Numbers 30:3 - On the noun אִישׁ

(The above rendering comes from the RJPS translation—an adaptation of the NJPS translation—as it was corrected in November 2023. Before accounting for this rendering, I will analyze the plain sense of the Hebrew term containing אִישׁ, by employing a situation-oriented construal as outlined in this document, pp. 11–16.)

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Here, as usual, אִישׁ is employed to schematically depict a situation—in this case, a situation that revolves around its key participant. It marks the participant in question (in this case, a hypothetical person) as essential for grasping that situation. This is a classic function of the situating noun.

The pairing of the masculine term אִישׁ with a parallel feminine formula in the next verse is a unique structure. It has prompted two schools of interpretation. According to one reading, אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה are mutually exclusive counterpart terms: אִישׁ refers to a man (v. 3), while אִשָּׁה refers to the complementary case of a woman (vv. 4–13)—so Jacob Milgrom (JPS Torah Commentary); Baruch Levine (Anchor Bible); Adele Berlin; Carol Meyers; and others.

According to the other construal, the relationship here is a taxonomy of whole and part: אִישׁ is a generic term (“anyone”) that includes אִשָּׁה—that is, אִישׁ introduces a general principle (v. 3), which is followed by a limited number of special cases centered on a woman (vv. 4–13)—so Midrash Sifrei; Targum Jonathan; and Mayer Gruber (pers. comm., 6/2/04).

The evidence is far stronger that the latter position is the plain sense, as I shall now explain.

CATEGORICAL STATEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VOWS. As noted above, the normal way of construing the frequently occurring formula אִישׁ כִּי־ followed by a YIQTOL verb is that the speaker is evoking a problematic situation that is defined by the actions of its central participant. This formula naturally applies to whoever is capable of the action in question. In this case, the opening אִישׁ כִּי־יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַיי evokes a generic situation, as does the almost identical wording in Lev 27:2, אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא נֶדֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ נְפָשֹׁת לַיי (NJPS “anyone”). Gender is not specified by the referring expression אִישׁ, given the non-specific (i.e., category) nature of the reference.

There is no warrant for excluding women from view, for everyone knows that women can make vows (e.g., Numbers 6 for a nazirite; Prov. 7:14), as the rest of both passages presupposes.

This reading is entirely conventional and therefore cognitively preferred. It yields a verse that is already coherent and informative on its own terms, so the audience would construe a generic scope to this statement before encountering the remainder of the passage: its highly salient point is that everyone should take their vows seriously.

Notwithstanding this categorical statement in v. 3, the next verse quickly establishes that the application of this principle is nuanced for a female, depending upon her relationship to the head of her household (which she herself might be, v. 10). In other words, the two categories placed in opposition are householder versus dependents.

HOUSEHOLD ORIENTATION. Predictably the ancient Israelite audience would understand this discussion in terms of their society’s basic economic and social unit, the corporate household, with its hierarchical structure. That household orientation—which would go without saying—conditions this passage’s interpretation.

In Israelite society, the ability to make a vow freely exemplified the autonomous authority that was possessed distinctively by a householder. (See Deut. 12:17–18; Judg. 11:30, 35; 1 Sam. 1:21; Jer. 44:25; cf. Prov. 7:14–20.)

How so? Typically, vows involve a donation of economic assets to a shrine, such as livestock. Such an utterance might (temporarily) reduce the household’s productive capacity—and its resilience in a crisis. It could also make that individual less available for work (such as by leaving home to travel to and from the sanctuary). The individual’s perceived need might well be at odds with the household’s best interests. Therefore, granting the household’s executive a limited right to annul a household member’s vow or oath would have provided a way for the household’s needs to be taken into account.

Surely this need for executive management of the household’s assets applied without regard to its members’ gender. That is, it applied to its dependent men as well as to its women. Even a royal prince like Absalom (a dependent of his father the king) needed to ask his father’s permission to ostensibly fulfill a vow (2 Sam 15:7–8). As an aside, the very fact that Absalom resorted to vow-fulfillment as a plausible ruse suggests that he was not merely asking for permission to leave town, but more pointedly testing the limits (once again) of his father’s willingness to rein in his son.

A FEMALE AS THE TEST CASE. Nonetheless, the most instructive case is that of a girl/woman, because in a patrilocal society, she customarily moved from one domicile to another when she married. A bride’s prior commitments (vows or oaths) might well not suit her new village and its local conditions. So the ancient audience would have seen women as the paradigm case for the legal question at hand. And treating her case is sufficient to cover all members of the household, including its boys/men. For if even the primary wife’s vow or oath is known to be subject to review, how much more so those of the household’s other members—who have lesser status and authority.

The passage’s summary in v. 17 supports the above interpretation. It speaks in terms of two sets of paired relationships: father–daughter (covered in vv. 4–9) and husband–wife (vv. 11–16). I.e., the text frames its categorization in terms of autonomous versus attached persons. Tellingly, it does not frame those foregoing laws in terms of gender distinctions per se (“man” versus “woman”).

In previous efforts to ascertain the meaning of this passage (2005; 2006; 2014), I had argued that אִישׁ designates a head of household as such. I now reject that view, on the grounds that the above construal requires fewer assumptions.

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As for rendering into English, the NJPS rendering ‘a man’ follows the line of thought that I have rejected above; it cannot be the plain sense of this passage, because it yields a less informative text that disregards the conventional way that אִישׁ functions. The revised rendering, combined with a clarifying footnote, best accounts for what is at stake in this passage.