APPENDIX TO DE SOMNIIS, II
Note on text.—The Trinity MS. which Cohn on a cursory inspection (Cohn on De Op. p. xxx) declared to be worthless as a whole, and which was therefore practically ignored in his and Wendland’s reconstruction of the text, does not seem, in this treatise at least, to deserve such a wholesale condemnation. While it certainly shares with A the great majority of that MS.’S mistakes and adds a fair number of its own, there is a not negligible number of cases where it is more correct. In three cases Wendland has adopted the reading of “Mangey e codice Cantabr. Coll. S. Trin.,” viz. σύγχυσις § 152, πᾶσαν § 196, ἐκατέρας § 241, as well as φυρόμενοι § 290, which Mangey had given on the authority of MS. Vat., a name apparently unidentified. But besides these there are several examples in which Wendland in correcting the text of A has actually reproduced that of Trin. Such are παρανέβλαστε § 64, ἀγείροντες § 127, εἰ δὲ δεῖ § 128, φῶς § 140, ὄντος § 250, κλίματα § 287.
The lacunas in Trin. are also of some interest. While they occur in the same places, except twice where the text runs on continuously, they do not by any means always occupy the same spaces, being in several cases considerably longer. This rouses a suspicion whether Wendland is justified in basing his conjectures, as he does to some extent, on the length of the spaces in A. Professor Minns indeed tells me that the tendency of scribes is to shorten the gaps, and that the greater length may point to the possibility that though Trin. (fifteenth or sixteenth century) is much later than A (thirteenth century) it may belong to a better tradition. In spite, however, of my doubts on this point, I have thought it wiser to record Wendland’s notes on the length of the spaces in A.
§ 27. Double diapason. Or perhaps “the two ways of completing the scale,” i.e. the conjunct tetrachords symbolize the attitude of the soul when it contemplates the universe by itself. In the disjunct tetrachords it is still concerned in the first tetrachord with creation, but breaks off and passes in the second to the contemplation of the Creator, whom it recognizes to be something different and transcending creation.
§ 38. εὐκαταφροντίστῳ. This is certainly an odd-looking word, but it is correctly formed, if we assume καταφροντίζω as an intensive form, like so many κατα’s, of the simple verb; and though only one instance of the verb in this sense (Polybius xxviii. 11. 10) is quoted, and that is said in L. & S. 1927 to be a doubtful reading, this is not much argument in dealing with Philo. On the whole, though the word is regarded as corrupt in Stephanus, I do not see much reason to doubt its genuineness. Wendland is somewhat rash in printing ἀνανταγωνίστῳ. It is not only far from the MSS. but has less point. The seeker after rewards needs not only persistence but care, and though swiftness is requisite his swift actions must be “well thought out.” I should say much the same of Mangey’s εὐκαταφόρῳ.
§ 45. Image and ideal form, etc. Are εἰκών and ἰδέα merely synonyms? They are combined in much the same way, though without any definite mention of the Logos, in Leg. All. i. 33, 42 and 53. I should suggest that in all these cases the Logos is the εἰκών of God, but the ἰδέα to creation. The usage is thus parallel to the phrases in which man is said to be the εἰκὼν εἰκόνος, and God the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος. See on De Som. i. 75.
§ 48. Barley-cake and water. Wendland refers to Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 13 (Usener, Epicurea 602) ὁ αὐτὸς (i.e. Epicurus) ἔλεγεν ἑτοίμως ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας διαγωνίζεσθαι μᾶζαν ἔχων καὶ ὕδωρ.
§ 55. οἱ ἐντρυφῶντες <τοῖς καθεστ> ῶσι νόμοις, MSS. ζῶσι νόμοις. This emendation of Mangey, accepted by Wendland, implies the use of ἐντρυφάω = “scorn,” a sense which the word does bear, but not apparently elsewhere in Philo, with whom it means “delight in.” I am inclined to think that ζω- at any rate may be right. ζῷον, ζωωτός, ζωύφιον, ζωοφόρος are all used of sculptured or painted figures not confined to animals, and cf. ζωγραφία itself. ζωοφόροις would suit the context excellently as it is particularly used of friezes. It is, however, rather far from ζῶσι νόμοις in form. I would ask for consideration sideration of the nearer ζωωμένοις. Though the dictionaries know nothing of any use of ζωόω = to carve figures, it is more or less implied by ζωωτός.
