate money contrary to the law," we compel the latter litigant to have the matter adjudicated locally.
If he asks the judges: "Write down the rationale why you have rendered this judgment against me and give it to me, lest you have erred," they must write down their rationales and give him the transcript. Afterwards, they expropriate what he owes. If the local judges feel the need to ask for clarification regarding a matter from the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, they should write down their question and send it. After their inquiry, the judgment should be rendered in the local court on the basis of the answer written to them by the Supreme Court.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּשְׁאָר הַדִּינִין שֶׁזֶּה טוֹעֵן וְזֶה טוֹעֵן אוֹ כְּשֶׁאָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה נָדוּן כָּאן וְהַלּוֶֹה אוֹמֵר נֵלֵךְ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה נֵלֵךְ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל כּוֹפִין אֶת הַלּוֶֹה וְעוֹלֶה עִמּוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי כב ז) "עֶבֶד לוֶֹה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה". וְכֵן אִם טָעַן זֶה שֶׁהִזִּיקוֹ אוֹ גְּזָלוֹ וְרָצָה הַטּוֹעֵן לַעֲלוֹת כּוֹפִין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁבְּעִירוֹ אֶת הַנִּטְעָן לַעֲלוֹת עִמּוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה: When does the above apply? With regards to judgments dependent on claims issued by both litigants or a situation when a lender desires to have the case adjudicated locally and the borrower says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court." If, by contrast, the lender says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court," we compel the borrower to ascend with the lender, as implied by Proverbs 22:7: "A borrower is a servant to the lender."
Similarly, if a person claims that his colleague injured or damaged his person or his property or stole from him, and the plaintiff desires to ascend to the Supreme Court, the local court compels the defendant to ascend together with him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים כְּשֶׁיִּהְיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים אוֹ רְאָיָה לַנִּגְזָל אוֹ לַנִּזָּק אוֹ לַמַּלְוֶה. אֲבָל טַעֲנָה רֵקָנִית אֵין מְחַיְּבִין אֶת הַנִּטְעָן לָצֵאת כְּלָל אֶלָּא נִשְׁבָּע בִּמְקוֹמוֹ וְנִפְטָר: When does the above apply? When the person from who property was stolen, the person who suffered injury or damage, or the lender has witnesses or proof that support his claim. When, however, his claim is unsupported, we do not obligate the defendant to leave his locale. Instead, he takes an oath there and is freed of obligation.

וְכֵן הַדִּין בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה שֶׁאֵין שָׁם בֵּית דִּין גָּדוֹל אֲבָל יֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חֲכָמִים גְּדוֹלִים מֻמְחִין לָרַבִּים וּמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן תַּלְמִידִים שֶׁאֵינָן כְּמוֹתָן. אִם אָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה נֵלֵךְ לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁבְּאֶרֶץ פְּלוֹנִית לִפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי הַגָּדוֹל וְנָדוּן לְפָנָיו בְּדִין זֶה. שֶׁכּוֹפִין אֶת הַלּוֶֹה וְהוֹלֵךְ עִמּוֹ. וְכֵן הָיוּ מַעֲשִׂים בְּכָל יוֹם בִּסְפָרַד: Similar concepts apply in the present age, when there is no Supreme Court, but there are places where there are great sages whose expertise is renown and there are other places where there are scholars who are not on that level. If the lender says: "Let us go to this-and-this place in this-and-this land to have the case adjudicated by so-and-so, the great sage," we compel the borrower to go with him. This was the practice continually in Spain.

אֶחָד מִבַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין שֶׁאָמַר אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי יָדוּן לִי וְאָמַר בַּעַל דִּינוֹ פְּלוֹנִי יָדוּן לִי הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי הַדַּיָּנִים שֶׁבֵּרֵר זֶה אֶחָד וְזֶה אֶחָד הֵם בּוֹרְרִים לָהֶן דַּיָּן שְׁלִישִׁי וּשְׁלָשְׁתָּן דָּנִין לִשְׁנֵיהֶן שֶׁמִּתּוֹךְ כָּךְ יֵצֵא הַדִּין לַאֲמִתּוֹ. אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה הָאֶחָד שֶׁבָּרְרוּ בַּעֲלֵי הַדִּין חָכָם גָּדוֹל וְסָמוּךְ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לָכוֹף אֶת בַּעַל דִּינוֹ שֶׁיָּדוּן אֵצֶל זֶה אֶלָּא גַּם הוּא בּוֹרֵר מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה: The following law applies when one of the litigants says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me," and the other litigant says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me." Together the two judges which were chosen by each of the litigants respectively choose a third judge and the three of them adjudicate the case for the two litigants. In this manner, a true judgment will emerge.
Even if the judge chosen by one of the litigants is a great sage who has received semichah, the one litigant cannot compel the other litigant to have him adjudicate the case. Instead, he also chooses a judge he desires.

