APPENDIX TO DE MUTATIONE NOMINUM
§ 7. Into the darkness. Philo treats this text in much the same way in De Post. 14 ff., and follows it up in the same way with Ex. 33:13. But there he insists on a point which he does not make here, viz. that the search is not altogether fruitless, since to realize that τὸ ὄν is incomprehensible is in itself a vast boon.
§ 12. The three natural orders, etc. This favourite idea of the “educational trinity” stated by Aristotle in the form παιδεῖᾳ δεῖν τριῶν, φύσεως, διδασκαλίας, ἀσκήσεως, is several times applied by Philo to Isaac, Abraham, and Jacob respectively. See note on De Sac. 5–7. But the representation of Isaac as τελειότης (Joh. Dam.) or ὁσιότης (MSS.) instead of as φύσις or αὐτομαθής does not seem appropriate, and is not, as far as I have seen, paralleled elsewhere. It may be worth consideration whether Philo wrote τῶν τριῶν, φύσεως, διδασκαλίας, ἀσκήσεως, and when φύσεως had been corrupted to φύσεων the blank thus created for Isaac was variously filled up. That the things symbolized should then be given in their ordinary order and the symbols in their historical order would not, I think, be unnatural. Mangey proposed φύσεως in place of ὁσιότητος, which seems somewhat more arbitrary.
§ 13. ὄνομά τι. This reading, which, supported as it is by the MSS. ὀνόματι, has almost as much authority as Joh. Dam.’s τὸ ὄνομα, seems to me decidedly preferable in sense. In the next sentence Philo seems to lay down that τὸ ὄνομά μου κύριον is not a natural way of expressing “my proper name,” and it is unlikely that he would himself adopt this order of the words.
Ibid. Transposition. Hyperbaton defined as an “arrangement of words or thoughts changed from the consecutive order” (λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατʼ ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις) is a wide term of which the grammarians give several subdivisions, including tmesis and parenthesis. Quoted examples somewhat similar to the hyperbaton here as supposed by Philo are “transtra per et remos” and γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών (for περιεγέλασε). See Ernesti s.v. and indices to Greek and Latin Grammarians.
§ 28. In a sense relative. On ὡσανεὶ πρός τι Drummond writes (Philo Judaeus, vol. ii. pp. 48, 49): “When we ascribe to Him titles which are descriptive of relation, we refer only to certain aspects of His being, certain ‘powers’ which, because they are directed towards objects, are quasi-relative. The limitation quasi seems to imply that the dependence of the correlative terms is not mutual, but is all on one side, and that not the divine side. The powers of the self-existent are put forth into exercise without experiencing any alteration in their intrinsic character through the reaction of the objects to which they are applied; so that, although their names involve a relation, it would be truer to say that their objects are relative to them than that they are relative to their objects.” It is perhaps worth noting that ὡς πρός τι (quasi ad aliquid) was an accepted grammatical name for exclusive opposites as “night,” “day,” and “life,” “death,” distinguished from πρός τι, e.g. “father,” “son.” See index to Grk. Gramm. Philo, however, cannot be using ὡσανεί in this sense, as βασιλεύς and εὐεργέτης are clearly πρός τι.
§ 32. And all that company. Compare the Stoic dogma αὐστηροὺς εἷναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, Diog. Laert. vii. 117, S. V. F. iii. 637–639. At the same time it is strange to find Philo limiting the wise entirely to this kind, in view of what he says in §§ 39 ff., and though his alternations between the Stoic strictness and the τιθασὸς καὶ ἥμερος σοφία of the Peripatetics are often startling, I think it may be worth while to consider the textually easy suggestion in the footnote: <τοι>οῦτος δὲ πᾶς ὁ θίασος <ὃς>.
§ 34. Was not found. This wording of the LXX suits Philo’s argument admirably, since one phrase of theirs was that the wise man μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνεύρετός ἐστι (S. V. F. iii. 32, p. 216).
§ 36. A wise man is non-existent. Other Stoic pronouncements more or less in this sense, though not quite so absolute, are that the wise man like the Phoenix appears once in 500 years, Seneca, Ep. 42. 1; that there have been not more than one or two of them, Eusebius, Pr. Ev. vi. 8. 13; that Hercules or Ulysses may have realized the ideal, Seneca, De Const. 2. 1, and that Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus all fell short of it, Quintilian xii. 1.
