Torah: Human greatness or divine obedience?

תַּנְיָא: שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים נִבְרְאוּ קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּבְרָא הָעוֹלָם, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: תּוֹרָה, וּתְשׁוּבָה, וְגַן עֵדֶן, וְגֵיהִנָּם, וְכִסֵּא הַכָּבוֹד, וּבֵית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, וּשְׁמוֹ שֶׁל מָשִׁיחַ. תּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״ה׳ קָנָנִי רֵאשִׁית דַּרְכּוֹ״.

Pesachim 54

but a man of understanding will draw it out” (Proverbs 20:5). Counsel in the heart of man is like deep water; that is a reference to Ulla, who had a thought but did not articulate it. But a man of understanding will draw it out; that is a reference to Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who understood the allusion even though it was not articulated. The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion do Ulla and Rabba bar bar Ḥana hold, leading them to reject Rabbi Abba’s statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion? The Gemara answers: They hold in accordance with that which Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One recites the blessing over fire both at the conclusion of Shabbat and at the conclusion of Yom Kippur. And that is how the people act. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was previously taught: One recites a blessing over fire only at the conclusion of Shabbat and not at the conclusion of Festivals or Yom Kippur, since the conclusion of Shabbat is the time of its original creation. And once he sees it, he recites the blessing immediately. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not recite the blessing immediately; rather, he waits and arranges and recites the blessings over fire and spices over the cup of wine that accompanies the recitation of havdala. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. How does Rabbi Yoḥanan explain the baraita? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one recites the blessing at the conclusion of Yom Kippur, it is referring to fire that rested on Yom Kippur, i.e., fire for which no prohibition was involved in its kindling, either because it was kindled before Yom Kippur or because it was kindled in a permitted manner, e.g., for a dangerously ill person. There, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the blessing is recited only at the conclusion of Shabbat, it is referring to fire generated from wood and from stones after Shabbat, similar to the primordial fire, which was created at the conclusion of Shabbat. It was taught in one baraita: With regard to fire generated from wood and stones, one recites a blessing over it; and it was taught in one other baraita: One does not recite a blessing over it. This apparent contradiction is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that one recites a blessing, it is referring to the conclusion of Shabbat. There, where the baraita states that one does not recite a blessing, it is referring to the conclusion of Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would distribute the blessings over the fire and the spices, reciting each when the opportunity arose. Rabbi Ḥiyya would collect them, reciting all the blessings at the same time in the framework of havdala. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: Even though Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi distributes them and recites each blessing at his first opportunity, he repeats the blessings and arranges and recites them over the cup of wine in order to discharge the obligation of his children and the members of his household. The Gemara stated that fire was originally created at the conclusion of Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Was fire created at the conclusion of Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten miraculous phenomena were created in heaven on Shabbat eve during twilight, and were revealed in the world only later? They were: Miriam’s well, and the manna that fell in the desert, and the rainbow, writing [ketav], and the writing instrument [mikhtav], and the tablets of the Ten Commandments, and the grave of Moses, and the cave in which Moses and Elijah stood, the opening of the mouth of Balaam’s donkey, and the opening of the earth’s mouth to swallow the wicked in the incident involving Korah. Rabbi Neḥemya said in the name of his father: Even the fire and the mule, which is a product of crossbreeding, were created at that time. Rabbi Yoshiya said in the name of his father: Even the ram slaughtered by Abraham in place of Isaac, and the shamir worm used to shape the stones for the altar, were created at that time. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the tongs were created at this time. He would say: Tongs can be fashioned only with other tongs, but who fashioned the first tongs? Indeed, the first pair of tongs was fashioned at the hand of Heaven. An anonymous questioner said to him: It is possible to fashion tongs with a mold and align it without the need for other tongs. Indeed, the first tongs were a creation of man. In any event, fire was originally created before Shabbat, not at the conclusion of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita is referring to our fire, and that baraita is referring to the fire of Gehenna. The Gemara explains: Our fire was created at the conclusion of Shabbat, but the fire of Gehenna was created on Shabbat eve. The Gemara proceeds to ask: Was the fire of Gehenna created on Shabbat eve? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Seven phenomena were created before the world was created, and they are: Torah, and repentance, and the Garden of Eden, and Gehenna, and the Throne of Glory, and the Temple, and the name of Messiah. The Gemara provides sources for the notion that each of these phenomena was created before the world was. Torah was created before the world was created, as it is written: “The Lord made me as the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old” (Proverbs 8:22), which, based on the subsequent verses, is referring to the Torah. Repentance was created before the world was created, as it is written: “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever You had formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God,” and it is written immediately afterward: “You return man to contrition; and You say: Repent, children of man” (Psalms 90:2–3). The Garden of Eden was created before the world was created, as it is written: “And God planted the Garden of Eden in the east [mikedem]” (Genesis 2:8). The term: In the east [mikedem] is interpreted in the sense of: Before [mikodem], i.e., before the world was created. Gehenna was created before the world was created, as it is written: “For its hearth is ordained of old” (Isaiah 30:33). The hearth, i.e., Gehenna, was created before the world was created. The Throne of Glory and the Temple were created before the world was created, as it is written: “Your Throne of Glory on high from the beginning, in the place of our Sanctuary” (Jeremiah 17:12). The name of Messiah was created before the world was created, as it is written in the chapter discussing the Messiah: “May his name endure forever; his name existed before the sun” (Psalms 72:17). The name of Messiah already existed before the creation of the sun and the rest of the world. This baraita states that Gehenna was created before the world was created and not during twilight before the first Shabbat. They say in answer: The void of Gehenna was created before the world, but its fire was created on Shabbat eve. The Gemara asks: And was its fire created on Shabbat eve? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The fire that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created on the second day of the week will never be extinguished, as it is stated: “And they shall go forth, and look upon the carcasses of the men who have rebelled against Me; for their worm shall not die, nor will their fire be extinguished; and they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh” (Isaiah 66:24)? And Rabbi Bana’a, son of Rabbi Ulla, said: Why doesn’t the verse state: That it was good, at the end of the second day of the week of Creation, as it does on the other days? It is because on that day the fire of Gehenna was created. And Rabbi Elazar said that even though: That it was good, was not stated with regard to the creations of the second day, He later included it on the sixth day, as it is stated: “And God saw all that He had done and behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Rather, the void of Gehenna was created before the world was created, and its fire was created only on the second day of the week. And the thought arose in God’s mind to create our fire on Shabbat eve; however, it was not actually created until the conclusion of Shabbat, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The thoughts of two phenomena arose in God’s mind on Shabbat eve, but were not actually created until the conclusion of Shabbat. At the conclusion of Shabbat, the Holy One, Blessed be He, granted Adam, the first man, creative knowledge similar to divine knowledge, and he brought two rocks and rubbed them against each other, and the first fire emerged from them. Adam also brought two animals, a female horse and a male donkey, and mated them with each other, and the resultant offspring that emerged from them was a mule. