75 Beitzah 39a

And Rav Ashi said a different explanation as to why the spices, water, and salt are not subject to nullification: It is because any one of these ingredients is an object whose prohibition is temporary, as the prohibition against their being taken out of the Shabbat limits lapses once the Festival has passed, and the general principle is that anything whose prohibition is temporary cannot become nullified, even by one part in one thousand. § It is taught in a mishna: Rabbi Yehuda exempts one from travel limitations in the case of water. The Gemara asks: Does this mean to imply that water, yes, it is exempted by Rabbi Yehuda, but salt, no, it is not? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are both nullified, whether in a dough or in a pot of cooked food. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. In this case of the mishna, the reference is to salt of Sodom, which is quite coarse and does not blend in easily with the dough, and, being noticeable in the final product, is not nullified. In that case of the baraita, the reference is to a type of fine salt known as isterokanit salt. Consequently, it is not noticeable in the final product and can be nullified. The mishna states that according to Rabbi Yehuda water mixed into dough, and presumably into a cooked dish as well, is considered nullified. The Gemara challenges this: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified in dough but not in a pot, due to its sauce. The pot, unlike bread, ends up with liquid in it, so the borrowed water is still recognizable. The Gemara replies: This is not difficult. This case of the mishna, where Rabbi Yehuda says that the water is nullified in the cooked food, is referring to a thick dish that has no liquid sauce. That case of the baraita, in which Rabbi Yehuda said the water is not nullified, is referring to a thin dish with liquid sauce. MISHNA: A coal that one borrowed from another on the Festival is as the feet of the owner, and it may be carried on the Festival to any place where its owner may walk. Since it has substance, it is associated with its owner. But a flame that one lit from another’s flame may be taken anywhere, as it has no substance. This essential difference between a coal and a flame has additional halakhic ramifications: If one uses a coal of consecrated property for a non-consecrated purpose, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property, since it has substance. But if one uses a consecrated flame, although according to rabbinic law one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, if one did benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse, since it does not have substance. Similarly, one who takes out a coal from a private domain to the public domain on Shabbat is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying, but one who takes out a flame is exempt. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a Tosefta (Beitza 4:7): Five things were stated with regard to a coal, in relation to the practical halakhic differences between a coal and a flame: (1) Coal is as the feet of the owner with regard to its Festival resting place, whereas a flame may be carried anywhere. (2) One is liable for misusing property consecrated to the Temple with a consecrated coal, whereas with regard to a flame, according to rabbinic law one may not benefit from it, but he is not liable for misusing property consecrated to the Temple. (3) Coal used for idol worship is prohibited for one to benefit from it, whereas from a flame of this sort it is permitted to benefit. (4) One who carries out a coal to the public domain is liable, whereas one who carries out a flame is exempt. (5) One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another is prohibited from using his coal, but he is permitted to derive benefit from his flame. With regard to the halakhot cited in the baraita above, the Gemara asks: What is different in the case of a flame of idol worship, that one is permitted to use it even ab initio, as the baraita uses the term permitted in that case; and what is different in the case of a consecrated flame, in that it is prohibited to be used ab initio, as the baraita states: One may not benefit from it, but he is not liable for misuse? The Gemara explains: In the case of idol worship, which is repulsive to Jews and from which Jewish people inherently maintain separation, the Sages did not decree additional restrictions with regard to it. However, concerning consecrated property, which is not repulsive and from which people do not inherently maintain separation, in order to prevent its misuse, the Sages did decree with regard to it that it is prohibited to use the flame. § It is taught in the baraita that one who carries out a coal to the public domain is liable, whereas one who carries out a flame is exempt. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita: One who carries out a flame of any size on Shabbat is liable? Rav Sheshet said: The second baraita is referring to a case where one carried out the flame along with a wooden chip. Since the flame is attached to a physical object, it is considered significant. The Gemara raises an objection: But if so, let it derive that one is liable for carrying out in this case due to the wooden chip, and the presence of the flame is irrelevant. The Gemara responds: That baraita speaks of a chip that does not have the minimum measure that determines liability for carrying out, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 89b): In the case of one who carries out wood on Shabbat, the measure that determines liability is enough wood to cook an egg of the kind that is the easiest to cook, which is the egg of a chicken. Because the chip is too small to cook an egg, one is not liable for carrying it out, but one is liable for carrying out the flame attached to it. Abaye said a different scenario: The mishna is referring to a case where one smeared a vessel with oil, and lit a fire on it, and carried out that flame. The Gemara asks: If so, let it derive that one is liable for carrying out in this case due to the vessel itself, and the flame is irrelevant. The Gemara replies: The mishna is referring to a fire lit in an earthenware shard, not in a whole vessel. The Gemara challenges: And nevertheless, let it derive that one is liable for carrying due to the earthenware shard itself. The Gemara answers: It deals with a shard that is not of the minimum measure that determines liability for carrying out, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 82a): The measure that determines liability for carrying out earthenware is enough to place between one window frame and another, as small shards of earthenware were sometimes placed between window frames during construction. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: But if so, if one is liable for carrying it out whenever the flame is attached to an object of substance, that which we learned in the mishna here: One who carries out a flame is exempt, under what circumstances can this case be found? The Gemara answers: The mishna is speaking of a case where one fanned the fire with his hand so that it spread into the public domain without its being attached to any vessel. MISHNA: With regard to a cistern of an individual, water drawn from it is as the feet of the individual who owns the cistern, and the water may be carried only to those places where its owner is permitted to walk. And water drawn from a cistern belonging jointly to all the people dwelling in a particular town is as the feet of the people of that town. And water drawn from a cistern of those who come up to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is as the feet of whoever fills his vessel with its water; the water has no defined boundary of its own since it is made available to all. GEMARA: Rava raised a contradiction to Rav Naḥman: We learned in the mishna that the water of a cistern of an individual is as the feet of the individual; and Rava raised a contradiction from the Tosefta (Beitza 4:8): Water drawn from flowing rivers and flowing springs are as the feet of all people. Rava said: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? With cisterns that contain collected water, not flowing water. And it was also said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: The mishna applies only to collected water. § The mishna states: And water drawn from a cistern of those who come up to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is as the feet of whoever fills his vessel with its water. It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue: In the case of one who filled a vessel with water from a public cistern on behalf of another and gave the water to him, Rav Naḥman said: The water is as the feet of the one for whom they were filled; Rav Sheshet said: It is as the feet of the one who filled it. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rav Sheshet, holds that a public cistern is ownerless, and the halakha is that one cannot take possession of ownerless property on behalf of someone else. Therefore, the water belongs to the one who drew it; it is as his feet, and this status does not change even if he subsequently gave it to anyone else. And one Sage, Rav Naḥman, holds that a public cistern is considered jointly owned by all its partners, namely, all of the Jewish people. Therefore, it is possible for one partner to draw water on behalf of another partner, and the drawn water immediately belongs to the person for whom it was drawn. Rava raised a challenge to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Nedarim 47b): One who says to another: I am hereby prohibited to you by force of ḥerem, a kind of vow of prohibition, as objects declared as ḥerem are generally consecrated to the Temple, the one prohibited by the vow, the addressee, is prohibited to derive benefit from the person who made the vow or from his property, as the point of the vow was to prohibit the addressee from deriving any benefit from the one who made the vow.