§ 46. Because He was good. Evidently taken from Timaeus 29 D, E λέγωμεν δὴ διʼ ἥν τινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἧν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. But by stopping short at ἀγαθός and ignoring the last ten words Philo seems rather to miss Plato’s point. See note on De Cher. 125.
§ 47. Positively righteous conduct. Philo here uses κατορθόῦ in a sense slightly different from the regular Stoic use. With them the κατόρθωματα are actions done from a good motive and part of a generally virtuous course of conduct, and are opposed to καθήκοντα or common duties; here it is opposed to simple abstention from evil-doing. See note on Quod Deus 100.
§ 57. ἐνηχεῖ. The word is inadequately treated in the Lexica. L. & S. “whisper, prompt,” cited from Philo (omitted in later editions) cannot be maintained in face of Quis Rerum 67, where it is coupled with ἐμβοῆσαι. The six examples quoted from Philo in the index as well as in others from later writers in Stephanus suggest that, as with κατηχεῖν, the main idea is insistent or reiterated address, thus passing easily (again like κατηχεῖν) into “instruction.” So perhaps here, where the thought may be that generally the teacher stands superior to the taught, but in this case treats him as an equal. Cf. also Quis Rerum 71.
§ 61. Wendland’s expunging of στοιχείῳ περιττεύει is rather arbitrary. Short of this there are three possibilities: (a) read as Markland στοιχείου περιττόν. This seems pointless, unless we might take it as a reference to the cacophony of a repeated a (the combination αα is certainly rare); (b) <ὡς> στοιχείῳ περιττεύει<ν>, i.e. to be better off by a letter—again somewhat pointless; (c) <τὸ> στοιχείῳ περιττεύει<ν> and transfer to after παρεσχῆσθαι—“a fine boon—to be better off by a letter.” This would certainly be effective, if the transference is not too drastic.
For τοῦ ἑνὸς ἅλφα perhaps read ἑνός, τοῦ ἄλφα. Cf. § 77.
Need we suppose with Wendland that a clause has slipped out after παρεσχῆσθαι? Abraham’s case has been dealt with; Sarah’s has not. It is possible, I think, to regard τὴν <γὰρ> Ἀβρὰμ … παραλαβών as a parenthetic explanation by Philo himself of the addition of rho.
§ 62. Misgivings of this sort. Or simply “ideas,” i.e. that God actually changes names, cf. ὑπονοεῖν, § 64. In this case the insertion of τοιαύτας seems necessary. Possibly, however, ὑπονοίας is used in the regular Philonic sense of underlying or allegorical meanings, and the corruption lies in ἐκκόψαιμεν (ἐκκαλύψαιμεν?). In this case the insertion of τοιαύτας is not needed.
§ 65. Signs. The use of χαρακτήρ here, as compared with 70 and 83, all of which must stand together, is difficult. Ordinarily χαρ., if it does not mean literally a stamp, is not a type or symbol, but a trait or characteristic, and this suits § 83, for the two kinds of virtue. It may with some forcing suit § 70, for though the names are the χαρακτῆρες they represent characteristics. But here this is not so, for the χαρ. which are small, sensible, and obscure must be the names and not what they represent. I have tried to evade the difficulty by translating “signs.”
§ 77. Facts. Philo here uses τυγχάνοντα more or less in the sense in which it was used in the Stoic theory of speech. They distinguished between (1) φωνή, the actual word spoken; (2) σημαινόμενον or σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, otherwise called λεκτόν, the meaning understood by the hearer; (3) τύγχανον, the actual object spoken of. Cf. S. V. F. ii. 166. Philo seems to make this distinction in Leg. All. ii. 15 τοῦ τυγχάνοντος ἢ τοῦ σημαινομένου. Here he perhaps uses τυγχ. for σημ., and though in Plutarch Adv. Colotem 1119 E the Epicureans are censured by the Stoics for eliminating σημ. and retaining only φωνή and τύγχ., the Stoics themselves are said to do the same in S. V. F. ii. 236.
