"חיים ומוות ביד הלשון" –נשים ידעניות מתקנות עולם

A widow is paid back [her kethubah] from the property of orphans only by taking an oath. [When the court] refrained from imposing an oath on her, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that she could take any vow which the orphans wanted and collect her kethubah. Witnesses sign their names on a get because of tikkun olam. Hillel instituted the prosbul because of tikkun olam.

Due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry, since this would ensure she would bring assets with her into a new marriage, the Sages were lenient with her, as the Sages issued several decrees in connection with the marriage contract in order to enable women to collect more easily. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not the case. § The mishna taught that the court refrained from administering an oath to her. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they refrained from administering oaths to widows? If we say that it is because of the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says, and some say that it was Rav Yehuda who says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a person during years of famine who deposited a gold dinar with a widow, and she placed the gold dinar in a jug of flour and unwittingly baked it in a loaf of bread along with the flour, and she gave the bread as charity to a poor man. After a period of time, the owner of the dinar came and said to her: Give me my dinar. She said to him: May poison benefit, i.e., take effect on, one of the children of that woman, i.e., my children, if I derived any benefit from your dinar. It was said: Not even a few days passed until one of her children died, and when the Sages heard of this matter, they said: If one who takes an oath truthfully is punished in this way for sin, one who takes an oath falsely, all the more so. The Gemara first clarifies the details of the incident: What is the reason that she was punished if she in fact did not derive any benefit from the dinar? The Gemara answers: Because she benefited [ishtarshi] from the place of the dinar, as the dinar took up space in the bread, enabling her to use less flour. Therefore, she did derive some small benefit from the dinar. The Gemara asks: If she in fact did derive benefit from the dinar, then what is meant by the statement: One who takes an oath truthfully? Wasn’t her oath actually false? The Gemara answers: It means that she was like one who took an oath truthfully, as her oath was truthful to the best of her knowledge. In any case, this woman was punished severely for a small mistake. The severity of taking a false oath, even inadvertently, is why the Sages ceased administering oaths to widows. The Gemara questions if this could be the reason for the ordinance: If they refrained from administering oaths due to this reason, then why would this be limited specifically to a widow? Even a divorcée should not be allowed to take an oath to collect her marriage contract as well. Why then does Rabbi Zeira say that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her? Why would this concern not apply in the case of a divorcée as well? The Gemara answers: A widow is different, as she continues to live in the house with the orphans and performs many services for them in the running of the home. Therefore, there is a concern that due to the benefit they receive from her as a result of the efforts she exerts for the orphans, she will rationalize and permit herself to take an oath that she had not collected any of her marriage contract, when in fact she had received a part of it. § Rav Yehuda said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court, as the oath that one takes in court is a severe oath, which involves the mentioning of God’s name and the holding of a sacred object. However, outside of court, where an oath is not taken in this manner, the judges administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow because she has not taken an oath, which indicates that he also would not administer an oath to her outside of the court. The Gemara answers: This is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav Yehuda. In the city of Sura they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this, as stated above. However, in the city of Neharde’a they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court; however, outside of court the judges administer an oath to her. And Rav says: Even outside of court as well, the judges do not administer an oath to her. The Gemara points out that according to this version of their statements, Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow in any case. The Gemara asks with regard to Rav’s practice: Let him administer a vow to the widow, instead of an oath, and collect the marriage contract in accordance with the mishna, which states that a widow can take a vow in place of the oath. The Gemara answers: In Rav’s time vows were treated lightly, and Rav was concerned that widows would not treat the prohibition created by the vow with appropriate severity. This would result in the orphans losing out on part of their inheritance, and the widows violating the prohibitions created by their vows. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rav Huna and attempted to collect payment of her marriage contract from the orphans. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow. The widow said to him: Isn’t the reason that I cannot collect payment only because of a concern that perhaps I already took some payment of my marriage contract? I swear as the Lord of Hosts lives that I did not derive any benefit from my marriage contract. Rav Huna says: Even though the court does not administer an oath to a widow, Rav concedes with regard to one who leaps and takes an oath of her own initiative that her oath is accepted, and she can collect payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rabba bar Rav Huna to collect payment of her marriage contract. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow, and my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow? She said to him: If I cannot collect payment of the marriage contract, then provide sustenance for me from my husband’s property, to support me until I remarry. He said to her: You also do not have any right to sustenance, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who demands payment of her marriage contract in court has no right to receive sustenance any longer. The husband committed to provide for her sustenance only as long as she does not wish to remarry. Generally, once a widow demands payment of her marriage contract, she demonstrates that she wishes now to remarry and is no longer entitled to receive sustenance from her deceased husband’s property. The widow became angry and said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: May his chair be overturned, i.e., he should fall from his position of power, as he ruled for me in accordance with the different opinions of two people. Since Rabba bar Rav Huna was concerned about her curse, he overturned his chair in order to fulfill the curse literally, and then stood it up, and even so, he was not saved from the weakness that resulted from her curse. With regard to this issue, the Gemara recounts: Rav Yehuda, the student of Shmuel, said to Rav Yirmeya Bira’a: If a widow comes to collect payment of her marriage contract, administer a vow in court and administer an oath outside of court, and let the report be received in my ears that you did so, as I desire to perform an action, i.e., to enable a widow to collect payment of her marriage contract, in contrast to the statements of Rav’s students, who hold that a widow cannot collect payment of her marriage contract. § The Gemara returns to the matter itself. The mishna taught that the court does not administer an oath to a widow in order to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Zeira says that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that if the court administered a vow to a divorcée and not an oath, then this is not sufficient to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract? But didn’t they send from there, from Eretz Yisrael, a document that states the following: How so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, received a bill of divorce from the hand of Aḥa bar Hidya, who is called Ayya Mari, and she took a vow and prohibited the produce of the world to herself, based on the truth of her statement that she did not receive from her marriage contract anything other than one coat [gelofkera], and one book of Psalms, and a book of Job, and a book of Proverbs, all of which were worn out.

Due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry, since this would ensure she would bring assets with her into a new marriage, the Sages were lenient with her, as the Sages issued several decrees in connection with the marriage contract in order to enable women to collect more easily. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not the case. § The mishna taught that the court refrained from administering an oath to her. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they refrained from administering oaths to widows? If we say that it is because of the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says, and some say that it was Rav Yehuda who says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a person during years of famine who deposited a gold dinar with a widow, and she placed the gold dinar in a jug of flour and unwittingly baked it in a loaf of bread along with the flour, and she gave the bread as charity to a poor man. After a period of time, the owner of the dinar came and said to her: Give me my dinar. She said to him: May poison benefit, i.e., take effect on, one of the children of that woman, i.e., my children, if I derived any benefit from your dinar. It was said: Not even a few days passed until one of her children died, and when the Sages heard of this matter, they said: If one who takes an oath truthfully is punished in this way for sin, one who takes an oath falsely, all the more so. The Gemara first clarifies the details of the incident: What is the reason that she was punished if she in fact did not derive any benefit from the dinar? The Gemara answers: Because she benefited [ishtarshi] from the place of the dinar, as the dinar took up space in the bread, enabling her to use less flour. Therefore, she did derive some small benefit from the dinar. The Gemara asks: If she in fact did derive benefit from the dinar, then what is meant by the statement: One who takes an oath truthfully? Wasn’t her oath actually false? The Gemara answers: It means that she was like one who took an oath truthfully, as her oath was truthful to the best of her knowledge. In any case, this woman was punished severely for a small mistake. The severity of taking a false oath, even inadvertently, is why the Sages ceased administering oaths to widows. The Gemara questions if this could be the reason for the ordinance: If they refrained from administering oaths due to this reason, then why would this be limited specifically to a widow? Even a divorcée should not be allowed to take an oath to collect her marriage contract as well. Why then does Rabbi Zeira