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says that the first mule was in the days of Anah, as it is stated: “And these are the children of Zibeon: Aiah and Anah; this is Anah who found the mules in the wilderness, as he fed the donkeys of Zibeon his father” (Genesis 36:24). The interpreters of Torah symbolism [ḥamurot] would say: Anah was the product of an incestuous relationship, and as a result he was spiritually unfit to produce offspring. Therefore, he brought an example of unfitness, i.e., an animal physically unfit to produce offspring, into the world, as it is stated: “These are the sons of Seir the Horite, the inhabitants of the land: Lotan, and Shoval, and Zibeon, and Anah” (Genesis 36:20). And it is also stated: “And these are the sons of Zibeon: Aiah and Anah” (Genesis 36:24). One verse describes both Anah and Zibeon as sons of Seir, meaning that they are brothers, while the other verse describes Anah as Zibeon’s son. Rather, this teaches that Zibeon cohabited with his mother, the wife of Seir, and fathered Anah from her. He is called Seir’s son although in fact he was the offspring of Seir’s son and Seir’s wife. The Gemara asks: And perhaps there were two people named Anah, one the son of Zibeon and the other the son of Seir? Rava said: I will state a matter that even King Shapur did not state. And who is this King Shapur? This cannot be a reference to Shapur, king of Persia; rather, it must be an epithet for someone else. He is Shmuel, whose legal rulings were accepted by the public like the edicts of a king by his subjects. Some say a different version, that it was Rav Pappa who said: I will state a matter that even King Shapur did not state. And who is he that Rav Pappa is referring to by the epithet King Shapur? He is Rava. The verse said: “This is Anah who found the mules,” indicating that he is the same Anah mentioned initially in the earlier verse. The Sages taught: Ten phenomena were created on Shabbat eve during twilight, and they were: Miriam’s well, and manna, and the rainbow, writing, and the writing instrument, and the tablets, the grave of Moses, and the cave in which Moses and Elijah stood, the opening of the mouth of Balaam’s donkey, and the opening of the mouth of the earth to swallow the wicked in the time of Korah. And some say that even Aaron’s staff was created then with its almonds and its blossoms. Some say that even the demons were created at this time. And some say that even the garment of Adam, the first man, was created at this time, as it is stated: “And God made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them” (Genesis 3:21). Apropos the list of items created during twilight, the Gemara cites that the Sages taught: Seven matters are concealed from people, and they are: The day of death; and the day of consolation from one’s concerns; the profundity of justice, ascertaining the truth in certain disputes; and a person also does not know what is in the heart of another; and a person does not know in what way he will earn a profit; and one does not know when the monarchy of the house of David will be restored to Israel; and when the wicked Roman monarchy will cease to exist. The Sages taught on a similar note: The thoughts of three matters arose in God’s mind to be created, and if they did not arise in His thoughts, by right they should have arisen in His thoughts, as they are fundamental to the existence of the world. God created a world in which a corpse rots, so that it requires burial and the family does not continually suffer by seeing the corpse; that the deceased are forgotten from the heart, and the sense of pain and loss diminishes with time; and that grain will rot so that it cannot be hoarded forever, and therefore one must sell his produce. And some say: He instituted that currency will circulate so that people will accept money as a method of payment. MISHNA: This mishna continues the previous discussion of customs. In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor on the Ninth of Av, one performs labor. In a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. And in all places Torah scholars are idle and do not perform labor on the Ninth of Av, due to the mourning over the Temple’s destruction. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to the Ninth of Av, a person should always conduct himself as a Torah scholar and refrain from performing labor. GEMARA: Shmuel said: The only communal fast in Babylonia during which all the stringencies of a communal fast are observed is the Ninth of Av. The Gemara asks: Is that to say, based on the parallel he drew between them, that Shmuel holds that the Ninth of Av is as stringent as communal fast days, in that during twilight on the Ninth of Av all activities prohibited on the Ninth of Av are prohibited? But didn’t Shmuel say: During twilight of the Ninth of Av all activities prohibited on the Ninth of Av are permitted, and the Sages did not decree any prohibitions during this time? And if you say that Shmuel holds: With regard to every communal fast, during twilight those activities considered to be afflictions are permitted, didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to a public fast day: One may eat and drink while it is still day? The Gemara analyzes this statement: What does the expression: While it is still day, come to exclude? What, isn’t it to exclude twilight of a communal fast day, when these activities are prohibited? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is to exclude the time after dark, when these afflictions are certainly in effect. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita supports Shmuel’s opinion: The only difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur is that with regard to this, Yom Kippur, its uncertainty is prohibited, as eating and drinking on Yom Kippur is prohibited by Torah law, whereas with regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted, as the afflictions of the Ninth of Av are rabbinic decrees. The Gemara explains the support for Shmuel’s opinion: What is the meaning of the expression: With regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted? Is it not referring to twilight, with regard to which there is uncertainty whether it is day or night? Apparently, it is permitted to eat during twilight on the Ninth of Av. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is as Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said in a different context: It is referring to uncertainty with regard to the determination of the first day of the new month, which would require observance of the Festival for two days. Here, too, the baraita is referring to uncertainty with regard to determination of the first day of the new month. Since the Ninth of Av is a fast of rabbinic origin, there is no requirement to observe two days. Rava taught: Pregnant women and nursing women fast and complete the fast on the Ninth of Av in the manner that they fast and complete the fast on Yom Kippur, and during twilight on the Ninth of Av it is prohibited to eat or drink. And they likewise said so in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast decreed to pray for rain? What, isn’t it referring to the matter of twilight? Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that it is permitted to eat and drink during twilight on the Ninth of Av. The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to performing labor, which is prohibited on the Ninth of Av, in contrast to other fasts. The Gemara expresses surprise: It is referring to performing labor? We already learned explicitly in the mishna: In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor on the Ninth of Av, one performs labor; in a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. Apparently, the prohibition against performing labor on the Ninth of Av depends on local custom and is not an outright prohibition. And even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only said that one may conduct himself as a Torah scholar and refrain from performing labor because when one sits and does not perform labor, it does not appear as presumptuousness on his part. It does not create the impression that he actually considers himself a Torah scholar because others may simply think that he has no work to do. However, in terms of prohibiting the performance of labor, he does not prohibit performing labor on the Ninth of Av. Rather, what is the meaning of the expression: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It was stated with regard to the closing prayer. On a communal fast day there are four prayers, and on Yom Kippur there are five prayers, but on the Ninth of Av there are only three prayers, like an ordinary weekday. But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If only a person would continue to pray throughout the entire day? This indicates that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a person may recite additional prayers if he so chooses. The Gemara answers: There, on a communal fast day, it is a requirement to recite four prayers; here, on the Ninth of Av, reciting additional prayers is optional according to Rabbi Yoḥanan. And if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of the expression: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It is with regard to the twenty-four blessings that are recited on a communal fast, as six blessings were added to the eighteen blessings of the daily Amida prayer. On the Ninth of Av one recites only the standard eighteen blessings. Rav Pappa said: What is the meaning of the phrase: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It comes to teach a stringency. There are different types of communal fasts for rain. The first three fasts are the least stringent; the next three are more stringent; and the final seven fasts are the most stringent of all. The statement teaches that the Ninth of Av is not like the first fast days, which are more lenient in several respects; for example, they do not begin during twilight. Rather, it is like the final fast days, when eating and performing labor are prohibited during twilight. The Gemara raises an objection: Didn’t we already learn that the only difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur is that with regard to this, Yom Kippur, its uncertainty is prohibited, because eating and drinking on Yom Kippur are prohibited by Torah law, whereas with regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted? What is the meaning of the expression referring to the Ninth of Av: Its uncertainty is permitted? Is it not referring to its twilight, contrary to the statement of Rav Pappa? The Gemara rejects this. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said in a different context: No. It is uncertainty with regard to the determination of the first day of the new month. There is no requirement to observe a second day of the Ninth of Av. By inference, with regard to all other matters this and that are equal. The Gemara comments: This statement supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: It is prohibited for a person to extend his finger into water on the Ninth of Av, just as it is prohibited for him to extend his finger into water on Yom Kippur. The Gemara raises an objection: The only difference between the Ninth of Av and a communal fast is that on this day, a communal fast, performance of labor is prohibited, and on that day, the Ninth of Av, performance of labor is permitted in a place where people are accustomed to perform labor. By inference, with regard to all other matters this and that are equal. However, with regard to a communal fast, it was taught in a baraita: When the Sages said that bathing is prohibited, they said it only with regard to washing one’s entire body, but with regard to washing one’s face, one’s hands, and one’s feet in increments, the Sages did not say that it was prohibited. Apparently, with respect to washing, the Rabbis were stricter with regard to the Ninth of Av than they were with regard to a communal fast. Rav Pappa said:

