על תיקון לאומי

whereas that robe atones for malicious speech spoken in public. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nadav asked Rabbi Ḥanina, and some say that it was Rabbi Shmuel bar Nadav, the son-in-law of Rabbi Ḥanina, who asked of Rabbi Ḥanina, and some say that he asked it of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: What is different and notable about a leper, that the Torah states: “He shall dwell alone; outside of the camp shall be his dwelling” (Leviticus 13:46)? He replied: By speaking malicious speech he separated between husband and wife and between one person and another; therefore he is punished with leprosy, and the Torah says: “He shall dwell alone; outside of the camp shall be his dwelling.” Rabbi Yehuda ben Levi says: What is different and notable about a leper that the Torah states that he is to bring two birds for his purification (Leviticus 14:4)? The Holy One, Blessed be He says: He acted by speaking malicious speech with an act of chatter; therefore the Torah says that he is to bring an offering of birds, who chirp and chatter all the time. § The Sages taught in a baraita: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall rebuke [hokhe’aḥ tokhiaḥ] your neighbor, and do not bear sin because of him” (Leviticus 19:17). Why does the verse specify “in your heart”? One might have thought that the verse means: Do not hit him, do not slap him, and do not ruin him due to hatred. Therefore the verse states “in your heart.” This teaches that the verse speaks of hatred in the heart. From where is it derived with regard to one who sees an unseemly matter in another that he is obligated to rebuke him? As it is stated: “You shall rebuke [hokhe’aḥ tokhiaḥ] your neighbor.” If one rebuked him for his action but he did not accept the rebuke, from where is it derived that he must rebuke him again? The verse states: “You shall rebuke [hokhe’aḥ tokhiaḥ],” and the double language indicates he must rebuke in any case. One might have thought that one should continue rebuking him even if his face changes due to humiliation. Therefore, the verse states: “Do not bear sin because of him”; the one giving rebuke may not sin by embarrassing the other person. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Tarfon says: I would be surprised if there is anyone in this generation who can receive rebuke. Why? Because if the one rebuking says to him: Remove the splinter from between your eyes, i.e., rid yourself of a minor infraction, the other says to him: Remove the beam from between your eyes, i.e., you have committed far more severe sins. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria says: I would be surprised if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke correctly, without embarrassing the person he is rebuking. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: I call the heavens and the earth as witnesses before me that Akiva was lashed, i.e., punished, many times on my account, as I would complain about him before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel the Great. And all the more so I thereby increased his love for me. This incident serves to affirm that which is stated: “Do not rebuke a scorner lest he hate you; rebuke a wise man and he will love you” (Proverbs 9:8). A wise man wants to improve himself and loves those who assist him in that task. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon, asked his father: If one is faced with the choice of rebuke for its own sake, or humility not for its own sake, which of them is preferable? His father said to him: Do you not concede that humility for its own sake is preferable? As the Master says: Humility is the greatest of all the positive attributes. If so, humility not for its own sake is also preferable, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A person should always engage in Torah and mitzvot even if not for their own sake, i.e., without the proper motivation but for ulterior motives, as through the performance of mitzvot not for their own sake, one will come in the end to do them for their own sake. The Gemara asks: What is considered rebuke for its own sake and humility not for its own sake? The Gemara answers: It is like this incident that occurred when Rav Huna and Ḥiyya bar Rav were sitting before Shmuel. Ḥiyya bar Rav said to Shmuel: See, Master, that Rav Huna is afflicting me. Rav Huna accepted upon himself that he would not afflict Ḥiyya bar Rav anymore. After Ḥiyya bar Rav left, Rav Huna said to Shmuel: Ḥiyya bar Rav did such-and-such to me, and therefore I was in the right to cause him distress. Shmuel said to him: Why did you not say this in his presence? Rav Huna said to him: Heaven forbid that the son of Rav should be humiliated because of me. This provides an example of rebuke for its own sake, as Rav Huna originally rebuked Ḥiyya bar Rav only when Shmuel was not present, and of humility not for its own sake, as Rav Huna did not forgive Ḥiyya bar Rav but simply did not wish to humiliate him. § The Gemara asks: Until where does the obligation of rebuke extend? Rav says: Until his rebuke is met by hitting, i.e., until the person being rebuked hits the person rebuking him.And Shmuel says: Until his rebuke is met by cursing, i.e., he curses the one rebuking him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until his rebuke is met by reprimand. The Gemara points out that this dispute between these amora’im is like a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Eliezer says: Until his rebuke is met by hitting; Rabbi Yehoshua says: Until his rebuke is met by cursing; ben Azzai says: Until his rebuke is met by reprimand. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: And all three of them expounded the same one verse, from which they derived their respective opinions. After Jonathan rebuked his father, Saul, for the way he treated David, the verse states: “Then Saul’s anger was kindled against Jonathan, and he said unto him: You son of perverse rebellion, do not I know that you have chosen the son of Yishai to your own shame, and to the shame of your mother’s nakedness” (I Samuel 20:30). And it is written: “And Saul cast his spear at him to smite him, whereby Jonathan knew that it had been determined by his father to put David to death” (I Samuel 20:33). According to the one who says: Until his rebuke is met by hitting, it is derived from that which is written: “To smite him.” And according to the one who says: Until his rebuke is met by cursing, it is derived from that which is written: “To the shame of your mother’s nakedness.” And according to the one who says: Until his rebuke is met by reprimand, it is derived from that which is written: “Then Saul’s anger was kindled.” The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says: Until his rebuke is met by reprimand, aren’t both hitting and cursing written in that verse? The Gemara answers: It is different there, as due to the special fondness that Jonathan had for David, he subjected himself to more abuse than is required by halakha. Apropos the topic of losing patience and hitting another, the Gemara asks: Until where does the requirement that a person should not change his place of lodging extend, i.e., how much must one suffer before he may move elsewhere? Rav says: Until the point of the host’s hitting him. And Shmuel says: Until the host packs up the guest’s clothes and places them on his back to throw him out. The Gemara comments: If it is a case where the host hits the guest himself, everyone agrees that the guest may move lodging. Similarly, if the host packs up the guest’s clothes and places them on his back, everyone also agrees that he may leave. When they disagree is in a case where the host hits his wife. One Sage, Rav, holds that since the host does not hurt the guest himself, what difference does it make to him? Therefore, he should not change his lodging on that account. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that if he continues to stay in that place he will come to fight with his host about this matter. And why is it so important that one should remain in the same lodging until he is forced to leave? It is as the Master says: A guest has the potential to degrade and to be degraded. If he moves from one place of lodging to another, people will assume that his host is unpleasant to him and that he is not a well-behaved guest, as the two of them cannot get along with one another, and the reputations of both of them will be tarnished. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: From where in the Torah is it derived that a person should not change his place of lodging? As it is stated when Abraham returned from Egypt: “And he went on his journeys from the South to Beth El, to the place where his tent had been at the beginning, between Beth El and Ai” (Genesis 13:3). Abraham took pains to revisit the same places he had stayed on his journey to Egypt. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina says: The source is from here, the beginning of the verse: “And he went on his journeys,” i.e., the same journeys he made on the way down to Egypt. What is the difference between these two explanations? The practical difference between them is with regard to a temporary lodging. According to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina, even one who is on a journey must return to stay in the same place where he originally lodged, whereas “his tent” indicates a measure of permanence. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is it derived that a person should not change from his craft and from the craft of his fathers? As it is stated: “And King Solomon sent and fetched Hiram out of Tyre. He was the son of a widow of the tribe of Naphtali, and his father was a man of Tyre, a worker in brass; and he was filled with wisdom and understanding and skill, to work all works in brass. And he came to King Solomon, and wrought all his work” (I Kings 7:13–14). And the Master says: Hiram’s mother was also from the house of Dan, as the verse states about him: “The son of a woman of the daughters of Dan” (II Chronicles 2:13). And it is written with regard to those who constructed the Tabernacle: “And with him was Oholiab, the son of Ahisamach, of the tribe of Dan, a craftsman, and a skillful workman, and a weaver in colors, in blue, and in purple, and in scarlet, and fine linen” (Exodus 38:23). This teaches that Hiram continued in the craft of brass work, the craft of his father’s family and also of his mother’s family from Dan. § The Gemara asks: Until where is the minimum limit of suffering? What is the least amount pain that is included in the definition of suffering? Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone for whom they wove a garment to wear and the garment does not suit him, i.e., it does not fit him exactly. Rava the Younger objects to this, and some say Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani objects: The Sages said an even greater statement than this, i.e., that even lesser inconvenience is still considered suffering: Even if people intended that they would dilute his wine with hot water, but they accidentally diluted it for him with cold water, it is considered suffering. Similarly, if he wanted it diluted with cold water, but they diluted it for him with hot water, this too is considered suffering. And you say all this, that it is considered suffering, only if the garment one ordered does not fit? Mar son of Ravina says: Even if one’s cloak turns around as he puts it on, so that he has to take it off and put it on again, this too is considered a form of suffering. Rava said, and some say it was Rav Ḥisda, and some say it was Rabbi Yitzḥak, and some say it was taught in a baraita: Even if one reached his hand into his pocket to take out three coins, but two coins came up in his hand, it is considered a form of suffering. The Gemara notes that it constitutes suffering specifically in a case where one reached into his pocket to take three coins, and two coins came up in his hand. But if he reached into his pocket to take two, and instead three coins came up in his hand, this is not considered to be suffering, as it is not an exertion to drop the extra coin back into his pocket. And why is it so important to know the least amount of suffering? As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a baraita: Anyone who passes forty days without suffering has received his World, i.e., his reward, and he will have no further reward in the World-to-Come. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say: