(כב) וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים׃ (כג) וְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִהְיֶ֑ה וְנָתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ׃
(22) When [two or more] parties fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact, the payment to be based on reckoning. (23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life,
Septuagint, Shemot 21:22-23 (NETS translation)
Now if two men fight and strike a pregnant woman and her child comes forth not fully formed, he shall be punished with a fine. According as the husband of the woman might impose, he shall pay with judicial assessment. But if it is fully formed, he shall pay life for life. |
Philo, Special Laws III
(108) But if any one has a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike her a blow on her belly, and she miscarries, if the child which was conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall be punished by a fine… But if the child which was conceived had assumed a distinct Shape in all its parts, having received all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall die; (109) for such a creature as that is a man…requiring nothing more than to be released and sent out into the world. |
תִּינוֹק בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד... וְנוֹחֵל וּמַנְחִיל. וְהַהוֹרְגוֹ, חַיָּב. וַהֲרֵי הוּא לְאָבִיו וּלְאִמּוֹ וּלְכָל קְרוֹבָיו כְּחָתָן שָׁלֵם:
A one day old baby boy… inherits and transmits; one who kills him is guilty of murder, and he counts to his father, to his mother and to all his relatives as a fully grown man
וא"ל אנטונינוס לרבי נשמה מאימתי ניתנה באדם משעת פקידה או משעת יצירה א"ל משעת יצירה א"ל אפשר חתיכה של בשר עומדת שלשה ימים בלא מלח ואינה מסרחת אלא משעת פקידה אמר רבי דבר זה למדני אנטונינוס ומקרא מסייעו שנאמר (איוב י, יב) ופקודתך שמרה רוחי
And Antoninos said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From when is the soul placed in a person? Is it from the moment of conception or from the moment of the formation of the embryo, forty days after conception? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is from the moment of the formation of the embryo. Antoninos said to him: That is inconceivable. Is it possible that a piece of meat could stand for even three days without salt as a preservative and would not rot? The embryo could not exist for forty days without a soul. Rather, the soul is placed in man from the moment of conception. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Antoninos taught me this matter, and there is a verse that supports him, as it is stated: “And Your Providence [pekudatekha] has preserved my spirit” (Job 10:12) indicating that it is from the moment of conception [pekida] that the soul is preserved within a person.
(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:
A woman who was having trouble giving birth, they abort the fetus inside her and take it out limb by limb, because her life comes before its life. If most of he had come out already they do not touch it because we do not push off one life for another.
(ט) אַף זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁלֹּא לָחוּס עַל נֶפֶשׁ הָרוֹדֵף. לְפִיכָךְ הוֹרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָעֻבָּרָה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד מֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ הָעֵבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ בֵּין בְּסַם בֵּין בְּיָד מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּרוֹדֵף אַחֲרֶיהָ לְהָרְגָהּ. וְאִם מִשֶּׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ וְזֶהוּ טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם:
This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef. On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether physically or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.
(ב) לפיכך העוברת שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להרגה ואם הוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם:
Therefore, in a case of a pregnant woman who is having difficulty in childbirth--it is permissible to abort the fetus inside her either with drugs or physically since the fetus is considered to be a rodef (pursuer) chasing her in order to kill her. Yet, if his head has breached then we do not harm him since we do not save one life by ending another. This is the nature of the world.
איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואמאי רודף הוא שאני התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה
Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.
משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו אף על העוברין מאי טעמיה דרבי ישמעאל דכתיב (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך איזהו אדם שהוא באדם הוי אומר זה עובר שבמעי אמו
בן נח – ליכא מידעם
It is stated in that book of Aggadot that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: A descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: It is derived from that which is written: “One who sheds the blood of a person, by a person [ba’adam] his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The word ba’adam literally means: In a person, and is interpreted homiletically: What is a person that is in a person? You must say: This is a fetus that is in its mother’s womb. Accordingly, a descendant of Noah is liable for killing a fetus.
מתני׳ האשה שיצאה ליהרג אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד האשה שישבה על המשבר ממתינין לה עד שתלד.
MISHNA: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, the court does not wait to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, she is killed immediately. But with regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth.
ישבה על המשבר וכו': מ"ט כיון דעקר גופא אחרינא הוא:
What is the reason for delaying the execution in this case? The Gemara answers: Once the fetus uproots from its place and begins to leave the woman’s body, it is considered an independent body and may not be killed together with the mother.
א"ר נחמן אמר שמואל האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סכין ומקרעים את כריסה ומוציאין את הוולד
§ Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: In the case of a woman who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, and died on Shabbat, one brings a knife, and tears open her abdomen, and removes the fetus, as it might still be alive, and it could be possible to save its life.
תוספות חולין דף לג עמוד א ד”ה אחדמשמע דטעמא משום דליכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור… ואע”ג דבן נח נהרג על העוברים כדאמר התם וישראל אינו נהרג נהי דפטור מ”מ לא שרי
This Gemara implies that there is nothing that is permissible to a Jew that is forbidden to a non-Jew… Although a Noahide is executed for killing a fetus, and a Jew is not executed, although he is exempt, nevertheless it is not permissible to do so.
תוס’ נדה (מד.) ד”ה איהווא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי’ מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת שמביאין סכין דרך ר”ה לקרוע האם כדמוכח בפ’ קמא דערכין (דף ז:) וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו דהא גוסס בידי אדם ההורגו פטור… ומחללין את השבת עליו…
Now, were you to ask – if it is permissible to kill a fetus in the mother’s womb [even after the mother has died], and it is not considered to just be placed in a box, then why can we violate Shabbat for him? For we bring a knife by way of the public domain to surgically remove him from the mother, as it is stated in Arakhin (7a). One can say: that nevertheless, for the sake of saving a life, we violate Shabbat even though it is permissible to kill him. For behold for a gosses by human hands, one who kills him is exempt… and we can nevertheless violate Shabbat to save his life…
תורת האדם שער המיחוש – ענין הסכנהואע”ג דתנן (אהלות פ”ז) האשה המקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, דאלמא מעיקרא לית ביה משום הצלת נפשות, ותנן נמי (נדה מ”ד א’) גבי תינוק בן יום אחד וההורגו חייב, ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא, וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות, אפילו הכי לענין שמירת מצות מחללין עליה, אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת שמא ישמור שבתות הרבה. הלכך אפי’ בהצלת עובר פחות מבן ארבעים יום שאין לו חיות כלל מחללין עליו כדעת בעל הלכות.ואיכא דסבירא ליה שאין מחללין משום נפלים…
The Mishna in Ohalot however states (7:6), ‘If a woman is in hard travail, one cuts up the child in her womb and brings it forth member by member, because her life comes before that of [the child]. But if the greater part has proceeded forth, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person’s life for that of another’. Now this implies that beforehand [before birth] there is no concept of ‘saving of a life’. Similarly the Mishna states (Niddah 44a) that if a person murders a one day old child he is liable the death penalty – that is, only a one day old child, not a fetus – and the verse also states that one pays monetary compensation for [causing a miscarriage] of a fetus. Nevertheless, regarding the issue of mitzvah observance, we can violate Shabbat for a fetus. The Torah says: violate one Shabbat for him, for perhaps he might keep many Shabbats. Therefore, even to save a fetus less than 40 days old, which has no [current] viability, we would desecrate Shabbat according to Hilkhot Gedolot.There are those who are of the opinion that we do not violate Shabbat for fetuses…
תוספות נדה דף מד עמוד א ד”ה איהווא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי’ מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת… וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו…
According to the possibility that it is permitted to kill it (the fetus) in the womb, even if the mother has already died, and it is not considered to be merely residing in a box, then we can ask – why should it be permissible to violate the Shabbat for its sake? And one can answer that nevertheless for the sake of preserving a life one can violate the Shabbat even though it is permissible to kill it…
Responsa of Maharit, 1:97
Rabbi Joseph ben Moses Trani (Maharit), the son of Mabit (q.v.), was born in Safed in 1568, and died in Constantinople in 1639.
Question. Regarding a fetus which is considered the thigh of its mother…In the second chapter of Hullin… Tosafot wrote that while one is exempt from killing a fetus, it is nevertheless not permitted to do so… [The reason is] that it is forbidden on the basis of bodily injury.The Mishna in chapter 7 of Ohalot states… And it is only because the mother’s life takes precedence that we can abort it, but were it not that there was a risk to her life, there is a matter of concern regarding [taking] the life of a fetus. So how then can we say in Arakhin that we would kill the fetus directly (lit., with our hands) because of concern of disfigurement of the mother? And an additional question, for in that very sugya in Arakhin, it quotes the case of the women who sits on the birthing stool on Shabbat… From this it is clear that it is considered a risk of life and it overrides Shabbat…. And Tosafot also wrote the a non-Jew is liable for killing a fetus, and a Jew is exempt, but although he is exempt, it is not permissible. We see that there is a prohibition in this matter.And we can answer – that the case of being taken out to be executed is different, since the fetus will be executed together with the mother, since a fetus is a thigh of the mother…
Responsa of Maharit, 1:99
And from the fact that the Gemara (Arakhin 7a) says, “It is obvious!” [that we can abort the fetus of the woman who is condemned], it implies that as far as taking a [fetal] life is concerned, there is not the slightest issue of concern… Therefore, regarding a Jewish woman, in a case of the mother’s need, it would appear that it is permissible to assist them to have an abortion, since it is for the sake of the mother’s health.
Responsa of Havot Yair, 31
Rabbi Yair Chaim ben Moses Samson Bachrach, Germany, 1638-1702.
Regarding your question of a married woman who became pregnant through adultery… and the question is whether she is permit to swallow some medicine that will cause her to abort. And you wanted to know my opinion regarding this matter…And it seems that your question is whether in general there is a sin of destroying a life in this case. Now, it would be possible to make a number of distinctions, such as whether 40 days have passed – for before this time it is “mere water”, as is stated in Yevamot and Kriot – or whether three months have passed which is the time when the pregnancy is visible, or if she sensed in her womb the movement of the infant, which occurs a brief time after the 3 months, nevertheless it is not our interest to decide based on how we would be inclined to think or the “logic of the gut”, but only according to Torah law.The Mishnah in Niddah states that only one who murders a one day old child is liable for execution, but not for a fetus…Nevertheless, before the fetus has detached, it would seem that it is permitted to abort it according to everyone, based on the Talmud in Arakhin, where a condemned woman can be hit so that the fetus’ death will not lead to her disgrace…And you cannot ask from the fact that we violate Shabbat to save the life of a fetus… for perhaps that is really because of the life of the mother, for any danger to the fetus is a danger to the mother…And you cannot say [that if it is permitted,] why did the Gemara imply that were it not for the principle of it being part of her body [which is condemned to death] we would wait for the child to be born, how much more so not to cause it death. For it certainly is forbidden ab initio. For it is no better than a case of masturbation, which is considered to be a “slaughtering of children.” And masturbation is considered a grave offense, and the reason is because every drop of semen has the potential to create holy progeny. And one cannot say that the prohibition of masturbation is because of auto-eroticism… Thus even women are prohibited from wasting seed [and destroying potential life]…Therefore, based on what we have written, it would be completely permissible in your case according to Torah law, were it not for the widespread practice amongst us and amongst them [not to abort], because of a safeguard against fornicators and those who fornicate after them…Nonetheless, in Hullin 33, Tosafot wrote as a matter of obvious fact that “while one is exempt [who aborts], nevertheless it is not permissible to do so”…This is implicit in the Gemara’s discussion, that had it not been for the reason that “the fetus is her body,” [and can be executed with her], there would be a logic to wait to save the fetus, and how much more so should we not cause its death at the outset. The reason for this is that to do so is no better than those who “inflame themselves under every leafy tree and slaughter (or ‘squeeze out’ children” (Niddah 13a based on Isa. 57:5), and the Rabbis spoke in extreme terms regarding the prohibition to waste semen, and the reason is because it is possible that a holy life (lit., seed) will be created from every drop. One cannot say that the reason for all these problems is because of provoking the evil inclination, for if that were the case, there would be no need to bring a proof from the verses.. And this prohibition of wasting semen applies even to women (to destroy the man’s semen in their body), and is only permitted in three special cases of women…We see that it is also Rashi’s opinion that regarding other women (not the special cases), the problem is only regarding the man to waste his seed, and it is not a problem for the women, thus there is no inherent problem to destroy the semen after it has been “absorbed” (i.e., possibly caused conception). Nevertheless, just because we can make an argument does not mean that we can make a ruling tht is should be allowed for a woman (to destroy the semen in her body), and how much more so after the semen has been “absorbed”. Thus, one who assists in this is aiding those who are sinning…Thus, anyone who is involved in this act, or who causes it, I fear that he may be deserving a sin offering… Although we have made arguments, to actually act on it, we cannot permit. And no more needs to be said about this. Now, please, my brother, do not burden me any more with questions such as these, for it is only with difficulty that I answered you this time.
Rabbi Jacob Emden, Responsa Shelat Yavetz, I 43
Rabbi Jacob ben Tzvi Emden was born in 1697 and died in 1776, in Germany.
