(כז) וַיִּבְרָ֨א אֱלֹהִ֤ים ׀ אֶת־הָֽאָדָם֙ בְּצַלְמ֔וֹ בְּצֶ֥לֶם אֱלֹהִ֖ים בָּרָ֣א אֹת֑וֹ זָכָ֥ר וּנְקֵבָ֖ה בָּרָ֥א אֹתָֽם׃
(27) And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them.
Rambam – 1135-1204 on Genesis 1:27:
In his image, in the image of God. Among all living creatures, Man alone is endowed – like his Creator – with morality, reason and free will. He can know and love God and can hold spiritual communion with Him; and Man alone can guide his actions through reason. It is in this sense that the Torah describes Man as having been created in God’s image and likeness.
לפיכך נברא אדם יחידי ללמדך שכל המאבד נפש אחת מישראל מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו איבד עולם מלא וכל המקיים נפש אחת מישראל מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קיים עולם מלא ומפני שלום הבריות שלא יאמר אדם לחבירו אבא גדול מאביך ושלא יהו המינים אומרים הרבה רשויות בשמים ולהגיד גדולתו של הקב"ה שאדם טובע כמה מטבעות בחותם אחד כולן דומין זה לזה ומלך מלכי המלכים הקב"ה טבע כל אדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון ואין אחד מהן דומה לחבירו לפיכך כל אחד ואחד חייב לומר בשבילי נברא העולם ושמא תאמרו
Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people, i.e., kills one Jew, the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world. The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: And this was done due to the importance of maintaining peace among people, so that one person will not say to another: My father, i.e., progenitor, is greater than your father. And it was also so that the heretics who believe in multiple gods will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person. And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all of them are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me, as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions. The court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say:
ואמר רבי יהושע בן לוי כל הכופה אשתו לדבר מצוה הויין לו בנים שאינן מהוגנין אמר רב איקא בר חיננא מאי קראה גם בלא דעת נפש לא טוב תניא נמי הכי גם בלא דעת נפש לא טוב
And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Anyone who forces his wife to perform the conjugal mitzva will have unworthy children as a consequence. Rav Ika bar Ḥinnana said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “Also, that the soul without knowledge is not good” (Proverbs 19:2). If intercourse takes place without the woman’s knowledge, i.e., consent, the soul of the offspring will not be good.
דחוור אפיה שקל באצבעתיה אנח ליה בפומיה א"ל אפסדת לסעודתא דמלכא אמרו ליה אמאי תיעביד הכי אמר להו מאן דעביד הכי פסיל למאכל דמלכא אמרו ליה אמאי אמר להו דבר אחר חזאי ביה בדקו ולא אשכחו שקל אצבעתיה אנח עליה אמר להו הכא מי בדקיתו בדקו אשכחו אמרו ליה רבנן מ"ט סמכת אניסא אמר להו חזאי רוח צרעת דקא פרחה עילויה: ההוא רומאה דאמר לה לההיא איתתא מינסבת לי אמרה ליה לא אזיל אייתי רימני פלי ואכל קמה כל מיא דצערי לה בלעתיה ולא הב לה עד דזג לה לסוף אמר לה אי מסינא לך מינסבת לי אמרה ליה אין אזיל אייתי רימני פלי ואכל קמה אמר לה כל מיא דצערי לך תוף שדאי תוף שדאי עד דנפקא מינה כי הוצא ירקא ואתסיאת: ועושה בצמר: בצמר אין בפשתים לא מתני' מני ר' יהודה היא דתניא אינו כופה לא לעמוד לפני אביו ולא לעמוד לפני בנו ולא ליתן תבן לפני בהמתו אבל כופה ליתן תבן לפני בקרו רבי יהודה אומר אף אינו כופה לעשות בפשתן מפני שפשתן מסריח את הפה ומשרבט את השפתים והני מילי בכיתנא רומאה: ר' אליעזר אומר אפילו הכניסה לו מאה שפחות: אמר רב מלכיו אמר רב אדא בר אהבה הלכה כרבי אליעזר אמר רבי חנינא בריה דרב איקא שפוד שפחות וגומות רב מלכיו בלורית אפר מקלה וגבינה רב מלכיא רב פפא אמר מתניתין ומתניתא רב מלכיא שמעתתא רב מלכיו וסימנך מתניתא מלכתא מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו שפחות: רשב"ג אומר וכו': היינו תנא קמא איכא בינייהו דמיטללא בגורייתא קיטנייתא ונדרשיר: מתני׳ המדיר את אשתו מתשמיש המטה ב"ש אומרים שתי שבתות בית הלל אומרים שבת אחת התלמידים יוצאין לתלמוד תורה שלא ברשות שלשים יום הפועלים שבת אחת העונה האמורה בתורה הטיילין בכל יום הפועלים שתים בשבת החמרים אחת בשבת הגמלים אחת לשלשים יום הספנים אחת לששה חדשים דברי רבי אליעזר: גמ׳ מ"ט דב"ש גמרי מיולדת נקבה ובית הלל גמרי מיולדת זכר וב"ה נמי נגמרו מיולדת נקבה אי מיולדת גמרי לה הכי נמי אלא ב"ה מנדה גמרי לה במאי קמיפלגי מר סבר מידי דשכיח ממידי דשכיח ומר סבר מידי דהוא גרים לה ממידי דהוא גרים לה אמר רב מחלוקת במפרש אבל בסתם דברי הכל יוציא לאלתר ויתן כתובה ושמואל אמר אפי' בסתם נמי ימתין שמא ימצא פתח לנדרו הא פליגי בה חדא זימנא דתנן המדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו עד שלשים יום יעמיד פרנס יותר מכאן יוציא ויתן כתובה ואמר רב לא שנו אלא במפרש אבל בסתם יוציא לאלתר ויתן כתובה ושמואל אמר אפי' בסתם נמי ימתין שמא ימצא פתח לנדרו צריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר רב משום דלא אפשר בפרנס אבל בההיא דאפשר בפרנס אימא מודי ליה לשמואל ואי איתמר בההיא בהך קאמר שמואל אבל בהא אימא מודי ליה לרב צריכא: התלמידים יוצאין לתלמוד וכו': ברשות כמה כמה דבעי
face blanch because he craved the food, so he took some of the food with his finger and put it in Mar Zutra’s mouth. The chief butler said to him: You have spoiled the king’s meal, as now he will not eat from it. The king’s soldiers who were there said to him: Why did you do this? He said to them: The one who makes such awful dishes is the one who actually spoiled the king’s food. They said to him: Why do you say this? He said to them: I saw something else, i.e., a leprous infection, in this meat. They checked and didn’t find anything. He took his finger and placed it on the food and said to them: Did you check here? They then checked that spot and found the infection. The Sages said to Rav Ashi: What is the reason that you relied on a miracle and assumed that leprosy would in fact be found there? He said to them: I saw a leprous spirit hovering over the food and realized that it had this defect. The Gemara relates another incident with regard to a similar subject: A certain Roman said to a certain woman: Will you marry me? She said to him: No. In order to convince her, he went and brought pomegranates and peeled them and ate them in front of her and did not give her any of them. The aroma of the pomegranates caused her mouth to water, so she swallowed all of the saliva that caused her anguish, but he did not give her any until she became ill and bloated. Ultimately, he said to her: If I cure you, will you marry me? She said to him: Yes. He went and brought pomegranates, peeled them and ate them in front of her. He said to her: All of the saliva that causes you anguish, spit it out, spit it out. She did this until something like a green leaf came out of her, and then she was cured. § The mishna says that a wife must make thread from wool. The Gemara infers: She must make thread from wool, but she is not obligated to do so from flax. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: A husband may not compel his wife to stand before his father and serve him, or to stand before his son and serve him, or to place straw before his animals, i.e., horses and donkeys, but he can compel her to place straw before his cattle, i.e., cows and bulls. Rabbi Yehuda said: He also cannot compel her to make thread from flax, because flax, while it is being spun, causes the mouth to smell foul and the lips to stiffen. The Gemara comments: This applies only to Roman flax, which causes the most damage. § The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he may compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Rav Malkiyyu said that Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, said: The halakha discussed in tractate Beitza (28b) that a skewer that had been used for roasting meat but no longer has an olive-bulk of meat on it may be moved to a corner on a Festival; the halakha with regard to maidservants in the mishna here; and the halakha discussed in tractate Nidda (52a) that if a girl has two hair follicles in her pubic region, even if there are no hairs growing from them, she is considered to have reached majority and may perform ḥalitza; these three halakhot were all stated by Rav Malkiyyu. However, the halakha discussed in tractate Avoda Zara (29a) that a Jew who cuts the hair of a pagan must stop at a distance of three fingerbreadths on every side before he reaches his forelock, as the pagans would grow their forelocks for idolatry and the Jew must not appear as if he were dressing the forelock for idolatrous purposes; and the halakha discussed in tractate Makkot (21a) that one may not place burnt ashes on a wound, as it looks like a tattoo; and the halakha discussed in tractate Avoda Zara (35b) that cheese made by a gentile is forbidden, because gentiles smooth the surface of their cheese with lard; these three halakhot were all stated by a different Sage named Rav Malkiya. Rav Pappa said: The halakhot mentioned above that relate to a mishna or a baraita were stated by Rav Malkiya, whereas amoraic statements of halakhot that are not related to a mishna or baraita were taught by Rav Malkiyyu. And your mnemonic to remember this is: The mishna is a queen [malketa], indicating that the comments that are referring to a mishna were made by Rav Malkiya, whose name is similar to the Aramaic term for queen. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, and Rav Pappa? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakha concerning maidservants. According to Rabbi Ḥanina, this halakha was stated by Rav Malkiyyu, whereas Rav Pappa holds that it was taught by Rav Malkiya, since it is referring to a dispute in a mishna. § The mishna says: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy. The Gemara asks: This is essentially the same as the opinion of the first tanna, Rabbi Eliezer, who said that idleness leads to licentiousness. The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case when she plays with small dogs [guriyyata kitanyata] or with games [nadrashir] like chess. Since there is something occupying her she is not in danger of idiocy, but occupying oneself with diversions of this type may still lead to licentiousness. MISHNA: With regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: He may maintain this situation for up to two weeks, but beyond that he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: He must