משלי ח׳

(א) הֲלֹֽא־חָכְמָ֥ה תִקְרָ֑א וּ֝תְבוּנָ֗ה תִּתֵּ֥ן קוֹלָֽהּ׃ ... (כב) יְֽהוָ֗ה קָ֭נָנִי רֵאשִׁ֣ית דַּרְכּ֑וֹ קֶ֖דֶם מִפְעָלָ֣יו מֵאָֽז׃ (כג) מֵ֭עוֹלָם נִסַּ֥כְתִּי מֵרֹ֗אשׁ מִקַּדְמֵי־אָֽרֶץ׃ (כד) בְּאֵין־תְּהֹמ֥וֹת חוֹלָ֑לְתִּי בְּאֵ֥ין מַ֝עְיָנ֗וֹת נִכְבַּדֵּי־מָֽיִם׃ (כה) בְּטֶ֣רֶם הָרִ֣ים הָטְבָּ֑עוּ לִפְנֵ֖י גְבָע֣וֹת חוֹלָֽלְתִּי׃

Proverbs 8

(1) It is Wisdom calling, Understanding raising her voice. (2) She takes her stand at the topmost heights, By the wayside, at the crossroads, (3) Near the gates at the city entrance; At the entryways, she shouts, (4) “O men, I call to you; My cry is to all mankind. (5) O simple ones, learn shrewdness; O dullards, instruct your minds. (6) Listen, for I speak noble things; Uprightness comes from my lips; (7) My mouth utters truth; Wickedness is abhorrent to my lips. (8) All my words are just, None of them perverse or crooked; (9) All are straightforward to the intelligent man, And right to those who have attained knowledge. (10) Accept my discipline rather than silver, Knowledge rather than choice gold. (11) For wisdom is better than rubies; No goods can equal her. (12) “I, Wisdom, live with Prudence; I attain knowledge and foresight. (13) To fear the LORD is to hate evil; I hate pride, arrogance, the evil way, And duplicity in speech. (14) Mine are counsel and resourcefulness; I am understanding; courage is mine. (15) Through me kings reign And rulers decree just laws; (16) Through me princes rule, Great men and all the righteous judges. (17) Those who love me I love, And those who seek me will find me. (18) Riches and honor belong to me, Enduring wealth and success. (19) My fruit is better than gold, fine gold, And my produce better than choice silver. (20) I walk on the way of righteousness, On the paths of justice. (21) I endow those who love me with substance; I will fill their treasuries. (22) “The LORD created me at the beginning of His course As the first of His works of old. (23) In the distant past I was fashioned, At the beginning, at the origin of earth. (24) There was still no deep when I was brought forth, No springs rich in water; (25) Before [the foundation of] the mountains were sunk, Before the hills I was born. (26) He had not yet made earth and fields, Or the world’s first clumps of clay. (27) I was there when He set the heavens into place; When He fixed the horizon upon the deep; (28) When He made the heavens above firm, And the fountains of the deep gushed forth; (29) When He assigned the sea its limits, So that its waters never transgress His command; When He fixed the foundations of the earth, (30) I was with Him as a confidant, A source of delight every day, Rejoicing before Him at all times, (31) Rejoicing in His inhabited world, Finding delight with mankind. (32) Now, sons, listen to me; Happy are they who keep my ways. (33) Heed discipline and become wise; Do not spurn it. (34) Happy is the man who listens to me, Coming early to my gates each day, Waiting outside my doors. (35) For he who finds me finds life And obtains favor from the LORD. (36) But he who misses me destroys himself; All who hate me love death.”