Question: Regarding what you asked – is there a violation to destroy a fetus in the womb of a mother who is pregnant due to fornication, both in the case of a single woman and the case of a married woman.Response: In the book Havot Yair (following responsum 31) I have found that the author was asked about a married woman who became pregnant due to adultery, and after the act she had regret, etc., if she is allowed to swallow some medicine that will cause her to abort (lit., destroy the corrupt seed within her)…Now it would seem to me that there is reason to be lenient since she has committed adultery and there is blood on her hands. Therefore, she is now deserving of death according to the Torah. Although her life is not in ur hands to execute her, nevertheless, by law of Heaven she is deserving of death… Although a mamzer once he is born has the status of a “kosher” person, for whom it would be murder to kill, nevertheless, now, that he is still a limb of his mother, and if her life were in our hands we would execute her with her unborn child… it is obvious to me that there is no prohibition in destroying it, even if his mother remains alive…Now, regarding the author’s attempt to demonstrate in that responsum that there was there was an element of violation based on the sin of wasting of seed. This can be rejected, for one can say that this (wasting potential life) is not the reason for the prohibition, but rather because one “spills into the dung heep” and gives power to the demonic powers and weakens the supernal forces, as is known from the masters of Kabbalah… One can thus see that it is not considered to be “for waste” except when it is wasted on the ground (as a result of masturbation), based on the reason given above… Thus, regarding a fetus, since it is not a life it is a doubt if it will ever become a full life, as discussed, the matter is still doubtful. Thus even for a “kosher” fetus (not the result of adultery) there would be reason to be lenient for a great need, until the point when it has “become uprooted” (childbirth has begun). Even when the mother’s life is not at risk, but it is just to save the fetus from the evil that will befall it, that it will cause significant pain to the mother. And this requires further investigation.Knowledge is easy to he who understands it, that there is nevertheless a prohibition at the outset to destroy a fetus based on the simple sense of the Talmud, although one is not liable for murder regarding fetuses. And similarly [it is prohibited] to destroy semen that has been absorbed into a woman’s body, although she has not yet conceived as a result. All of this is definitely forbidden without a reason, as is clear from the discussion that women who may not use a mokh, save for three special cases. In truth, however, for a (legitimate) purpose it is permissible, even to “waste seed” and to spill it on the ground, as we see in the case of the testing of the genitals (Yevamot 76a). From this we see that this serious prohibition is permitted in the case of the mitzvah need, as I have written elsewhere, and there is no need to write at more length.
Tzitz Eliezer 9: 51 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg)
Summary of the halakhot that emerge from the preceding section:1. A Noahide is executed for aborting a fetus. There is an opinion that he is not executed.2. A Jew is not executed for aborting a fetus.3. When there is a need, and the law determines that it is allowed to arrange for an abortion, it is preferable to have it done by a Jewish doctor.4. One should be stricter regarding arranging an abortion for non-Jews than for Jews, since they are prohibited regarding aborting a fetus and one would transgress putting a stumbling block before the blind if there is no one else to do the abortion… Similarly, when there is a need to arrange for an abortion for a non-Jew, one should attempt to have a Jewish doctor perform it.5. Some are of the opinion that even though a Jew is not executed for aborting a fetus, there is nevertheless a Biblical prohibition against him doing such.6. Others hold that there is no Biblical prohibition, only a Rabbinic one.7. Still others hold that even Rabbinically, the prohibition is a weak one.8. Kabalistically, the prohibition regarding aborting a fetus is very severe.9. When there is a danger to the mother in continuing the pregnancy, one can allow an abortion easily.10. Even when there is no danger, but the mother’s health is very delicate, and for the sake of her health or to relieve her of severe pain, it is advised to perform an abortion, even though there is no real risk of life, even here one can allow this, according to the judgment of the decisor, as he sees the case.11. One can also allow, as above, when the woman is nursing.12. A married woman who committed adultery or was raped and became pregnant, even from a non-Jew, where the child would not be a mamzer, and she has now repented (in the case of adultery), a number of great decisors are inclined to allow for an abortion, either because of her shame or because of desecration of the divine name, and the shame and stigma to the family [and other reasons, as mentioned above].13. To have an abortion before 40 days from conception, and also before 3 months from conception, is much more lenient than to do so after these periods. It is thus preferable to arrange for the abortion prior to these periods, while the fetus has not begun to stir, when there is a well-based concern that the fetus that will be born deformed and beset by afflictions.14. At the other extreme, to kill a fetus once the woman is in the process of giving birth and the fetus has already been “uprooted to emerge”, it is much stricter than before this moment, and one cannot allow in such a case, save when there is a direct threat to the mother’s life.15. Even in cases where the law would allow for an abortion, nevertheless, one should get the husband’s permission, since it is his property.16. It is also preferable to have an abortion by drinking a medicine than by direct surgical means.17. A woman who has a terminal illness, and if she continues her pregnancy continues it will hasten her death, and the woman is beseeching not to have the abortion, and she does not care that the pregnancy will hasten her death, as long as she leaves behind a child, one can allow such a pregnancy to continue, on the basis of “sit and be passive.”18. All Jews are commanded with a strict decree not to deal lightly regarding ending a pregnancy, and there is a great responsibility in such a case, both on the one asking to have the abortion and on the decisor being asked. Not to mention that there is in such decisions the fencing in of the breaches made by the wanton women and those who would fornicate after them , that even the nations of the world have fenced themselves regarding this, and established laws and strict punishments on the violators and those who assist them, and behold Israel are a holy people.
