51 Beitzah 27a

גָּמַר בִּשּׁוּלַיְיהוּ — חֲזוּ לְהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, תִּקְשֵׁי לָךְ קְדֵרוֹת דְּעָלְמָא, דְּהָא סְתָם קְדֵרוֹת דְּעָלְמָא בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת רוֹתְחוֹת הֵן, וּלְאוּרְתָּא אָכְלִינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ! אֶלָּא גְּמָרוֹ בִּידֵי אָדָם לָא קָא מִבַּעְיָא לַן. כִּי קָא מִבַּעְיָא לַן גְּמָרוֹ בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ הָהוּא בּוּכְרָא. שַׁדְּרֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, סְבַר דְּלָא לְמֶחְזְיֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זְרִיקָא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. הֲדַר שַׁדְּרֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא, סְבַר דְּלָא לְמֶחְזְיֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי זְרִיקָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא שְׁבַקְתִּינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן לְמֶעְבַּד עוֹבָדָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְאַתְּ מָה בִּידָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אֲמַר מַאן דְּהוּא: אֶזְכֵּי וְאֶסַּק לְהָתָם, וְאֶגְמְרַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא מִפּוּמֵּיהּ דְּמָרַהּ. כִּי סָלֵיק לְהָתָם, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲמַר מָר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, אֲנָא ״מִסְתַּבְּרָא״ אֲמַרִי. מִדְּקָתָנֵי בְּמַתְנִיתִין: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵין מוּמוֹ נִיכָּר מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אֵין זֶה מִן הַמּוּכָן, וְקָתָנֵי לַהּ בְּבָרַיְיתָא בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִסְתַּבְּרָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ. מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַלְיָא בְּאַשְׁלֵי רַבְרְבֵי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פַּזִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן שָׁאוּל אָמַר רַבִּי מִשּׁוּם קְהָלָא קַדִּישָׁא דְּבִירוּשָׁלַיִם: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וַחֲבֵרָיו אָמְרוּ הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ? וְהָא אִינְהוּ קַשִּׁישֵׁי מִנֵּיהּ טוּבָא! אֶלָּא: בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֲמָרוּהָ. דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶרְאָה אֶת מוּמוֹ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְנִשְׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי מוּמְחֶה — אָסוּר. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: רְאִיַּית בְּכוֹר לָאו כִּרְאִיַּית טְרֵפָה, רְאִיַּית בְּכוֹר — מֵחַיִּים, רְאִיַּית טְרֵפָה — לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה. וּמִינַּהּ: רְאִיַּית טְרֵפָה — אֲפִילּוּ בְּיוֹם טוֹב, רְאִיַּית בְּכוֹר — מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַטּוּ הָתָם, בְּרוֹאִין מוּמִין פְּלִיגִי? בִּקְנָסָא פְּלִיגִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּדוּקִּין שֶׁבָּעַיִן — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִשְׁתַּנִּין. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמוּמִין שֶׁבַּגּוּף, רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: גָּזְרִינַן מוּמִין שֶׁבַּגּוּף אַטּוּ מוּמִין שֶׁבָּעַיִן. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: לָא גָּזְרִינַן. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְנִשְׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי מוּמְחֶה — אָסוּר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵיס, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ. אַמֵּי וַרְדִּינָאָה חָזֵי בּוּכְרָא דְּבֵי נְשִׂיאָה הֲוָה. בְּיוֹמָא טָבָא לָא הֲוָה חָזֵי. אֲתוֹ וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַמֵּי, אֲמַר לְהוּ: שַׁפִּיר קָא עָבֵיד דְּלָא חָזֵי. אִינִי? וְהָא רַבִּי אַמֵּי גּוּפֵיהּ חָזֵי! רַבִּי אַמֵּי כִּי חָזֵי — מֵאֶתְמוֹל הֲוָה חָזֵי,

And then when their cooking is finished, they once again become fit for eating. This demonstrates that even food that had temporarily been set aside because it had become inedible does not remain prohibited for the entire day. Abaye said to him: And according to your reasoning that foods are temporarily considered muktze while being cooked, cooked dishes in general present a difficulty for you on Shabbat as well. As ordinary cooked dishes in general are still bubbling at twilight and not yet edible, and yet we partake of them later in the evening. This demonstrates that although the food was considered muktze at the critical moment of twilight, it is not prohibited for the duration of Shabbat. Rather, it must be that we have no dilemma with regard to a food whose completion, which brings it to its finished and edible form, is entirely in the hands of a person, e.g., beans and lentils. Such foods are certainly not considered as muktze for all of Shabbat simply because they had become temporarily unfit for eating. Where we have a dilemma is with regard to an item whose completion is in the hands of Heaven, such as figs and grapes, which dry by the heat of the sun. This dilemma remains unresolved. § The Gemara returns to the issue of permitting firstborn animals. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia had a firstborn animal that acquired a blemish on a Festival, and he wished to serve it to priests staying at his house. He sent it to be presented before Rabbi Ami for examination, and Rabbi Ami thought that he should not examine it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Zerika said to him, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya: The principle is that in cases of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in this case permits examination of the firstborn. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia then sent the firstborn to be presented before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who likewise thought that he should not examine it. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him, and some say it was Rabbi Zerika: The principle is that in cases where Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Yirmeya: What is the reason that you did not allow the Sages to act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? He said to him: And you, what do you have? Do you have a tradition that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Abba said to him that Rabbi Zeira said as follows: The halakha in this case is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara relates that a certain unidentified person in Babylonia said: May it be His will that I merit to go up there to Eretz Yisrael, and that I learn this teaching from the mouth of its Master; I will ask Rabbi Zeira himself for his opinion on this matter. When he went up there to Eretz Yisrael, he found Rabbi Zeira and said to him: Did the Master say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Zeira said to him: No, that is not what I said; rather, I said: It stands to reason that this is so. It is reasonable to rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon on this issue, although I do not have a definitive tradition to this effect. Rabbi Zeira explains: Why do I think so? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: Any firstborn animal whose blemish is not perceptible while it is still day is not considered to be among the animals prepared prior to the Festival for use on the Festival. And a baraita taught the same ruling in the name of the Sages, indicating that this is the majority opinion. One should therefore learn from this that it stands to reason that the halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara asks: In the final analysis, what conclusion was reached about this matter? Whose opinion does the halakha follow? Rav Yosef said: Come and hear, as this matter hangs on great trees, meaning it is the subject of a dispute among the early Sages. As Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said in the name of the holy community in Jerusalem: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and his colleagues said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara wonders at the wording of this report: How could the holy community in Jerusalem have reported that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and his colleagues said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Aren’t they much older than he? Why, then, would they have reported a halakha in his name? The Gemara answers: Rather, the holy community in Jerusalem said the following: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and his colleagues, who said that one may not examine blemishes on a Festival, spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. To which teaching of Rabbi Meir is the Gemara referring? It is as we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 28a): If one slaughtered a firstborn before it was shown to a Sage and deemed permitted, and afterward he showed its blemish to a Sage, who confirmed that it was indeed a permanent blemish that permitted the animal to be slaughtered, Rabbi Yehuda permits it, as it had been established that the animal was blemished. And Rabbi Meir says: Since it was slaughtered without the permission of an expert, it is prohibited. Apparently Rabbi Meir holds that the examination of a firstborn is not as simple a process as the examination of a tereifa, since it involves more than a mere examination of the body of the animal. The examination of a firstborn must be conducted when the animal is alive, whereas the examination of a tereifa may be performed even after slaughtering. And from this Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and his colleagues inferred that the examination of a tereifa, which consists merely of clarifying the facts of the animal’s physical state, may be done even on a Festival. On the other hand, the more stringent examination of a firstborn, which can be likened to the rendering of a judgment, a process with principles of its own, must be performed on the eve of the Festival. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is that to say that there, in that mishna, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether or not one may examine blemishes on a Festival? That was not their dispute; rather, they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not there is a penalty for one who acted improperly. As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If the blemish was in the eyelids, e.g., if a fissure developed there that disqualifies the animal, everyone, including Rabbi Meir, agrees that the animal is prohibited, because such a blemish changes its appearance after the slaughter. It is possible that after slaughter what was a temporary blemish will then look like a permanent one, and the animal will incorrectly be permitted retroactively. When they disagree is in a case of blemishes in the body, e.g., if an ear had been cut off or a foreleg broken, which are prominent blemishes whose appearance does not change after death. Rabbi Meir holds that we issue a decree that blemishes in the body are prohibited due to blemishes in the eye, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that we do not issue such a decree. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The wording of the mishna in tractate Bekhorot is also precise according to this explanation, as it teaches that Rabbi Meir says: Since it was slaughtered without the permission of an expert who confirmed that this is a permanent blemish, it is prohibited. Learn from this that this is a penalty that Rabbi Meir imposes and nothing else. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is the correct understanding of the mishna. § The Gemara relates that Ami of Vardina was the examiner of firstborns in the household of the Nasi. On Festivals he would not examine firstborn blemishes. They came and told Rabbi Ami about this. He said to them: He does well not to examine them. The Gemara raises an objection: Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Ami himself examine firstborns for blemishes on a Festival? The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Ami would examine the blemishes of firstborns, it was on the day before the Festival that he would examine them, to see whether the blemishes were permanent or temporary.