ספר הזהר, תרומה נ״ט:תרכ״ג-ס״א:תרמ״ג

אוֹרַיְיתָא צווַֹחַת וָאֶהְיֶה אֶצְלוֹ אָמוֹן, בִּי בָּרָא קוּדְשָׁא בְּרִיךְ הוּא עָלְמָא, דְּעַד (נ''א אלא עד) (ס''א לא אתברי) אִתְבְּרֵי עָלְמָא, אַקְדִּימַת אוֹרַיְיתָא תְּרֵין אַלְפֵי שְׁנִין לְעָלְמָא, וְכַד בָּעָא קוּדְשָׁא בְּרִיךְ הוּא לְמִבְרֵי עָלְמָא, הֲוָה מִסְתַּכָּל בָּהּ בְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, בְּכָל מִלָּה וּמִלָּה, וְעָבִיד לָקֳבְלָהּ אוּמָנוּתָא דְּעָלְמָא. בְּגִין דְּכָל מִלִּין וְעוֹבָדִין דְּכָל עָלְמִין, בְּאוֹרַיְיתָא אִינּוּן. וְעַל דָּא קוּדְשָׁא בְּרִיךְ הוּא הֲוָה מִסְתָּכַּל בָּהּ, וּבָרָא עָלְמָא.

Zohar, Terumah 59:623-61:643

...

יומא כ״ח

אָמַר רַב קִיֵּים אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ כָּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקוֹלִי וְגוֹ׳ אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא לְרַב וְאֵימָא שֶׁבַע מִצְוֹת הָא אִיכָּא נָמֵי מִילָה וְאֵימָא שֶׁבַע מִצְוֹת וּמִילָה אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִם כֵּן מִצְוֹתַי וְתוֹרוֹתָי לְמָה לִי אָמַר (רַב) וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב אָשֵׁי קִיֵּים אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ אֲפִילּוּ עֵירוּבֵי תַבְשִׁילִין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר תּוֹרוֹתָי אַחַת תּוֹרָה שֶׁבִּכְתָב וְאַחַת תּוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל פֶּה

