Rachava asks: If you drive with a goat and a large fish (a shibbuta) what is the ruling? Do we say that since the goat does not descend into the sea and the shibbuta does not ascend onto the land you have not done anything? Or perhaps, in any event, you are now driving?
Rav Chisda sent to Rabba with Rav Acha bar Rav Huna: ... Didn’t we learn: There is a case where you plow one furrow and are liable for violating eight prohibitions? one who plows with an ox and a donkey, and they were both consecrated, for mixed food crops in a vineyard, and it was the Sabbatical, on a Festival, and he was a priest and a nazirite, in a place of ritual impurity...
אמרי ליה פפונאי לרב מתנה מצא קן בראשו של אדם מהו אמר (שמואל ב טו, לב) ואדמה על ראשו...
§ The residents of Pappunya said to Rav Mattana: If one found a nest on the head of a person, what is the law? Rav Mattana said: “And earth upon his head” (II Samuel 15:32)...
MISHNA: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), i.e.: That which you slaughter you may eat.
GEMARA: The reason is that the knife fell. But if one dropped the knife it is valid, and even though they did not have intention.
Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall and it went and slaughtered in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches and he says about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.
Peleimu raised a dilemma before Rabbi: In the case of one who has two heads, on which of them should they don tefillin? Rabbi said to him: Either get up and exile yourself or accept upon yourself excommunication!
In the meantime, a certain man arrived and said to Rabbi: A child has been born to me who has two heads. How much money must I give to the priest?
A certain elder came and taught him: You are obligated to give him ten sela, the requisite five for each head.
f so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If it was found beyond fifty cubits from a dovecote, it belongs to its finder. And if there is no other dovecote in the area, it certainly fell from that dovecote. How, then, can it be given to the finder? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a chick that hops from place to place but does not yet fly. As Rav Ukva bar Ḥama says: With regard to any creature that hops, it does not hop more than fifty cubits. Consequently, any bird found within fifty cubits of a dovecote is assumed to have come from there. If it is farther away than that, it likely came from elsewhere or was dropped by travelers.
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one leg of the chick was within fifty cubits of the dovecote, and one leg was beyond fifty cubits, what is the halakha? And it was for this that they removed Rabbi Yirmeya from the study hall
״וְשִׁבַּחְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת הַשִּׂמְחָה״ — שִׂמְחָה שֶׁל מִצְוָה. ״וּלְשִׂמְחָה מַה זֹּה עוֹשָׂה״ — זוֹ שִׂמְחָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁל מִצְוָה. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁאֵין שְׁכִינָה שׁוֹרָה לֹא מִתּוֹךְ עַצְבוּת וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ עַצְלוּת וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ שְׂחוֹק וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ שִׂיחָה וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ דְּבָרִים בְּטֵלִים, אֶלָּא מִתּוֹךְ דְּבַר שִׂמְחָה שֶׁל מִצְוָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְעַתָּה קְחוּ לִי מְנַגֵּן וְהָיָה כְּנַגֵּן הַמְנַגֵּן וַתְּהִי עָלָיו יַד ה׳״. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: וְכֵן לִדְבַר הֲלָכָה. אָמַר רָבָא: וְכֵן לַחֲלוֹם טוֹב. אִינִי, וְהָאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: כׇּל תַּלְמִיד חָכָם שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְאֵין שִׂפְתוֹתָיו נוֹטְפוֹת מָר, תִּכָּוֶינָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״שִׂפְתוֹתָיו שׁוֹשַׁנִּים נוֹטְפוֹת מוֹר עוֹבֵר״: אַל תִּקְרֵי ״מוֹר עוֹבֵר״, אֶלָּא ״מָר עוֹבֵר״. אַל תִּקְרֵי ״שׁוֹשַׁנִּים״, אֶלָּא ״שֶׁשּׁוֹנִים״. לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּרַבָּה וְהָא בְּתַלְמִידָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא הָא וְהָא בְּרַבָּה, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּלִפְתַּח, הָא לְבָתַר דִּפְתַח. כִּי הָא דְּרַבָּה מִקַּמֵּי דְּפָתַח לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן אָמַר מִילְּתָא דִּבְדִיחוּתָא וּבָדְחִי רַבָּנַן, לְסוֹף יָתֵיב בְּאֵימְתָא וּפָתַח בִּשְׁמַעְתָּא.
“So I commended mirth,” that is the joy of a mitzva. “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” that is joy that is not the joy of a mitzva, to teach you that the Divine Presence rests upon an individual neither in sadness, nor in laziness, nor in laughter, nor in frivolity, nor in idle conversation, nor in idle chatter, but rather in the joy of a mitzva. As it was stated: “But now bring me (Elisha) a minstrel; and it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Eternal came upon him” (II Kings 3:15).
Rav Yehuda said: And, so too for a matter of halakha.
Rava said: And, so too in order to have a good dream.
Is that so? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who sits before their teacher and their lips are not dripping with myrrh, shall be burnt, as it is stated: “His lips are as lilies, dripping with flowing myrrh [shoshanim notefot mor over]” (Song of Songs 5:13)? He interpreted: Do not read mor over, flowing myrrh; rather, read mar over, flowing bitterness. Likewise, do not read shoshanim, lilies; rather, read sheshonim, that are studying, meaning that lips that are studying Torah must be full of bitterness. This is not difficult, this, is referring a rabbi, and that to a student. And if you wish, say this and that are referring to a rabbi, and it is not difficult. This is before one begins, whereas that, is after one already began teaching halakha.
This is like that which Rabba did. Before he opened his teaching to the Sages, he would say something humorous and the Sages would be cheered. In the end, he sat in fear and began teaching.
Talmudic Humor and the Establishment of Legal Principles: Strange Questions, Impossible Scenarios, and Legalistic Brainteasers
by Hershey H. Friedman, Ph.D.
Humorous cases and brainteasers are excellent pedagogic tools for those studying law and even for other disciplines. They make the lectures more interesting and help clarify matters. Using improbable scenarios is somewhat reminiscent of the way computer programs are tested. Extreme data is used and if the program works with the unusual data it will presumably work with any kind of data. Examining far- fetched, and even impossible, cases enables one to determine what should be done in more routine case
רַבִּי בְּרוֹקָא חוֹזָאָה הֲוָה שְׁכִיחַ בְּשׁוּקָא דְּבֵי לָפָט. הֲוָה שְׁכִיחַ אֵלִיָּהוּ גַּבֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִיכָּא בְּהַאי שׁוּקָא בַּר עָלְמָא דְּאָתֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי חֲזָא לְהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה סָיֵים מְסָאנֵי אוּכָּמֵי וְלָא רְמֵי חוּטָא דִתְכֵלְתָּא בִּגְלִימֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי בַּר עָלְמָא דְּאָתֵי הוּא. רְהַט בָּתְרֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עוֹבָדָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל הָאִידָּנָא, וְתָא לִמְחַר. לִמְחַר אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עוֹבָדָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זַנְדּוּקְנָא אֲנָא, וְאָסַרְנָא גַּבְרֵי לְחוֹד וְנָשֵׁי לְחוֹד, וְרָמֵינָא פּוּרְיַיאי בֵּין הָנֵי לְהָנֵי כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לֵיתוֹ לִידֵי אִיסּוּרָא. כִּי חָזֵינָא בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל דְּיָהֲבִי נׇכְרִים עֲלַהּ עֵינַיְיהוּ, מָסַרְנָא נַפְשַׁאי וּמַצֵּילְנָא לַהּ. יוֹמָא חַד הֲווֹת נַעֲרָה מְאוֹרָסָה גַּבַּן דִּיהַבוּ בָּהּ נׇכְרִים עֵינַיְיהוּ, שְׁקַלִי דּוּרְדְּיָיא דְּחַמְרָא וּשְׁדַאי לַהּ בְּשִׁיפּוּלַהּ, וַאֲמַרִי: דַּשְׁתָּנָא הִיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי טַעְמָא לֵית לָךְ חוּטֵי, וּרְמֵית מְסָאנֵי אוּכָּמֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עָיֵילְנָא וְנָפֵיקְנָא בֵּינֵי נׇכְרִים, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִידְּעוּ דִּיהוּדָאָה אֲנָא. כִּי הָווּ גָּזְרִי גְּזֵירְתָּא, מוֹדַעְנָא לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן וּבָעוּ רַחֲמֵי וּמְבַטְּלִי לִגְזֵירְתַּיְיהוּ. וּמַאי טַעְמָא כִּי אָמֵינָא לָךְ אֲנָא מַאי עוֹבָדָךְ, וַאֲמַרְתְּ לִי: זִיל הָאִידָּנָא וְתָא לִמְחַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּהַהִיא שַׁעְתָּא גָּזְרִי גְּזֵירְתָּא, וְאָמֵינָא: בְּרֵישָׁא אֵיזִיל וְאֶשְׁמְעַ[הּ], וְאֶשְׁלַח לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּלִבְעוֹ רַחֲמֵי עֲלַהּ דְּמִילְּתָא. אַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי אֲתוֹ הָנָךְ תְּרֵי אַחֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָנָךְ נָמֵי בְּנֵי עָלְמָא דְּאָתֵי נִינְהוּ. אֲזַל לְגַבַּיְיהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: מַאי עוֹבָדַיְיכוּ? אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אִינָשֵׁי בָּדוֹחֵי אֲנַן, מְבַדְּחִינַן עֲצִיבֵי. אִי נָמֵי, כִּי חָזֵינַן בֵּי תְרֵי דְּאִית לְהוּ תִּיגְרָא בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ, טָרְחִינַן וְעָבְדִינַן לְהוּ שְׁלָמָא.
Rabbi Beroka Ḥoza’a was often found in the market of Bei Lefet, and Elijah the Prophet would often appear to him. He said to Elijah: is there anyone in this market worthy of the World-to-Come? He said to him: No... In the meantime, two brothers came. Elijah said to Rabbi Beroka: These two also have a share in the World-to-Come. Rabbi Beroka went over to them and said to them: What is your occupation? They said to him: We are jesters, and we cheer up the depressed. Alternatively, when we see two people who have a quarrel between them, we strive to make peace.
Holy Folly: Using Humor to Reach for G-d
By Sarah Rindner
The Talmud notes the important role of laughter in the religious psyche. One story recorded in Ta’anit 22a describes a conversation between the sage Rabbi Broka Ḥoza’ah and Elijah the prophet. Rabbi Broka asks Elijah which people in the marketplace will merit a place in the World to Come. . . . Elijah highlights several people who would not obviously pass for righteous: a jailkeeper dressed in non-Jewish clothing and a pair of jesters.
Elijah reveals that the jailkeeper’s outward appearance hides a hidden holy agenda that one would never have guessed. The jokesters, too, are more righteous than they seem, Elijah reveals. But while the jailkeeper’s saintliness is hidden, the jokesters’ virtue hides in plain sight. The very reason one might think they are not particularly saintly—the fact that they make their living lightening the mood and distracting people from their sorrows—is precisely the source of their greatness.
Rabbi Naftali Loewenthal, a London-based scholar of Jewish mysticism, . . . explained that comic irony fosters [a different] kind of perspective, helping a person balance the forces of the divine soul pushing for good and the temptations of the world. Humor “takes the air out of the urges within a person,” and in doing so clears a space for him to connect with something that transcends the narrow self.
Socrates and the Fat Rabbis by Daniel Boyarin
Both Plato and the Talmud can thus be read dialogically if we look for dialogue in the right places, and that is most assuredly not in their represented dialogues. In both texts, there is a voicing of the most serious and important, the most truth-committed of the enterprises of a community of intellectuals, that which is spoudaios (morally serious) for the writers themselves: for Plato dialogue in search of the Truth; for the Rabbis of the Bavli dialectic in search of the correct praxis, and for both, even beyond the results of the search, an absolutely vital protreptic for a way of life and discourse, philosophia/Torah. But both of these dead-serious commitments are turned on their heads within the same texts via a grotesque, satirical narrative framework in which things are shown not to be what they seem; truth is contingent and bound up with the jealousies, envies, sexual desires, and passions of historical moments.