Lech Lecha 5784 - Redeeming the Captive

(8) Then the king of Sodom, the king of Gomorrah, the king of Admah, the king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela, which is Zoar, went forth and engaged them in battle in the Valley of Siddim: (9) King Chedorlaomer of Elam, King Tidal of Goiim, King Amraphel of Shinar, and King Arioch of Ellasar—four kings against those five. (10) Now the Valley of Siddim was dotted with bitumen pits; and the kings of Sodom and Gomorrah, in their flight, threw themselves into them, while the rest escaped to the hill country. (11) [The invaders] seized all the wealth of Sodom and Gomorrah and all their provisions, and went their way. (12) They also took Lot, the son of Abram’s brother, and his possessions, and departed; for he had settled in Sodom. (13) A fugitive brought the news to Abram the Hebrew, who was dwelling at the terebinths of Mamre the Amorite, kinsman of Eshkol and Aner, these being Abram’s allies. (14) When Abram heard that his kinsman’s [household] had been taken captive, he mustered his retainers,*retainers Meaning of Heb. ḥanikh uncertain. born into his household, numbering three hundred and eighteen, and went in pursuit as far as Dan. (15) At night, he and his servants deployed against them and defeated them; and he pursued them as far as Hobah, which is north of Damascus. (16) He brought back all the possessions; he also brought back his kinsman Lot and his possessions, and the women and the rest of the people.

Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: Concerning this matter that the Sages stated, that redeeming captives is a great mitzva, from where is it derived? Rabba bar Mari said to him: As it is written: “And it shall come to pass, when they say to you: To where shall we depart? Then you shall tell them: So says the Lord: Such as are for death, to death; and such as are for the sword, to the sword; and such as are for famine, to famine; and such as are for captivity, to captivity” (Jeremiah 15:2). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whichever punishment is written later in this verse is more severe than the one before it.

MISHNA: The captives are not redeemed for more than their actual monetary value, for the betterment of the world; and one may not aid the captives in their attempt to escape from their captors for the betterment of the world, so that kidnappers will not be more restrictive with their captives to prevent them from escaping. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For the betterment of the captives, so that kidnappers will not avenge the escape of the captives by treating other captives with cruelty.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to this expression: For the betterment of the world, is it due to the financial pressure of the community? Is the concern that the increase in price will lead to the community assuming financial pressures it will not be able to manage? Or perhaps it is because the result of this will be that they will not seize and bring additional captives, as they will see that it is not worthwhile for them to take Jews captive?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer based on the fact that Levi bar Darga redeemed his daughter who was taken captive with thirteen thousand gold dinars. This indicates that private citizens may pay excessive sums to redeem a captive if they so choose. Therefore, it must be that the reason for the ordinance was to avoid an excessive burden being placed upon the community. If the ordinance was instituted to remove the incentive for kidnappers to capture Jews, a private citizen would also not be permitted to pay an excessive sum.

Abaye said: And who told us that he acted in accordance with the wishes of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against the wishes of the Sages, and this anecdote cannot serve as a proof.

Ransoming captives comes before feeding or clothing the poor. There is no act of charity more meritorious than ransoming captives; therefore, money collected for any worthy purpose whatsoever may be used as ransom, even if originally collected for the erection of a Synagogue. And further: even if the building materials have already been bought and the beams squared (which makes it a grave offense to sell them for any other purpose) nevertheless, it is permitted to sell them to raise a ransom. However, if the structure is already erected it should not be sold. (Still, if one donates a Sela to Charity without specification, ransoming is not to be understood in the general term of charity, and the Sela should not be used for this purpose without the knowledge of the members of the community.)

He who shuts his eyes against the ransoming of captives transgresses the negative precepts, "Thou shalt not harden thy heart", and, "[Thou shalt not] shut thy hand"; also this, "Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor", and this, "He shall not rule with rigor over him in thy sight"; and he neglects the positive precepts, "Thou shalt surely open thy hand unto him", and, "that thy brother may live with thee," and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" and, "Deliver them that are carried away unto death."

Every moment that one delays unnecessarily the ransoming of a captive, it is as if he were to shed blood.

Captives are not to be ransomed at an unreasonable cost, for the safety of society; otherwise, the enemies would exert every effort to capture victims. But a man may ransom himself at any price. So also, a scholar should be ransomed at a greater price, or even a student who gives promise of becoming a great scholar. (As to whether one's wife is considered "another" or "one's self," see Eben Ha-Ezer, 78.)

Captives should not be aided to escape, for the sake of public safety; lest the enemies treat the captives with greater severity and confine them under closer custody.

Translation from ChatGPT as a study aid. Not an official translation.

