Three sources in the Torah that a proxy can act in place of his/her sender
§ The mishna states that an agent has the power to effect betrothal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is halakhic agency? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to one who divorces his wife: “That he writes her a bill of divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her [veshilleḥah] out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The verse employs the verb: And he sends [veshillaḥ]. The fact that the verse employs the term veshillaḥ, as opposed to another verb denoting divorce, vegereshah, teaches that he can appoint an agent [shaliaḥ], as both words share the root shin, lamed, ḥet. The husband does not have to personally give his wife the bill of divorce.
Does proxy work for all obligations?
-SA
א"כ לכל דבר מצוה יועיל השליח אמר אדם לחבירו שב בסוכה בעבורי הנח תפילין בעבורי. ולאו מילתא היא שהמצוה שחייבו המקום לעשות בגופו האיך יפטר הוא על ידי שלוחו והוא לא יעשה כלום בודאי בגירושין ובקדושין מהני כי הוא המגרש ולא השליח שמה כתב בגט אלא פלוני פטרית פלונית וכן נמי האשה למי היא מקודשת כי אם לו והאי אשתו וכן בתרומה הוא נותן התרומה מפירותיו וכן בפסח הוא אוכלו ועל שמו ישחט ויזרק הדם אבל בסוכה הכי נמי יכול לומר לשליחו עשה לי סוכה והוא יושב בה אבל אם ישב בה חבירו לא קיים הוא כלום וכן לולב וציצית וכל המצות.
... There are those that ask; why can't one nominate a proxy to sit in the Sukkah for him, put on Teffilin etc. The answer is that proxy cannot work for those obligations that are incumbent on your physical person, thus sitting in a Sukkah, wearing Teffilin what matters is your physical presence in the Sukkah, your body wearing Teffilin, not the act of donning or sitting.
Can a proxy sin for you?
§ The Gemara returns to discuss various aspects of agency. And there is a difficulty from that which we learned in a Mishna (Bava Kamma 59b): In the case of one who sends an item that causes a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, a mentally incapicitated person, or a minor, the one who sent it is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. If he sent it in the hands of a halakhically competent person, only the halakhically competent person is liable.
But why is the halakhically competent person liable? Let us say that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself. The Gemara answers: There it is different, as there is no agency for transgression, as we say: When there is a conflict between the words of the Master, i.e., God, and the words of the student, i.e., a human being, whose words should be listened to?
What does this mean? Why would this disqualify the proxy from acting in his stead? What if the proxy was unaware of the illegality of the action? What if the proxy is a halacha denier, and simply doesn't care? Is the proxy valid? (SA)
Since when there is a conflict between the words of the master and the words of the student, who should one listen to?! And the sender can say " I thought that he would ignore me?" However in the instance where the proxy would not transgress, this reasoning does not apply.
Remark: This Semah is very important, keep it mind until after you cover the Talmud in Baba Metizah, where his final statement will become clear.
What would the Smah think about the questions we asked above?
גמרא ... והנלע"ד דהא דאמרינן דאין שליח לד"ע משום דדברי הרב ודברי התלמיד כו' לאו מסברא אמרינן הכי ומטעמא דסבור שלא ישמע דהא בפרק הכונס כתבו התוספות דבשוכר שליח לא שייך האי סברא וכבר העליתי שם בחידושי דבסתם שליחות נמי לא שייך האי טעמא אלא דוקא באומר דרך הסתה דומיא דמסית ע"ש .... והטעם נראה דכיון דלא ילפינן שליחות בכל התורה אלא מגירושין ותרומה וקדשים לית לן לרבויי אלא דומיא דהנך דלית בהו עבירה משא"כ היכא דאיכא צד עבירה לא הוי דומיא דהנך ולא אמרה תורה שלח לתקלה כיון דלקושטא דמילתא אין לשליח לשמוע דברי התלמיד אלא דברי הרב וה"ל האי מילתא דדברי הרב כמו פירכא על מה הצד דילפינן מתרומה וגירושין.
My opinion is as follows: the fact that the institution of proxy does not exist when doing a sin, is not a logical flaw in Shlichos. The reason "I thought he wouldn't do it" does not apply in the event he was hired to do this (see Tosfos in HaKones) and I have shown this reason does apply in the standard case of Shlichos as well... Rather the reason why there is no Shliach le'dvar Averiah is due to how the entire concept of proxy was derived from the Torah. The only sources for Shlichos in the Torah are found by marriage, divorce, Terumah, and sacrifices, thus we only have the right (vis a vis the laws of Dershos -SA) to extend it to those areas that are similar to these three.