Yoma 28

The Gemara expresses wonder at Rabbi Zeira’s equation of these two issues: But isn’t there the burning of the limbs and the fats? The Gemara answers: That is not difficult, because the burning of the limbs and the fats is the end of the daytime service. The Gemara asks further: But isn’t there the removal of the ashes? The Gemara rejects that argument: Removing the ashes is the start of the daytime service, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If a priest sanctified his hands at night by washing them for the removal of the ashes, the next day, i.e., after daybreak, he need not sanctify his hands again, as he already sanctified them at the start of the service. Rabbi Zeira’s equation between services that are incomplete by themselves and services for which a non-priest does not incur the death penalty therefore remains intact. If so, the question that he asked concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement remains difficult. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement must be revised, and one must posit that when it was stated, this is how it was stated: Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A non-priest who arranges the two logs is liable to receive the death penalty, since it is a service that is complete, i.e., it is not followed and completed by a subsequent service. Although the burning of the limbs upon the altar follows the placement of the logs, that is considered to be an independent act, not the completion of the service of placing the logs. This is because the placing of the logs is done while still night, while the burning of the limbs cannot be done until daybreak. Rava strongly objects to this: However, if that is so, the service of placing the two logs should require a lottery. The Gemara expresses surprise at Rava’s comment: And doesn’t it require a lottery? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Whoever was privileged to perform the removal of the ashes is also privileged to perform the arrangement of the two logs? There was in fact a lottery for arranging the two logs. Rather, this is what Rava actually said: If placing the logs is considered a complete service and is therefore a task important enough to warrant the death penalty for a non-priest who performs it, they should hold a separate lottery for it by itself. The Gemara answers: It is as we said at the beginning of the chapter, that the task of placing the logs was added to the lottery for the removal of ashes as an incentive for the priests to rise before dawn (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Based on Rava’s comments, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that any service that is a complete service and for which a non-priest would be liable to receive the death penalty requires a lottery, but if a non-priest would not be liable to receive the death penalty it would not require a lottery? But isn’t there slaughtering, which may be performed by non-priest and yet requires a lottery? The Gemara rejects this point: Slaughtering is different, because it is the beginning of the daytime service, which gives it added importance. The Gemara asks further on Rava’s statement: Is that to say that a service that is complete requires a lottery, whereas a service which is followed by a subsequent service that completes it does not require a lottery? But isn’t there the burning of the limbs and the fats? The Gemara answers: That is not difficult because the burning of the limbs and the fats is the end of the daytime service. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the removal of the ashes? The Gemara answers: A lottery was established for that service only due to the incident that occurred when the priests came to danger. As explained above, the reason Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the arrangement of the logs is a complete service, and is not considered a prelude to the burning of limbs, is because the former is a nighttime service and the latter is a daytime service. Mar Zutra, and some say Rav Ashi, said: We too have learned in a mishna that the arrangement of the two logs is a nighttime service. As we learned: The appointed priest said to them: Go out and see if the time for slaughtering has arrived, whereas the mishna did not teach: See whether the time for arranging the two logs has arrived. This shows that arranging the logs may be done while it is still night; it is therefore not considered to be connected to, and complemented by, the placing of the limbs the following day. The Gemara rejects this proof: The reason the mishna mentions slaughtering is that it prefers to teach this statement with regard to that which has no rectification if it is done at night, such as slaughtering the offering, which is rendered irreparably invalid if performed before daybreak. It does not want to teach it with regard to something that has rectification if done at night, such as arranging the two logs, which can always be removed and replaced properly. However, it is possible that the proper time for arranging the logs is daytime, and therefore it may be regarded as a service that is completed by the subsequent burning of limbs on the altar. MISHNA: The appointed priest said to the other priests: Go out and observe if it is day and the time for slaughter has arrived. If the time has arrived, the observer says: There is light [barkai]. Matya ben Shmuel says that the appointed priest phrased his question differently: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated even to Hebron? And the observer says: Yes. And why did they need to ascertain whether or not it is day, which is typically evident to all? It was necessary, as once, the light of the moon rose, and they imagined that the eastern sky was illuminated with sunlight, and they slaughtered the daily offering before its appropriate time. The animal was later taken out to the place designated for burning and burned because it was slaughtered too early. In order to prevent similar errors in the future, the Sages instituted that they would carefully assess the situation until they were certain that it was day. After the priests announced the start of the day, they led the High Priest down to the Hall of Immersion. The Gemara comments: This was the principle in the Temple: Anyone who covers his legs, a euphemism for defecating, requires immersion afterward; and anyone who urinates requires sanctification of the hands and feet with water from the basin afterward. GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita that the Sages disputed the precise expression that was employed in the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael says that the formula is: The light flashed; Rabbi Akiva says: The light has risen, which is brighter than a mere flash. Naḥuma ben Apakshiyon says: There is even light in Hebron. Matya ben Shmuel says that the appointed priest in charge of the lotteries says: The entire eastern sky is illuminated all the way to Hebron. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says that this is what the appointed priest said: The entire eastern sky is illuminated all the way to Hebron and the entire nation has gone out, each and every person to engage in his labor. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira’s version of the formula: If it is so that the people have gone to work, it has grown considerably lighter. People go to work after it is light. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira is referring to a time after sunrise, not a time adjacent to dawn. The Gemara answers: It is that people have gone out to hire workers that we are saying. Owners of fields rose early, adjacent to dawn, to hire workers so that they could begin working when it is light. § Rav Safra said: The time for the afternoon prayer of Abraham begins from when the walls begin to blacken from shade. When the sun begins to descend from the middle of the sky, producing shadows on the walls, that marks the beginning of the setting of the sun and then the afternoon prayer may be recited. Rav Yosef said: And will we arise and derive a halakha from Abraham? Didn’t Abraham live before the Torah was given to the Jewish people, and therefore halakhot cannot be derived from his conduct? Rava said: The tanna derived a halakha from Abraham’s conduct, and we do not derive a halakha from his conduct? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), this verse teaches that the entire day is suitable for performance of the mitzva of circumcision. However, the vigilant are early in their performance of mitzvot and circumcise in the morning, as it is stated with regard to the binding of Isaac: “And Abraham arose early in the morning and saddled his donkey” (Genesis 22:3). He awakened early to fulfill the mitzva without delay. Apparently, halakha is derived from the conduct of Abraham. Rather, Rava said: With regard to Rav Yosef, it was not the matter of deriving halakha from the conduct of Abraham that is difficult. Rather, this is difficult for him, as we learned in a mishna: When Passover eves occur on Shabbat eves, the daily afternoon offering is slaughtered at six and a half hours of the day and sacrificed on the altar at seven and a half hours. The afternoon offering was slaughtered as early as possible to enable all the Paschal lambs, which were slaughtered after the daily afternoon offering was sacrificed, to be slaughtered and roasted before sunset, so that no labor would be performed on Shabbat. Now, if indeed this halakha is derived from the conduct of Abraham, let us slaughter the offering even earlier, from when the walls begin to blacken, just after the end of the sixth hour of the day. Apparently, halakha is not derived from the conduct of Abraham. The Gemara rejects this: What is the difficulty?
