Essential Talmud: Conflict of Interest

(5) A man can examine all Negaim except for his own Negaim. Rabbi Meir says: Even not the Negaim of his relatives. A man may revoke all vows except for his own vows. Rabbi Yehudah says: Even not the vows of his wife that are between her and others. A man may examine all first-born [animals to see if they have a blemish that would invalidate them as sacrifices] except for his own first-born.

MISHNA: In the case of one who deposits produce with another, even if it is lost due to spoilage or vermin, the bailee may not touch it, as it is not his. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He sells it before the court, as by doing so he is like one returning a lost item to the owner, since through its sale he prevents the owner from losing the value of his produce.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: In the case of one who deposits produce with another and it rotted, wine and it fermented, oil and it putrefied, honey and it spoiled, the bailee may not touch them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He effects a remedy for these items and sells them in court. The baraita adds: And when he sells them, he sells them to others and does not sell them to himself, even for the same price, so no one will suspect that he bought it at a discount. On a similar note, with regard to charity collectors, when they do not have poor people to whom to distribute charity, they change copper perutot that they collected for more valuable silver coins only for other people, but they do not change the coins for themselves, to avoid suspicion. If collectors for the charity plate collected ready-made food for the poor, at a time where there are no poor people to whom to distribute the food, they sell the food only to others but do not sell the food to themselves.

Anyone who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law, that is inconclusive. Even though one can compare the halakhot of disqualifying judges to the halakhot of disqualifying witnesses, one cannot cite this as an example of a mishna taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Whose opinion is recorded in this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, isn’t there the counterexample of a conspiring witness in monetary matters, who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law but is disqualified from adjudicating cases of monetary law? Rather, is the ruling of the mishna not the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara explains why this cannot be the source: If this is the unattributed mishna Rav Pappi was referring to, from where is it derived that it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Perhaps the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage, e.g., converts and mamzerim, not those who are disqualified due to sin. As, if you do not say so, then with regard to the latter clause of that mishna, which teaches: There is one who is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but is unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law, to whom could this be referring? Why would one be unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law? If it is referring to one who was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of capital law, is he fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law? But doesn’t everyone agree that he is disqualified? Rather, the mishna is clearly referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage. Here too, in the first clause, the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage. Rather, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna here, as we learned in a mishna (Rosh HaShana 22a): These people are disqualified from bearing witness, as they are considered wicked and guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice, and those who lend money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in produce of the Sabbatical Year. And Canaanite slaves are also disqualified. This is the principle: For any testimony for which a woman is not fit, these too are not fit.

Abaye said to him: If it is permitted for a Jew to eat leaven, let him take it for himself and pay the owner back later. Why trouble him to sell it to someone else? The Gemara responds: Eating it himself is not an option due to the potential of suspicion. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to a similar situation: Collectors of charity who have no poor people to whom they can distribute the money, change the money with other people and do not change it themselves, i.e., with their own coins. Likewise, collectors of food for the charity plate, who would collect food in large vessels for the poor to eat, who do not have poor people to whom to distribute the food, sell the food to others and do not sell it to themselves, as it is stated: “And you shall be clear before God and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22). It is not sufficient that a person is without sin in the eyes of God. He must also appear upright in the eyes of other people so that they will not suspect him of wrongdoing.

§ Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: Those who issue decrees in Jerusalem would take their wages, ninety-nine maneh, equal to 9,900 dinars per year, from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. If they did not wish to do so, one adds to their wages. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: If they did not wish to do so? Does this mean that if they desired higher wages, they were paid more? Is that to say that we are dealing with wicked people who demand wages beyond what they need? Rather, on the contrary, Rav Asi said that if their wages were insufficient for their needs, then even if they did not wish to receive higher wages, one adds to their wages so that they may devote themselves to their communal service. The Gemara relates: The Sage Karna would take an istera, a small coin, from the innocent party, and an istera from the guilty party, i.e., he would charge both parties that came to him for judgment, and then he would judge their case. The Gemara asks: But how could he do so? Isn’t it written: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8), which indicates that a judge may not take money from either of the two litigants? And if you say that this prohibition against taking a bribe applies only when a judge does not take from both parties, as there is a concern that perhaps he may come to pervert the judgment in favor of the party that gave him the bribe, whereas in the case of Karna, since he took from both parties he will not come to pervert the judgment, who says that the verse is referring only to those circumstances? Is it permitted to take a bribe even in a case when one will not pervert the judgment? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8); what is the meaning when the verse states this? If it comes to teach that one should not acquit the guilty and one should not convict the innocent due to a bribe, it is already stated: “You shall not wrest judgment” (Deuteronomy 16:19). Rather, this verse teaches that even if the purpose of the bribe is to ensure that one acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, the Torah nevertheless says: “And you shall take no bribe.” This indicates that it is prohibited for a judge to receive anything from the litigants, even if there is no concern at all that justice will be perverted. The Gemara answers: This applies only when one takes the money in the form of a bribe, even if he does not intend to pervert the judgment, whereas Karna took the money in the form of a salary, not a bribe.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who accept bribes, and how they ruin themselves. If a person has pain in his eyes, he gives a doctor money, and even then it is uncertain whether he will be healed or whether he will not be healed. And yet those judges take the value of a peruta, a small amount of money as a bribe, and actively blind their eyes, as it is stated: “For a bribe blinds those who have sight” (Exodus 23:8). The Sages taught: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly blind the eyes of fools. “And perverts the words of the righteous” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly pervert the statements of the wicked. The Gemara asks: Are fools and the wicked suitable for judgment, i.e., to be appointed as judges? Rather, this is what the tanna of the baraita said: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”; even if he were very wise but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without suffering blindness of the heart, i.e., he will eventually turn foolish. “And perverts the words of the righteous”;

even if he is completely righteous but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without becoming demented. ... § Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: This judge who borrows items from others is disqualified from rendering judgment because it is as though he accepts a salary. ..... Rava said: What is the reason for the prohibition against taking a bribe? Once a judge accepts a bribe from one party, his thoughts draw closer to him and he becomes like his own self, and a person does not find fault in himself. The Gemara notes that the term itself alludes to this idea: What is the meaning of shoḥad, bribe? It can be read as: Shehu ḥad, as he is one, i.e., at one mind with the litigant. Rav Pappa said: A person should not judge a case involving one whom he loves, nor involving one whom he hates. He should not judge one whom he loves, as he will not find any fault in him, while with regard to one whom he hates, he will not find any merit in him. Abaye said: With regard to this Torah scholar who is beloved by the residents of his town, it is not because he is a superior Sage than others; rather, it is because he does not reprove them in Heavenly matters. He is beloved because he is not strict with them with regard to the observance of mitzvot. Rava said: At first I would say that all these residents of Meḥoza love me; however, once I became a judge I said that some of them hate me and some of them love me, as I assumed that their feelings toward me depended on the success of their case. When I saw that the one I declared guilty today would be found innocent the following day, I realized that my rulings do not determine their attitudes, and therefore I said: If they love, then they all love me, and if they hate, then they all hate me, regardless of what happens in the courtroom. § The Sages taught: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8). It is not necessary to say that this includes bribery by means of money; however, even verbal bribery, assisting by means of speech, is also prohibited. The halakha that a bribe is not necessarily monetary is derived from the fact that it is not written: And you shall take no profit.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of bribing with words? The Gemara explains: This can be demonstrated by that episode involving Shmuel, who was once crossing a river on a narrow ferry. A certain man came along and gave him a hand to help him out of the ferryboat. Shmuel said to him: What are you doing in this place? The man said to him: I have a case to present before you for judgment. Shmuel said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, as you did me a favor. Although no money changed hands, a bond was formed between the pair. The Gemara relates a similar story. Ameimar was sitting and judging a case when a feather floated and landed on his head. A certain man came by and removed it from his head. Ameimar said to him: What are you doing here? He said to him: I have a case to present before you. Ameimar said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, due to the favor you performed for me. The Gemara likewise relates: ... The sharecropper of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was accustomed to bringing him a basket [kanta] full of fruits every Shabbat eve. One day, he brought him the basket on a Thursday. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: What is different that you came early now, this week? The sharecropper said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the basket of fruits, as in any case I am coming on Thursday, the day the courts are in session. Rabbi Yishmael did not accept the basket of fruits from him, and he said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case. Rabbi Yishmael seated a pair of rabbinic scholars and they judged the sharecropper’s case. As Rabbi Yishmael was coming and going, he said to himself: If he wants, he could claim this, and if he wants, he could claim that, i.e., he kept thinking of all the ways in which the litigant who brought him the fruits could win his case. He said to himself: Blast the souls of those who accept bribes. If I, who did not accept anything, and if I had accepted, I would have accepted my own property, as it is my sharecropper and the fruits legally belong to me, am nevertheless in this state of mind due to the proposed gift, all the more so are those who actually accept bribes inevitably biased in favor of the one who bribed them. The Gemara likewise relates with regard to Rabbi Yishmael bar Elisha, who was a priest, that a certain man once brought him the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: From where are you? The man said to him: I am from such and such a place. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And from there to here was there no priest to whom you could give the first shearing? He said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, and he would not accept the first shearing from him.

