MISHNA: With regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: He may maintain this situation for up to two weeks, but beyond that he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: He must divorce her if it continues beyond one week. Apropos the husband’s obligation to his wife regarding marital relations, the Gemara mentions other aspects of this issue: Students may leave their homes and travel in order to learn Torah without their wives’ permission for up to thirty days, and laborers may leave their homes without their wives’ permission for up to one week. The set interval defining the frequency of a husband’s conjugal obligation to his wife stated in the Torah (see Exodus 21:10), unless the couple stipulated otherwise, varies according to the man’s occupation and proximity to his home: Men of leisure, who do not work, must engage in marital relations every day, laborers must do so twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once every thirty days, and sailors once every six months. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Beit Shammai say a husband may force abstinence on his wife by a vow for a period of up to two weeks without being compelled to divorce her? They derive this from the halakha that a woman who gave birth to a female is ritually impure and prohibited from engaging in conjugal relations with her husband for two weeks after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:5). From this they derive that a period of up to two weeks of abstinence is not deemed undue suffering. And from where do Beit Hillel derive their opinion? They derive it from a woman who gave birth to a male, as she is ritually impure for one week (see Leviticus 12:1–4). The Gemara asks: And if this is so, Beit Hillel should also derive the halakha from a woman who gave birth to a female, since it is clear that the Torah does at times mandate a period of abstinence longer than one week. The Gemara answers: If they derived it from a woman who gave birth, this is indeed how they would have derived it. Rather, Beit Hillel derived it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, who is prohibited from marital relations for seven days according to Torah law. The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that one should derive a common matter from a common matter. Consequently, they derive the halakha of a permitted abstinence by a husband who vowed not to engage in marital relations with his wife from the halakha of a menstruating woman, since both are common cases. And one Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that one should derive a matter that one caused, such as a vow, from a different matter that he caused, i.e., childbirth, and not from menstruation, which was not caused by him at all. Rav said: The dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai concerns one who specifies the given period of time in his vow, but if he vowed not to engage in marital relations with her for an unspecified period of time, all agree that he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. The reason is that since he did not indicate how long he intended to keep the vow, her suffering begins immediately. And Shmuel said: Even with regard to an unspecified vow he should also wait for the same period of time, as perhaps he will find an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow and then he will not need to divorce her. The Gemara asks: Didn’t they disagree about this issue once already? As we learned in a mishna (70a): In the case of one who vows that his wife is prohibited from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than that amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Rav said there: They taught this only with regard to a case where he specifies a limited time during which the vow would be in effect, but if he vows without specification, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even when he vowed without specification, he should also wait, as perhaps he will discover an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases, as if it were stated only with regard to this case, of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might think that in this case Rav says he must divorce her because there is no possibility of appointing a trustee, but that with regard to that halakha, in the case when he vows not to provide sustenance, which can be provided by a trustee, one would say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he should wait. Conversely, if the dispute was stated with regard to that case, where a trustee can be appointed, one might think that in that case Shmuel said to wait, but in this case of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Therefore, it is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases. § The mishna said that students may leave their homes and travel for up to thirty days in order to learn Torah, without their wives’ permission. The Gemara asks: If they went with permission, for how long can they go? The Gemara expresses wonderment at this question: If they went with the permission of their wives, they can go for as long as they want. If the husband and wife agree on this, why is there any reason for the court to intervene?