APPENDIX TO QUOD DEUS SIT IMMUTABILIS
§ 3. Bounds which the lustral water has consecrated. For this use of περιρραντήρια see De Cher. 96 (and footnote). Below (8) it is used for the purification itself, as in Quod Det. 20.
§ 6. I give him to thee a gift. The stress which Philo lays on δίδωμι and δοτόν suggests that he had in mind a different version of the text from that of the LXX, where, though in v. 27 we have “the Lord gave me my request,” v. 28 runs “I lend him (κιχρῶ) to the Lord, a loan (χρῆσιν) to the Lord.”
§ 14. Multiplied a thousand-fold. For this way of taking μυρία (as sing. fem.) it may be argued that it follows up the thought of ἡ δὲ πολλή. On the other hand the words may be a reminiscence of Theaetetus 156 A, where Plato, speaking of the product of the union of τὸ ποιεῖν with τὸ πάσχειν, says γίνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει ἄπειρα, in which case it would be better to take μυρία as plur. neut.
§ 18. Some future pleasure. A hit at the Epicureans; see note on Quod Det. 157; cf. also S.V.F. iii. 21.
§ 22. Indeed some maintain, etc. Evidently this refers to the Stoic doctrine of the constancy of the Sage; see quotation from Stobaeus in S.V.F. iii. 548, particularly the words οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατʼ οὐδένα τρόπον οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι.
§ 24. Like a lyre. For the figure cf. De Sacr. 37. There is a hint of this thought (which should be distinguished from that of the soul as a harmony) in Rep. 554 F and Laws 653 B.
Ibid. The insertion suggested by Wendland is also advocated by him in De Ebr. 6. But though easy enough it is not required, and would be impossible in Quis Rer. Div. Her. 207 ff. where τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιστήμην is followed by a long excursus showing the universality of opposites and noting that the doctrine was taught by Heraclitus.
§ 27. So for example. οὕτως, which otherwise seems rather otiose, is perhaps used in the same idiomatic way as in Plato and elsewhere = “without more ado” i.e. “we often just turn from them.”
§ 31. Time. These two sections are reminiscent of Timaeus 37–38 B, though there time is represented as coming into existence with the universe.
§ 32. The archetype and pattern of time. So in Timaeus 37 D “so he bethought him to make a moving image of eternity (εἰκὼ κινητὸν αἰῶνος) … moving according to number, even that which we have called time”; 38 B time was made after the pattern of the eternal nature (κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως).
§ 34. Thought quiescent in the mind. This definition of ἐννοία as ἀποκειμένη νόησις is Stoic (S.V.F. ii. 847). The definition of διανόησις as “thought brought to an issue” or “working out of the thought” is perhaps invented by Philo to fit the διενοήθη of his text. He means presumably that an ἔννοια becomes a διανόησις when it becomes the subject of active deliberation.
§ 43. Like a ring … it stamps. There seems some confusion here between the imprint and the power which makes it. This might perhaps be avoided by taking ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων as subject to ἐναπεμάξατο.
§ 44. Sometimes of an appropriate kind. Cf. Plut. Adv. Coloten 1122 C τὸ δὲ ὁρμητικὸν ἐγειρόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πρακτικῶς κινεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. In adding to “sometimes the reverse,” “this condition of the soul is called ὁρμή,” Philo seems to be writing rather loosely, for when the impression is contrary to the nature of the animal, the resulting impulse was called ἀφορμή (aversion); see S.V.F. iii. 169.
Ibid. First movement. Another name for ὁρμή is φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι, while an ἀφορμή is φορὰ διανοίας ἀπό τινος. In using the phrase πρώτη κίνησις, which does not seem to appear elsewhere in our sources, Philo is perhaps thinking of the πρώτη ὁρμή of animals defined as the instinct of self-preservation; see Diog. Laert. vii. 88.
§ 46. Mind is the sight of the soul. So Aristot. Top. 17, p. 108 a, 11 ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθάλμῳ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, cf. Eth. Nic. i. 6, p. 1096 b 28. The saying is, however, older than Aristotle, who quotes as example of a metaphor from some unknown writer or speaker ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (Rhet. iii. 10. 7, p. 1411 b, 73).
Ibid. Something better and purer. i.e. the πέμπτη οὐσία, an idea which, originally Pythagorean, was adopted by Aristotle. Cf. Reid on Cic. Acad. i. 26. It is definitely referred to under that name by Philo, Quis Rer. Div. Her. 283.
§ 53. Laws in the proper sense of the word. Because νόμος is used in a wider sense for custom and the like. So in De Praemiis 55 νόμος δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ λόγος προστάττων ἃ χρὴ καὶ ἀπαγορεύων ἃ μὴ χρή.
Ibid. Leading statements. Or perhaps “principles.” Cf. 62. Philo can hardly have regarded Balaam’s words in Num. 23:19 as being part of the actual legislation. He thinks of them rather as summing up the ideas upon which the law is based. Thus, in a parallel use of the two texts in De Som. i. 237, they are called “the sole two ways of all the legislation.” Every command or prohibition appeals either to love or fear.
§ 57. Out of care for health. Cf. Aristot. Phys. ii. 3, p. 194 b 32 τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἶον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγιεία. διὰ τί γάρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιείῃ.
§ 59. The reading ἀποπατεῖ might seem to be supported by De Plant. 35. But not only are the terms used for the excretory process less offensive there, but any such meaning is practically given here clearly enough by καὶ τἄλλα … εἴποιμι. Wendland ultimately (Rhein. Mus. 82, p. 480) proposed παύεται, ἀποπαυσάμενος δὲ, but the MS. ἀποπαύεται is quite tenable.
§ 62. As the heavens or the universe. This is partly at least aimed at the Stoics, see Diog. Laert. vii. 148 (S.V.F. i. 164) where Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius are all credited with holding τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὔρανον as being οὐσίαν θεοῦ. Cf. ib. vii. 137.
§§ 65 ff. The thought of these sections has already been brought out in De Cher. 15, but with a different purpose. There it was used to illustrate the truth that the motive of the doer determines whether his action is right or wrong, here to show that falsehood may often be salutary to the person to whom it is said. In the note on De Cher. 15 it was pointed out that the thought might be drawn from Rep. 389 B. It should be added that it was adopted by the Stoics, see S.V.F. iii. 554, 555, where the cases of deceiving the sick and the enemy are specially mentioned.
§ 66. He will gladly endure. If the MS. reading is retained and ἅσμενος is taken with ἀπερεῖ, we must understand the latter as = “declines” and might translate the former by “only too gladly.” But the thought is strange. Wendland suggests removing ἄσμενος to a later place in the sentence, but the slight alteration suggested seems to the translator simpler.
§§ 70–73. The argument in these sections is very strange. The discussion in 51–69 would naturally lead up to the first explanation given in Quaest. Gen. i. 95 that the words “I was wroth because I made them” is a hyperbolical way of saying that the sins of men grew so great that they might be expected to anger even Him who knew no anger. But the explanation here given, which appears in an even less intelligible form in the Quaest., is something different. Philo seems to take the words as meaning “it was in anger that I made them,” and to explain them in the sense that since when men do evil, it is due to anger (and similar passions), and since the creation of men has actually resulted in evil, the creation may be said to be due to God’s anger. But not only is the explanation exceedingly strained, but it can only be got by using ὅτι in a way not known to those “who settle Hoti’s business.” The suggestion that by putting ἐθυμώθην before ὅτι ἐποίησα instead of after it the writer meant to indicate that the wrath was coincident with the creation, instead of after it, is still wilder. There is a strong likeness, which may only be superficial, to Leg. All. ii. 78.
§ 78. A condensed mass of ether. Cf. De Cher. 26, where the sun is φλογὸς πίλημα πολλῆς. That αἰθέριον means “of ether” not “in ether” is shown by Plut. Mor. 928 C (S.V.F. ii. 668). “The Stoics say that τοῦ αἰθέρος τὸ μὲν αὐγοειδὲς … οὐρανὸν γεγονέναι, τὸ δὲ πυκνωθὲν καὶ συνειληθὲν ἄστρα.” So ps.-Justin, Quaest. et Resp. ad Graecos 172 C ὁ ἥλιος πίλημα αἰθεροειδὲς τῇ οὐσίᾳ.
§ 79. Friend and kinsman. Cf. Timaeus, 45 B, C, where the fire in the eyes is called ἀδελφόν to that of the daylight and forms with it ἓν σῶμα οἰκειωθέν, whence vision is produced.
§ 84. For the breath, etc. This is the Stoic theory of hearing, cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 158 (S.V.F. ii. 872): “We hear when the air between the sonant body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion” (πληττόμενον) (Hicks’s translation). Also the definition in S.V.F. ii. 836 ἀκοὴ δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μεχρὶς ὤτων. For πλήξας cf. the derivation commonly given by ancient philologists, “verbum ab aere verberato.”
Ibid. For the consonance. One may suspect that for γάρ we should read δέ or καί, as we seem to have a second reason for the view that “we hear through a dyad,” founded apparently on Timaeus 80 B, where the two different notes μίαν ἐξ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας ξυνεκεράσαντο πάθην.
§ 89. Philo’s interpretation of the Nazarite vow has already been partially given in Leg. All. i. 17. When the Nazarite lets his hair grow, it signifies the growth of virtuous thoughts. The contact with the corpse which defiles the Nazarite and interrupts his vow is that temporary contact with spiritual death which may befall even the good. The hair is cut off, that is, the good thoughts are forgotten, but they will grow again. We find again what we have lost and the days of defection are blotted out.
§ 92. Asked him … of the source of his knowledge. The genitive (of the subject of the question) after πυνθάνομαι is certainly strange. If we accept “the father of his knowledge” we must suppose that Philo thinks of a father as being the father of the son’s qualities. Cohn compares “the grandfather of his education,” De Sacr. 43, where see note, and also De Som. i. 47 ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης.
§ 97. Miserable are those. This thought of the fruitlessness of effort, where ability is wanting, has been worked out more fully in De Sacr. 113–117. There, however, one important exception is made. In 115 Philo laid down that moral effort is never wasted. He does not deny this here but confines himself to the practical and intellectual life.
§ 100. Achieve righteousness. A καθῆκον or common duty does not become a κατόρθωμα unless done with a right motive and perhaps not even then, unless it is part of a generally virtuous course of conduct; see Zeller, Stoics, p. 265.
§ 101. <τῶν>. This insertion turns this difficult sentence into good sense, i.e. to pay a large sum duly, unless it is done willingly, shows no more real honesty than the admittedly dishonest course of paying some small deposit in the hope of inducing the depositor to entrust some large sum, which the person thus trusted will be able to embezzle. This “confidence trick” has been already mentioned in De Cher. 14, and appears again in De Plant. 101. In the absence of any complete banking-system, the depositing of property with individuals and their honesty and dishonesty in discharging the debt played a great part in commercial life.
§ 108. ἥτις … ἑαυτῇ. The correction suggested in the footnote has this advantage over Wendland’s that the scribe is more likely to have been misled by the repeated χαρίτων than by the repeated τῶν, and that αὐτὴ is a less violent change from ἑαυτῇ than πηγή. For the thought that the ἀγαθότης is itself a χάρις cf. Leg. All. iii. 78, where the ἀγαθότης καὶ χάρις is said to be the ἀρχὴ γενέσεως. For the coupling of πρεσβυτάτη with χάρις cf. De Cong. 38.
§§ 111–116. This allegory is evidently founded on Gen. 39, where in verse 1 of the LXX Potiphar is described as a chief cook and eunuch, while in verse 21 Joseph is said to find favour with the chief gaoler. Philo, of course, takes great liberties with the story, making Joseph an eunuch himself and ignoring the statement that it was the Lord who gave him this favour with the gaoler. Presumably he is so anxious to get an antithesis to Noah’s finding favour with God, that he seizes on these words in verse 21, couples them with the convenient parts of the story, viz. that the person who found favour with the gaoler was the slave of the eunuch and instrument of pleasure, and ignores all the rest. It may be said in excuse that by so ignoring them he manages to find a text for a very impressive sermon.
§ 111. [σύλλογοι καί]. σύλλογοι is coupled with ἐκκλησία in De Som. ii. 184 (a closely parallel passage), cf. also Leg. All. iii. 81. But “meetings” or “gatherings” does not fit in well with μελετῶνται, and Wendland (who also suggests διάλογοι) may be right in omitting the words. It should be noted, however, the phrase σύλλογοι καὶ λόγοι ἐγίγνοντο κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν, i.e. gatherings and conversations after the assembly had broken up, actually occurs in Dem. De Falsa Leg. 133. Philo, who often shows a close acquaintance with Demosthenes, may have adopted the phrase, though somewhat straining it. If the words are retained we might translate “it is ever the practice to meet and talk of virtue.”
§ 129. Does not use it as its pilot. Philo has evidently in his mind the similar but much more elaborate parable in Rep. 488 B-489 C, where the pilot is the true philosopher, and the inexperienced sailor the politicians, who obtain the mastery of the ship.
§ 135. Defiles all these. Philo again treats his text in a very arbitrary way. Instead of the things being cleared out, before the priest enters, to prevent their defilement, they are cleared out because they are defiled.
§§ 155 and 156. The contrast between the earthly and the heavenly goods is expressed in the allegory of the well-water and the rain. The former is earthly, scanty, obtained by labour; the latter heavenly, abundant, and showered on us without effort of our own. To labour for the former is an ἔργον δυσελπιστίας because it shows that we lack the higher hope. For δυσελπιστία cf. Ley. All. iii. 164. Elsewhere, as in De Post. 136 ff. and De Ëbr. 112 ff., the figure of the well calls up more favourable ideas to Philo.
§§ 162–165. Here we have, of course, Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean, cf. particularly Eth. Nic. ii. 6 and 7, where both Philo’s first two examples are given. Cf. De Mig. 147, where the doctrine is ascribed to the “gentle and sociable philosophy,” meaning apparently the Peripatetic.
§ 167. Its essential nature. Observe how closely this peculiarly Aristotelian expression (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) follows on the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean.
§ 176. The best of constitutions, democracy. Philo several times speaks in this way of democracy (De Agr. 45, De Conf. 108, De Abr. 242, De Spec. Leg. iv. 237, De Virt. 180). In three of these places he contrasts it with ochlocracy, or mobrule, while in De Conf. he gives as its ruling characteristic that it honours equality. He does not seem to have got this view, at any rate of the name democracy, from the schools. Neither Plato nor Aristotle speak of it with such favour, and the Stoics held that the best form of government was a mixture of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy (Diog. Laert. vii. 131). Here apparently the democracy which the world enjoys consists in each getting its turn.