SBHC Monday Night Beiyun Selling Someone Else's Chamets

The Gemara notes: And even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with this statement of Rav Naḥman, and rules that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As Ravin bar Rav Adda said: There was an incident that occurred involving a certain person who deposited a saddlebag [disakkayya] filled with leavened bread with Yoḥanan Ḥakuka’a, and mice bore a hole in the bag, and leavened bread was spilling out of the sack. And he came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi on Passover eve to ask what he should do. In the first hour of the day Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Wait, as the owner of the bag might yet return to take it from you and eat the leaven. In the second hour he said to him: Wait. In the third hour he said to him: Wait. In the fourth hour he said to him: Wait. In the fifth hour, concluding that the person was not coming, he said to him: Go and sell it in the market.

An Israelite which has the chametz of another Israelite in hand as collateral -- we delay until the fifth hour, and if its master doesn't come we sell it to gentiles, and if he does not sell it he is obligated to burn it in its time of proscription, even if if he wasn't obligated it its responsibility.

GEMARA: The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but at the time that he sold the property he did not say anything with regard to his intention. Ultimately, he did not ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he wished to renege on the sale. Rava said: Since he did not explicitly state that he was selling his property on the condition that he ascend to Eretz Yisrael, that is an unspoken matter that remained in the heart, and unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle? If we say it is from that which we learn in a baraita:

How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. Rather, is it not because we say: Unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps there it is different, since it is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to achieve atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary.

With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words “he shall offer it” teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: “According to his will.”

Rather, the Gemara derives a proof from the latter clause of that same baraita: And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to divorce her or to free him. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statements of the Sages, and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva.