Talmud Tuesdays - Session 39 & 40

(5) You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which man shall live: I am the LORD.

R. Yishmael and R. Elazar b. Azaryah and R. Akiva were once walking on the road, with Levi Hasadar and R. Yishmael the son of R. Elazar b. Azaryah walking behind them, when this question was asked: Whence is it derived that the saving of a life overrides the Sabbath? R. Yishmael responded: It is written (Ibid. 22:1) "If the thief be found breaking in, etc." — If in such an instance, where it is doubtful whether he is coming to steal or to kill, and the spilling of blood defiles the land and causes the Shechinah to depart, he is permitted to kill the thief to save his life — how much more so does the saving of life override the Sabbath! R. Elazar b. Azaryah responded: If circumcision, which includes only one of a man's organs, overrides the Sabbath, how much more so all of his body! R. Akiva says: If the saving of a life overrides the sacrificial service, which overrides the Sabbath, how much more so does the saving of a life override the Sabbath! R. Yossi Haglili says: "My Sabbaths shall you keep": "but" ("ach," before "My") "divides," i.e., there are Sabbaths that you override, and there are Sabbaths that you rest. R. Shimon b. Menassia says (Ibid. 14) "And you shall keep the Sabbath, for it is holy to you" — Sabbath is given to you and you are not given (i.e., "surrendered") to the Sabbath. R. Nathan says (Ibid. 16) "And the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath to observe the Sabbath for their generations": Desecrate one Sabbath in order to keep many Sabbaths.

MISHNA: In the case of one who is seized with the life-threatening illness bulmos, causing him unbearable hunger pangs and impaired vision, one may feed him even impure foods on Yom Kippur or any other day until his eyes recover, as the return of his sight indicates that he is recovering. In the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one may not feed him from the lobe of the dog’s liver. This was thought to be a remedy for the bite, but the Rabbis deem it ineffective. And Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash permits feeding it to him, as he deems it effective. And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat, although administering a remedy is prohibited on Shabbat. This is because there is uncertainty whether or not it is a life-threatening situation for him, as it is difficult to ascertain the severity of internal pain. And a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat. Similarly, with regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there; and there is uncertainty whether he is still alive or whether he is dead; and there is uncertainty whether the person under the debris is a gentile or whether he is a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him. One may perform any action necessary to rescue him from beneath the debris. If they found him alive after beginning to clear the debris, they continue to clear the pile until they can extricate him. And if they found him dead, they should leave him, since one may not desecrate Shabbat to preserve the dignity of the dead.

That was also taught in a baraita: One heats water for an ill person on Shabbat, whether to give him to drink or to wash him, since it might help him recover. And they did not say it is permitted to desecrate only the current Shabbat for him, but even a different, future Shabbat. And one must not say: Let us wait and perform this labor for him after Shabbat, perhaps he will get well in the meantime. Rather, one heats it for him immediately because any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat. And this is so not only with regard to uncertainty whether his life is in danger on the current Shabbat, but even in a case of uncertainty with regard to danger on a different Shabbat. And these acts should not be performed by gentiles or Samaritans but should be done by the greatest of the Jewish people, i.e., their scholars, who know how to act properly. And one does not say: These actions may be performed based on the advice of women or Samaritans, since they are not considered experts able to declare a person ill enough to override Shabbat. However, the opinions of these people do combine with an additional opinion, meaning that if there is a dispute, their opinions may be considered when coming to a decision. § The Sages taught in a baraita: One engages in saving a life on Shabbat, and one who is vigilant to do so is praiseworthy. And one need not take permission from a court but hurries to act on his own. How so? If one sees a child who fell into the sea, he spreads a fisherman’s net and raises him from the water. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he catches fish in the net as well. Similarly, if one sees a child fall into a pit and the child cannot get out, he digs part of the ground out around the edge of the pit to create a makeshift step and raises him out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he fashions a step.

Incidental to the Gemara’s discussion of corpses, it cites that which was taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a living day-old baby, one desecrates Shabbat to save his life. Yet for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat. For a day-old baby we desecrate Shabbat because the Torah says: Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he can observe many Shabbatot. But for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat, as once a person dies he is idle from mitzvot. And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to the verse: “Set apart among the dead [bametim ḥofshi], like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6). Once a person dies, he becomes free [ḥofshi] from the mitzvot.

When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations or bloodshed. That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context? Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.

§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them. The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance. The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress. The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous. Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol. From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer? Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life. And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another. § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress. The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Even to change the strap of a sandal. There was a Jewish custom with regard to sandal straps. If the gentile authorities were to decree that Jews must change their practice and wear sandal straps like those worn by the gentiles, one would be obligated to give up his life rather than veer from the accepted custom.