Perhaps the walls of the Temple begin to blacken only at six and a half hours of the day because they are not perfectly aligned. The Temple walls were broad at the bottom and gradually narrowed as they reached the top; therefore, the upper part of the wall did not cast a shadow on the wall opposite it until six and a half hours of the day.
Or, alternatively, it is different with regard to Abraham because there was great knowledge of astronomy [itztagninut] in his heart. He was able to precisely calculate the movements of the heavenly bodies and was therefore able to discern immediately after noon that the sun had begun its descent. Others require a half hour to be certain that the descent of the sun has begun.
Or, alternatively Abraham was different because he was an Elder and sat and studied Torah in a yeshiva, where the Divine Presence rests. There he developed the expertise to determine the precise hour. As Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: From the days of our ancestors, yeshiva never left them. Our ancestors were leaders of their generations, who taught Torah to students who came to them. When they were in Egypt there was a yeshiva with them, as it is stated: “Go and gather the Elders of Israel” (Exodus 3:16), indicating that there were Sages among them who studied Torah. And similarly, when they were in the desert, there was a yeshiva with them, as it is stated: “Gather for me seventy men from the Elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16). Abraham our Patriarch was himself an Elder and would sit in yeshiva, as it is stated: “And Abraham was old, advanced in years” (Genesis 24:1). From the apparent redundancy of the terms old and advanced in years, it is derived that old means that he was a wise Elder and prominent in Torah, and advanced in years means that he was elderly. Similarly, Isaac our Patriarch was an Elder and sat in yeshiva, as it is stated: “And it came to pass when Isaac was old and his eyes were dim” (Genesis 27:1). Similarly, Jacob our Patriarch was an Elder and sat in yeshiva, as it is stated: “And Israel’s eyes were heavy with age” (Genesis 48:10). Eliezer, servant of Abraham, was an Elder and sat in yeshiva, as it is stated: “And Abraham said to his servant, the elder of his household, who ruled over all he had” (Genesis 24:2). Rabbi Elazar said: The verse means that he had mastery over the Torah of his master, having gained proficiency in all of the Torah of Abraham. That is the meaning of the verse: “He is Damascus [Dammesek] Eliezer” (Genesis 15:2). Rabbi Elazar said: The word Dammesek is a contraction of he who draws [doleh] and gives drink [mashke] to others from his master’s Torah. Apropos the previous statement, the Gemara cites that Rav said: Abraham our Patriarch fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, as it is stated: “Because [ekev] Abraham hearkened to My voice and kept My charge, My mitzvot, My statutes and My Torahs” (Genesis 26:5). Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said to Rav: And say that the verse means that he fulfilled only the seven Noahide mitzvot and not the entire Torah. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there also circumcision that Abraham clearly observed, which is not one of the Noahide laws? Apparently, Abraham fulfilled more than just those seven. The Gemara asks: And say that he fulfilled only the seven mitzvot and circumcision. Rav said to him: If so, why do I need the continuation of the verse, that Abraham kept: My mitzvot and My Torah? That is a clear indication that he fulfilled mitzvot beyond the seven Noahide mitzvot, and apparently fulfilled the entire Torah. Rav said, and some say Rav Ashi said: Abraham our Patriarch fulfilled the entire Torah, even the mitzva of the joining of cooked foods, a rabbinic ordinance instituted later, as it is stated: My Torahs. Since the term is in the plural, it indicates that Abraham kept two Torahs; one, the Written Torah, and one, the Oral Torah. In the course of fulfilling the Oral Torah, he fulfilled all the details and parameters included therein. § It was taught in the mishna that Matya ben Shmuel says that the appointed priest asks: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated even to Hebron? And he says: Yes. The Gemara asks: Who said yes? If we say it is that person who is standing on the roof, does he dream and also interpret his dream? Is it reasonable that the one asking the question answers it? Rather, say that it was that person who is standing on the ground who said yes. From where does he know that the sky is illuminated such that he is able to answer yes? The Gemara suggests two possible solutions: If you wish, say it was that person who is standing on the ground who answered yes, and if you wish, say it was that person who is standing on the roof who answered. If you wish, say that the person who is standing on the roof said: The entire eastern sky is illuminated. And that person who is standing on the ground said to him: Has it illuminated even to Hebron? And he who is standing on the roof said to him: Yes. And if you wish, say instead that the person who is standing on the ground said: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated? And he who is standing on the roof said to him: Do you mean that it is illuminated even to Hebron? And he who is standing on the ground said to him: Yes, that is what I mean. § The mishna asks: And why did they need to ascertain this? The mishna answered that there was an incident where they confused the light of the moon with the light of the rising sun and slaughtered the daily morning offering too early. The Gemara asks: And are sunlight and moonlight mistaken for one another? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A column of the light of the moon is not similar to a column of the light of the sun; a column of the light of the moon rises like a staff in one column while a column of the light of the sun diffuses to here and to there? The Gemara answers that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: It was a cloudy day, and then even the moonlight diffuses to here and to there, which caused them to err and believe that it was the rising sun. Rav Pappa said: Learn from this statement of Rabbi Yishmael that a cloudy day is similar to a completely sunny day because the sunlight is further diffused by the clouds. The Gemara asks: What are the practical ramifications of the statement that a cloudy day is similar to a completely sunny day? The Gemara explains: The ramifications are with regard to spreading hides to dry them. On a cloudy day, wherever the hides are placed they will be exposed to sunlight. Alternatively, the ramifications are according to that which Rava taught with regard to matza: A woman may neither knead dough for matza for Passover in the light of the sun nor may she prepare the dough with hot water heated in the sun. On a cloudy day, one may not knead the dough anywhere outside since the light of the sun is diffused everywhere. Apropos a cloudy day, the Gemara cites that Rav Naḥman said: The hazy light of the sun through the clouds is more damaging than the light of the sun itself. And your mnemonic is the cover of a jar of vinegar: As long as the jar is tightly closed, the odor of the vinegar does not spread and it intensifies. Even the slightest opening in the lid releases an odor more powerful than the odor generated by vinegar that was not sealed in a jar. The same is true with regard to the rays of the sun. With regard to sunlight that is obscured behind clouds, when it escapes through breaks in the clouds it is more powerful than direct sunlight. Dazzling sunlight, which shines through cracks in the clouds, is more harmful to the eyes than direct sunlight. And your mnemonic is a drip; water that drips on a person is more bothersome than water in which one completely immerses his body.

