Save "Gun Control and Halacha"
Gun Control and Halacha
ועוד תניא אין מוכרין להם לא זיין ולא כלי זיין ואין משחיזין להן את הזיין ואין מוכרין להן לא סדן ולא קולרין ולא כבלים ולא שלשלאות של ברזל אחד עובד כוכבים ואחד כותי

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita: One may not sell weapons to gentiles or the auxiliary equipment of weapons, and one may not sharpen weapons for them. And one may not sell them stocks used for fastening the feet of prisoners, or iron neck chains [kolarin], or foot chains, or iron chains. This prohibition applies equally to both a gentile and a Samaritan.

א"ר דימי בר אבא כדרך שאסור למכור לעובד כוכבים אסור למכור ללסטים ישראל ה"ד אי דחשיד דקטיל פשיטא היינו עובד כוכבים
Apropos the baraita that discusses the prohibition against selling weapons, the Gemara relates that Rav Dimi bar Abba says: Just as it is prohibited to sell to a gentile, it is prohibited to sell to an armed bandit who is a Jew. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this prohibition? If the thief is suspected of killing, isn’t it obvious that it is prohibited? After all, he is the same as a gentile. Providing a Jew who might kill with weapons is no different from giving a weapon to a gentile, as in both cases one violates the prohibition: Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.
ואי דלא קטיל אמאי לא לעולם דלא קטיל והב"ע במשמוטא דזימנין דעביד לאצולי נפשיה
And if he is a bandit who does not kill, why not sell to him? The Gemara answers: Actually, Rav Dimi bar Abba is referring to a bandit who does not kill, and here we are dealing with a bandit who steals, as sometimes he makes use of his weapon to save himself when he is caught. Consequently, it is prohibited to sell him weapons in case he kills with them in self-defense.

(יב) אָסוּר לִמְכֹּר לְעַכּוּ''ם כָּל כְּלֵי הַמִּלְחָמָה וְאֵין מַשְׁחִיזִין לָהֶם אֶת הַזַּיִן וְאֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן לֹא סַכִּין וְלֹא קוֹלָרִין וְלֹא כְּבָלִים [שֶׁל בַּרְזֶל] וְלֹא שַׁלְשְׁלָאוֹת שֶׁל בַּרְזֶל הִינְדּוּאָה וְלֹא דֻּבִּים וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֵזֶק לָרַבִּים. אֲבָל מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן תְּרִיסִין שֶׁאֵינָן אֶלָּא לְהָגֵן:

(12) It is forbidden to sell arms of any kind to heathen ; one should not sharpen their weapons; one should not sell them a knife — — or anything that is likely to be a public danger. Shields, however, may be sold to them, since they are used only for defense.

(יד) כָּל שֶׁאָסוּר לִמְכֹּר לְעַכּוּ''ם אָסוּר לִמְכֹּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהוּא לִסְטִים מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּמְצָא מַחֲזִיק יְדֵי עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵרָה וּמַכְשִׁילוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל הַמַּכְשִׁיל עִוֵּר בְּדָבָר וְהִשִּׂיאוֹ עֵצָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ הוֹגֶנֶת אוֹ שֶׁחִזֵּק יְדֵי עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵרָה שֶׁהוּא עִוֵּר וְאֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה דֶּרֶךְ הָאֱמֶת מִפְּנֵי תַּאֲוַת לִבּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא יט יד) "וְלִפְנֵי עִוֵּר לֹא תִתֵּן מִכְשׁל". הַבָּא לִטּל מִמְּךָ עֵצָה תֵּן לוֹ עֵצָה הַהוֹגֶנֶת לוֹ:

(14) Whatever must not be sold to a heathen must not be sold to a Jewish bandit, since this will encourage a criminal and misdirect him. So too, anyone who misdirects a person, blind on any subject, by giving him wrong advice, or encourages a criminal, who is blind and cannot see the way of truth because of his greedy lust, is transgressing a prohibitive command, as it is written: "You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14), meaning that if a man comes to you for advice, you should give him an advice fitting his needs.

