Part One: Is a Fetus a Person?
(יז) וְאִ֕ישׁ כִּ֥י יַכֶּ֖ה כָּל־נֶ֣פֶשׁ אָדָ֑ם מ֖וֹת יוּמָֽת׃
(17) If anyone kills any human being, he shall be put to death.
(כב) וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים׃ (כג) וְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִהְיֶ֑ה וְנָתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ׃ (כד) עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל׃ (כה) כְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה׃ (ס)
What is the penalty for murder in these sources?
What is the penalty for causing a miscarriage to a fetus?
What conclusions can we draw about the status of a fetus from this set of sources?
Note that the Greek version of this passage from the Septuagent, used by the Catholic Church as the basis for the Church's translation, reads differently.
The Gemara asks: And about marriage were they concerned? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and her husband died on that same day, she immerses to purify herself, as she is ritually impure due to their intercourse, and she may partake of teruma that same evening? Evidently, the Sages were not concerned that she became pregnant from the initial act of intercourse, even that of marriage. Rav Ḥisda said: She immerses and partakes of teruma only until forty days after her husband’s death, when there is still no reason for concern, as if she is not pregnant then she is not pregnant. And if she is pregnant, until forty days from conception the fetus is merely water. It is not yet considered a living being, and therefore it does not disqualify its mother from partaking of teruma.
(ז) הַמַּפֶּלֶת לְיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים, אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת לְוָלָד. לְיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה וּלְנִדָּה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, יוֹם אַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וּלְנִדָּה. יוֹם שְׁמוֹנִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה וּלְנִדָּה, שֶׁהַזָּכָר נִגְמָר לְאַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, וְהַנְּקֵבָה לִשְׁמוֹנִים וְאֶחָד. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֶחָד בְּרִיַּת הַזָּכָר וְאֶחָד בְּרִיַּת הַנְּקֵבָה, זֶה וָזֶה לְאַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד:
(7) If a woman miscarried on the fortieth day, she need not be concerned that it was a valid childbirth. On the forty-first day, she sits as for both a male and a female and as for a menstruant. Rabbi Ishmael says: [if she miscarried on] the forty-first day she sits as for a male and as for a menstruant, But if on the eighty-first day she sits as for a male and a female and a menstruant, because a male is fully fashioned on the forty-first day and a female on the eighty-first day. But the sages say: the fashioning of the male and the fashioning of the female both take forty-one days.
What is the significance of the forty day mark for the fetus?
What is the status of the fetus prior to forty days?
Note that Rabbi Immanuel Jakobowitz, a leading 20th century authority, suggests that the Talmud's forty days may be equal to sixty days in our terms, because of our ability to detect a pregnancy earlier.
Part Two: Fetal Development and Abortion
One of them said: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: With regard to one who emancipates half of his slave, the slave acquires freedom for half of himself, and one of them added an explanation and said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi for this ruling? He holds: A fetus is considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its mother’s body, and it is as though the master transferred ownership of one of her limbs to her. Since the maidservant is pregnant, the child is considered to be a part of her, and it is as though he emancipated a portion of her body. Therefore, the mother is not acting as an agent for the child, and this halakha does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.
What does this source tell us about the status of the fetus between 40 days and birth?
Part Three: Justifiable Abortion
(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:
(6) If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.
[In the case of] a pregnant woman [who is in mortal danger during childbirth, she may] extend her hand and cut up [her fetus] and remove it limb by limb, for as long as it has not emerged to the world, it is not a nefesh [soul] and it is permitted to kill it and to save its mother. But if its head has emerged, one may not touch it to kill it, for it is as living offspring, and one does not set aside one nefesh for another. ...
(ט) אַף זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁלֹּא לָחוּס עַל נֶפֶשׁ הָרוֹדֵף. לְפִיכָךְ הוֹרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָעֻבָּרָה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד מֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ הָעֵבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ בֵּין בְּסַם בֵּין בְּיָד מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּרוֹדֵף אַחֲרֶיהָ לְהָרְגָהּ. וְאִם מִשֶּׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ וְזֶהוּ טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם:
(9) This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef. On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.
1. According to the MIshnah, when the mother's life is in danger during childbrith, whose life takes precedence, the mother or the fetus? When does the answer to this question change?
2. How do Rashi and Rambam differ in their understanding of this situation?
3. What might the implications be of Rashi and Rambam's positions for the questions about abortion we face today?
Part Four: Contemporary Views
It would be forbidden to kill it even to save someone’s life. The exception would be to save the life of the mother during childbirth, not for any other need of the mother, which would definitely be forbidden.
Even for children for whom the doctors predict a very short life span, such as those children who are born with the disease called Tay-Sachs, which through newly developed tests can be diagnosed prenatally, it would be forbidden since there is no danger to the mother and the infant is not a rodef. One cannot permit an abortion even though there is very great suffering involved … It is incontrovertible and clear as I have written, a straightforward halachah according to the words of our Masters, the traditional commentaries and halachic authorities, that abortion would be forbidden as bona-fide murder, for any fetus; legitimate or a mamzer, genetically normal or afflicted with Tay-Sachs, are all included in the prohibition according to Jewish law.
If there is a danger to the mother from continuing the pregnancy, one should permit abortion without hesitation. Also, if her health is poor and to cure her or to relieve her from great pain it is necessary to abort the fetus, even if she is not in actual danger, there is room to permit it, based on the halachic authority’s evaluation of the situation.
In the case of a baby who will have Tay-Sachs, "One should permit...abortion as soon as it becomes evident without doubt from the test that, indeed such a baby shall be born...if, indeed, we may permit an abortion according to the halachah because of 'a great need' and because of pain and suffering, it seems that this is the classic case for such permission. And it is irrelevant in what way the pain and suffering is expressed, whether it is physical or psychological. Indeed, psychological suffering is in many ways much greater than the suffering of the flesh.
Compare and contrast the three modern opinions above. How does each relate to the current controversy over abortion rights and restrictions?