במדבר ט׳

(א) וַיְדַבֵּ֣ר יְהוָ֣ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֣ה בְמִדְבַּר־סִ֠ינַי בַּשָּׁנָ֨ה הַשֵּׁנִ֜ית לְצֵאתָ֨ם מֵאֶ֧רֶץ מִצְרַ֛יִם בַּחֹ֥דֶשׁ הָרִאשׁ֖וֹן לֵאמֹֽר׃ (ב) וְיַעֲשׂ֧וּ בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֛ל אֶת־הַפָּ֖סַח בְּמוֹעֲדֽוֹ׃ (ג) בְּאַרְבָּעָ֣ה עָשָֽׂר־י֠וֹם בַּחֹ֨דֶשׁ הַזֶּ֜ה בֵּ֧ין הָֽעֲרְבַּ֛יִם תַּעֲשׂ֥וּ אֹת֖וֹ בְּמוֹעֲד֑וֹ כְּכָל־חֻקֹּתָ֥יו וּכְכָל־מִשְׁפָּטָ֖יו תַּעֲשׂ֥וּ אֹתֽוֹ׃ (ד) וַיְדַבֵּ֥ר מֹשֶׁ֛ה אֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לַעֲשֹׂ֥ת הַפָּֽסַח׃ (ה) וַיַּעֲשׂ֣וּ אֶת־הַפֶּ֡סַח בָּרִאשׁ֡וֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה֩ עָשָׂ֨ר י֥וֹם לַחֹ֛דֶשׁ בֵּ֥ין הָעַרְבַּ֖יִם בְּמִדְבַּ֣ר סִינָ֑י כְּ֠כֹל אֲשֶׁ֨ר צִוָּ֤ה יְהוָה֙ אֶת־מֹשֶׁ֔ה כֵּ֥ן עָשׂ֖וּ בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (ו) וַיְהִ֣י אֲנָשִׁ֗ים אֲשֶׁ֨ר הָי֤וּ טְמֵאִים֙ לְנֶ֣פֶשׁ אָדָ֔ם וְלֹא־יָכְל֥וּ לַעֲשֹׂת־הַפֶּ֖סַח בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֑וּא וַֽיִּקְרְב֞וּ לִפְנֵ֥י מֹשֶׁ֛ה וְלִפְנֵ֥י אַהֲרֹ֖ן בַּיּ֥וֹם הַהֽוּא׃ (ז) וַ֠יֹּאמְרוּ הָאֲנָשִׁ֤ים הָהֵ֙מָּה֙ אֵלָ֔יו אֲנַ֥חְנוּ טְמֵאִ֖ים לְנֶ֣פֶשׁ אָדָ֑ם לָ֣מָּה נִגָּרַ֗ע לְבִלְתִּ֨י הַקְרִ֜ב אֶת־קָרְבַּ֤ן יְהוָה֙ בְּמֹ֣עֲד֔וֹ בְּת֖וֹךְ בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (ח) וַיֹּ֥אמֶר אֲלֵהֶ֖ם מֹשֶׁ֑ה עִמְד֣וּ וְאֶשְׁמְעָ֔ה מַה־יְצַוֶּ֥ה יְהוָ֖ה לָכֶֽם׃ (פ) (ט) וַיְדַבֵּ֥ר יְהוָ֖ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֥ה לֵּאמֹֽר׃ (י) דַּבֵּ֛ר אֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לֵאמֹ֑ר אִ֣ישׁ אִ֣ישׁ כִּי־יִהְיֶֽה־טָמֵ֣א ׀ לָנֶ֡פֶשׁ אוֹ֩ בְדֶ֨רֶךְ רְחֹקָ֜הׄ לָכֶ֗ם א֚וֹ לְדֹרֹ֣תֵיכֶ֔ם וְעָ֥שָׂה פֶ֖סַח לַיהוָֽה׃ (יא) בַּחֹ֨דֶשׁ הַשֵּׁנִ֜י בְּאַרְבָּעָ֨ה עָשָׂ֥ר י֛וֹם בֵּ֥ין הָעַרְבַּ֖יִם יַעֲשׂ֣וּ אֹת֑וֹ עַל־מַצּ֥וֹת וּמְרֹרִ֖ים יֹאכְלֻֽהוּ׃ (יב) לֹֽא־יַשְׁאִ֤ירוּ מִמֶּ֙נּוּ֙ עַד־בֹּ֔קֶר וְעֶ֖צֶם לֹ֣א יִשְׁבְּרוּ־ב֑וֹ כְּכָל־חֻקַּ֥ת הַפֶּ֖סַח יַעֲשׂ֥וּ אֹתֽוֹ׃ (יג) וְהָאִישׁ֩ אֲשֶׁר־ה֨וּא טָה֜וֹר וּבְדֶ֣רֶךְ לֹא־הָיָ֗ה וְחָדַל֙ לַעֲשׂ֣וֹת הַפֶּ֔סַח וְנִכְרְתָ֛ה הַנֶּ֥פֶשׁ הַהִ֖וא מֵֽעַמֶּ֑יהָ כִּ֣י ׀ קָרְבַּ֣ן יְהוָ֗ה לֹ֤א הִקְרִיב֙ בְּמֹ֣עֲד֔וֹ חֶטְא֥וֹ יִשָּׂ֖א הָאִ֥ישׁ הַהֽוּא׃ (יד) וְכִֽי־יָג֨וּר אִתְּכֶ֜ם גֵּ֗ר וְעָ֤שָֽׂה פֶ֙סַח֙ לַֽיהוָ֔ה כְּחֻקַּ֥ת הַפֶּ֛סַח וּכְמִשְׁפָּט֖וֹ כֵּ֣ן יַעֲשֶׂ֑ה חֻקָּ֤ה אַחַת֙ יִהְיֶ֣ה לָכֶ֔ם וְלַגֵּ֖ר וּלְאֶזְרַ֥ח הָאָֽרֶץ׃ (פ)

Numbers 9

(1) The LORD spoke to Moses in the wilderness of Sinai, on the first new moon of the second year following the exodus from the land of Egypt, saying: (2) Let the Israelite people offer the passover sacrifice at its set time: (3) you shall offer it on the fourteenth day of this month, at twilight, at its set time; you shall offer it in accordance with all its rules and rites. (4) Moses instructed the Israelites to offer the passover sacrifice; (5) and they offered the passover sacrifice in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month, at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai. Just as the LORD had commanded Moses, so the Israelites did. (6) But there were some men who were unclean by reason of a corpse and could not offer the passover sacrifice on that day. Appearing that same day before Moses and Aaron, (7) those men said to them, “Unclean though we are by reason of a corpse, why must we be debarred from presenting the LORD’s offering at its set time with the rest of the Israelites?” (8) Moses said to them, “Stand by, and let me hear what instructions the LORD gives about you.” (9) And the LORD spoke to Moses, saying: (10) Speak to the Israelite people, saying: When any of you or of your posterity who are defiled by a corpse or are on a long journey would offer a passover sacrifice to the LORD, (11) they shall offer it in the second month, on the fourteenth day of the month, at twilight. They shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter herbs, (12) and they shall not leave any of it over until morning. They shall not break a bone of it. They shall offer it in strict accord with the law of the passover sacrifice. (13) But if a man who is clean and not on a journey refrains from offering the passover sacrifice, that person shall be cut off from his kin, for he did not present the LORD’s offering at its set time; that man shall bear his guilt. (14) And when a stranger who resides with you would offer a passover sacrifice to the LORD, he must offer it in accordance with the rules and rites of the passover sacrifice. There shall be one law for you, whether stranger or citizen of the country. (15) On the day that the Tabernacle was set up, the cloud covered the Tabernacle, the Tent of the Pact; and in the evening it rested over the Tabernacle in the likeness of fire until morning. (16) It was always so: the cloud covered it, appearing as fire by night. (17) And whenever the cloud lifted from the Tent, the Israelites would set out accordingly; and at the spot where the cloud settled, there the Israelites would make camp. (18) At a command of the LORD the Israelites broke camp, and at a command of the LORD they made camp: they remained encamped as long as the cloud stayed over the Tabernacle. (19) When the cloud lingered over the Tabernacle many days, the Israelites observed the LORD’s mandate and did not journey on. (20) At such times as the cloud rested over the Tabernacle for but a few days, they remained encamped at a command of the LORD, and broke camp at a command of the LORD. (21) And at such times as the cloud stayed from evening until morning, they broke camp as soon as the cloud lifted in the morning. Day or night, whenever the cloud lifted, they would break camp. (22) Whether it was two days or a month or a year—however long the cloud lingered over the Tabernacle—the Israelites remained encamped and did not set out; only when it lifted did they break camp. (23) On a sign from the LORD they made camp and on a sign from the LORD they broke camp; they observed the LORD’s mandate at the LORD’s bidding through Moses.