(ה) אֵין מוֹכְרִים לָהֶם וְלֹא לְיִשְׂרָאֵל הֶחָשׁוּד לִמְכֹּר לָהֶם, וְלֹא לְיִשְׂרָאֵל לִסְטִים, דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים כְּגוֹן דֻּבִּים וַאֲרָיוֹת, וְלֹא שׁוּם כְּלֵי זַיִן, וְלֹא סַדָּן. שטא''ק בִּלְשׁוֹן אַשְׁכְּנַז כֵּן פֵּרֵשׁ רַשִׁ''י בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דַּף ט''ו, וְלֹא כְּבָלִים וְקוֹלָרִין (פֵּרוּשׁ מֵעִנְיַן וַיִּתְּנֻהוּ בַסוּגַר (יְחֶזְקֵאל יט, ט) וְיַהֲבוּהוּ בְּקוֹלָרִין (פֵּרוּשׁ בַּרְזֶל סְבִיב הַצַוָּאר) וְשַׁלְשְׁלָאוֹת שֶׁל בַּרְזֶל, וַאֲפִלּוּ עֶשֶׁת שֶׁל בַּרְזֶל; וְלֹא מַשְׁחִיזִים לָהֶם כְּלִי זַיִן; וְלֹא בּוֹנִים לָהֶם מָקוֹם שֶׁדָּנִים בּוֹ בְּנֵי אָדָם.

(יג) וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁאָסְרוּ לִמְכֹּר לְעַכּוּ''ם כָּךְ אָסְרוּ לִמְכֹּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁמּוֹכֵר לְעַכּוּ''ם. וּמֻתָּר לִמְכֹּר כְּלֵי זַיִן לְחַיִל שֶׁל בְּנֵי הַמְּדִינָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מְגִנִּין עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל:

(13) Just as the sages have prohibited the sale of arms to a heathen, so have they prohibited selling the same to a Jew who sells to a heathen. On the other hand, weapons may be sold to the local citizens' force, since they protect the Jewish population.

