[א] יכול הנודר בנזיר ובקרבן יהא מביא קרבן זה? תלמוד לומר "כִּי תִשָּׁבַע" – על שבועה הוא חייב, לא שנדר בנזיר ובקרבן. 1) (Vayikra 5:4) ("Or if a soul swear, to pronounce with the lips, to do harm or to do good, for all that a man will pronounce with an oath, and it be hidden from him, and he knew, and he is guilty in one of these") I might think (the intent of the verse to be that if one violates any pronouncement of the lips, including) a vow to become a Nazir or to bring a sacrifice, he is liable for an offering; it is, therefore, written: "if a soul swear" — It is for an oath that one is liable, and not for the others.
[ב] יכול המהרהר בלב יהא חייב? תלמוד למר "בִשְׂפָתַיִם" – לא בלב. או יכול שאני מוציא את הגומר בלב? תלמוד לומר "לְבַטֵּא". 2) I might think that if one thought (the oath) in his heart (but did not utter it) he were liable; it is, therefore, written "with the lips," not with the heart. Or I might think that I exclude what is resolved in one's heart (as in an instance when one resolves upon a loaf of wheat, but utters (only) "a loaf." It is, therefore, written "to utter" (i.e., so long as there is no contradiction between the utterance and the resolution of the heart, the resolution stands.)
[ג] יכול הנשבע להרע לאחרים יהא חייב? תלמוד לומר 'להרע ולהיטיב'. מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות – יצא הנשבע להרע לאחרים. 3) I might think that if one swore to do harm to others (but did not do so) he were liable (for an offering); it is, therefore, written "to do harm or to do good." Just as doing good is one's option — to exclude one's swearing to do harm to others (which is not his option).
[ד] יכול הנשבע להרע לעצמו יהא פטור? תלמוד לומר 'להרע ולהיטיב'. מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות – אף אני אביא הנשבע להרע לעצמו שיהא חייב. 4) I might think that if one thought to harm himself (but did not do so) he were exempt (from an offering); it is, therefore, written "to do harm or to do good." Just as doing good is one's option, so doing harm is one's option — to include in liability (for an offering) one who swears to harm himself.
[ה] יכול שאני מוציא אף הנשבע להיטיב לאחרים? וכשהוא אומר "או להיטיב" – להיטיב אף לאחרים. 5) I might think that I exclude (from offering-liability) even one who swears to do good to others — "or to do good" includes doing good to others.
[ו] או יכול הנשבע לעבור על המצוה יהא חייב? תלמוד לומר 'להרע ולהיטיב'. מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות – יצא הנשבע לעבור על המצות. 6) Or I might think that if one swore to transgress a mitzvah (but did not do so) he were liable (for an offering); it is, therefore, written: "to do harm or to do good" — Just as doing good is optional, so doing harm is optional, which excludes one who swears to transgress a mitzvah (which is mandatory).
[ז] אוציא את הנשבע לעבור על המצוה ולא אוציא את הנשבע לקיים את המצוה? שהיה בדין שיהיה חייב, דברי (צ"ל כדברי – גר"א) ר' יהודה בן בתירא. אמר ר' יהודה בן בתירא מה אם הרשות – שאינו מושבע עליה מהר סיני – הרי הוא חייב עליה, מצוה – שהוא מושבע עליה מהר סיני – אינו דין שיהא חייב עליה?! אמרו לו: לא! אם אמרת בשבועת הרשות – שכן עשה לאו כהן; תאמר בשבועת מצוה שלא עשה בה לאו כהן?! 7) I would exclude swearing to transgress a mitzvah, but I would not exclude swearing to fulfill a mitzvah from liability (for non-fulfillment), as per R. Yehudah b. Betheirah, viz.: If for something optional against which he is not forsworn from Mount Sinai he is liable, does it not follow a fortiori that for something against which he is forsworn from Mount Sinai he should be liable (for breaking his oath)! — No, in an optional oath (as in "to do harm or to do good") the positive (e.g., to eat) is equated with the negative (not to eat) as opposed to a mitzvah oath, where the positive (e.g., to eat matzah) is not equated with the negative (not to eat matzah).
[ח] 'להרע ולהיטיב' – אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה; דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין? תלמוד לומר "לְבַטֵּא". אין לי אלא להבא; לשעבר מנין? תלמוד לומר "לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא", דברי ר' עקיבא. ר' ישמעאל אומר 'להרע ולהיטיב' – להבא. אמר לו [ר' עקיבא] אם כן אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה; דברים שאין בהם הרעה והטבה מנין? אמר לו: מריבוי הכתוב. אמר לו: אם ריבה הכתוב לכך, ריבה הכתוב לכך! 8) "to do harm or to do good": This tells me only of things which are susceptible of "harm" and "good." Whence do I derive the same for (neutral) things, which are not thus susceptible? From (the superfluous) "that a man will pronounce." This tells me only of (an oath to do something in) the future. Whence do I derive that this (also) applies to (an oath of something having been done in) the past? From "all that a man will pronounce." These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Yishmael says "to do harm or to do good" connotes the future. R. Akiva: If so, this should apply only to (matters of) "harm and good." Whence do I derive that it applies (also) to other (i.e., neutral) matters? R. Yishmael: From the superfluous verse ("that a man will pronounce"). R. Akiva: If the verse is superfluous for this (neutral matters), it is also superfluous for that (an oath re the past).
[ט] "הָאָדָם בִּשְׁבֻעָה" – פרט לאנוס. "וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ" – פרט למזיד. 'ונעלם ממנו..ונעלמה ממנו' – שבועה. או יכול "ונעלם ממנו" החפץ? תלמוד לומר "בִּשְׁבֻעָה ונעלם ממנו" – על העלם שבועה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם החפץ. 9) "a man … with an oath": This excludes one who swore falsely by mistake (assuming that he was telling the truth). "and it be hidden from him": This excludes one who swore falsely deliberately (and repented of it, in which instance he does not bring an offering). "and it be hidden from him": That the oath was "hidden" (i.e., forgotten by) him (e.g., "Did I say that I will or that I will not eat?") or that the object of the oath were "hidden" from him ("Did I say 'wheat bread' or 'barley bread'?") — "an oath and it be hidden from him" implies that he is liable for "hiddenness" of the oath but not for "hiddenness" of the object.