say that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her? Why would this concern not apply in the case of a divorcée as well? The Gemara answers: A widow is different, as she continues to live in the house with the orphans and performs many services for them in the running of the home. Therefore, there is a concern that due to the benefit they receive from her as a result of the efforts she exerts for the orphans, she will rationalize and permit herself to take an oath that she had not collected any of her marriage contract, when in fact she had received a part of it. § Rav Yehuda said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court, as the oath that one takes in court is a severe oath, which involves the mentioning of God’s name and the holding of a sacred object. However, outside of court, where an oath is not taken in this manner, the judges administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow because she has not taken an oath, which indicates that he also would not administer an oath to her outside of the court. The Gemara answers: This is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav Yehuda. In the city of Sura they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this, as stated above. However, in the city of Neharde’a they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court; however, outside of court the judges administer an oath to her. And Rav says: Even outside of court as well, the judges do not administer an oath to her. The Gemara points out that according to this version of their statements, Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow in any case. The Gemara asks with regard to Rav’s practice: Let him administer a vow to the widow, instead of an oath, and collect the marriage contract in accordance with the mishna, which states that a widow can take a vow in place of the oath. The Gemara answers: In Rav’s time vows were treated lightly, and Rav was concerned that widows would not treat the prohibition created by the vow with appropriate severity. This would result in the orphans losing out on part of their inheritance, and the widows violating the prohibitions created by their vows. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rav Huna and attempted to collect payment of her marriage contract from the orphans. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow. The widow said to him: Isn’t the reason that I cannot collect payment only because of a concern that perhaps I already took some payment of my marriage contract? I swear as the Lord of Hosts lives that I did not derive any benefit from my marriage contract. Rav Huna says: Even though the court does not administer an oath to a widow, Rav concedes with regard to one who leaps and takes an oath of her own initiative that her oath is accepted, and she can collect payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rabba bar Rav Huna to collect payment of her marriage contract. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow, and my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow? She said to him: If I cannot collect payment of the marriage contract, then provide sustenance for me from my husband’s property, to support me until I remarry. He said to her: You also do not have any right to sustenance, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who demands payment of her marriage contract in court has no right to receive sustenance any longer. The husband committed to provide for her sustenance only as long as she does not wish to remarry. Generally, once a widow demands payment of her marriage contract, she demonstrates that she wishes now to remarry and is no longer entitled to receive sustenance from her deceased husband’s property. The widow became angry and said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: May his chair be overturned, i.e., he should fall from his position of power, as he ruled for me in accordance with the different opinions of two people. Since Rabba bar Rav Huna was concerned about her curse, he overturned his chair in order to fulfill the curse literally, and then stood it up, and even so, he was not saved from the weakness that resulted from her curse. With regard to this issue, the Gemara recounts: Rav Yehuda, the student of Shmuel, said to Rav Yirmeya Bira’a: If a widow comes to collect payment of her marriage contract, administer a vow in court and administer an oath outside of court, and let the report be received in my ears that you did so, as I desire to perform an action, i.e., to enable a widow to collect payment of her marriage contract, in contrast to the statements of Rav’s students, who hold that a widow cannot collect payment of her marriage contract. § The Gemara returns to the matter itself. The mishna taught that the court does not administer an oath to a widow in order to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Zeira says that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that if the court administered a vow to a divorcée and not an oath, then this is not sufficient to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract? But didn’t they send from there, from Eretz Yisrael, a document that states the following: How so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, received a bill of divorce from the hand of Aḥa bar Hidya, who is called Ayya Mari, and she took a vow and prohibited the produce of the world to herself, based on the truth of her statement that she did not receive from her marriage contract anything other than one coat [gelofkera], and one book of Psalms, and a book of Job, and a book of Proverbs, all of which were worn out.

Due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry, since this would ensure she would bring assets with her into a new marriage, the Sages were lenient with her, as the Sages issued several decrees in connection with the marriage contract in order to enable women to collect more easily. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not the case. § The mishna taught that the court refrained from administering an oath to her. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they refrained from administering oaths to widows? If we say that it is because of the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says, and some say that it was Rav Yehuda who says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a person during years of famine who deposited a gold dinar with a widow, and she placed the gold dinar in a jug of flour and unwittingly baked it in a loaf of bread along with the flour, and she gave the bread as charity to a poor man. After a period of time, the owner of the dinar came and said to her: Give me my dinar. She said to him: May poison benefit, i.e., take effect on, one of the children of that woman, i.e., my children, if I derived any benefit from your dinar. It was said: Not even a few days passed until one of her children died, and when the Sages heard of this matter, they said: If one who takes an oath truthfully is punished in this way for sin, one who takes an oath falsely, all the more so. The Gemara first clarifies the details of the incident: What is the reason that she was punished if she in fact did not derive any benefit from the dinar? The Gemara answers: Because she benefited [ishtarshi] from the place of the dinar, as the dinar took up space in the bread, enabling her to use less flour. Therefore, she did derive some small benefit from the dinar. The Gemara asks: If she in fact did derive benefit from the dinar, then what is meant by the statement: One who takes an oath truthfully? Wasn’t her oath actually false? The Gemara answers: It means that she was like one who took an oath truthfully, as her oath was truthful to the best of her knowledge. In any case, this woman was punished severely for a small mistake. The severity of taking a false oath, even inadvertently, is why the Sages ceased administering oaths to widows. The Gemara questions if this could be the reason for the ordinance: If they refrained from administering oaths due to this reason, then why would this be limited specifically to a widow? Even a divorcée should not be allowed to take an oath to collect her marriage contract as well. Why then does Rabbi Zeira say that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her? Why would this concern not apply in the case of a divorcée as well? The Gemara answers: A widow is different, as she continues to live in the house with the orphans and performs many services for them in the running of the home. Therefore, there is a concern that due to the benefit they receive from her as a result of the efforts she exerts for the orphans, she will rationalize and permit herself to take an oath that she had not collected any of her marriage contract, when in fact she had received a part of it. § Rav Yehuda said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court, as the oath that one takes in court is a severe oath, which involves the mentioning of God’s name and the holding of a sacred object. However, outside of court, where an oath is not taken in this manner, the judges administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow because she has not taken an oath, which indicates that he also would not administer an oath to her outside of the court. The Gemara answers: This is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav Yehuda. In the city of Sura they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this, as stated above. However, in the city of Neharde’a they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court; however, outside of court the judges administer an oath to her. And Rav says: Even outside of court as well, the judges do not administer an oath to her. The Gemara points out that according to this version of their statements, Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow in any case. The Gemara asks with regard to Rav’s practice: Let him administer a vow to the widow, instead of an oath, and collect the marriage contract in accordance with the mishna, which states that a widow can take a vow in place of the oath. The Gemara answers: In Rav’s time vows were treated lightly, and Rav was concerned that widows would not treat the prohibition created by the vow with appropriate severity. This would result in the orphans losing out on part of their inheritance, and the widows violating the prohibitions created by their vows. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rav Huna and attempted to collect payment of her marriage contract from the orphans. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow. The widow said to him: Isn’t the reason that I cannot collect payment only because of a concern that perhaps I already took some payment of my marriage contract? I swear as the Lord of Hosts lives that I did not derive any benefit from my marriage contract. Rav Huna says: Even though the court does not administer an oath to a widow, Rav concedes with regard to one who leaps and takes an oath of her own initiative that her oath is accepted, and she can collect payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rabba bar Rav Huna to collect payment of her marriage contract. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow, and my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow? She said to him: If I cannot collect payment of the marriage contract, then provide sustenance for me from my husband’s property, to support me until I remarry. He said to her: You also do not have any right to sustenance, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who demands payment of her marriage contract in court has no right to receive sustenance any longer. The husband committed to provide for her sustenance only as long as she does not wish to remarry. Generally, once a widow demands payment of her marriage contract, she demonstrates that she wishes now to remarry and is no longer entitled to receive sustenance from her deceased husband’s property. The widow became angry and said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: May his chair be overturned, i.e., he should fall from his position of power, as he ruled for me in accordance with the different opinions of two people. Since Rabba bar Rav Huna was concerned about her curse, he overturned his chair in order to fulfill the curse literally, and then stood it up, and even so, he was not saved from the weakness that resulted from her curse. With regard to this issue, the Gemara recounts: Rav Yehuda, the student of Shmuel, said to Rav Yirmeya Bira’a: If a widow comes to collect payment of her marriage contract, administer a vow in court and administer an oath outside of court, and let the report be received in my ears that you did so, as I desire to perform an action, i.e., to enable a widow to collect payment of her marriage contract, in contrast to the statements of Rav’s students, who hold that a widow cannot collect payment of her marriage contract. § The Gemara returns to the matter itself. The mishna taught that the court does not administer an oath to a widow in order to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Zeira says that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that if the court administered a vow to a divorcée and not an oath, then this is not sufficient to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract? But didn’t they send from there, from Eretz Yisrael, a document that states the following: How so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, received a bill of divorce from the hand of Aḥa bar Hidya, who is called Ayya Mari, and she took a vow and prohibited the produce of the world to herself, based on the truth of her statement that she did not receive from her marriage contract anything other than one coat [gelofkera], and one book of Psalms, and a book of Job, and a book of Proverbs, all of which were worn out.

