ON THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF GOD (QUOD DEUS IMMUTABILIS SIT)
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION
This treatise, which is really a continuation of the De Gigantibus, discusses the following verses, Gen. 6:4–12.
I. (1–19) And after this when the angels of God went in unto the daughters of men, and begat for themselves … (v. 4).
II. (20–73) But the Lord God seeing that the wickednesses of men were multiplied upon the earth and that every man is purposing in his heart carefully evil things every day, God had it in His mind that He had made man upon the earth and He bethought Him. And God said, I will blot out man whom I have made from the face of the earth … because I was wroth that I had made him (vv. 5–7).
III. (74–121) But Noah found grace before God. Now these are the generations of Noah. Noah was a just man, being perfect in his generation, and Noah was well pleasing to God (vv. 8–9).
IV. (122–139) And the earth was “corrupted” (or destroyed) before God, and the earth was filled with iniquity (v. 11).
V. (140–end) And the Lord God saw the earth, and it was corrupted, because all flesh destroyed His way upon the earth (v. 12).
I. Having suggested (1–3) that “after this” means “after the Spirit of God had departed,” Philo goes on to discuss what is meant by saying that these “angels,” which in the previous treatise he had taken to mean “evil angels” or “evil souls,” beget “for themselves.” This is shewn, first by contrast with Abraham (4) and (5–6) with Hannah, who gave her child as a thank-offering to God. This leads to a short meditation on the purifying power of thankfulness, and our need of such purification (7–9), and this is followed by a digression on the words of Hannah’s psalm: “The barren hath borne seven, but she that had many children has languished,” which are treated as contrasting the sacred number “seven” with selfish plurality (10–15). This brings back the thought of “begetting for themselves,” as mere selfishness which, as in the case of Onan, brings destruction (16–19).
II. The idea that the words “God had it in His mind,” etc. suggest that God had repented of making man is rejected as impious (20–22). God is unchangeable. Even among men the sage may live a life of constancy and harmony (23–25), and while most of us are the victims of fickleness and inconstancy, partly because we are unable to gauge the future, it is not so with God, for time is His creation and His life is eternity (27–32).
What then is the meaning of “God had in His mind that He had made man”? To explain this, Philo reproduces the Stoic theory of the four classes of things which we find in nature. First there is ἕξις (coherence), i.e. inorganic objects such as stones and dead wood. This ἕξις is conceived of as a “breath” (πνεῦμα) continually passing up and down, and thus binding them together (33–36). Secondly there is φύσις (growth), as seen in plants, and here Philo takes the opportunity to dilate on the wonders of the annual resurrection (37–40). Third comes animal life (ψυχή) with its threefold phenomena (again Stoic) of “sense,” “presentation” and “impulse” (41–44). All these have been mentioned to lead up to the fourth stage, that of the rational mind of man, which alone has free-will and is therefore alone liable to praise or blame, and it was this misused freedom of man which God “had in mind” (45–50).
We have still to do with the concluding words, “I was wroth that I made man.” Here Philo, who evidently had the variant ἐθυμώθην for ἐνεθυμήθην, is in great difficulty. He cannot allow anger to God and he repeats the explanation of such anthropomorphic phrases (which he gave in De Sac. 94 f.), namely that they are accommodated to our weaker natures, which require the discipline of fear (51–69). But this alone does not satisfy him. His further explanation is hardly intelligible, but seems to mean that as it is anger and similar passions which produce human wickedness, God’s judgement on the wicked may be spoken of as caused by God’s anger (70–73).
III. But we must observe that this phrase, “I was wroth,” etc., is followed at once by the words, “Noah found grace,” and this contrast brings us to the thought that God in His dealings mingles mercy with judgement, as our weak nature requires (74–76). This “mingling” in fact is a necessary condition before we can understand the divine at all (77–81), and the contrast of the mixed and the unmixed, which is the same as that of the One and the Many, is illustrated by the words “God spake once and these two things have I heard” (for God’s speech is single, while our hearing is produced by different factors) (82–84), and also by the way in which Moses shews us the one just man side by side with the many unjust (85).