MISHNA: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving to eat it, one feeds her until she recovers, as failure to do so could lead to a life-threatening situation. If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts who determine that he indeed requires food. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him according to his own instructions, until he says that he has eaten enough and needs no more. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled consecrated meat or pig meat and craved those specific foods, one inserts a thin reed into the juice of that item and places it on her mouth. If her mind become settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the gravy itself of that forbidden food. If her mind becomes settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the fat of the forbidden food itself, as there is no halakha that stands in the way of saving a life except for the prohibitions against idol worship, and forbidden sexual relationships, and bloodshed. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to the halakha that the prohibition against idol worship takes precedence over saving one’s life, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 6:5), why is it stated in the continuation of the verse: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? One of these statements appears to be superfluous. Rather, it is to teach that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name. And if there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase “with all your might” to mean: With all your possessions. Therefore, one must be prepared to forfeit his life rather than be saved through idol worship. § With regard to the concept that one must surrender his life rather than have forbidden sexual relations or shed blood through murder, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated about the rape of a betrothed woman: “For as when a man rises against his fellow and slays him, even so is this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). One might ask: What idea did we learn about a betrothed woman from a murderer? The halakha of a betrothed woman is clear; what new point is learned by comparing it to the halakha of a murderer? Rather, this halakha about the murderer, which appears to come to teach about the betrothed woman, is found to actually be the subject of teaching. The inference is as follows: Just as with regard to the betrothed woman, permission is given to save her at the cost of the life of her attacker, so too, the murderer may be saved from committing the crime at the cost of his life, i.e., one may save the victim by killing the attacker. Another teaching is derived in the opposite direction, from the case of murder to the case of rape. Just as the murderer is subject to the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, i.e., one must even allow himself to be killed rather than take the life of another, so too, a man must surrender his life rather than engage in forbidden sexual relations with a betrothed young woman. By inference, the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, applies to all forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the murderer himself, from where do we derive this halakha that he should be killed rather than transgress the prohibition against murder? The Gemara answers: It is derived through reason, as it was told: A certain person came before Rava. He said to Rava: The master of the village where I live said to me: Kill so-and-so, and if you do not do so, I will kill you. What should I do? Rava said to him: Let yourself be killed, and you should not kill. Rava reasoned: What did you see to make you think that your blood is redder and more important than his? Perhaps the blood of that man is redder, and he is more important than you. If so, it is logical that one must not kill another person to save himself.

The baraita relates an incident illustrating this point. There was an incident involving ben Dama, son of Rabbi Yishmael’s sister, in which a snake bit him. And following the attack, Ya’akov of the village of Sekhanya, who was a heretic, a disciple of Jesus the Nazarene, came to treat him, but Rabbi Yishmael did not let him do so. And ben Dama said to him: Rabbi Yishmael, my brother, let him treat me, and I will be healed by him. And I will cite a verse from the Torah to prove that accepting medical treatment from a heretic is permitted in this situation. But ben Dama did not manage to complete the statement before his soul departed from his body and he died. Rabbi Yishmael recited with regard to him: Fortunate are you, ben Dama, as your body is pure and your soul departed in purity, and you did not transgress the statement of your colleagues, who would state the verse: “And who breaks through a fence, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), i.e., one is punished for ignoring an ordinance of the Sages. This incident indicates that it is not permitted for one to accept medical treatment from a heretic even if it is clear that without it he will live only a short while. The Gemara explains: Heresy is different, as it is enticing. In other words, it is prohibited to accept medical treatment from a heretic, as one might come to be drawn after his heresy. By contrast, receiving medical attention from a gentile is permitted if it is certain that one will die if he is not treated. The Master said above: You did not transgress the statement of your colleagues, who would state the verse: “And who breaks through a fence, a snake shall bite him.” The Gemara asks: But ben Dama was also bitten by a snake, even before this declaration of Rabbi Yishmael, so how can he be considered fortunate? The Gemara explains: The snake mentioned in the curse of the Sages is different, as it has no remedy whatsoever. Although ben Dama was bitten by a snake, he could have been healed. The Gemara asks: And what would ben Dama have said? What verse did he intend to cite as proof that it was permitted for him to be healed by a heretic? The verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes, and My ordinances, which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). This teaches that one should live by God’s mitzvot, and not that he should die by them. This verse serves as a source for the halakha that one may violate a prohibition in order to save a life. And why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree with ben Dama? He maintains that this matter applies only in private, but in public one may not transgress a prohibition even to save a life. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael would say: From where is it derived that if oppressors say to a person: Worship an idol and you will not be killed, that one should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “He shall live by them,” and not that he should die by them. One might have thought that this applies even in public. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:32).