Tzitz Eliezer, 13:102 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg) The question is regarding terminating a pregnancy because of the Tay-Sachs disease… The technology today which allows testing for this disease cannot giver reliable results prior to three months into the pregnancy. Thus his question is if one can view such a disease with such severe and certain consequences, sufficient severity to allow for a termination of the pregnancy even after three months, or if the period of three months is absolute, and there is no justification, short of direct risk to the life to the mother, that would allow for a termination of pregnancy after three months.Behold after investigation into the matter with great seriousness, and with consideration of all the relevant circumstances, it seems in my humble opinion, on the basis of the analysis that I wrote in my responsa, 9:51.3… that in a case such as this, in which the consequences are so grave if the pregnancy and childbirth are allowed to continue, it is permissible to terminate the pregnancy until 7 months have elapsed, and in a way in which no danger will befall the mother. Beyond 7 months the issue is more serious (and the stringency here is more based on how the matter seems and the “knowledge of the gut”, to use the phrase of the Havot Yair) since at the end of 7 months the fetus is often fully developed.It is clear that capital punishment is not prescribed for abortion, and with the exception of a single opinion, the decisors conclude that there is nevertheless some form of a prohibition. But the opinion of most rabbis is that the prohibition is only of Rabbinic origin, or that it is in the category of the well-being of the world, but that there is not even the slightest element of destroying a life. Therefore, Maharit, in his responsum, permitted abortion for a Jewish woman whenever the matter was necessary for her health even when her life was not at stake.Like this, and even to a greater degree, was it argued to be permissible in Responsa Yavet, 1:43… And therefore ask yourself where is there a great need regarding pain and suffering greater than the woman in our case which will be inflicted upon her if she gives birth to such a creature whose very being is one of pain and suffering and his death is certain within a few years… and added to that is the pain and suffering of the infant. This would seem to be the classic case in which abortion may be permitted, and it doesn’t matter what type of pain and suffering is endured, physical or emotional, as emotional pain and suffering is to a large extent much greater than physical pain and suffering…(2) And you should know that in the words of Maharit and Yavetz, there is not mentioned at all that there should be a distinction between within 3 months and after 3 months. And the clear distinction given is only regarding once it has been “uprooted to emerge” and beforehand. To the contrary, Yavetz writes thusly: “As long as it has not uprooted to emerge,” and from this we can infer that as long as this is not the case, there is no distinction regarding what month it is in…(4) Also in Responsa Havot Yair, 31, where he raises the possibility of distinguishing between before and after 40 days, or before and after 3 months, he expresses in passing his reservations about such distinctions, and he writes thusly: “Nevertheless, it is not our desire to make a decision based on what seems, and a knowledge of the gut”…(6) Thus, as I have indicated at the outset, it would seem in my humble opinion that one can allow in a case such as ours to arrange for a termination of the pregnancy immediately once the test results are definitive that the child has this disease, even up to 7 months of pregnancy, provided that there is no risk to the mother…(7) I will add that, to do it in the best possible way, it would be ideal if the operation could be performed by a woman doctor, for in such a case there would be another aspect of leniency, according to Havot Yair and Yavetz in their responsa. For they are of the opinion that the prohibition for a Jew to kill a fetus is because of wasting of seed, see there, and women are not prohibited in doing such according to most decisors. |
Tzitz Eliezer, 14:102 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg) Regarding checking the amniotic fluid to detect if the fetus has Mongoloidism (Down’s syndrome), and terminating a pregnancy under such circumstances.March 19, 1978To his honor, haRav haGaon, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, shlita, head of the Rabbinical Court, Jerusalem…Among those who give birth over the age of 37, the frequency of such cases is approximately 1%, and amongst those who give birth over the age of 40, the frequency of occurrence is approximately 2%. The Ministry of Health will implement an amniocentesis screening program to be done at a time that will enable the detection of the embryos with this syndrome and the decision to terminate the pregnancy. This syndrome cannot be detected within the first three months of pregnancy. There is thus in this case a halakhic question similar to the one regarding pregnancy with a child who has Tay-Sachs disease.As is known to his honor, a child who suffers from Down’s syndrome is completely different from one who suffers from Tay-Sachs. Down’s syndrome is a very undesirable disease accompanied by physical changes and mental retardation that sometimes requires institutional care and is linked to a shortened life expectancy. But, one should not compare a child with this disease to a child with Tay-Sachs who will surely die. It seems to me that the permission to terminate the pregnancy in a case of Tay-Sachs is based mainly on how such a case will impact the mental state of the parents, especially the mother, and it is for this reason that the rabbi (you) ruled that it is possible to terminate the pregnancy up through the seventh month of pregnancy. The harsh impact of a case of Tay-Sachs on the parents is clear and straightforward. On the other hand, although it is possible that Down’s syndrome will have such a negative effect, at the same time I am familiar with families who love their children who suffer from Down’s syndrome.I am sure that I will soon be faced with inquiries from mothers of thirty-seven to forty years who will have two concerns: (a) Is it permissible to perform amniocentesis in order to discover cases of Down’s syndrome? (b) Requests for termination of pregnancy in such cases.Response. March 26, 1978. Jerusalem. To the honorable Prof. Dr. M. Meir, the executive director of Shaarei Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem.… Let us turn to second and main problem, if it is permissible to terminate pregnancy in the event that the examination shows 100% (as I was told in a verbal conversation) that the fetus suffers from Down’s syndrome, given that we are talking about doing this after three months of pregnancy.Now, as his honor himself senses and emphasizes in his letter, one cannot compare the case of a child with this disease to a child with Tay-Sachs who will definitely die.Similarly, a child who suffers from Down’s syndrome is very different from one who suffers from Tay-Sachs.Therefore, it would seem that we cannot issue a general permission to terminate a pregnancy in a case of Tay-Sachs. However, when the results of the examination are known, the doctor must send the woman (and the hospital administration must issue an order in this regard) to a posek, providing the specifics of the results of the test, and the rabbi who is a posek will pay close attention to the emotional state of the couple in regards to this, and will decide with his halakhic judgment whether to allow the termination of the pregnancy. Only upon receipt of a qualified posek permit may the hospital management agree to do so in its facility.I have emphasized that it is impossible issue a general permission… for according to the halachic sources and arguments that I have detailed and explained in my two previous responsa, in the course of my discussion of termination of pregnancy in the case of Tay-Sachs disease, there is a wide space (a strong basis) to conclude that it is permitted based on those same sources and reasons, even in the case of a fetus with Down’s syndrome. For in the final analysis, as his honor as described in his letter, it is also a very undesirable disease accompanied by physical changes and mental retardation that sometimes requires institutional care and is linked to a shortened life span. These realities have the ability, in many cases, to destroy the emotional/mental state of both the wife and the husband, including the ability to cause them to come down with a serious or not-so-serious illness, and also to destroy the health of the couple’s family life.Let me give an example from a case that came before me in a couple of ultra-Orthodox Jews (from the old yishuv) who had already been born to them – it shouldn’t happen to us – two children who had Down’s syndrome who died a little more than a year after their birth. As a result, the wife was struck with an anxiety attack, and this expressed itself in her refusal to have marital relations with her husband for fear of becoming pregnant and again becoming pregnant with such a fetus. The husband waited a year, then two, and frequently implored his wife to return to a normal marital life, and the woman turned her back to him and remained adamant in her refusal. The situation came to my attention when they were already on the verge of divorce. When I saw what the situation was, I gave the woman permission to undergo the appropriate tests in case she got pregnant. She resumed martial relations with her husband, she became pregnant, she underwent the test, the test showed that everything was fine, and she gave birth to a sound and healthy child. Peace in their house was restored to its proper place, and they continue to live a happy life together.In another case, I was asked by a certain Torah-scholar – scientist, regarding his wife, who was over forty and pregnant, and the doctor advised her to do the test. I tried to influence him that there was no need for an examination and to behave like our forbearers did who had faith in God that everything would turn out alright. He responded to me that from the moment his wife learned from the doctor about the concern (regarding Down’s syndrome) and the possibility to determine this through this recently developed test, she is not able to sleep at night, and she is deeply distressed to the point that he fears for her health. In this way, this knowledge has brought women into a state of “one who adds knowledge adds pain.”Therefore, regarding such cases, and similar ones, it seems that we can certainly base a permission (for termination of pregnancy) one the rulings of the great poskim that we cited in our earlier writings (see Tztitz Eliezer, vol. 9, 13:102, and the previous responsum in this volume). In other words, whether based on the opinion of many poskim who hold that the prohibition against abortion for a Jew is only a rabbinic violation, for a fetus is not considered a life; or based on the opinions of the poskim who believe that it is not even an appurtenance to the sin of murder, but rather an offense like any other offense, add to this the fact that we don’t even violate Shabbat to save such a fetus (according to these opinions) as long as the woman is not in active childbirth; or based on Maharit and the many who are in his camp who permit an abortion whenever it is required for the health of the mother, even when there is no risk to life, and this is even if the prohibition is a Biblical one inasmuch as the fetus does not yet have a presumption of being alive; or based on the opnions that are mentioned in Havot Yair; or based on Yavetz and those in his camp who are of the opinion that there is a basis to be lenient as long as the child has not begun to leave the mother’s womb, even if there is no risk to life of the mother, but only to save her from the fact that the child will cause her great pain; or based on the author of Rav Paalim who is of the opinion that when dealing with these cases, a great need is defined not only in terms of one’s physical health needs, but also in terms of one’s spiritual and emotional needs, in accordance with how I explained and gave backing to this position; or explain and substantiate this; and so on, everything as I wrote and explained with great depth with God’s help in our earlier writings.