We can now consider more fully the phrase “Noah found grace with the Lord God.” The word “found” leads to reflections first on the differences between finding (εὕρεσις) and “refinding” or “recovering” (ἀνεύρεσις) (86), and this difference is illustrated by an allegorical interpretation of the rules laid down for the “Great Vow” in Num. 6 (86–90), and then by the way in which the gifted by nature absorb knowledge without difficulty, while the efforts of the inapt come to disaster (91–93). This distinction extends to questions of conduct also, for those who with no good motive force themselves to right actions, against which their nature rebels, merely cause misery to themselves (94–103). Again the phrase “found grace” (χάρις) may be best interpreted as meaning that the just man “finds” that what we have is God’s free gift (also χάρις) (104–108). Yet Philo seems at once to ignore this forced interpretation and to identify the meaning of the words “found grace” with the subsequent “was well pleasing” (εὐαρεστῆσαι) and after pointing out, as usual, that the double phrase “Lord God” represents God’s two aspects of “sovereignty” and “goodness” (109–110), proceeds to contrast Noah with Joseph, “who found grace with the ruler of the prison” into which he was thrown. This story of Joseph teaches us the lesson that if we are the prisoners of passion, we should at least avoid the friendship of our gaoler and not become his satellites (111–116). This contrast between Noah and Joseph brings us to the consideration of the words “these are the generations (γενέσεις) of Noah.” Philo takes γένεσις to mean “becoming” or “development,” and explains it in this case by the words that follow, “just,” “perfect” “well pleasing to God” (117–118), and illustrates it from the text, “Joseph was keeping sheep with his brothers, being young, with the sons of Bilhah and Zilpah,” where the γένεσις is from the higher nature of Jacob to that of the “young” Joseph and the bastard sons (119–121).
IV. Philo now turns to the words “the whole earth was corrupted or destroyed” (122). The first view put forward is that Goodness (i.e. Noah) necessarily works the destruction of the Bad (123). But this passes at once into a really different thought that Goodness shews up the Bad in its true light. This is illustrated from three points or rules in the law of leprosy; first, that the appearance of “healthy colour” makes the leper unclean (123–126); secondly, that complete leprosy is clean, while the partial is unclean, shewing that the completely and therefore involuntarily immoral condition is innocence compared with the partial enlightenment, by which the soul knows that it is sinful but does not amend (127–130); thirdly, that the infected house is pronounced unclean by the priest who visits it, shewing again that the entrance of divine reason will reveal the impurity of the soul (131–135). The same moral is found in the words of the widow of Zarephath to Elijah, “O man of God, thou hast entered to remind me of my sin” (136–139).
V. The important point here is that “destroyed his way” means “destroyed God’s way” (140–143), and this reminds us of the passage in which Israel asked for leave to pass through Edom’s territory, and said “we will go by the king’s way” (144) But Philo cannot endure to be confined to these two words, but deals with the whole content of Num. 20:17–20 in a way which, perverse as it is, shews much richness of thought as well as ingenuity. (α) When Israel says “I will pass through thy land” we have the resolve of the Wise both to test the life of the pleasure-lover, so as to reject it through experience and not mere ignorance, and also not to stay in it (145–153). (β) On the other hand, “we will not go through the fields and vineyards” means “we will abide in the fields of heavenly fruits and the vineyards of virtue and true joy” (154). (γ) “We will not drink of thy well” means that “we on whom God rains his mercies have no need of the scanty water of the wells of earthly pleasures” (155–158). (δ) “We will go by the king’s way” is “we will tread the road of wisdom” (159–161). (ε) “We will turn neither to the right nor to the left” shews that this way of wisdom is in the mean, as e.g. courage is the mean between rashness on the right and cowardice on the left (162–165). (ζ) When in reply to Edom’s refusal and threat of war Israel replies, “we will pass along the mountain,” Philo by a strange play on ὅρος (the mountain) and ὅρος (definition) extracts the idea that the wise man’s course is on lofty thoughts based on scientific analysis (166–167). (η) “If I drink of thy water, I will give thee its value” (τιμή) is turned into “If I truckle to you, I shall be giving to the worthless an honour which will lead the weak to honour it also” (167–171). (θ) The words “the matter is nothing” (see note on 145) are taken to mean the vanity of earthly things. And this leads to a meditation on the witness of history to the instability of national prosperity and indeed of all human aims (172–180). Thus we arrive at the conclusion that while Edom would bar the king’s way, the divine reason will bar that of Edom and its associates (180).
This last word leads to some concluding thoughts about Balaam as one of these “associates.” The sections (181–end), which otherwise have little connexion with the preceding matter, go back to the thought of 122–139, and describe Balaam as the type of those who reject the warning of divine reason as the inward judge and thus are past all cure.