52 Beitzah 27b

וּבְיוֹם טוֹב שַׁיּוֹלֵי קָא מְשַׁיֵּיל הֵיכִי הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא. כִּי הָא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַיְיתִי בּוּכְרָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא אַפַּנְיָא דְּמַעֲלֵי יוֹמָא טָבָא. הֲוָה יָתֵיב רָבָא וְקָא חָיֵיף רֵישֵׁיהּ. דַּלִּי עֵינֵיהּ וְחַזְיֵיהּ לְמוּמֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל הָאִידָּנָא וְתָא לִמְחַר. כִּי אֲתָא לִמְחַר, אֲמַר: הֵיכִי הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲוָה שַׁדְיָין שְׂעָרֵי בְּהָךְ גִּיסָא דְּהוּצָא, וַהֲוָה אִיהוּ בְּאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא. בַּהֲדֵי דְּבָעֵי לְמֵיכַל, עַיֵּיל רֵישֵׁיהּ וּפַרְטֵיהּ הוּצָא לְשִׂפְוָתֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּלְמָא אַתְּ גְּרַמְתְּ לֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דִּגְרָמָא אָסוּר, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ מוּם, מִנַּיִין שֶׁלֹּא יִגְרוֹם לוֹ עַל יְדֵי דָּבָר אַחֵר, שֶׁלֹּא יָבִיא בָּצֵק אוֹ דְבֵלָה וְיַנִּיחַ לוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הָאֹזֶן כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא הַכֶּלֶב וְיִטְּלֶנּוּ — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל מוּם״. אָמַר ״מוּם״, וְאָמַר ״כׇּל מוּם״. מַתְנִי׳ בְּהֵמָה שֶׁמֵּתָה — לֹא יְזִיזֶנָּה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ. וּמַעֲשֶׂה וְשָׁאֲלוּ אֶת רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן עָלֶיהָ וְעַל הַחַלָּה שֶׁנִּטְמֵאת, וְנִכְנַס לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ וְשָׁאַל, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא יְזִיזֵם מִמְקוֹמָם. גְּמָ׳ לֵימָא תְּנַן סְתָמָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? (דִּתְנַן) רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַדִּלּוּעִין לִפְנֵי הַבְּהֵמָה, וְאֶת הַנְּבֵלָה לִפְנֵי הַכְּלָבִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם לֹא הָיְתָה נְבֵלָה מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת — אֲסוּרָה. אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁמֵּתוּ, שֶׁאֲסוּרִין. הָנִיחָא לְמָר בַּר אַמֵּימָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא דְּאָמַר: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁמֵּתוּ שֶׁאֲסוּרִין, שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא דְּאָמַר: חָלוּק הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁמֵּתוּ, שֶׁמּוּתָּרִים — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תַּרְגְּומַהּ זְעֵירִי, בְּבֶהֱמַת קֳדָשִׁים. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: עָלֶיהָ וְעַל הַחַלָּה שֶׁנִּטְמֵאת. מָה חַלָּה — דְּקַדִּישָׁא, אַף בְּהֵמָה — דְּקַדִּישָׁא. אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּקַדִּישָׁא הָא דְּחוּלִּין — שַׁרְיָא. הָנִיחָא לְמָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: חָלוּק הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַף בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁמֵּתוּ שֶׁמּוּתָּרִין — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמָר בַּר אַמֵּימָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁמֵּתוּ שֶׁאֲסוּרִין — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בִּמְסוּכֶּנֶת, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל. מַתְנִי׳ אֵין נִמְנִין עַל הַבְּהֵמָה לְכַתְּחִלָּה בְּיוֹם טוֹב. אֲבָל נִמְנִין עָלֶיהָ מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב, וְשׁוֹחֲטִין וּמְחַלְּקִין בֵּינֵיהֶם. גְּמָ׳ מַאי אֵין נִמְנִין? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין פּוֹסְקִין דָּמִים לְכַתְּחִלָּה עַל הַבְּהֵמָה בְּיוֹם טוֹב. הֵיכִי עָבֵיד? אָמַר רַב: מֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי בְהֵמוֹת וּמַעֲמִידָן זוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר: זוֹ כָּזוֹ? תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: לֹא יֹאמַר אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ הֲרֵינִי עִמְּךָ בְּסֶלַע, הֲרֵינִי עִמְּךָ בִּשְׁתַּיִם, אֲבָל אוֹמֵר לוֹ: הֲרֵינִי עִמְּךָ לְמֶחֱצָה וְלִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ.