divorce her if it continues beyond one week. Apropos the husband’s obligation to his wife regarding marital relations, the Gemara mentions other aspects of this issue: Students may leave their homes and travel in order to learn Torah without their wives’ permission for up to thirty days, and laborers may leave their homes without their wives’ permission for up to one week. The set interval defining the frequency of a husband’s conjugal obligation to his wife stated in the Torah (see Exodus 21:10), unless the couple stipulated otherwise, varies according to the man’s occupation and proximity to his home: Men of leisure, who do not work, must engage in marital relations every day, laborers must do so twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once every thirty days, and sailors once every six months. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Beit Shammai say a husband may force abstinence on his wife by a vow for a period of up to two weeks without being compelled to divorce her? They derive this from the halakha that a woman who gave birth to a female is ritually impure and prohibited from engaging in conjugal relations with her husband for two weeks after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:5). From this they derive that a period of up to two weeks of abstinence is not deemed undue suffering. And from where do Beit Hillel derive their opinion? They derive it from a woman who gave birth to a male, as she is ritually impure for one week (see Leviticus 12:1–4). The Gemara asks: And if this is so, Beit Hillel should also derive the halakha from a woman who gave birth to a female, since it is clear that the Torah does at times mandate a period of abstinence longer than one week. The Gemara answers: If they derived it from a woman who gave birth, this is indeed how they would have derived it. Rather, Beit Hillel derived it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, who is prohibited from marital relations for seven days according to Torah law. The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that one should derive a common matter from a common matter. Consequently, they derive the halakha of a permitted abstinence by a husband who vowed not to engage in marital relations with his wife from the halakha of a menstruating woman, since both are common cases. And one Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that one should derive a matter that one caused, such as a vow, from a different matter that he caused, i.e., childbirth, and not from menstruation, which was not caused by him at all. Rav said: The dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai concerns one who specifies the given period of time in his vow, but if he vowed not to engage in marital relations with her for an unspecified period of time, all agree that he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. The reason is that since he did not indicate how long he intended to keep the vow, her suffering begins immediately. And Shmuel said: Even with regard to an unspecified vow he should also wait for the same period of time, as perhaps he will find an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow and then he will not need to divorce her. The Gemara asks: Didn’t they disagree about this issue once already? As we learned in a mishna (70a): In the case of one who vows that his wife is prohibited from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than that amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Rav said there: They taught this only with regard to a case where he specifies a limited time during which the vow would be in effect, but if he vows without specification, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even when he vowed without specification, he should also wait, as perhaps he will discover an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases, as if it were stated only with regard to this case, of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might think that in this case Rav says he must divorce her because there is no possibility of appointing a trustee, but that with regard to that halakha, in the case when he vows not to provide sustenance, which can be provided by a trustee, one would say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he should wait. Conversely, if the dispute was stated with regard to that case, where a trustee can be appointed, one might think that in that case Shmuel said to wait, but in this case of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Therefore, it is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases. § The mishna said that students may leave their homes and travel for up to thirty days in order to learn Torah, without their wives’ permission. The Gemara asks: If they went with permission, for how long can they go? The Gemara expresses wonderment at this question: If they went with the permission of their wives, they can go for as long as they want. If the husband and wife agree on this, why is there any reason for the court to intervene?