§ 106. The so-called sacred games. Cf. De Agr. 116 f, where after describing the pentathlum and other contests he says τούτων μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγώνων πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἱερὸς οὐδείς, κἂν πάντες ἄνθρωποι μαρτυρῶσιν … ὁ τοίνυν Ὀλυμπιακὸς ἀγὼν μόνος ἂν λέγοιτο ἐνδίκως ἱερὸς, οὐχ ὃν τιθέασιν οἱ τὴν Ἧλιν οἰκοῦντες, ἀλλʼ ὁ περὶ κτήσεως τῶν θείων καὶ ὀλυμπίων ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρετῶν.
§ 113. If Mangey’s correction of φαινόμενα to ποιμαινόμενα is adopted the picture becomes clear. The shepherd-mind and its sheep “the flock of reasoning” are naturally inseparable, and if the mind is enticed out into the bodily region, the flock will be easily given over by the senses into the hands of the “shepherds of an evil herd.”
§ 114. Guidance and rule of law. In the Stoic sense of law see S. V. F. iii. 613, 614 λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον, and therefore the wise man alone is νόμιμος.
§ 121. ποιὸς οὗτος. Siegfried in a pamphlet, Die hebräischen Worterklärungen des Philo, pp. 21, 22, has the following note which I transcribe for the benefit of Hebraists: “τὸν Ὠσηὲ μετονομάζει Μωυσῆς εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν, indem er den irgendwie beschaffenen zu einer bestimmten Qualität umprägt. Denn Ὠσηέ ist = ποῖος οὗτος ‘irgendwie beschaffen ist dieser’ Hebräisch dachte sich Philo Ὠσηέ etwa = אֵיוֶת. Er mochte meinen אַי bediente an sich ‘irgendwie,’ da אי mit בת = אֵיבָת = ‘wie’ ist.”
However plausible this explanation may be as far as the Hebrew goes, it cannot be fitted into the Greek. ποῖος is not “irgendwie beschaffen,” which would rather be ὁποιοσοῦν or even ἄποις. And even if ποῖος can mean this, it is incompatible with the use in the next sentence and in the references given in the footnote to Leg. All. Mangey makes the same mistake when he translates “salus qualiscumque.”
§ 135. Chain of destiny. Though there is no real philological connexion between εἰμαρμένη and εἰρμός, it seems to have been regularly assumed. See S. V. F. ii. 915–921, e.g. 918 ἡ εἰμαρμένη εἱρμός τις οὖσα αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ Στωικοὶ ὁρίζονται.
§ 138. Superstition, etc. It is noticeable that here also as in De Cher. 48 Philo insists on the esoteric character of the doctrine, that God was the father of the child of a human mother, as something which should not be mentioned to profane ears. See also Leg. All. iii. 219. Presumably he felt that it easily lent itself to confusion with pagan myths.
§ 144. ἀμβλίσκουσαν for ἀναλίσκουσαν. In support of this conjecture and the suggestion that Philo may have in mind Theaetetus 149 D, it may be noted that Plato in the same passage speaks of the midwives regulating συνουσίαι, also that, in the parallel passage in Hannah’s hymn, Quod Deus 14, we saw some reason to suspect a quotation from the Theaetetus. He alludes again to the treatise in § 212 and quotes it at some length in De Fuga 63 and 82.
It may be objected, no doubt, that ἀμβλίσκειν used transitively would properly apply to the fruits of the συνουσία, rather than to the συνουσία itself; but this does not come out clearly from the words of the Theaetetus. I do not at any rate think that ἀναλίσκουσαν can be right.
§ 146. Many and indeed infinite particulars. For this “recognized formula of the Platonic school” cf. particularly Philebus 14 C, 15 B ff.
§ 150. Perversions of art. Cf. Quintilian ii. 15. 2 “(rhetoricen) quidam pravitatem quandam artis, id est κακοτεχνίαν, nominaverunt.”
§ 152. The Sage alone is king. This Stoic “paradox,” see S. V. F. iii. 617, has already appeared in De Sobr. 57 and De Mig. 197, and appears later in De Som. ii. 244.
§ 153. The definitions of the four virtues are those regularly accepted by the Stoics, see S. V. F. iii. 262. Cf. Leg. All. i. 63.
§ 160. Orousis. See S. V. F. iii. 169, where it is defined as φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι μέλλον, but (ibid. 173) the ὁρμὴ πρὸ ὁρμῆς is called ἐπιβολή.
§ 167. Virtue is … a thing for joy. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 43 “semper sapiens beatus est. Atque etiam omne bonum laetabile est.”
Ibid. A state of happy feeling. Who are the philosophers alluded to? Hardly the Stoics. I have found no evidence that they identified εὐπάθεια with ἀρετή, and it is prima facie unlikely. Outside Stoicism the word seems to be used rather with the suggestion of bodily welfare, or at least without the higher sense which Philo, who several times couples it with ἀρετή, often gives it. See note on De Mig. 219. I can hardly think, however, that he speaks without authority and should conjecture that there were philosophers who like him used it as = εὐδαιμονία and naturally therefore equated it with ἀρετή, perhaps also like him colouring it with the Stoic insistence on joy as “the best of the higher emotions.”
The MSS. reading ἀπάθειαν was retained by Mangey, and has in its favour that the Stoics definitely identified ἀπ. with ἀρ. (οἱ Στωικοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ Ps.-Plut. Hom. 134, cf. S. V. F. iii. 201), but the context clearly makes it impossible.
§ 197. Worthy of perseverance. Though neither Mangey nor Wendland question the reading, this use of ὑπομονή seems to me strange, for ἀνδρεία consists of ὑπομονή, or at least of knowledge of ἃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν, cf. § 153, and no one could be said ὑπομένειν ἀνδρείαν. I think ἐπιμονῆς should be read, used by Philo for “persistence,” e.g. Quod Det. 118. The phrase then = δεῖ ἐπιμένειν τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ. A tempting emendation would be <ὑπομονὴ> ὑπομονῆς ἀξίων ἡ ἀνδρεία, φυγὴ ἡ δειλία, which would be in exact accordance with the Stoic definition, but definition would be somewhat out of place here.
§ 207. Demonstrative pronouns … indicate. Both δείξεις and παρεμφαίνειν are technical terms in Greek grammar, the former, however, being used to describe the function performed by pronouns in general, personal as well as demonstrative. Possibly therefore “pronouns” would be a better translation here than “demonstrative pronouns,” see Grk. Gramm. Part II. vol. i. p. 9. The meaning of παρεμφαίνειν is best seen from the use of ἀπαρέμφατος as the regular term for the infinitive, because it does not particularize any gender, number, or person like the “paremphatic” words. See an article by myself in the Journal of Theological Studies, January 1921.
§ 217. His charge. Mangey and Wendland question ὁ ἀγομένος, proposing ὁ εἰσαγόμενος or ὁ παιδαγωγούμενος. I understand Philo to be thinking of the derivation of παιδαγωγός from παῖς and ἄγω, and probably also of the fact that one chief function of the παιδ. was to escort the boy to school.
§ 242. Freedom from disturbance. This translation is put forward as a desperate attempt to give some sense to the text as it stands. If we take ἡσυχία in the natural sense of “silence,” as it clearly is used, with reference to this passage, in § 251, the whole becomes absurdly pointless. Even with Wendland’s conjecture of ἐπεί τοι for κἄπειτα, “if a man does not keep silence he can surely be silent if he wishes” is strangely inept. I believe the passage is corrupt. The sense required is, speaking is voluntary, and therefore abstention from kind words and speaking unkind words are equally wrong. This might be obtained by correcting to ὁ μηδʼ ἐκ τύχης ἐθέλων τι τῶν ἐπιεικεστέρων φθέγξασθαι, οὗ δὲ (or καὶ οὗ) λυσιτελὲς τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἡσυχίαν δεξιοῦσθαι, μὴ ἡσυχάζων· ἐπεί τοι τις κτλ. In this case εἰ μὴ … φωνήν would mean “if he fails to speak kindly.”
§ 243. The word is the shadow of the act. This saying is ascribed to Democritus, Diog. Laert. ix. 37, Ps.-Plut. De Lib. Educandis 14.