If a woman says, “I was married and I am divorced”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says, “I am divorced”, she is not believed. If she says, “I was taken captive but I have remained clean”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive and she says, “I have remained clean” she is not believed. But if the witnesses came after she had married, she shall not go out. Two women were taken captive: one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”, and the other one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”-- they are not believed. But when they testify regarding one another, they are believed.

the witnesses who testified that he is unfit and the judges who testified that he is fit are two witnesses and two witnesses who contradict them, and in that case, the allegation of theft is not completely eliminated. If it was a challenge based on an allegation of flawed lineage, e.g., he is a Canaanite slave and therefore unfit to serve as a judge, that is a mere revealing of a matter that will ultimately be revealed in any case and does not require actual testimony. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest preventing the judges from asserting his fitness after they signed. The Gemara concludes: Actually, I will say to you that it was a challenge based on an allegation of theft, and these judges say: We know about him that he repented and is now fit to serve as a judge. In that case, their testimony does not contradict the original testimony that he was guilty of theft. § Rabbi Zeira said: This matter, I heard from Rabbi Abba, and if it was not for Rabbi Abba of Akko, I would have forgotten it. With regard to a case of three judges who convened as a tribunal to ratify a document, and one of them died before signing the ratification, the surviving judges must emend the standard formula of the ratification and write: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer alive. In that way it is clear that although only two judges signed, the document was ratified by three judges. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And if the judges wrote in the ratification: This document was produced before us, the court; they no longer need to add that they were three judges, as, when unmodified, the term court connotes a tribunal of three judges. The Gemara asks: And perhaps it was an impudent court, and that is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; however, because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court be comprised of three judges, they are called an impudent court. Therefore, writing: Before us, the court, does not rule out the possibility that the document was ratified by fewer than three judges. The Gemara answers: It is clear that the document was ratified by the requisite three judges, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, which presumably conforms to rabbinic protocol. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the Rabbis of the court of Rav Ashi hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel and they convened an impudent court, whose ruling is binding. The Gemara answers: It is clear, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, and our teacher Rav Ashi said to us how to ratify the document. MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband. GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man [la’ish hazeh] as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off “to the man [la’ish]” without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says “this [hazeh],” thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to derive this from the verse? It is based on logic: He rendered her forbidden and he rendered her permitted. Rather, where this verse is necessary, is in order to derive the halakha that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: From where in the Torah is it derived that a father is deemed credible to render his daughter forbidden? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to the man [la’ish]” (Deuteronomy 22:16). The Gemara asks: Why do I need the subsequent term “this [hazeh]”? The Gemara explains: The verse is necessary to derive the halakha that Rabbi Yona taught; as Rabbi Yona taught in a baraita that in the verse: “I gave my daughter to this man,” written in the context of a husband slandering his wife, “this” is written to infer: The halakhot in this passage apply to a man who slanders his wife and not to the yavam, in the case of levirate marriage. § The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn’t she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible. And there was also an incident involving an important woman who was outstanding in beauty, and many men were clamoring to betroth her. And she said to them: I am already betrothed. Sometime later she arose and betrothed herself to a man. The Sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do so? She said to them: Initially, when unscrupulous people approached me seeking to marry me, I said: I am betrothed. Now that scrupulous people approached me, I arose and betrothed myself to one of them. And the Gemara notes: This halakha was raised by Rav Aḥa Sar HaBira before the Sages in Usha, the seat of the Sanhedrin, and the Sages said: If she provided a rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible. Shmuel raised a dilemma before Rav: If a woman said to her husband: I am ritually impure as I am menstruating, and then said: I am pure, what is the halakha? Is she permitted based on her latter statement, or did she render herself an entity of prohibition with her first statement and therefore remains forbidden? Rav said to him: Even in that case, if she provided a