הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, לֹא עָלֶיךָ הַמְּלָאכָה לִגְמוֹר, וְלֹא אַתָּה בֶן חוֹרִין לִבָּטֵל מִמֶּנָּה.
[Rabbi Tarfon] used to say: It is not your responsibility to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.
1. What does Rabbi Tarfon suggest is the limit of of our responsibility?
2. What do you think the work is that Rabbi Tarfon is referring to?
כל מי שאפשר למחות לאנשי ביתו ולא מיחה נתפס על אנשי ביתו באנשי עירו נתפס על אנשי עירו בכל העולם כולו נתפס על כל העולם כולו
Whoever can prevent their household from committing a sin but does not, is responsible for the sins of their household; if they can prevent the people of their city, they are responsible for the sins of their city; if the whole world, they are responsible for the sins of the whole world.
1. Do you identify with this text's understanding of communal responsibility and collective guilt?
2. How does this text differ from Rabbi Tarfon with regard to our obligations to act?
3. Is there a difference between our responsibility for the work(Rabbi Tarfon) and for protesting (this section of Talmud)? Can you combine these two messages?
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement (1973)
"The more deeply immersed I became in the thinking of the prophets, the more powerfully it became clear to me what the lives of the prophets sought to convey: That morally speaking there is no limit to the concern one must feel for the suffering of human beings.
It also became clear to me that in regard to cruelties committed in the name of a free society, some are guilty, while all are responsible.
I did not feel guilty as an individual American for the bloodshed in Vietnam, but I felt deeply responsible.
"You shall not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor (Leviticus 19:16). This is not a recommendation but an imperative, a supreme commandment.
And so I decided to change my mode of living and to become active in the cause of peace in Vietnam.
How does Heschel's teaching about guilt vs. responsibility connect with texts 1 and 2?
(יד) כָּל הַיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל וְלֹא הִצִּיל עוֹבֵר עַל (ויקרא יט-טז) "לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ". וְכֵן הָרוֹאֶה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ טוֹבֵעַ בַּיָּם. אוֹ לִסְטִים בָּאִים עָלָיו. אוֹ חַיָּה רָעָה בָּאָה עָלָיו. וְיָכוֹל לְהַצִּילוֹ הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ. אוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׂכֹּר אֲחֵרִים לְהַצִּילוֹ וְלֹא הִצִּיל. אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים אוֹ מוֹסְרִים מְחַשְּׁבִים עָלָיו רָעָה אוֹ טוֹמְנִין לוֹ פַּח וְלֹא גִּלָּה אֹזֶן חֲבֵרוֹ וְהוֹדִיעוֹ. אוֹ שֶׁיָּדַע בְּעַכּוּ''ם אוֹ בְּאוֹנֵס שֶׁהוּא בָּא עַל חֲבֵרוֹ וְיָכוֹל לְפַיְּסוֹ בִּגְלַל חֲבֵרוֹ לְהָסִיר מַה שֶּׁבְּלִבּוֹ וְלֹא פִּיְּסוֹ. וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בִּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ. הָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָם עוֹבֵר עַל לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ:
Whenever a person can save another person’s life but fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:16 states: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor.” The same is true when a person sees a colleague drowning at sea or being attacked by robbers or a wild animal, and he can save him himself or can hire others to save him and does not. Similarly, [it applies] when he hears [others] conspiring to harm a colleague or planning a snare for him, and he does not inform him and notify him [of the danger]. And similarly this is true if he knows of others scheming to harm a friend and can appease the conspirator and prevent him from carrying out the plot and does not, and all things in this vein, the one who does these things transgresses the commandment of "Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor."
Leviticus 19:16 commands us to directly save lives when we can. What else falls into that category, according to Maimonides?
(שמות כב, כד) אם כסף תלוה את עמי את העני עמך עמי ונכרי עמי קודם עני ועשיר עני קודם ענייך ועניי עירך ענייך קודמין עניי עירך ועניי עיר אחרת עניי עירך קודמין
(Exodus 22:24) "If you lend money to any of My people who are poor with you"... [R. Joseph intepreted this to mean that if the choice lies between] My people and strangers, my people have precedence; a poor person and a rich one, the poor have precedence. Your [family's] poor and the poor of your city, your poor have precedence; the poor of your city and the poor of another city, the poor of your city have precedence.
What about this text do you think is wise? What about it is troubling?
ת"ר: מפרנסים עניי נכרים עם עניי ישראל ומבקרין חולי נכרים עם חולי ישראל וקוברין מתי נכרים עם מתי ישראל מפני דרכי שלום:
Our Rabbis taught: We sustain the non-Jewish poor with the Jewish poor, visit the non-Jewish sick with the Jewish sick, and bury the non-Jewish dead with the Jewish dead, for the sake of peace.
- What might "for the sake of peace" mean?
- How does this text interact with the previous text?
ARUCH HASHULCHAN, YOREH DE'AH 251:4
Now there is something fundamental about the details of the laws above that troubles me deeply. For if we explain the texts that I have cited according to their simple meaning – that certain groups are prior to others – they imply that [one may distribute the entirety of one’s tzedakah money to one group within the established hierarchy] and need not give at all to those who fall outside of that particular group . . .And if this is the case, poor people without wealthy relatives will die of starvation. Now how is it possible to say this?! Therefore, in my humble opinion, the explanation of [tzedakah priorities] is as follows: Certainly every person, whether of modest or significant means, is obligated to give a portion of his [or her] tzedakah money to needy people who are not relatives. . . . And in places where there are no wealthy residents, should people be left to starve? How is it possible to say this? Nor do people act this way.
- What does the author of this text claim “troubles [him] deeply” about the positions he cites? What does he propose as an alternate reading of the law?
- How does this text resolve the tensions between the first two texts? What problems or questions remain?
RABBI JONATHAN SACKS, "THE DIGNITY OF DIFFERENCE", p. 30
we move outward from the members of our family to our neighbors, our society and the world. Traditionally, our sense of involvement with the fate of others has been in inverse proportion to the distance separating us and them. What has changed is that television and the Internet have effectively abolished distance. They have brought images of suffering in far-off lands into our immediate experience. Our sense of compassion for the victims of poverty, war and famine, runs ahead of our capacity to act. Our moral sense is simultaneously activated and frustrated. We feel that something should be done, but what, how, and by whom?
Do you agree that media exposure has increased your feeling of empathy for people suffering far away? What are some advantages and disadvantages of our greater exposure to distant suffering? How should we respond to these changes?