מִי שֶׁקִּבֵּל עָלָיו קָרוֹב אוֹ פָּסוּל בֵּין לִהְיוֹתוֹ דַּיָּן בֵּין לִהְיוֹתוֹ עֵד עָלָיו. אֲפִלּוּ קִבֵּל אֶחָד מִן הַפְּסוּלִים בַּעֲבֵרָה כִּשְׁנֵי עֵדִים כְּשֵׁרִים לְהָעִיד עָלָיו אוֹ כִּשְׁלֹשָׁה בֵּית דִּין מֻמְחִין לָדוּן לוֹ. בֵּין שֶׁקִּבֵּל עַל עַצְמוֹ לְאַבֵּד זְכֻיּוֹתָיו וְלִמְחל מַה שֶּׁהָיָה טוֹעֵן עַל פִּיהֶן. בֵּין שֶׁקִּבֵּל שֶׁיִּתֵּן כָּל מַה שֶּׁיִּטְעֹן עָלָיו חֲבֵרוֹ בְּעֵדוּת זוֹ הַפָּסוּל אוֹ בְּדִינוֹ. אִם קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ עַל זֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וְאִם לֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין. נִגְמַר הַדִּין וְהוֹצִיא הַמָּמוֹן בְּדִין זֶה הַפָּסוּל אוֹ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר: The following rules apply when a litigant accepts his own or an opposing litigant's relative or another person who is unacceptable to serve as a judge or a witness in his case. If he affirms his commitment with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. If he did not affirm his commitment with a kinyan, he can retract his consent until the case is concluded. Once the verdict is rendered and the unacceptable judge ruled in his verdict - or a verdict was rendered on the basis of the testimony of an unacceptable witness - that money should be expropriated, the litigant may not retract.
The above laws also apply if a litigant accepted a person who is disqualified because he committed a transgression as two witnesses to testify concerning him or as a court of three judges to rule concerning his interests. Similarly, it applies regardless of whether he gave his consent at the risk of forfeiting rights and waiving a claim that he is pressing or he gave his consent at the risk of having to pay what the plaintiff demands of him because of the testimony of this unacceptable witness or because of the ruling of this unacceptable judge.

וְכֵן מִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּב לַחֲבֵרוֹ שְׁבוּעָה בְּבֵית דִּין וְאָמַר לוֹ הִשָּׁבַע לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשְׁךָ וְהִפָּטֵר אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשְׁךָ וְאֶתֵּן לְךָ כָּל מַה שֶּׁתִּטְעֹן. אִם קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ וְאִם לֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין. נִגְמַר הַדִּין וְנִשְׁבַּע כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר וְחַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם: Similarly, the following rules apply when a person was obligated by a court to take an oath to a colleague and the person to whom the oath must be given state: "Take an oath on your own life, and be freed of liability," or "Take an oath on your own life that your claim is justified and I will give you everything that you claim." If he affirms his commitment with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. If he did not affirm his commitment with a kinyan, he can retract his consent until the case is concluded. Once the case is concluded and he took an oath as stipulated, he cannot retract and is obligated to pay.

וְהוּא הַדִּין לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּב שְׁבוּעַת הֶסֵּת וַהֲפָכָהּ. אִם קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ אוֹ אִם נִשְׁבַּע זֶה שֶׁנֶּהְפְּכָה עָלָיו אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ: Similar laws apply when a person was obligated to take a sh'vuat hesset and he reversed it and obligated the plaintiff. If he affirmed his consent with a kinyan or the plaintiff took the oath, the defendant cannot retract.

וְהוּא הַדִּין בְּמִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה חַיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאָמַר אֶשָּׁבַע לְךָ שְׁבוּעָה. אִם קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וְאִם לֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁקִּבֵּל בְּבֵית דִּין חוֹזֵר עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין וְיִשָּׁבַע: Similarly, when a person was not obligated to take an oath and yet he said: "I will take an oath in response to your claim," if he affirmed his statement with a kinyan, he cannot retract. If he did not affirm his statement with a kinyan, he has the right to retract until the judgment is concluded and he actually takes the oath, even though he made his commitment in court.

מִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּב בְּבֵית דִּין וְהֵבִיא עֵדִים אוֹ רְאָיָה לִזְכוּתוֹ. סוֹתֵר אֶת הַדִּין וְחוֹזֵר הַדִּין. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּבָר נִגְמַר הַדִּין כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא רְאָיָה סוֹתֵר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ הַדַּיָּנִים כָּל רְאָיוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לְךָ הָבֵא מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵבִיא רְאָיָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם סוֹתֵר אֶת הַדִּין. מַה יַּעֲשֶׂה אִם לֹא מָצָא בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים וּמָצָא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים: When a person was obligated by a court, and then brought witnesses or proof to vindicate himself, the judgment is rescinded and the case should be tried again. Although the judgment was already rendered, whenever he brings support for his claim, the judgment is rescinded.
Even if the judges tell him: "Bring all the proofs that you have within 30 days," a litigant may have the judgment rescinded although he brings proof after 30 days. What can he do if he did not discover the proof within 30 days, but found it afterwards?

