25 Makkot 14a

Ravina says: Actually, the reason Rabbi Akiva rules that those liable to receive karet are flogged is

as we stated initially, that if they repented the heavenly court absolves them of the punishment of karet, and therefore this is not a case of two punishments for one transgression, and there is no exemption from lashes. What do you say in response, that they did not yet repent? Nevertheless, since the matter is not clear-cut with regard to karet, as perhaps they repented, they are therefore not exempt from lashes. § It is taught in the baraita that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Those liable to receive karet in cases of incest were included in the principle: “For anyone who performs any of these abominations, the souls who do so shall be excised from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29). And why was the punishment of karet, when administered to one who engages in intercourse with his sister, excluded from this verse and mentioned independently (Leviticus 20:17)? It is to sentence him to be punished with karet and not to be punished with lashes. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, who maintain that those liable to receive karet are flogged, why do I need karet to be written in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his sister; what does it teach? The Gemara answers: It teaches to divide the various prohibitions of sexual intercourse with forbidden relatives, and is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says that if one performed all the transgressions described in the passage in the Torah enumerating forbidden relatives during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each and every one, as one is liable to receive karet for each and every one. The Gemara asks: And concerning Rabbi Yitzḥak, who derives the halakha that one who is liable to receive karet is not flogged from the fact that karet for one who engages in intercourse with his sister emerged from the generalization, from where does he derive the concept to divide the various prohibitions? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse written with regard to a menstruating woman: “And to a woman in the separation of her impurity you shall not approach” (Leviticus 18:19). From the superfluous expression “and to a woman,” Rabbi Yitzḥak derives that one is liable for intercourse with each and every forbidden woman. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis as well, let them derive the division of the prohibitions from this verse, rather than from the fact that karet for one who engages in intercourse with his sister emerged from the generalization. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, they derive division from the verse with regard to a menstruating woman; but rather, the question again arises: Why do I need karet to be written in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his sister; what does it teach? The Gemara answers: It teaches to render him liable to bring three separate sin-offerings for engaging in intercourse with his sister, and with his father’s sister, and with his mother’s sister, during a single lapse of awareness. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the fact that he is liable to bring three sin-offerings obvious? The actions were performed with separate bodies, i.e., three different women, and those actions violated the names of three separate prohibitions; no derivation is required. Rather, it is to render him liable to bring three separate sin-offerings for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister. The Gemara inquires: And how can you find these circumstances? The Gemara answers: It is found in the case of a wicked person, son of a wicked person. How so? If a man engages in intercourse with his mother, and she bears him two daughters, and he then engages in intercourse with one of the daughters and fathers a son, that son could engage in intercourse with the other daughter, who is his half sister through his father, as well as being his father’s half sister and his mother’s half sister. The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Yitzḥak, from where does he derive this? He derives it by means of an a fortiori inference, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua a question in the meat market [itliz] of the town of Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel’s son. Rabbi Akiva asked: In the case of one who engages in intercourse with his sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister, what is the halakha with regard to bringing a sin-offering? Is he liable to bring only one sin-offering for engaging in intercourse that violated all of the prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every prohibition that he violated when he engaged in intercourse with that woman? Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: We did not hear the halakha in that case. But we heard the halakha in a similar case: One who engages in intercourse with five menstruating women during one lapse of awareness is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one of the women with whom he engaged in intercourse, and it appears with regard to the matter of your inquiry that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every prohibition, by means of an a fortiori inference. How so? If in the case of a menstruating woman, which involves violation of the name of one prohibition, he is liable for intercourse with each and every one, here, where the woman is forbidden due to the names of three prohibitions, is it not all the more so logical that he is liable to bring three sin-offerings? The Gemara explains: And according to the other opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that liability for intercourse with each and every one is derived from an explicit verse, it is a refuted a fortiori inference: What is notable about the case of a menstruating woman? It is notable in that the actions were performed with separate bodies, i.e., different women, while in the case in question, the person engaged in intercourse with one woman. The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak too, this is certainly a refuted a fortiori inference, from which no halakha can be derived. Rather, as for the halakha that a person is liable to bring three sin-offerings for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister, Rabbi Yitzḥak derives it from the phrase “his sister” written in the latter clause of that verse. The verse begins: “And a man who takes his sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother…and they shall be excised…the nakedness of his sister he has revealed, he shall bear his transgression” (Leviticus 20:17). From the repetition of the term sister, it is derived that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every prohibition that he violated. The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion of the Rabbis, who derive this halakha from the term “sister” at the beginning of the verse, why do I need the phrase “his sister” to be written in the latter clause of that verse; what does it teach? The Gemara answers: It teaches to render him liable for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is also the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother, which comes to say that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference. Although the Torah specified liability for one who engaged in intercourse with his paternal sister and for one who engaged in intercourse with his maternal sister, an independent derivation is necessary for liability for one who engaged in intercourse with a woman who is both his paternal and his maternal sister. The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who derives another matter from the term “sister” in the latter verse, from where does he derive liability for one who engaged in intercourse with a woman who is both his paternal and his maternal sister? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say he derives the punishment from the prohibition; just as the prohibition includes intercourse with a woman who is both his paternal and his maternal sister, the same applies to the punishment. And if you wish, say instead that he derives it

from the term “his sister” at the beginning of the verse (Leviticus 20:17), as the verse could have been formulated: And a man who takes the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother, and there is no need to mention a sister at all. Liability for intercourse with a woman who is the daughter of both his father and his mother is derived from the term “his sister.”