§ 70. Wendland by giving the reference to Gen. 2:9 implies that the twofold tree combines the tree of life with the tree of knowledge. It is more probable, I think, that the latter only is meant, twofold because it is the knowledge of good and evil. The reference is certainly also to Gen. 3:3, where we have οὐ μὴ ἄψησθε αὐτῆς, thus linking up the story of the tree with the prohibition against “taking hold of the pair.” While in De Op. 154 Philo interprets the knowledge of good and evil as φρόνησις, i.e. the power to distinguish the two and choose the good, in Leg. All. i. 101 f. the tree is the cause of good and evil, abstinence from which is abstinence from evil. Cf. also ibid. 61. The thought comes out most clearly in Quaestiones Gen. i. 15, where speaking of the tree he says that when good and evil are mingled together, the combination contains the beginning of death (“ubi vero bonum et malum commixta sint, principium habent mixturae mortis”).
On the other hand, the tree of life may be the “monad” which Adam neglects. Cf. παρελθόντες τὸ ζωῆς ἀθανάτου φυτόν, De Op. 156.
Observe the condemnation of duality in this section contrasted with the approval of it in §§ 26–28, a contrast which Philo surely has in mind. When the soul couples its contemplation of creation with acknowledgement of the Creator, duality is blessed; when it mingles good with evil, duality is accursed.
§ 119. The “sacred line.” For what little is known of the technical meaning of τὸν ἀφʼ ἱερᾶς κινεῖν in the game of πεσσοί see L. & S. on γραμμή, and Dict. of Ant. s.v. latrunculi. In the other passages quoted it seems to be a proverbial phrase for “try the last chance.” This does not fit here. Possibly we might suppose that if the piece on the sacred line was the last to be moved in defence, it would also ordinarily be the last to be attacked, whereas Xerxes attacks it first. More probably Philo, seeing an effective play of words on the sacredness of the heavens and the sacred line of the draught-board, strains the phrase to cover something especially rash and desperate.
§ 121. The Germans, etc. Wendland quotes Strabo vii. 2. 1 οὐδʼ εὖ οὐδʼ ὁ φήσας ὅπλα αἴρεσαι πρὸς τὰς πλημμυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους. The same is said by Aelian, Hist. ii. 23, of the “Kelts,” probably meaning the Germans. It is suggested that this story gave Shakespeare the idea of “taking arms against a sea of troubles.”
§ 122. Speared, wounded, etc. So Aelian, ibid. ὡσπεροῦν ἢ φοβῆσαι δυνάμενοι ἢ τρῶσαι.
§ 123. One of the ruling class. Mangey positively declared that this person was Flaccus. It is as positively denied by Edersheim (Dict. of Chr. Biog., article on Philo) and by Ewald (Geschichte Volkes Israel, vol. vi. p. 253 n. 1). There is certainly nothing said in the treatise In Flaccum of an attempt to enforce Sabbath-breaking; and if it had been made, it is most unlikely that Philo would have passed it over. In fact the attempt here mentioned seems to have been unsuccessful, and the point lies in the arrogant and (in Philo’s eyes) blasphemous language in which the threat was couched. The immediate predecessors of Flaccus were Iberus (not Severus as in Mangey’s text, see Reiter’s note on In Flaccum 2) and Vitrasius Pollio (Dion Cassius Iviii. 19. 6), and either of these may have been the governor here alluded to.
§ 140. Shall we first bow, etc. Assuming, as in the footnote, that ἀφέντες may be corrected to ὑφέντες (or καθέντες, cf. De Plant. 145), and that πρότερον can be used in antithesis to εἶτα, the following alternative is possible, <ἃς> (i.e. χεῖρας) ὑφ(καθ)έντες, i.e. the hands are first raised in prayer, then lowered as the suppliant prostrates himself.
§ 209. Pleasure is said by her votaries, etc. The Epicurean view that present ills are mitigated by the memory of past good is several times referred to. See Usener, Epicurea 436–439. The closest parallel to this passage is Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 34. 95 “(praecepit Epicurus) corpus gaudere tamdiu, dum praesentem sentiret voluptatem, animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prospicere venientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere: ita perpetuas et contextas voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum expectatio speratarum voluptatum cum perceptarum memoria iungeretur.”
§ 221. Mangey retained ἐγχωρεῖν (“before thou wast dwelling”), supposing that Philo read or thought he read it in the LXX. But the argument here and elsewhere shews that he understood εἶναι.
§ 245. The lacuna.—Mangey in proposing to fill this up with μᾶλλον recognized its inappropriateness to us ὡς εἶπέ τις, which he wished to correct to ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις. This seems to me unnecessary. One would prefer to suppose some single poetic noun which would signify a waterspout, but I do not know of any such. The missing letters, however, may easily be some epithet applied to rushing water in general (e.g. βαθυδίνης) or adverb (e.g. ἀμβολάδην) or some longer phrase. Wendland does not state the length of the lacuna in A. In Trin. it is over twenty letters. It is a fairly likely guess, considering the number of Homeric phrases in this treatise, that this too comes from Homer. For τις applied to Homer cf. § 260 below, and De Somniis, i. 150.
§ 247. For the lacuna here Wendland suggests ἐπαλλήλως or ἀπαύστως, for example. But I do not see why the initial λ, which also appears in Trin. should be ignored in this case.
§ 282. For this lacuna the following suggestions have been proposed: νυκτὸς (Hoeschel), νύκτα πεσεῖν (Cohn), νύκτα αἰώνιον (Wendland), νύκτα ἀκτέον (Mangey), αἰώνιον or ἀκτέον being corrections for ἄξιον. Except for the doubtful evidence of space (in Trin. it is about fifteen letters), I see no objection to νύκτα alone. It is easy to supply ἄγεσθαι.
§ 283. Third on the list. Mangey, retaining τρεῖς, suggested as possible that the three Aloeidae are meant, cf. De Conf. 4. But the Aloeidae, Otus and Ephialtes, were two, not three. Apart from this, the explanation seems to me very improbable. In De Conf. 4 the story of the Aloeidae is no doubt compared to that of the Babel-builders, but only by the scoffers. While Philo often illustrates his points from Greek myths, I know of no instance where he accepts them in the way which Mangey’s suggestion involves.
Ibid. Uncreated, imperishable. Cf. De Op. 7, where the belief that the world was ἀγένητος καὶ ἀΐδιος is described as an impious falsehood ascribing inactivity (ἀπραξία) to God. On this Cohn quotes the statement that Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus held that it was ἀγένητος καὶ ἀϊδιος καὶ ἄφθαρτος (Diels, Doxographi, p. 332), and the somewhat similar words of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. x. 39), τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν οἶον νῦν ἐστι, καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται. Philo, however, in the treatise De Aet. maintains that it is ἄφθαρτος, and indeed ascribes this belief to Moses (§ 19). May a reconciliation of these conflicting views be found in the opinion mentioned in Quis Rerum 246 φθαρτὸν μὲν εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ φθαρησόμενον? The Maker can destroy it, but never will. See note on that passage. Cf. also De Dec. 58.
§ 294. Winged chariot. From Phaedrus 246 E ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα πρῶτος πορεύεται. So also in Quis Rerum 301.
§ 300. Ex. 7:15. It is idle to guess what text or texts followed. Though Euphrates, except in Gen. 2:15, is only mentioned as a boundary, this and the other three rivers of that passage, as well as the “river of God” in Ps. 46, would serve his purpose. His point is that spiritually the “river of Egypt” alone is identified with mere speech. He seems in § 302 to ignore the fact that in §§ 238 f. he has identified all rivers with λόγος. Possibly the sequel went on to shew that in good rivers speech is reasonable speech which is inseparable from action.