אֲבָל אִם סָתַם אֶת טַעֲנוֹתָיו אֵינוֹ סוֹתֵר. כֵּיצַד. אָמְרוּ לוֹ יֵשׁ לְךָ עֵדִים אָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים. יֵשׁ לְךָ רְאָיָה אָמַר אֵין לִי רְאָיָה. וְדָנוּ אוֹתוֹ וְחִיְּבוּהוּ. כֵּיוָן שֶׁרָאָה שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּב אָמַר קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהָעִידוּנִי אוֹ שֶׁהוֹצִיא רְאָיָה מִתּוֹךְ אֲפֻנְדָּתוֹ אֵין זֶה כְּלוּם וְאֵין מַשְׁגִּיחִין עַל עֵדָיו וְעַל רְאָיָתוֹ: If, however, the litigant completed stating his claims, he cannot have the judgment rescinded.
What is implied? The judges asked him: "Do you have witnesses supporting your claim?"
He replied: "I do not have witnesses."
"Do you have proof of your position?"
"I do not have proof," he answered.
In such a situation, if the court judged him and held him liable, the judgment is not rescinded. Although when he sees that he was being held liable, he declared: "So-and-so and so-and-so come forward and testify on my behalf" or he produced written proof from his money-belt, it is not significant. We do not pay any attention to his witnesses or his proof.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים כְּשֶׁהָיְתָה הָרְאָיָה אֶצְלוֹ וְהָעֵדִים עִמּוֹ בַּמְּדִינָה. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים וְאֵין לִי רְאָיָה וּלְאַחַר מִכָּאן בָּאוּ לוֹ עֵדִים מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם. אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה הַחֵמֶת שֶׁל אָבִיו שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם הַשְּׁטָרוֹת מֻפְקֶדֶת בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים וּבָא זֶה שֶׁהַפִּקָּדוֹן אֶצְלוֹ וְהוֹצִיא לוֹ רְאָיָתוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא וְסוֹתֵר. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה סוֹתֵר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִטְעֹן וְלוֹמַר זֶה שֶׁאָמַרְתִּי אֵין לִי עֵדִים אֵין לִי רְאָיָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הָיוּ מְצוּיִין אֶצְלִי. וְכָל זְמַן שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִטְעֹן וְלוֹמַר זֶה שֶׁאָמַרְתִּי אֵין לִי עֵדִים אֵין לִי רְאָיָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הָיוּ מְצוּיִין אֶצְלִי אוֹ מִפְּנֵי כָּךְ וְכָךְ אָמַרְתִּי אֵין לִי עֵדִים וְאֵין לִי רְאָיָה וְהָיָה מַמָּשׁ בִּדְבָרָיו הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא סָתַם טַעֲנוֹתָיו וְסוֹתֵר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם פֵּרֵשׁ וְאָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים כְּלָל לֹא הֵנָּה וְלֹא בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְלֹא רְאָיָה כְּלָל לֹא בְּיָדִי וְלֹא בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִסְתֹּר: When does the above apply? When the proof was in his possession and the witnesses were together with him in the country. If, however, he said: "I have neither witnesses, nor proof," and afterwards, witnesses came from overseas or a leather satchel belonging to his father where legal documents were held had been entrusted to another person and that person came and supplied him with proof, he may call on these witnesses and/or this proof and have the ruling rescinded.
Why may he have the ruling rescinded? Because he could claim: "The reason I said: 'I don't have any witnesses' and 'I don't have any proof is because they were not available to me." Whenever he could make such a claim and there is substance to his words, he is not considered to have completed stating his claims when he originally stated: "I have no witnesses...." He may bring the witnesses and/or proof and have the judgment rescinded.
Accordingly, if he explicitly states: "I have no witnesses at all, neither here or overseas, nor any written proof, neither in my possession or in the possession of others," he cannot have the judgment rescinded.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּגָדוֹל שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּב וְהֵבִיא רְאָיוֹת וְהֵבִיא עֵדִים אַחַר שֶׁסָּתַם טַעֲנוֹתָיו. אֲבָל יוֹרֵשׁ שֶׁהוּא קָטָן כְּשֶׁמֵּת מוֹרִישׁוֹ וּבָאוּ עָלָיו טְעָנוֹת מֵחֲמַת מוֹרִישׁוֹ אַחַר שֶׁהִגְדִּיל וְאָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים וְאֵין לִי רְאָיָה וְאַחַר שֶׁיָּצָא מִבֵּית דִּין חַיָּב אָמְרוּ לוֹ אֲחֵרִים אָנוּ יוֹדְעִים לְאָבִיךָ עֵדוּת שֶׁתִּסְתֹּר בָּהּ דִּין זֶה. אוֹ אָמַר לוֹ אֶחָד מוֹרִישְׁךָ הִפְקִיד רְאָיָה זוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא מִיָּד וְסוֹתֵר שֶׁאֵין הַיּוֹרֵשׁ קָטָן יוֹדֵעַ כָּל רְאָיוֹת מוֹרִישׁוֹ: When does the above apply? With regard to an adult who was held liable and then brought written proof or witnesses after completing the statement of his arguments.
Different concepts apply, however, with regard to an heir who was a minor when the person whose estate he inherited died and a suit was lodged against him because of that person after he came of age. Even though he stated: "I have neither witnesses, nor proof," and after he departed from the court after being held liable, others told him: "We know testimony that favors your father that will cause this judgment to be rescinded," or "The person whose estate you inherited entrusted this written proof to me," he may bring the testimony or the proof immediately and have the judgment rescinded. The rationale is that a minor is not aware of all the proofs possessed by the person whose estate he inherited.