Thus we have no source for a proxy for the sake of a sinful act. Yet you may ask, why should it be different? The Talmud answers "The words of the Master.." This is merely a reason to say that Shlichos was not extended to these types of activities, but as far as we are concerned, shiliach le'dvar avierah does not exist because there is no source for it. (This is a paraphrasing of the Pinei Yehoshua -SA)
According to the reasoning of the Penei Yehoshua, what should be the halacha in the above cases? Should intent matter? Should knowledge matter? -SA
אמאי מעל נימא אין שליח לדבר עבירה - תימה הא ע"כ מיירי בשוגג דאי במזיד ליכא מעילה דאין מעילה במזיד א"כ יש שליח לדבר עבירה דלא שייך למימר דברי הרב ודברי תלמיד דברי מי שומעים כיון שהוא שוגג דהכי נמי משמע בפ' מרובה (ב"ק דף עט:) דקאמר הרי שגנב טלה מן העדר ואמר לכהן טול טלה זה שהוא שלי או נתנו לכהן לבכורות בנו והראה לו בטלה של חבירו ומסיק דמיד שהוציאו הכהן מרשות בעלים נתחייב הגנב במשיכת הכהן והקשה ר"י התם אמאי חייב הגנב נימא אין שליח לדבר עבירה ותירץ כיון שאין הכהן יודע שהוא בא מגניבה לא שייך למימר דברי מי שומעין ואומר ר"י דהכא מיירי אפי' דנזכר השליח קאמר דמעל בעל הבית והשתא פריך אמאי מעל נימא אין שליח לדבר עבירה דדברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ואע"ג דנזכר השליח מעל בעל הבית כדמוכח במעילה (דף כא.) דתני נזכר בעל הבית ולא נזכר שליח השליח מעל נזכרו שניהם חנוני מעל והטעם לפי דמעילה אינו אלא בשוגג כדפרישית לפיכך מעל אותו שלא נזכר ואותו שנזכר מזיד הוא מ"מ דוקא אם נזכרו שניהם הא אם נזכר השליח לבד בעל הבית מעל:
(This is a paraphrasing of the bold text. SA)
Why does he transgress Meilah if this would imply that he is a proxy for a sinful act? Question: since liability for Meilah can only exist if the agent transgressed it accidentally, how the reasoning of the words of the master apply here? He was unaware? ... Answer: the case was that the proxy was acting intentionally, but the sender was still unaware, thus the agent is bound by the words of the master.
Based on Tosfos's issue with Meilah being done accidentally, meaning that one can not bring any proof from an accidental transgression to the general question of Ayn Shliach Ledvar Averiah, does he seem to agree with the Semah or the Penei Yehoshua? This is important to think about, as will become clear later.
-SA
How does the Gemara understand the issue of Ayn Shliach Le Dvar Averiah in this step? Does the approach of the Semah or Penei Yehoshua work? If not, can you think of any other approach?
-SA
How would you explain the disagreement between Reb Samah and Ravina? How would the Semah and Penei Yehoshua understand it?
-SA
דאמר לישראל קדש לי אשה גרושה - וא"ת ואפי' אמר לכהן נמי וי"ל דכהן מקרי בר חיובא הואיל ואם מקדשה לעצמו חייב.
Question: Why does the case of a Cohen marrying a divorcee, require that a Yisroel is a proxy? A Cohen does not transgress anything by acting as a proxy for another person? (A Cohen can act as a proxy for a Yisroel marrying a divorcee -SA).
Answer: A Cohen is called a Bar Chiyuva (subject to the liability) due to the fact that he has this same prohibition as well, even though in this moment and through this action he is not transgressing it.
Now we are up the creek. According to Tosfos, a Cohen cannot serve as a proxy for his fellow Cohen to marry a divorcee even though the proxy does not transgress anything by doing this. According to the Semah, why should it make a difference if this proxy can transgress this prohibition in a different setting? All we should care about is if he has any reason not to listen to the sender, meaning, is he violating anything right now! According to the Penei Yehoshua life is not any better; if the Torah never created the institution of proxy for acts of sin, all we should worry about is the sender; is he trying to use the power of proxy to transgress a sin? If so, it does not work; why should we care about the sins of the proxy?
Here we see a fascinating idea. What is Shlichos? We have shown earlier that Shlichos works even in the instance where a woman asks a man to accept a marriage offer on her behalf. Yet, a man cannot make the מעשה קידושין, the halachic act of marriage that a woman needs, he does not have this capacity. All he can do is the physical act, the עשייה, and relate that back to the woman, and since she has the necessary capacities, this gives the act halachic power, rendering her married.
However, generally speaking, if this עשייה, this action can be elevated into the status of מעשה, meaning all the necessary requirement are in place, one can not separate the two, and consequently, the proxy relates back to the sender the entire מעשה.
Thus, according to the Penei Yehoshua, this that the Torah never created the institution of proxy with regard to acts of sin, this is only relevant when you are trying to relate back to the sender a מעשה, since that is what has any legal import, otherwise, if you are only relating back to the sender the עשייה then there should be no problem. Meaning, when the proxy needs to relate back an act of sin, that he cannot do, and thus nothing happens. However, if for this proxy, the requirements are not met to elevate this into an act of sin (e.g. a Yisroel does not have the capacity to do the sinful act of marrying a divorcee since he was never included in this prohibition) he cannot elevate this into a מעשה עבירה, and all he can relate back to the sender is the physical action, and this is not excluded from Shlichos.
Thus, when the proxy is not a Bar Chiyuva all he can relate back to the sender is the action, and since for the sender such an action can be transformed into a מעשה עבירה, he is liable for it.
Now Tosfos puts us in a very difficult situation. If we understand like the Semah, why should the fact that a Cohen has a prohibition to marry a divorcee in any way discourage him from acting as a proxy for another Cohen? And according to the Penei Yehoshua, if the Torah never created the possibility of a proxy for sin, why should it make a difference if the proxy would transgress as well, all that we should care about should be the sender.
-SA
Now how about murder?
והא דתני האומר לשלוחו צא הרוג את הנפש הוא חייב ושולחיו פטור שמאי הזקן אומר משום חגי הנביא שולחיו חייב שנא' (שמואל ב יב, ט) אותו הרגת בחרב בני עמון
The Gemara questions the statement that there is no agency for transgressions: But there is that which is taught in a baraita: One who says to his agent: Go kill a person, he, the killer, is liable if he kills, and the one who appointed him is exempt. Shammai the Elder says in the name of Haggai the prophet: The one who appointed him is liable, as it stated with regard to David, who directed Joab to kill Uriah: “Him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon” (II Samuel 12:9). David was held responsible for the death of Uriah.