And on the Festival itself he would ask only how the incident occurred, meaning that he would investigate the cause of the blemish, as in that case where a certain man who was a priest brought a firstborn before Rava, close to nightfall on a Festival eve. Rava was sitting and washing the hair on his head. He raised his eyes and saw the firstborn’s blemish. He then said to the owner of the firstborn: Go now, and come back tomorrow. When he came back on the following day, Rava said to him: How did the incident that caused the blemish occur? The owner said to Rava: Barley grains were scattered on one side of a fence of thorns, while the firstborn was standing on the other side. When it wanted to eat, it stuck its head through the fence and a thorn cut its lip. Rava said to the owner: Perhaps you caused the blemish by deliberately placing the barley on the other side of the fence? He said to him: No. The Gemara comments: And from where do you say that causing a blemish to an offering is prohibited? As it is taught in a baraita: It is written with regard to offerings: “There must not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21). I have only an explicit prohibition that it may not have a blemish; from where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to it by means of something else, e.g., that he does not bring dough or a dried fig and place it on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? Therefore the verse states “any blemish.” It says “blemish” and it says “any blemish”; the word “any” comes to teach that one may not cause a blemish. MISHNA: With regard to an animal that died, one may not move it from its place on a Festival. And such an incident once occurred and they asked Rabbi Tarfon about it. And on that same occasion they also asked him about ḥalla that had been separated from dough and then became ritually impure on a Festival. Such ḥalla is not fit to be eaten by anyone, nor may it be used in any other manner, e.g., as animal feed or as fuel for a fire, on that day. Rabbi Tarfon entered the study hall and inquired about these matters, and the Sages said to him: One may not move them from their place. GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that we learned the unattributed mishna not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 156b) that Rabbi Shimon says: One may cut up gourds for an animal on Shabbat so that it can eat them more easily, and similarly, one may cut up an unslaughtered animal carcass for dogs. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not an animal carcass already on the eve of Shabbat, but rather it died on Shabbat itself, it is prohibited. Since Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between an animal that died on Shabbat and one that died before Shabbat, it would appear that Rabbi Shimon holds that one may move an animal carcass and feed it to dogs even if it died on Shabbat. Accordingly, the mishna that prohibits moving an animal that died on a Festival seems to conflict with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna can be understood even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon nevertheless concedes in the case of animals that were entirely healthy at twilight but died on the Festival that they are prohibited. Since they were healthy at twilight, the owner had no intention at that point in time of feeding them to dogs, and they are therefore prohibited as muktze. The baraita, on the other hand, is referring to an animal that had been sick on the previous day; since the owner knew that it was close to death, he had in mind to feed it to his dogs after it died. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rava, who said that Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of animals that died on the Festival without having been mortally sick the day before that they are prohibited on the Festival due to muktze; according to this opinion, it is well. However, according to the opinion of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said that Rabbi Shimon was in disagreement even in the case of animals that died suddenly, and he holds that they are permitted, what is there to say? The unattributed mishna appears to contradict this opinion. The Gemara answers: Ze’iri explained it as follows: The mishna is referring to a sacred animal that died; since it is sacred property, one may not derive benefit from it, and therefore one may not give it to dogs. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: They asked Rabbi Tarfon about it and about ḥalla that became ritually impure, from which it may be inferred: Just as ḥalla is sacred, so too, the animal mentioned here is one that was sacred, rather than a non-sacred animal. The Gemara asks: Rather, according to this explanation, the reason that the animal may not be moved is that the animal was sacred; but if it was a non-sacred animal that died, it would be permitted to move it. If so, this works out well according to the opinion of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said that Rabbi Shimon was in disagreement even in the case of animals that died, and he holds that they are permitted; according to this opinion, it is well, as one can say that the mishna, which indicates that one may move an animal that died on a Festival, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, according to the opinion of Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rava, who said that Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of animals that died that they are prohibited, what is there to say? The mishna is in accordance with neither Rabbi Shimon nor Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the animal was in danger of dying the day before, and the owner had in mind to feed it to his dogs after it died, and all agree with regard to the ruling. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, an allowance is granted to move the animal if it was a non-sacred animal and it had been in danger prior to the Festival; and if the animal was sacred, even he agrees that it is prohibited, as it may not be fed to dogs. MISHNA: One may not register to have a portion of an animal on a Festival ab initio, since it is prohibited to divide up an animal into portions for different people, as this is similar to conducting business, a weekday activity, on a Festival. But one may register for the animal on the eve of the Festival, and then those who registered for the animal may slaughter and divide it between them on the Festival itself in accordance with the agreement reached the day before. The next day, each pays the slaughterer according to his portion of the animal. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: One may not register? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One may not fix a sum of money and set a particular price for each portion of an animal on a Festival ab initio. The Gemara asks: What should one do on a Festival to divide up the animal without fixing a price? Rav said: He should bring two animals and stand them one next to the other and say: Is this one equal in value to the other one? If the purchasers confirm that this is the case, then after the Festival they assess the value of the animal that is identical to the animal that had been slaughtered on the Festival, and in that way they establish the amount that each person must pay. This is also taught in a baraita that states: A person may not say to another on a Festival: I am hereby in partnership with you in this animal that you are about to slaughter for the value of a sela, or: I am hereby in partnership with you for two sela. However, he may say to him: I am hereby in partnership with you for half the animal, or for a third or a quarter, without stipulating the value of that share, and after the Festival they may determine how much each share is worth.