מִי שֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ שֶׁאִם לֹא יָבוֹא בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וְיִשָּׁבַע יִהְיֶה חֲבֵרוֹ נֶאֱמָן בְּטַעֲנָתוֹ וְיִטּל כָּל מַה שֶּׁטָּעַן בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה. אוֹ שֶׁאִם לֹא יָבוֹא בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וְיִשָּׁבַע וְיִטּל אִבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ כְּלוּם וְיִפָּטֵר חֲבֵרוֹ. וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא בָּא נִתְקַיְּמוּ הַתְּנָאִים וְאִבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ. וְאִם הֵבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁהָיָה אָנוּס בְּאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִקִּנְיָן זֶה וְיִשָּׁבַע כְּשֶׁיִּתְבָּעֶנּוּ חֲבֵרוֹ כְּשֶׁהָיָה מִקֹּדֶם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה: The following rules apply when a person affirmed his consent to the following agreement with a kinyan: If he does not come on this-and-this day and take an oath, his colleague's claim would be accepted and that colleague could take whatever he claims without taking an oath. Alternatively, if he does not come on this-and-this day, take an oath, and collect his due, he forfeits his right to the claim. Nothing is to be granted him and his colleague is released of liability. Should that day pass and he not come, the stipulation is binding and he forfeits his rights.
If, however, he brings proof that he was held back by forces beyond his control on that day, he is not bound by his agreement. He may take an oath against the claim issued by his colleague as before. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

בֵּית דִּין שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ מִקְצָתָם אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וּמִקְצָתָם אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב הוֹלְכִין אַחַר הָרֹב. וְזוֹ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁל תּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כג ב) "אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת". בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וּבִשְׁאָר דִּינֵי אָסוּר וּמֻתָּר וְטָמֵא וְטָהוֹר וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. אֲבָל בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בָּזֶה הַחוֹטֵא אִם יֵהָרֵג אוֹ לֹא יֵהָרֵג. אִם הָיוּ הָרֹב מְזַכִּים זַכַּאי וְאִם הָיוּ הָרֹב מְחַיְּבִין אֵינוֹ נֶהֱרָג עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין יֶתֶר עַל הַמְזַכִּים שְׁנַיִם. מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה לָמְדוּ שֶׁעַל זֶה הִזְהִירָה תּוֹרָה וְאָמְרָה (שמות כג ב) "לֹא תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְרָעֹת". כְּלוֹמַר אִם הָרֹב נוֹטִים לְרָעָה לַהֲרֹג לֹא תִּהְיֶה אַחֲרֵיהֶם עַד שֶׁיִּטּוּ הַטָּיָה גְּדוֹלָה וְיוֹסִיפוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין שְׁנַיִם. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כג ב) "לִנְטֹת אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת" הַטָּיָתְךָ לְטוֹבָה עַל פִּי אֶחָד לְרָעָה עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. וְכָל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים קַבָּלָה הֵם: When a court reaches a split decision - some say that the defendant is not liable, and others say that he is liable, we follow the majority. This is a positive mitzvah of Scriptural origin, as Exodus 23:2 states: "Follow after the inclination of the majority."
When does the above apply? With regard to financial matters and with regard to laws involving questions of what is forbidden and what is permitted, what is impure and what is pure and the like. With regard to capital cases, different laws apply if there is a difference of opinion whether the transgressor should be executed or not. If the majority rule to exonerate him, he is exonerated. If, however, the majority rules that he is guilty, he should not be executed until there are at least two more judges who hold him guilty than who exonerate him.
According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that the Torah warned against this saying Ibid.: "Do not follow the majority to do harm." That is to say that if the majority are inclined "to do harm," i.e., to execute the defendant, you should not follow them until there is a significant inclination, and there is a majority of two judges who rule that he is guilty.
This is implied by (Ibid.): "to follow the inclination of the majority and influence the judgment." A positive inclination may be made on the basis of a majority of one, a harmful inclination, on the basis of a majority of two. All of these concepts are based on the Oral Tradition.

בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה זַכַּאי. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר זַכַּאי הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר זַכַּאי וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ. אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם זַכַּאי אוֹ חַיָּב וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ יוֹסִיפוּ הַדַּיָּנִים שְׁנַיִם. נִמְצְאוּ חֲמִשָּׁה נוֹשְׂאִים וְנוֹתְנִים בַּדָּבָר. אָמְרוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה מֵהֶם זַכַּאי וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה זַכַּאי. אָמְרוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה חַיָּב וּשְׁנַיִם זַכַּאי הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. אָמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם מֵהֶם זַכַּאי וּשְׁנַיִם מֵהֶם חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מוֹסִיפִין שְׁנַיִם. אֲבָל אִם אָמְרוּ אַרְבָּעָה זַכַּאי אוֹ חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ. אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה זַכַּאי וְאֶחָד חַיָּב וְאָמַר אֶחָד אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה זֶה שֶׁאָמַר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ הוּא שֶׁאָמַר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ בַּתְּחִלָּה בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר אַחֵר הוֹלְכִים אַחַר הָרֹב. הָיוּ מֶחֱצָה לְמֶחֱצָה וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוֹסִיפִין שְׁנַיִם אֲחֵרִים. וְכֵן אִם נִסְתַּפֵּק הַדָּבָר מוֹסִיפִין וְהוֹלְכִין עַד שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. הִגִּיעוּ לְשִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד וְאָמְרוּ שְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה חַיָּב וּשְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה זַכַּאי וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ נוֹשְׂאִים וְנוֹתְנִים עִמּוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּחֲזֹר לְדִבְרֵי הַצַּד הָאֶחָד וְנִמְצְאוּ שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשִׁשָּׁה מְזַכִּים אוֹ מְחַיְּבִין. וְאִם לֹא חָזַר לֹא הוּא וְלֹא אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי הַדָּבָר סָפֵק וּמַעֲמִידִין אֶת הַמָּמוֹן בְּחֶזְקַת בְּעָלָיו: The following laws apply when there is a difference of opinion within a court of three judges with regard to a monetary issue: If two say the defendant's claim should be vindicated and one says that he is liable, his claim is vindicated. If two say that he is liable and one says his claim should be vindicated, he is held liable. If one says that his claim should be vindicated and one says he is liable, or two say that his claim should be vindicated or that he is liable and the third judge says: "I do not know," we add another two judges. Thus five judges debate the matter.
If three say the defendant's claim should be vindicated and two say that he is liable, his claim is vindicated. If three say that he is liable and two say his claim should be vindicated, he is held liable. If two say that his claim should be vindicated and two say he is liable, and the fifth judge says: "I do not know," we add another two judges. If, however, four say his claim should be vindicated or that he is liable and one says: "I don't know," or three say his claim should be vindicated and one says that he is liable, and the fifth says: "I don't know," we follow the majority. This applies whether the judge who says: "I don't know" is the same who said "I don't know" at the outset or another individual.
If, in this situation as well, the opinions are evenly balanced and one says: "I don't know," or in any situation that there is a doubt, we continue to add two more judges until we reach 71 judges. If, after reaching 71, the issue is still unresolved, i.e., 35 hold him liable, and 35 wish to vindicate his claim and one says: "I don't know," they debate the matter until the judge who has not made up his mind sides with one of the opinions and thus there will be 36 who vindicate him or 36 who hold him liable. If neither that judge or another changes his opinion, the matter remains unresolved and the money is allowed to remain in the possession of its owner.

כָּל מִי שֶׁאָמַר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לָתֵת טַעַם לִדְבָרָיו וּלְהוֹדִיעַ מֵאֵי זֶה טַעַם בָּא לוֹ הַסָּפֵק. כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁמַּרְאֶה הַמְזַכֶּה מֵאֵי זֶה טַעַם מְזַכֶּה וְהַמְחַיֵּב מֵאֵי זֶה טַעַם מְחַיֵּב: Whenever a judge says: "I don't know," he is not required to explain the rationale for his statements and explain the reason why he is in doubt. In contrast, a judge who rules that a litigant's claim is vindicated must state why he vindicates the claim, or if he holds him liable, he must state why he holds him liable.

סַנְּהֶדְרִין שֶׁפָּתְחוּ כֻּלָּם בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת תְּחִלָּה וְאָמְרוּ כֻּלָּן חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שָׁם מִקְצָת מְזַכִּין שֶׁיְּהַפְּכוּ בִּזְכוּתוֹ וְיִרְבּוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין וְאַחַר כָּךְ יַהֲרֹג: When all the judges of a Sanhedrin begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable, he is exonerated. There must be some who seek to exonerate him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable. Only then he is executed.

