51 Megillah 27a

It stands to reason to rule in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is permitted for a synagogue to be made into a study hall. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that the opinion of Rav Pappi is correct. § Bar Kappara interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And he burnt the house of the Lord, and the king’s house, and all the houses of Jerusalem, and every great house he burnt with fire” (II Kings 25:9)? He explained: “The house of the Lord”; this is the Holy Temple. “The king’s house”; these are the king’s palaces [palterin]. “And all the houses of Jerusalem”; as understood in its literal sense. With regard to the final phrase: “And every great house he burnt with fire,” Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about the meaning of “great house”: One of them said: It is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, i.e., the study hall; and the other one said: It is referring to a place where prayer is made great, i.e., the synagogue. The Gemara explains their respective opinions: The one who said that the reference is to where the Torah is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes Torah study as great, as it is written: “The Lord was pleased, for His righteousness’ sake, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21). And the one who said that the reference is to where prayer is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes prayer as great, as it is written: “Tell me, I pray you, all the great things that Elisha has done” (II Kings 8:4), and that which Elisha did, i.e., restored a boy to life, he did through prayer. The Gemara comments: Conclude that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is the one who said that “great house” is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said elsewhere: It is permitted for a synagogue to be made into a study hall. This ruling indicates that he holds that a study hall has a higher degree of sanctity than a synagogue. It is therefore reasonable that he assumes that “great house” is referring specifically to a study hall. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that he was the one who said the term is referring to a place where the Torah is made great. § The mishna states: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. Similarly, the proceeds of the sale of any sacred item may not be used to purchase an item of a lesser degree of sanctity. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: On the one hand, since the proceeds are not raised to a higher degree of sanctity by doing so, maybe it is prohibited; or, perhaps in this case, since there is no possibility of raising it to another, higher degree of sanctity, it seems well and should be permitted? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the mishna: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. One may infer: It is only scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings that may not be purchased with the proceeds, but to purchase a new Torah scroll with the proceeds of an old Torah scroll seems well and is permitted. The Gemara rejects this proof: The mishna discusses the halakha that applies only after the fact that a Torah scroll was sold. Perhaps it is only in that case where the proceeds may be used to purchase another Torah scroll. When the dilemma was raised to us, it was with respect to permitting the sale of one Torah scroll in order to purchase another ab initio. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of the Prophets or Writings, since in each case the wrapping cloths are being used for something with a greater degree of sanctity. However, a scroll of the Prophets or Writings may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll. The Gemara explains the proof: In any event, the baraita is teaching: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. One may infer: A Torah scroll may be rolled up only in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah; but to roll it up in wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll, no, it is not permitted. By extension, one Torah scroll may certainly not be sold in order to purchase another. The Gemara rejects the proof: If this inference is valid, one should be able to say the latter clause and make a similar inference from it. The latter clause teaches: And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll. It may be inferred from this that it is prohibited only to roll up scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll, but to roll up one Torah scroll in the wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll seems well. By extension, one should be permitted to sell a Torah scroll to purchase another. Rather, perforce one must conclude that no inference beyond its basic meaning can be deduced from the baraita, as the inferences are contradictory. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the Tosefta (Megilla 3:12): A Torah scroll may be placed upon another Torah scroll, and a Torah scroll may be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be placed upon scrolls of the Prophets or Writings. However, scrolls of the Prophets or Writings may not be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be placed upon a Torah scroll. From the first clause, it is apparent that one Torah scroll may be used for the sake of another. By extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another. The Gemara rejects this proof: Can you say a proof from the halakha of placing one Torah scroll upon another? The halakha of placing scrolls upon one another is different, because it is impossible to place them in any other way, as they must be laid one atop the other when placed in the ark. As, if you do not say so, that it is indeed permitted when in an unavoidable situation, how could we furl a Torah scroll at all? Does one sheet of parchment not rest upon another? Rather, since it is impossible to furl the scroll in any other way, it is permitted. Here too, since it is impossible to place the scrolls in the ark in any other way, it is permitted. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: A person may not sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one. The Gemara rejects this proof. There, in the case of the baraita, it is prohibited because of a concern for negligence. The old one might be sold and a new one never bought. However, when we speak, it is of a case where the new scroll is already written and waiting to be redeemed immediately with the proceeds of the sale. Therefore, the question remains: What is the halakha in this case? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: A Torah scroll may be sold only if the seller needs the money in order to study Torah or to marry a woman. Learn from this baraita that exchanging one entity of Torah, i.e., a Torah scroll, for another entity of Torah, i.e., Torah study, seems well, and by extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps Torah study is different, as the study of Torah leads to action, i.e., the fulfillment of the mitzvot, and perhaps it is only due to its great importance of Torah study that it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll for it. Similarly, marrying a woman is also of utmost importance, as it is stated with regard to Creation: “He created it not a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18). This indicates that marrying and having children fulfills a primary goal of Creation. But selling an old Torah in order to buy a new Torah might not be permitted. On the same topic, the Sages taught in a baraita: A person may not sell a Torah scroll, even if he does not need it. Furthermore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even if a person has nothing to eat, and out of his need he sold a Torah scroll or he sold his daughter to be a maidservant, he never sees a sign of blessing from the proceeds of either sale. Clearly, it is never appropriate to sell a Torah scroll for any purpose. The mishna states: And similarly, the same limitation applies to any surplus funds from the sale of sacred items. Rava said: They taught that the surplus funds have sanctity only in a case where the community sold a sacred object and then used the proceeds to purchase something with a greater degree of sanctity, and there was money left over. However, if the community collected money from its members in order to purchase a sacred object, and there was extra money left over beyond the price of the object, that extra money is permitted to be used for any purpose, as the money was never sanctified. Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? When they did not explicitly stipulate that they would do with the surplus funds as they see fit. However, if they made such a stipulation, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya is permitted. The Gemara will explain the meaning of the term dukhsusya. Abaye explains the challenge: What are the circumstances of this stipulation? If we say that they sold a sacred object and after using the proceeds to purchase another sacred object there was money left over, then even when they made a stipulation, of what avail is it? How can a stipulation desanctify the money? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where they collected money to purchase a sacred object and there was money left over after they made the purchase. In such a case, the reason that it is permitted to use the extra money for any purpose is that they made an explicit stipulation. However, if they did not make a stipulation, no, it would not be permitted. Rava rejects this argument: Actually, you can explain that the mishna is referring to a case where they sold a sacred object and there was money left over after purchasing a new one, and this is what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? In a case where the seven representatives of the town did not explicitly stipulate that they could use the money as they see fit, in an assembly of the residents of the town. However, if the seven representatives of the town made such a stipulation in an assembly of the residents of the town, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya would also be permitted. Abaye said to one of the Sages who would arrange the Mishna before Rav Sheshet: Did you hear anything from Rav Sheshet with regard to what the meaning of the term dukhsusya is? He said to him: This is what Rav Sheshet said: It is the town horseman who would serve the townspeople as a sentry and for public dispatches. The Gemara introduces a parenthetical comment: Abaye said: Accordingly, one can learn from this incident that with regard to this young Torah scholar who has heard something and does not know the meaning of it, he should inquire of its meaning before somebody who is frequently before the Sages, as it is impossible that such a person did not hear something about it from some great man. § Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the charity collectors in that town made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector, so as not to be suspected of reneging. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them, and with it they finance the poor of their own town. The Gemara comments: That is also taught in a baraita: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them. But in the case of an individual who went from his hometown to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made him pledge a certain sum for charity, he should give it to the poor of that town. The Gemara relates: Rav Huna once decreed a fast day. On the day of the fast, Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai and all the people of his town came to Rav Huna. A certain sum of charity was imposed upon them and they gave it. When they wanted to go home, they said to Rav Huna: May our Master give to us the charity that we gave, and we will go back, and with it we will finance the poor of our own town. He said to them: It was taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement, that the money is returned when the people leave, said? When there is no