TOYNBEE’S CRITICISM of Judaism and Jewry is spread practically across the entire face of the ten volumes of his Study. This is the external mark of the intrinsic connection that exists between that author’s interpretation of world history and his understanding of Judaism. Believing that he has discerned the central theme of all history, he briskly treads his path through the maze of events and occurrences. But it is his central theme which is responsible for Toynbee’s preoccupation with Judaism, as well as for the facts that most of the basic principles of the Study are developed in innumerable—rather one-sided—debates against Judaism and the alleged aspirations of the Jewish people. The theme of universal history, according to Toynbee, is Man’s Salvation. But no one who is bold enough to believe in that will ever be able to get away from Israel. He must either bless or curse—and Toynbee does both—but he cannot leave alone. The salvation of man is not only a central theological concept of Judaism, but the goal toward which, in Judaic teaching, all history is moving. It was the prophets of Israel, and they alone, who interpreted history as man’s Messianic development toward his salvation. Toynbee takes over the Jewish concept but puts it to work side by side with his rejection of Judaism and of the Jewish people. No wonder that the final outcome of A Study of History is intellectually as well as morally insipid.1See below the Epilogue, section 2.
Probably the most significant aspect of A Study of History is that it is not at all a historical work, i.e., one belonging to the discipline of the science of history. It is a philosophical and theological inquiry concerning a great deal of historical raw material. The historian Toynbee supplies the information; the philosopher and theologian. Toynbee provides the interpretation. However, since Toynbee is much more historian than theologian or philosopher, he really believes that his interpretation is derived from the facts of history; and so he lustily engages in the discovery of a considerable number of “laws” of history. But since the days of Hume and Kant no philosopher should make the mistake of thinking that “laws” can be derived from facts. That man cannot save himself and depends for his salvation on an Act of Grace by God, who in a form incarnate gives Himself to the world in order to redeem it, is Christian doctrine; and as such it will be treated with respect as the faith of their fellow men by non-Christians too. But when Toynbee adduces countless instances of human failure in history in order to distill from them the proof that man, on account of his intrinsic nature, will never save himself—which, by the way, is Toynbee’s central thesis—then he is talking nonsense. The examples may establish the fact that, up to date, man has not succeeded in saving himself. Whether he has failed because he has blundered—and what he needs is more time to try—or because he is incapable of saving himself: on this point history remains silent. It is for the religions and philosophies of mankind to take over where history leaves off and to interpret the facts as best they may. The principles of interpretation do not emanate from history, but from philosophy, ethics, and religion. It is so in the case of Toynbee, and as it has been so in the case of all the interpreters of history, even though he does not seem to be aware of the fact. Toynbee’s “laws” of history are all imported from without and applied to the facts, but not proved by them. From the point of view of historical objectivity all that one might say in their favor is that, according to Toynbee, they are not contradicted by the facts.
Toynbee’s discussion of H. A. L. Fisher’s approach to history is beside the point.1See V/414. Fisher is of course right that, for the historian, history is without meaning. But this is not the same as saying that “history is bunkum.” The meaning is in the interpretation, and the interpretation is never provided by history itself. Toynbee is fooling himself when he suggests that his “laws” are those of history. They are philosophical and theological concepts with whose help he attempts to bring order to the chaos of historical events. There may be dozens of others, as there indeed are, that may be equally useful as “categories” or as “principles of selection” for the purpose of imposing some order on the “Tohu va’Bohu” of mere facts. If the “principles of selection” are to be treated as more than a mere device for the writer of history to marshal his facts coherently, if they are to be granted the solemn dignity of “laws,” expressing—as in the case of Toynbee—eternal metaphysical truth, then they have validity only in so far as they may stand their ground in the realm of philosophy, ethics, or theology. But nowhere in the Study is the soundness of the many philosophical, metaphysical, or theological premises of Toynbee even investigated, much less established. The author of the Study has read widely and makes clever eclectical and literary use of his reading; it is, however, extremely doubtful that he deserves much consideration either as a philosopher or as a theologian.
It would be pointless to argue that the Toynbean “laws” of history might have “statistical” significance, as—indeed—Toynbee occasionally suggests. There is no need to discuss here the question whether the concept of statistical laws of modern scientific research is at all applicable—and if so to what extent—to the study of history. Whatever the verdict of the logician, scientist, or philosopher, it is certain that statistics could never yield the Toynbean pattern of world history. By their very essence statistical laws have only quantitative meaning and are, indeed, always about quantitative relationships in nature; the Toynbean “laws” are about values and metaphysical truths. Statistical laws can be put to the test of experiment: if they “work,” if they are successful, they may be assumed to be valid. The validity of value concepts, on the other hand, cannot be questioned by failure in practice, nor can metaphysical truths be ascertained by facts of history.
Toynbee, for instance, spends a great amount of effort to prove how right Jesus was when he said that all who take the sword perish by the sword. Now, for a believer in Jesus, the real significance of the pronouncement lies not in the fact that it was made on the basis of experimental observation, but in the fact that its source is divine inspiration and knowledge. It is the revelation of the metaphysical truth that this world has been so established by God that those who take the sword must perish by it. Only on this account is it wrong, in all circumstances, to take the sword; he who does so acts against the Will of God. This may be true and it does make a lot of sense for the believer, but it cannot be “proved” by a study of history. It is sufficient that history should not contradict it. What Toynbee has shown—if he has done so much—is that, as far as our observations reach, all those who ever took the sword perished by the sword. Consequently, one is entitled to conclude that, for anyone who does not wish to perish, it would be foolish to take the sword, for the probability that he will perish by the sword is extremely high. But suppose that a person should enjoy being foolish and cared nothing whether he lived or perished.… Notwithstanding his ten volumes, Toynbee has not made the slightest contribution toward establishing more firmly among men the truth that it is ethically wrong to take the sword. All his examples show only that taking the sword is likely to lead to failure. This, however, means nothing for the question of values. If it is right to take the sword, it will be right to do so even though one is likely to perish in the action; if it is wrong to take the sword, it will remain an evil thing to do even though it may bring honor, glory, long life, and all the riches of the world. Facts know nothing of “ought” and “ought not.” Ethical values and religious truth are not confirmed by success nor invalidated by failure.
The prophets of Israel did not gain their interpretation of history as historians. The meaning which they attributed to history as the gradual Messianic evolution of mankind toward salvation has its origin in their faith in God and in the logical application of that faith to the understanding of all life. Man’s failure in history is, to use a phrase of Jacob Burckhardt,1See Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom, ed. Meridian Books, N. Y. 1955, p. 234. a scandal. The scandal caused Toynbee to panic intellectually;2See below chapter V, section 1 and the Epilogue, section 1. because of it he became a religious historian. The believer, however, believes not because of the scandal, but in spite of it; nor does he seek his justification in history, but in his own conscience before God.