סַנְהֶדְרִי קְטַנָּה שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וְאַחַד עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה זַכַּאי. שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב וְאַחַד עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ אַחַד עָשָׂר זַכַּאי וְאַחַד עָשָׂר חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אֲפִלּוּ עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁנַיִם מְזַכִּין אוֹ מְחַיְּבִין וְהָאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ יוֹסִיפוּ שְׁנַיִם. זֶה שֶׁאָמַר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה וְנִמְצְאוּ אַחַר הַתּוֹסֶפֶת עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חוּץ מִזֶּה הַמִּסְתַּפֵּק. אָמְרוּ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר זַכַּאי וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה זַכַּאי. אַחַד עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהָאֶחָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹנִים אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי הַמְחַיְּבִין רַבּוּ בִּשְׁנַיִם. אָמְרוּ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר זַכַּאי וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מוֹסִיפִין שְׁנַיִם אֲחֵרִים. וְכֵן מוֹסִיפִין וְהוֹלְכִין עַד שֶׁיִּרְבּוּ הַמְזַכִּין אֶחָד וִיהֵא זַכַּאי אוֹ יִרְבּוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין שְׁנַיִם אוֹ יוֹתֵר וִיהֵא חַיָּב. הָיוּ אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין יוֹתֵר אֶחָד בִּלְבַד מוֹסִיפִין וְהוֹלְכִין עַד שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. הִגִּיעוּ לְשִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשִׁשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וּשְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה זַכַּאי. שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשִׁשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב וּשְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי דָּנִים אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ עַד שֶׁיִּרְאֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן דִּבְרֵי חֲבֵרוֹ וּמְזַכִּין אוֹתוֹ אוֹ מְחַיְּבִין אוֹתוֹ. וְאִם לֹא רָאָה גָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּדַּיָּנִים אוֹמֵר נִזְדַּקֵּן הַדִּין וּפוֹטְרִין אוֹתוֹ. שְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב וּשְׁלֹשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ פּוֹטְרִין אוֹתוֹ. אַרְבָּעָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי וְשִׁשָּׁה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי רַבּוּ הַמְחַיְּבִין שְׁנַיִם: The following rules apply when there is a difference of opinion in a minor Sanhedrin. If twelve judges say that he should be exonerated and eleven say that he should be held liable, he is exonerated. If twelve say that he is liable and eleven say that he should be exonerated or eleven say that he should be exonerated and eleven say that he is liable, and one says: "I don't know," we add two judges. Even if there are twelve who wish to exonerate him and twelve who hold him liable, and one who one says: "I don't know," we add two judges. The rationale is that the judge who says: "I don't know," is considered as if he does not exist, for he cannot change his mind and explain why the defendant should be held liable. Thus after the addition, there are 24 judges aside from the person who says: "I don't know."
If twelve say that he should be exonerated and twelve say that he is liable, he is exonerated. If eleven say that he should be exonerated and thirteen say that he is liable, he is liable. This applies even if one of the original judges says: "I don't know." For there are two more judges who rule that he is liable.
If twelve say that he should be exonerated and twelve say that he is liable, we add two judges. And similarly, if the balance is not broken, we continue to add two judges until there is at least one more judge who rules that he should be exonerated or at least two more judges who rule that he should be held liable. If there are an even number of judges on both sides, and one says: "I don't know," or if the number of judges who rule that he is liable is only one more than those who rule that he should be exonerated, we continue to add judges until we reach 71.
The following rules apply when the court reaches that size. If 36 say that he should be exonerated and 35 say that he is liable, he should be exonerated. If 36 say that he is liable and 35 say that he should be exonerated, they debate back and forth against each other until one of them sees the other's perspective and either exonerates him or holds him liable. If such a change in perspective does not take place, the judge of the greatest stature declares: "This judgment has become aged," and he is released.
If 35 say that he is liable and 35 say that he should be exonerated, and one says "I don't know," we release him. If 34 say that he should be exonerated and 36 say that he is liable, and one says: "I don't know," he is held liable. For there is a majority of two judges who hold him liable.

בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּא לָהֶם מַחְלֹקֶת בֵּין בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בֵּין בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בֵּין בְּדִינֵי תּוֹרָה. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶן אֶלָּא דָּנִין אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ וְהוֹלְכִין אַחַר הָרֹב שֶׁלָּהֶן. וְאִם בְּדִין אֶחָד מִן הַנֶּהֱרָגִין נֶחְלְקוּ דָּנִין אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ עַד שֶׁיִּפְטְרוּהוּ אוֹ יִתְחַיֵּב: When there is a difference of opinion in the Supreme Sanhedrin, whether with regard to a law involving capital punishment, monetary law, or other matters of Torah law, we do not add judges. Instead, they debate against each other and the ruling follows the majority. If their difference of opinion involves whether a person will be executed, they should debate against each other until they either exonerate him or hold him liable.

מַה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נפָשׁוֹת. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַחֲזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחֲזִירִין לְחוֹבָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכּל רְאוּיִין לְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אוֹ חוֹבָה בֵּין הַדַּיָּנִים בֵּין הַתַּלְמִידִים וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַכּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וַאֲפִלּוּ הַתַּלְמִידִים וְאֵין מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה אֶלָּא הַדַּיָּנִים. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַדַּיָּן הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין יֵשׁ לוֹ לַחְזֹר וּלְהִמָּנוֹת עִם הַמְחַיְּבִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם לִזְכוּת וּבַיּוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה: What are the differences between cases involving financial matters and cases involving capital punishment? Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated by three judges, while cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated by 23. In cases involving financial matters, we begin the judgment either with a statement to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we begin with a statement which points towards acquittal, as we explained, and we don't begin with one which points toward his conviction.
In cases involving financial matters, we make a decision based on a majority of one whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we acquit him on the basis of a majority of one, but convict him only when there is a majority of two. In cases involving financial matters, we retry a judgment whether doing so is to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we retry a judgment if it will lead to acquittal, but not if it will lead to conviction, as we explained.
In cases involving financial matters, everyone - both the judges or the scholars - is entitled to advance any rationale whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, everyone - even the students - may advance a rationale leading to acquittal, but only the judges may advance a rationale leading to conviction. In cases involving financial matters, a person who advanced a rationale to the defendant's detriment may change his mind and advance a rationale in his support. Conversely, one who advanced a rationale in the defendant's support may change his mind and advance a rationale to his detriment. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a judge who advanced a rationale for conviction may advance a rationale for acquittal, but a judge who advanced a rationale for acquittal may not change his mind and advance a rationale for conviction. At the time the judgment is being rendered, however, he may vote to be counted among those favoring conviction, as we explained.
Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated during the day, but the verdict may be rendered at night. Cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated during the day and the verdict must also be rendered during the day. The verdict in cases involving financial matters is rendered on that very day, whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a verdict of acquittal is rendered on that very day, but a verdict of conviction is not rendered until the following day.

לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת לֹא עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא עֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב שֶׁמָּא יִתְחַיֵּב וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהָרְגוֹֹ לְמָחָר וְאָסוּר לְעַנּוֹת אֶת דִּינוֹ וּלְהַנִּיחוֹ אַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת אֶלָּא אוֹסְרִין אוֹתוֹ עַד אֶחָד בְּשַׁבָּת וּמַתְחִילִין בְּדִינוֹ: For this reason, we do not adjudicate cases involving capital punishment on Fridays, nor on the days preceding festivals. The rationale is that the defendant may be convicted and it is impossible to execute him on the following day, but it is forbidden to postpone his execution until after the Sabbath. Hence, we imprison him and begin his trial on Sunday.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדָּנִין אוֹתָן בְּכָל יוֹם מִן הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות יח כב) "וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם בְּכָל עֵת" מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם לָמְדוּ שֶׁאֵין דָּנִין בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת: According to Scriptural Law, cases involving financial law can be adjudicated at all times, as Exodus 18:22 states: "They shall judge the people at all times." According to Rabbinic Law, cases are not adjudicated on Fridays.

אֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי גָּלוּת הַדִּינִים הָאֵלּוּ שָׁוִים בָּהֶן אֶלָּא שֶׁהַמַּלְקוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה וְאֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן בְּשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל חוּץ מִדָּבָר אֶחָד שֶׁדִּינוֹ בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה: All of the same laws that apply to cases involving capital punishment apply also to cases involving lashes and exile, except that cases involving lashes are adjudicated by three judges. None of these distinctions are made with regard to the judgment of an ox that is stoned except for one, that the judgment is adjudicated by 23 judges.

הַמַּסִּית אֵין דִּינָיו כִּשְׁאָר דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. מְכַמְנִין לוֹ אֶת הָעֵדִים. וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ הַתְרָאָה כִּשְׁאָר הַנֶּהֱרָגִין. וְאִם יָצָא מִבֵּית דִּין זַכַּאי וְאָמַר אֶחָד יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו חוֹבָה מַחֲזִירִין אוֹתוֹ. יָצָא חַיָּב וְאָמַר אֶחָד יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו זְכוּת אֵין מַחֲזִירִין אוֹתוֹ. וְאֵין טוֹעֲנִין לְמַסִּית. וּמוֹשִׁיבִין בְּדִינוֹ זָקֵן וְסָרִיס וּמִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּנִים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְרַחֲמוּ עָלָיו. שֶׁהָאַכְזָרִיּוּת עַל אֵלּוּ שֶׁמַּטְעִין אֶת הָעָם אַחֲרֵי הַהֶבֶל רַחֲמִים הוּא בָּעוֹלָם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יג יח) "לְמַעַן יָשׁוּב ה' מֵחֲרוֹן אַפּוֹ וְנָתַן לְךָ רַחֲמִים": The laws which pertain to a mesit, a person who entices others to serve false divinities, differ from those pertaining to others liable for capital punishment. We hide witnesses to observe his act. He does not need a warning as must be given to others who are executed. If he departed from the court after being acquitted, and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his conviction," he is returned and retried. If he was sentenced to death and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his release," he is not retried. The court does not advance arguments in defense of a mesit. An elderly person, a eunuch, and a person who does not have sons are placed on the court which judges him, so that they will not have mercy on him. For cruelty to those who sway the people after emptiness brings mercy to the world, as implied by Deuteronomy 13:19: "so that God will turn away from His fierce anger and grant you mercy."

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְכֵן הַטֻּמְאוֹת וְהַטָּהֳרוֹת מַתְחִילִין מִן הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּדַּיָּנִים וְשׁוֹמְעִין אֶת דְּבָרָיו. וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַתְחִילִין מִן הַצַּד וְאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין דִּבְרֵי הַגָּדוֹל אֶלָּא בָּאַחֲרוֹנָה: With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, the judge of the greatest stature gives his ruling first and the other judges hear his ruling. With regard to laws involving capital punishment, we begin from the side. The words of the judge of the highest stature are not heard until the end.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְכֵן הַטֻּמְאוֹת וְכֵן הַטָּהֳרוֹת הָאָב וּבְנוֹ הָרַב וְתַלְמִידוֹ מוֹנִין אוֹתָן בִּשְׁנַיִם. וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וּמַכּוֹת וְקִדּוּשׁ הַחֹדֶשׁ וְעִבּוּר הַשָּׁנָה אָב וּבְנוֹ אוֹ הָרַב וְתַלְמִידוֹ מוֹנִין אוֹתָן בְּאֶחָד: With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as two judges. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, lashes, and the sanctification of the moon and the declaration of a leap year, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as one.

זֶה שֶׁאָנוּ מוֹנִין הָאָב עִם הַבֵּן בֵּין בְּאֶחָד בֵּין בִּשְׁנַיִם כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה הָאֶחָד מֵהֶן בַּסַּנְהֶדְרִין וְהַשֵּׁנִי הָיָה מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים שֶׁאָמַר יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אוֹ חוֹבָה שׁוֹמְעִין דְּבָרָיו וְנוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין עִמּוֹ וְנִמְנִין עִמּוֹ: The concept that a father and a son are counted as one or as two applies when one is a member of the Sanhedrin and the other was one of the students attending the court who said: "I can contribute a rationale that will lead to his vindication," or "...to his being held liable." We listen to his words and enable him to participate in the debate, and he is counted in the polling of the judges.

וּבִשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין אֵין גּוֹמְרִין אֶת הַדִּין בִּקְרוֹבִים שֶׁהַדַּיָּנִין הַקְּרוֹבִים פְּסוּלִין לְדִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר: At the time of the final judgment, relatives are not included. For judges who are related to each other are not acceptable to rule together, as will be explained.

תַּלְמִיד שֶׁהָיָה חָכָם וּמֵבִין וְהָיָה מְחֻסָּר קַבָּלָה הֲרֵי רַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ הַקַּבָּלָה שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לָהּ בְּדִין זֶה וְהוּא דָּן עִמּוֹ בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת: When a student was wise and understanding but is lacking sufficient knowledge of the tradition, his master may convey to him the tradition which he requires with regard to these laws and then he may serve as a judge even in cases regarding capital punishment.

הַכּל כְּשֵׁרִים לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אֲפִלּוּ גֵּר וְהוּא שֶׁתִּהְיֶה אִמּוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְגֵר דָּן אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ הַגֵּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין אִמּוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְכֵן הַמַּמְזֵר וְהַסּוּמָא בְּאַחַת מֵעֵינָיו כָּשֵׁר לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת. אֲבָל בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן אֶלָּא כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּם וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים הַמַּשִּׂיאִין לִכְהֻנָּה וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן סוּמָא אֲפִלּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵעֵינָיו כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ: All individuals are acceptable to judge cases involving financial laws, even a convert, provided his mother is a native-born Jewess.
A convert may judge a fellow convert even if his mother is not a native-born Jewess. Similarly, a mamzer and a person who is blind in one eye are acceptable to adjudicate financial disputes. Cases involving capital punishment, however, may be judged only by priests, Levites, and Israelites with lineage acceptable to marry into the priesthood. not one of them may be blind even in one of his eyes, as we explained.