01 Beitzah 2a

MISHNA: With regard to an egg that was laid on a Festival (Eduyyot 4:1), Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten even on that day, and Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten, as the Gemara will explain at length. Apropos this exceptional case, in which Beit Shammai are lenient and Beit Hillel are strict, the mishna cites additional halakhot of the Festivals in which this unusual phenomenon occurs (Yoma 79b). Beit Shammai say: Leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, is prohibited on Passover in the measure of an olive-bulk. However, the measure for edible leavened bread is greater, that of a large date-bulk. And Beit Hillel say: For both this and that, the measure is that of an olive-bulk. Furthermore, with regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird on a Festival (Eduyyot 4:2), in which case there is a mitzva from the Torah to cover the blood after slaughtering (Leviticus 17:13), Beit Shammai say: He digs earth with a shovel and covers the blood with that earth ab initio. And Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter ab initio, unless he had earth prepared for that purpose while it was still day. But even Beit Hillel concede that if one already slaughtered the animal or the bird, then he should dig with a shovel and cover the blood. Additionally, they agree that the ashes of a stove are considered prepared for the use of covering blood, as will be explained by the Gemara. GEMARA: The Gemara inquires: With what case are we dealing in this mishna? If we say that the mishna is referring to a chicken that is designated for eating, i.e., one planned to slaughter and eat a chicken that laid an egg, what is the reason that Beit Hillel prohibit eating the egg? It is food that has been separated [de’ifrat]. The entire chicken is considered food, as it is designated for eating, and this egg is simply a part that became detached. Just as one may partake of the chicken itself on a Festival, its egg should likewise be fit for consumption. Rather, the mishna must be referring to the case of a chicken designated for laying eggs. Since the owner of this chicken decided not to eat it on the Festival, it is classified as set-aside [muktze], and muktze items may not even be moved, let alone eaten. Since the chicken itself is muktze, its egg is muktze as well. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason of Beit Shammai for permitting one to eat the egg? After all, it is muktze. The Gemara expresses surprise at this question: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps Beit Shammai do not hold that there is a prohibition of muktze? There are different opinions with regard to the scope of the prohibition of muktze. It is possible that Beit Shammai, like other tanna’im, maintain that there is no prohibition of this type of muktze. Perhaps this is the subject of their dispute with Beit Hillel. Before stating its proposed solutions for this difficulty, the Gemara notes: It enters our mind to say that even one who permits moving an item that was set aside by its owners on a Festival or Shabbat prohibits the owners from doing so with an object that came into being [nolad] on a Festival. One may not move an object that came into being on a Festival or Shabbat, since the owner never entertained the notion that he would be able to use it. This egg is certainly an object that came into being on the Festival. What, then, is the reason of Beit Shammai? Rav Naḥman said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a chicken designated for laying eggs. However, our previous assumption was mistaken, as the Sage who holds that there is a prohibition of muktze in general also holds that there is a prohibition of objects that came into being, while one who does not hold that there is a prohibition of muktze likewise does not hold that there is a prohibition of objects that came into being (Shabbat 45b). Consequently, the dispute can be summed up as follows: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that there is no prohibition of muktze; and Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who rules that there is a prohibition of muktze. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: And did Rav Naḥman actually say that Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shabbat 143a) that Beit Shammai say: One may remove bones and shells left from the meal from the table, despite the fact that they are inedible and are muktze. And Beit Hillel say: It is prohibited to do so; rather, one may remove the entire board [tavla] that is the table surface, which is a vessel that may be carried, and shake it all at once. By moving the table, which is not muktze, one is able to shake off the bones and shells, but he may not move the items themselves. And Rav Naḥman said: That version of the mishna is not in accordance with the halakha; rather, the opinions should be reversed, as we have nothing other than the following version of this dispute: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the prohibition of muktze applies, while Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the halakha of muktze does not apply. Why, then, does Rav Naḥman explain that the ruling of Beit Hillel in the case of the egg in the mishna is based on the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there actually is a prohibition of muktze? The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman could have said to you in reply: With regard to Shabbat, this is a case where the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna, which is generally accepted as the halakha, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 156b): One may cut pumpkins before an animal to facilitate their consumption, and likewise one may cut up an animal carcass before dogs, even if the animal died on Shabbat, to enable them to consume it. Although that carcass is classified as muktze, it may be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara concludes: That unattributed mishna in tractate Shabbat is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. For this reason, Rav Naḥman establishes that the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai should be understood to mean that Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, whom the halakha apparently follows, as there is a principle that the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel’s opinion. However,