מדרבי נתן דתניא רבי נתן אומר מניין שלא יגדל אדם כלב רע בתוך ביתו ואל יעמיד סולם רעוע בתוך ביתו ת"ל (דברים כב, ח) לא תשים דמים בביתך
The justification for this is from the ruling of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that one may not raise a vicious dog in his house, and one may not set up an unstable ladder in his house? The verse states: “You shall not bring blood into your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8), i.e., one may not allow a hazardous situation or item to remain in one’s house. As long as the belligerent dog or cat is still alive, the owner is in violation of this verse and therefore the court may excommunicate him for failing to remove the danger.
מתני׳ כל שחבתי בשמירתו הכשרתי את נזקו הכשרתי במקצת נזקו חבתי בתשלומי נזקו כהכשר כל נזקו
MISHNA: With regard to anything for which I became responsible for safeguarding it to prevent it from causing damage, if it in fact causes damage, it is considered as if I actively facilitated that damage, and accordingly I must pay for it. In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused.
גמ׳ ת"ר כל שחבתי בשמירתו הכשרתי את נזקו כיצד שור ובור שמסרן לחרש שוטה וקטן והזיקו חייב לשלם מה שאין כן באש
GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita that elucidates the mishna’s ruling: With regard to anything for which I became responsible for safeguarding it to prevent it from causing damage, if it in fact causes damage, it is considered as if I actively facilitated that damage and accordingly must pay for it. How so? In the case of an ox or a pit that one transferred to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, whose presumed limited intellectual capacity means they are deemed incapable of sufficiently safeguarding them from causing damage, and the ox or pit caused damage, the halakha is that since the owner of the ox or pit did not fulfill his duty to safeguard them, he is liable to pay for the damage, which is not so in a corresponding case where the damage is caused by a fire.
במאי עסקינן אילימא בשור קשור ובור מכוסה דכוותה גבי אש גחלת מאי שנא הכא ומאי שנא הכא
The Gemara elucidates: With what are we dealing? If we say that the baraita deals with a tethered ox or a covered pit, which cannot cause damage in the manner in which the owner left them, then the case in the corresponding situation of fire, where he is not liable, is where one transferred an ember to one of limited halakhic competence, which, had it been left alone, would not have erupted into a fire and caused damage. This cannot be correct, because if so, what is different here in the case of an ox and a pit, where one is liable, and what is different there in the case of the fire, that exempts him from liability? There seems to be no reason to differentiate between them.
אלא בשור מותר ובור מגולה דכוותה גבי אש שלהבת מה שאין כן באש דפטור והא אמר ריש לקיש משמיה דחזקיה לא שנו אלא שמסר לו גחלת וליבה אבל שלהבת חייב מ"ט דהא ברי הזיקא
Rather, the baraita must be dealing with an untethered ox or an exposed pit, which can cause damage in the manner in which the owner left them. If so, then the case in the corresponding situation of fire, where he is not liable, is where one transferred a flame to one of limited halakhic competence, which can also cause damage in this form. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But if so, why does the baraita state: Which is not so in the case of damage caused by a fire, as one is exempt from paying damages? But this is untenable, as didn’t Reish Lakish say in the name of Ḥizkiyya: They taught that one is exempt from damage caused by a fire only in a case where he transferred an ember to one of limited halakhic competence who then fanned it into a flame. But if he transferred a flame to him, the one who transferred the flame to him is liable for any damage caused. What is the reason? He is responsible because the capacity for it to cause damage is certain.
לעולם בשור קשור ובור מכוסה ודכוותה גבי אש גחלת ודקא אמרת מאי שנא הכא ומ"ש הכא
The Gemara returns to its initial suggestion: Actually, the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a tethered ox or a covered pit, and the case in the corresponding situation of fire, where he is not liable, is where one transferred an ember to one of limited halakhic competence. And with regard to that which you said in order to reject this: What is different here in the case of an ox and a pit that causes him to be liable and what is different there in the case of the fire, that exempts him from liability? Seemingly, in all these cases the item was not able to cause damage in its current form, so he is exempt from liability.
שור דרכיה לנתוקי בור דרכיה לנתורי גחלת כמה דשביק לה מעמיא עמיא ואזלא
The Gemara explains: You could answer as follows: The typical manner of an ox is to free itself from being tethered and the typical manner of a pit is for its cover to become dislodged. Therefore, as it is negligent to transfer an ox or pit to someone who is incapable of sufficiently safeguarding them, the one who transferred the ox or flame to them is liable. By contrast, with regard to an ember, as long as he leaves it alone it progressively dims, and the only way in which it will cause damage is if someone else actively fans it into a flame; therefore, he is not liable.
ולר' יוחנן דאמר אפילו מסר לו שלהבת נמי פטור דכוותה הכא בשור מותר ובור מגולה מ"ש הכא ומ"ש הכא
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: Even if the halakha is that if one transferred a flame to one of limited halakhic competence he is exempt, it is possible to say that the case in the corresponding situation here in the first clause of the baraita is stated with regard to an untethered ox or an exposed pit. The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different here in the case of an ox and a pit that causes him to be liable and what is different there in the case of the fire that exempts him from liability? Seemingly, in all these cases the item that was transferred is capable of causing damage in its current form, so he would be expected to be liable.
התם צבתא דחרש קא גרים הכא לא צבתא דחרש קא גרים
The Gemara explains: There, in the case of fire, ultimately the deaf-mute’s handling [tzevata] of the flame causes the damage, as if it were not for him moving the flame no damage would have been caused. Here, in the case of the ox and the pit, the deaf-mute’s handling of them does not cause the damage. Rather, the damage was caused even though they remained in exactly the same dangerous state in which the one who had transferred them to the deaf-mute did so. Therefore, the damage is a result of that person’s negligence, and he is liable.

(ו) אֶחָד מִן הַשֻּׁתָּפִין שֶׁבִּקֵּשׁ לִפְתֹּחַ לוֹ חַלּוֹן בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ לַחֲצַר חֲבֵרוֹ מְעַכֵּב עָלָיו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמִּסְתַּכֵּל בּוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ. וְאִם פָּתַח יִסְתֹּם. וְכֵן לֹא יִפְתְּחוּ הַשֻּׁתָּפִים בְּחָצֵר פֶּתַח בַּיִת כְּנֶגֶד פֶּתַח בַּיִת אוֹ חַלּוֹן כְּנֶגֶד חַלּוֹן. אֲבָל פּוֹתֵחַ אָדָם לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פֶּתַח כְּנֶגֶד פֶּתַח וְחַלּוֹן כְּנֶגֶד חַלּוֹן. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאוֹמֵר לוֹ הֲרֵינִי כְּאֶחָד מִבְּנֵי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים שֶׁרוֹאִין אוֹתְךָ:

We use cookies to give you the best experience possible on our site. Click OK to continue using Sefaria. Learn More.OKאנחנו משתמשים ב"עוגיות" כדי לתת למשתמשים את חוויית השימוש הטובה ביותר.קראו עוד בנושאלחצו כאן לאישור