(7) Keep far from a false charge; do not bring death on those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.

Rabbi Natan says: It is a mitzva to depart from the truth in order to preserve peace, as it is stated: “And Samuel said: How can I go, and Saul will hear and kill me” (I Samuel 16:2). God responded in the next verse that Samuel should say he went to sacrifice an offering, indicating that God commands one to lie in order to preserve peace. It was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Great is peace, as even the Holy One, Blessed be He, departed from the truth for it. As, initially it is written that Sarah said of Abraham: “And my lord is old” (Genesis 18:12), and in the end it is written that God told Abraham that Sarah said: “And I am old” (Genesis 18:13). God adjusted Sarah’s words in order to spare Abraham hurt feelings that might lead Abraham and Sarah to quarrel.

With regard to a king on the Sanhedrin, the source is as it is written: “Do not answer in a cause [riv]” (Exodus 23:2), which is explained to mean: Do not answer to a great person [rav]. Therefore, one whose stature will make the other judges afraid to contradict him may not be appointed to the Sanhedrin. The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Nor is a king or a High Priest seated on a court for intercalating the year. A king does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the sustenance of soldiers. Taxes were collected on a yearly basis, while the soldiers were paid monthly, so the king had a vested interest in not adding a month to the calendar. A High Priest does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the cold. If a month is added to the calendar and the High Priest must perform his Yom Kippur immersions and walk barefoot on the floor of the Temple deeper into the cold autumn, he too will have a vested interest in not adding a month. Rav Pappa says: Learn from the ruling concerning the High Priest that the weather of the year follows the months, meaning that changes in the seasons are in accordance with the sequence of the months in the standard, non-intercalated calendar. The High Priest would not want the year to be intercalated, because then the colder weather of Marḥeshvan would occur during Tishrei. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But isn’t that contradicted by the incident of those three cattle herders that were standing around, and the Sages heard them saying various statements about annual weather signs? One of them said: If the first grains and the late-ripening grains sprout at the same time, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar but still Shevat. And one of them said: If an ox dies in the morning in the snow, indicating that it is still very cold, and at noon in the shade of a fig tree it sleeps, rubbing against it to strip off its skin because of the heat, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And one of them said: If there is a very strong east wind, which is cold, yet the warm air that you blow with your jaw goes out and toward it and overcomes its effect, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And since those signs had not yet come to pass, the Sages intercalated the calendar that year. The Gemara rejects this: And can you understand that the Sages relied on cattle herders to determine halakha? Rather, the Sages relied on their own calculations, and those cattle herders were supported inasmuch as their statements were supported by the Sages’ independent conclusion.