(D) I would also add that in a case where an abortion is permitted, in addition to the need and obligation to obtain the consent of the woman to terminate the pregnancy (as his honor wrote in his letter, which is included in the standard that you have prepared in this regard), there is also a need and an obligation to receive the husband’s consent, in accordance with the well-known halakha regarding damages when someone causes a woman to miscarry, that such damages are paid to the husband (Shemot 21:22, Baba Kama 42 and 49, Rambam, Hovel u’Mazik 5:1-2, and Hoshen Mishpat 423:1).In conclusion:(a) It is permitted to conduct an amniocentesis for the purpose of making a decision regarding termination of pregnancy due to mental retardation in a case of Down’s syndrome.(b) In the event that the examination shows, with confidence, that the fetus has Down’s syndrome, a permissive ruling must be obtained from a qualified rabbi to perform a termination of pregnancy.(c) An additional consideration to permit such an abortion would be if there was the possibility to terminate the pregnancy through drinking some medicine or through giving an injection (i.e., non-surgical means).(d) In addition to the need to obtain the consent of the woman to terminate the pregnancy, the consent of the husband must also be obtained.With great honor and blessing, Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg |
Tzitz Eliezer 14:10 – excerpt on amniocentesis
Regarding the first matter (of the permissibility of undergoing an amniocentesis), there are two questions: (a) Whether it is permissible to conduct such an examination? and (b) Even if it is permitted on its own terms, is it permissible in cases where it will lead to a transgressing a prohibition? Because this will lead to causing the woman to stumble (in sin), for when she learns at that hospital the results of the examination, and when the hospital, which follows Torah law, will refuse to terminate the pregnancy, she will go to a different hospital or doctor who will agree to go against Torah law and carry out the termination of pregnancy.Let me explain. The question regarding the intrinsic permissibility of the procedure, is because to do this test – as your honor has explained it to me in our oral conversation – it is necessary to insert a needle through the walls of the woman’s body and into her uterus (and this is done under local anesthesia) and the needle reaches the uterine cavity and draws a quantity of fluid from it … Sometimes it can happen (even if this is rare) that such an examination cause real harm and damage, such as bleeding and the like.And examining the matter, it seems that despite this we can permit the act itself of performing a test … As far as the possibility that this will cause some injury to the woman as a result of this, behold this is it only a doubt (i.e., a small risk), and for this the woman’s consent suffices. For they do not perform such procedures without the woman’s consent to that, The permission to do this is certainly true given that they do not perform such a procedure for the purposes of inflicting injury, but for the sake of benefit.The second question is that, as a result of the examination, the woman will be informed that the defect has been discovered in the fetus, and will arrange for the termination of pregnancy even in the case where the halakhic ruling is to forbid it. As a result of which, by administering the test we are transgressing the prohibition of putting a stumbling block before the blind, This can be an even greater concern if the woman who is undergoing the test is not religious, for in such a case the stumbling block is more real and anticipatable.However, after looking into this matter, it appears that even the concern for this prohibition (of placing a stumbling block) does not exist, For we do not transgress the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind except in cases where it is clear that the other person will transgress as a result of the first person’s actions. But wherever there is room to argue that the first person’s actions will possibly not lead to sin, then he does not transgress placing a stumbling block before the blind…Now, in our case, we have all of these factors (of leniency regarding placing a stumbling block before the blind), and even more than them, For we are not handing the person the forbidden thing, for the test itself is not a violation, as stated above. It is also not clear whether this will even lead to a transgression, for in our case there are many many doubts regarding this. First, perhaps the test will be negative, which is what occurs in the vast majority of cases (the occurrence of Down’s syndrome in this population is only 1-2%), Second, who is to say that the woman will consent afterwards to undergo a termination of pregnancy. Thirdly, perhaps according to the circumstances of the case, she will receive a halakhic ruling permitting her to terminate her pregnancy from a rabbi who is a posek who will permit this according to Torah law…
Iggrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat, 2:69
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, 1895-1986, was the leading halachic authority of American Jewry.
Day after Sukkot. 1976.
Regarding Killing a fetus…And in Maimonides it is even more explicit that killing a fetus is actual murder…Therefore, regarding the law, it is prohibited under the prohibition of “Thou shalt not murder” to abort a fetus, with the single exception that one who kills it is exempt from the death penalty… And because of this I ruled that even if the doctors are saying that there is a possibility that the mother may die if the fetus is not killed – although for desecrating Shabbat and violating other commandments one would do so in such a case, even for a small concern of life – nevertheless, to kill a fetus it would be forbidden until the doctors assess that the likelihood of her death is almost definite…And even if the doctor is being forced by threat of death to perform an abortion, it would appear that he must give up his life rather than do so [although an argument could be made to the contrary]… Therefore, this ruling requires greater thought, whether one must give up his life rather than perform an abortion…I have written all this because of the great calamity in the world that many governments have allowed the killing of fetuses, among them political leaders in the State of Israel, and countless of fetuses have already been killed, and in these days the greatest need is to make a fence around the Torah, how much more so not to make leniencies regarding the prohibition of murder that is so severe. Thus, I was appalled by the responsa of a learned man in Israel written to the director of Shaarei Tzedek Hospital who permits the abortion of a Tay-Sachs fetus even beyond 3 months. And he ruled such by prefacing that the prohibition was, according to many decisors, only rabbinic… It is clear and simple as I wrote, the law which is made clear by the early rabbis and the decisors of Jew law, that abortion is prohibited as it is considered actual murder, whether the fetus is legitimate or illegitimate, regular fetuses or those which are suffering from Tay-Sachs. It is strictly prohibited, and do not err and rely on the responsum of that learned man…
Tzitz Eliezer, 20:2
1993.The case is of a certain woman who is pregnant with quadruplets, and after a medical exam the doctors have determined that it is necessary to kill one fetus, and then the other three will definitely live, but without this, all of them will die. I was asked by her husband, who is a talmid chakham, if it is permissible by law to kill one of them so that his siblings live, or if this is similar to the law that is ruled in Rambam, Foundations of Torah 5:5, that if non-Jews tell you to give us one person to be killed, or else we will kill all of you, that you must let everyone die rather than giving over one Jewish soul…Now, we have shown, that one who kills a fetus is not considered a murdered, and that this is not included in the three cardinal sins for which it is said that one must die rather than transgressing, one of which is murder, and on this point no one argues. The only debate is which negative prohibition applies to this case, whether the prohibition of wounding or that of wasting seed, or something similar, but that this is not even in the category of appurtenances to murder. And the majority of the decisors are of the opinion that it is only a Rabbinic violation, and some frame it merely as “a minor violation”…Based on all the above, it appears to me, in my humble opinion, that the ruling regarding our question is, that it is permissible to kill one fetus so that more than three fetuses (each one of whom is in the category of a pursuer of the other) will survive…
Dr. Avraham Steinberg, The Beginning of Life – Jewish Perspectives, 2005.
PRE-IMPLANTATION EMBRYO |
Rav Yitzhak Zilberstein: “The Evaluation of the Pre-embryo Before Implantation for Prevention of Defective Embryos and Gender Determination,” Assia, Iyar 5752
And since most great authorities hold that there is no law of loss of life with regard to abortions, it is clear that it is possible to rule leniently in this case and in the matter under discussion, where the questioner wrote that even if the fetuses survived, they’d be born with serious mental and physical defects, it’s clear that one should follow the lenient ruling and say that it is permissible to kill some of the fetuses so that the remaining ones will be born healthy. |