Meiri Niddah 17a
"Although intercourse was reserved for the night, if because of one’s nature one finds himself forced to sleep at night and ought not be aroused or excited, or if the woman’s nature is such that she is overtaken by sleep at night and is not receptive at that time, one is permitted to have intercourse during the day, with due modesty, in order that intercourse be performed with acceptance and love and not by force..."
רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר שארה כסותה לפום שארה תן כסותה שלא יתן לה לא של ילדה לזקינה ולא של זקינה לילדה כסותה ועונתה לפום עונתה תן כסותה שלא יתן חדשים בימות החמה ולא שחקים בימות הגשמים: תני רב יוסף שארה זו קרוב בשר שלא ינהג בה מנהג פרסיים שמשמשין מטותיהן בלבושיהן מסייע ליה לרב הונא דאמר רב הונא האומר אי אפשי אלא אני בבגדי והיא בבגדה יוציא ונותן כתובה: רבי יהודה אומר אפילו עני שבישראל וכו': מכלל דת"ק סבר הני לא היכי דמי אי דאורחה מ"ט דת"ק דאמר לא ואי דלאו אורחה מ"ט דר"י לא צריכא כגון דאורחיה דידיה ולאו אורחה דידה ת"ק סבר כי אמרינן עולה עמו ואינה יורדת עמו הני מילי מחיים אבל לאחר מיתה לא ורבי יהודה סבר אפילו לאחר מיתה אמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא הלכה כרבי יהודה ואמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא מי שנשתטה בית דין יורדין לנכסיו וזנין ומפרנסין את אשתו ובניו ובנותיו ודבר אחר א"ל רבינא לרב אשי מ"ש מהא דתניא מי שהלך למדינת הים ואשתו תובעת מזונות בית דין יורדין לנכסיו וזנין ומפרנסין את אשתו אבל לא בניו ובנותיו ולא דבר אחר א"ל ולא שאני לך בין יוצא לדעת ליוצא שלא לדעת מאי דבר אחר רב חסדא אמר זה תכשיט רב יוסף אמר צדקה מ"ד תכשיט כ"ש צדקה מ"ד צדקה אבל תכשיט יהבינן לה דלא ניחא ליה דתינוול אמר רב חייא בר אבין אמר רב הונא מי שהלך למדינת הים ומתה אשתו ב"ד יורדין לנכסיו וקוברין אותה לפי כבודו לפי כבודו ולא לפי כבודה אימא אף לפי כבודו הא קמ"ל עולה עמו ואינה יורדת עמו ואפילו לאחר מיתה אמר רב מתנה האומר אם מתה לא תקברוה מנכסיו שומעין לו מ"ש כי אמר דנפלי נכסי קמי יתמי כי לא אמר נמי נכסי קמי יתמי רמו אלא האומר אם מת הוא לא תקברוהו מנכסיו אין שומעין לו לאו כל הימנו שיעשיר את בניו ויפיל עצמו על הציבור: מתני׳ לעולם היא ברשות האב עד שתכנס
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl. Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife. Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes. The Gemara comments: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to have intercourse with my wife unless I am in my clothes and she is in her clothes, he must divorce his wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. This is in keeping with the opinion of the tanna of the baraita that the Torah mandates the intimacy of flesh during sexual relations. § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman for his wife’s funeral. The Gemara infers: This proves by inference that the first, anonymous tanna cited in the mishna holds that these are not part of a husband’s obligations. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is the common custom in her family at funerals, what is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna who said that he does not have to do so? If he neglected to provide these items he would be treating her with disrespect. And if this is not the common custom in her family, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state their dispute in a case where it is the common custom for his family according to its social status, but it is not common for her family according to its social status. The first tanna holds: When we say that a woman who marries a man ascends with him, i.e., she must be treated as equal in status to her husband if his social status is higher than hers, and does not descend with him if he is from a lower social status, this applies only when they are alive, but after death the Sages did not enforce this rule. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Even after death she must be treated in accordance with his status, which means that if those in his family are mourned with flutes and lamenting women, he must provide the same for her funeral. Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Apropos this ruling, the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: With regard to one who became insane, the court enters his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, his sons, and his daughters, and it also gives something else, as will be explained. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife claims sustenance, the court descends to his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters and does not give something else. If a father is not obligated to sustain his children in his absence, what is different about a situation where he is mad? Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Is there no difference for you between a man who leaves his responsibilities knowingly and one who leaves them unknowingly? A father who lost his sanity did not do so by his own choice, and therefore it can be assumed that he would want to provide for his children from his possessions, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. By contrast, if he went overseas he freely decided to depart, and one would think that he would leave enough for his sons and daughters. If he failed to do so, he has demonstrated that he does not want to provide for them. The Gemara asks: What is this something else mentioned in the baraita? Rav Ḥisda said: This is a wife’s ornaments, to which she is entitled in addition to her sustenance. Rav Yosef said: It is money for charity. The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that the court does not pay for a woman’s ornaments from her husband’s property if he has gone overseas, all the more so he maintains that the husband’s property is not taken for charity. Conversely, the one who says that the court does not give money for charity holds that this applies only to charity, but it does give her ornaments, as it is assumed that it is not satisfactory for him that his wife be demeaned by a lack of jewelry. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife died, the court enters his property and buries her in accordance with his dignity. The Gemara asks: Does the court act in accordance with his dignity and not in accordance with her dignity? What if she came from a more dignified family than her husband? The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin meant: Even in accordance with his dignity, i.e., if his family was more distinguished than hers, he must bury her in accordance with the dignity of his family. The Gemara adds: This comes to teach us that she ascends with him to his social status and does not descend with him, and this principle applies even after her death, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna. Rav Mattana said: In the case of one who says that if his wife dies, they should not bury her using funds from his property, the court listens to him. The Gemara asks: What is different about the case when he says this command that induces the court to comply with his wishes? It is due to the fact that the property has come before the orphans as an inheritance, while the obligation to bury her is not incumbent upon them but is a duty of the inheritors of her marriage contract. However, even if he did not state the above preference, the property is cast before the orphans and it belongs to them. What does it matter whether or not the husband issued a command to this effect? Rather, the Gemara amends Rav Mattana’s statement: With regard to one who says that if he himself dies, they should not bury him using funds from his property, one does not listen to him, but the court spends his money without resorting to charity. The reason for this is that it is not in his power to enrich his sons by saving them this expense and to cast himself as a burden on the community. MISHNA: Even after she is betrothed, a daughter is always under her father’s authority until she enters
מבוסס על תלמוד בבלי מס' נדרים
בני אימה,
בני אנוסה,
בני שנואה,
בני נידוי,
בני תמורה,
בני מריבה,
בני שכרות,
בני גרושת הלב
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Derived from Talmud Bavli Nedarim 20b -conditions when not to be sexual:
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Iggeret HaKodesh (13th cen., attributed to Nachmanides)
Neither sexual organs nor sexual intercourse are obscene, for how could God create something that contains an obscenity? God created man and woman, and all their organs and functions, with nothing obscene in them. We believe that God created nothing containing either ugliness or obscenity.