(a) Personal Ransom: Is it permissible to submit to the extortion of terrorists in order to save a kidnapped individual?

(b) Question: Throughout the existence of the state, there have been cases in which terrorists kidnapped civilians or soldiers, threatening that unless many terrorists are released from our prisons, they would murder the captives in their custody. The question is whether, according to Jewish law, one should comply with their demand and release many terrorists in order to save the lives of Jews, or should one not yield to their blackmail?

(c) Answer: In previous discussions, we learned that, as a general rule, one should not yield to the extortion of kidnappers. However, in a situation where the captive is in imminent danger, the opinions of the halachic authorities diverge. Nevertheless, all of this applies specifically to regular criminals whose primary goal is financial gain. When dealing with a protracted state of war with terrorists, we are forbidden to yield to any extortion on their part. By yielding, we would be showing a clear sign of weakness to our enemies, causing their morale to rise and emboldening them to harm us more. Furthermore, it is well known that, following any such "success," additional terrorists join their ranks. Additionally, those who venture to harm us in the future will not hesitate because they will rely on the fact that even if they are captured, they will be swiftly released from Israeli prisons in a hostage exchange. Moreover, there is a reasonable concern that at least some of the released terrorists will return to target Jews. Therefore, despite the painful nature of the situation, we should not yield to extortion and pay more for the release of a captive than is customary in such cases, meaning a one-for-one exchange.

(d) The general rule is that during a state of war, we do not yield to the demands of the enemy, and even if they capture a single one of our own, we go to war to save him. We find this in the Torah (Numbers 21:1): "The Canaanite king of Arad, who lived in the Negev, heard that Israel was coming along the road to Atharim. He attacked the Israelites and took some of them prisoners." The Sages explained that only one maidservant was taken from Israel, and yet they did not engage in any negotiations; instead, they went to war against them to save her. Similarly, when the Amalekites spread out on Ziklag and took women as captives, King David did not engage in negotiations; rather, he fought them to save the captives (1 Samuel 30). Even if the enemies come to seize straw and stubble only, we go out against them in battle, for if we yield to them on a small matter, they will continue to wage war against us. (Eruvin 45a).

(e) All of the above pertains to terrorists and enemies who persist in their warfare. However, when we are dealing with a concluded state of war, it is permissible to exchange all the prisoners in our hands for the prisoners in their hands, even though we have many more captives. This is because this is the accepted practice according to ceasefire agreements, which stipulate the return of all captives, and it is not considered to be paying more than their value. Therefore, there is no concern that returning the prisoners will lead to a continuation of the war. Presumably, the considerations for opening a new war will be based on different criteria.

Footnote: Koach Katan - Minority Opinion

Rabbi Kalaiv, in the field of Techumin (boundaries), volume 4, page 108, wrote as follows: However, see Chavat Binyamin, Rabbi Israeli, Volume 1, page 16, and Asiya (contemporary halachic issues), Volume 7, page 8, where it is argued that there may be permission to exchange our prisoner for many prisoners, based on the rationale that an individual can redeem oneself at any excessive price. In his view, any soldier who enlists in the army should consider it as if they have secured their own release against the prisoners held by the enemy and can be redeemed at any cost. Therefore, it is left to the IDF to decide whether to redeem the soldier and at what price. However, in practice, it has been noted that we cannot always rely on the judgment of IDF commanders, as some may be inclined to change their position based on political considerations. It is clear that the prisoner exchanges conducted so far have raised the morale of the terrorists, and many of the released terrorists have continued to engage in acts of terror, leading to more Israeli casualties. Therefore, the current consensus among rabbis is that exchanging prisoners at an excessive cost is prohibited. The reasoning behind this is that it is believed that terrorists will interpret the release as a sign of weakness, leading to an increase in their morale, and they will intensify their attacks. Furthermore, it is likely that at least some of the released terrorists will return to harm Jews. Therefore, as long as the struggle continues, there is no permission to exchange prisoners at an excessive cost. The same is true for the views of other rabbis in Yishuv (Jewish settlement in Israel). Rabbi Goren, in "Torat HaMedina" (The Torah of the State), pages 424-436, also agrees that it is forbidden to yield to terrorist extortion. Nevertheless, in the case of soldiers taken captive during their service, he wrote that it is conceivable that the state has an absolute duty to redeem them at any cost, without regard for the damage this may cause to security and the state. He concludes that it is obligatory to impose the death penalty on terrorists, and without doing so, there will be no deterrent against them, and they will count on being released in prisoner exchanges. Rabbi Israeli in Chavat Binyamin 17 permitted endangering soldiers in order to avoid prisoner exchanges when the prisoner exchange involves humiliation and the degradation of the honor of Israel.