במדבר כ״ז

Numbers 27

(1) The daughters of Zelophehad, of Manassite family—son of Hepher son of Gilead son of Machir son of Manasseh son of Joseph—came forward. The names of the daughters were Mahlah, Noah, Hoglah, Milcah, and Tirzah. (2) They stood before Moses, Eleazar the priest, the chieftains, and the whole assembly, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and they said, (3) “Our father died in the wilderness. He was not one of the faction, Korah’s faction, which banded together against the LORD, but died for his own sin; and he has left no sons. (4) Let not our father’s name be lost to his clan just because he had no son! Give us a holding among our father’s kinsmen!” (5) Moses brought their case before the LORD. (6) And the LORD said to Moses, (7) “The plea of Zelophehad’s daughters is just: you should give them a hereditary holding among their father’s kinsmen; transfer their father’s share to them. (8) “Further, speak to the Israelite people as follows: ‘If a man dies without leaving a son, you shall transfer his property to his daughter. (9) If he has no daughter, you shall assign his property to his brothers. (10) If he has no brothers, you shall assign his property to his father’s brothers. (11) If his father had no brothers, you shall assign his property to his nearest relative in his own clan, and he shall inherit it.’ This shall be the law of procedure for the Israelites, in accordance with the LORD’s command to Moses.” (12) The LORD said to Moses, “Ascend these heights of Abarim and view the land that I have given to the Israelite people. (13) When you have seen it, you too shall be gathered to your kin, just as your brother Aaron was. (14) For, in the wilderness of Zin, when the community was contentious, you disobeyed My command to uphold My sanctity in their sight by means of the water.” Those are the Waters of Meribath-kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin. (15) Moses spoke to the LORD, saying, (16) “Let the LORD, Source of the breath of all flesh, appoint someone over the community (17) who shall go out before them and come in before them, and who shall take them out and bring them in, so that the LORD’s community may not be like sheep that have no shepherd.” (18) And the LORD answered Moses, “Single out Joshua son of Nun, an inspired man, and lay your hand upon him. (19) Have him stand before Eleazar the priest and before the whole community, and commission him in their sight. (20) Invest him with some of your authority, so that the whole Israelite community may obey. (21) But he shall present himself to Eleazar the priest, who shall on his behalf seek the decision of the Urim before the LORD. By such instruction they shall go out and by such instruction they shall come in, he and all the Israelites, the whole community.” (22) Moses did as the LORD commanded him. He took Joshua and had him stand before Eleazar the priest and before the whole community. (23) He laid his hands upon him and commissioned him—as the LORD had spoken through Moses.

ויקרא י׳:ב׳-כ׳

(ב) וַתֵּ֥צֵא אֵ֛שׁ מִלִּפְנֵ֥י יְהוָ֖ה וַתֹּ֣אכַל אוֹתָ֑ם וַיָּמֻ֖תוּ לִפְנֵ֥י יְהוָֽה׃ (ג) וַיֹּ֨אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶֽל־אַהֲרֹ֗ן הוּא֩ אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֨ר יְהוָ֤ה ׀ לֵאמֹר֙ בִּקְרֹבַ֣י אֶקָּדֵ֔שׁ וְעַל־פְּנֵ֥י כָל־הָעָ֖ם אֶכָּבֵ֑ד וַיִּדֹּ֖ם אַהֲרֹֽן׃ ... (ו) וַיֹּ֣אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֣ה אֶֽל־אַהֲרֹ֡ן וּלְאֶלְעָזָר֩ וּלְאִֽיתָמָ֨ר ׀ בָּנָ֜יו רָֽאשֵׁיכֶ֥ם אַל־תִּפְרָ֣עוּ ׀ וּבִגְדֵיכֶ֤ם לֹֽא־תִפְרֹ֙מוּ֙ וְלֹ֣א תָמֻ֔תוּ וְעַ֥ל כָּל־הָעֵדָ֖ה יִקְצֹ֑ף וַאֲחֵיכֶם֙ כָּל־בֵּ֣ית יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל יִבְכּוּ֙ אֶת־הַשְּׂרֵפָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֖ר שָׂרַ֥ף יְהוָֽה׃ (ז) וּמִפֶּתַח֩ אֹ֨הֶל מוֹעֵ֜ד לֹ֤א תֵֽצְאוּ֙ פֶּן־תָּמֻ֔תוּ כִּי־שֶׁ֛מֶן מִשְׁחַ֥ת יְהוָ֖ה עֲלֵיכֶ֑ם וַֽיַּעֲשׂ֖וּ כִּדְבַ֥ר מֹשֶֽׁה... (יב) וַיְדַבֵּ֨ר מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶֽל־אַהֲרֹ֗ן וְאֶ֣ל אֶ֠לְעָזָר וְאֶל־אִ֨יתָמָ֥ר ׀ בָּנָיו֮ הַנּֽוֹתָרִים֒ קְח֣וּ אֶת־הַמִּנְחָ֗ה הַנּוֹתֶ֙רֶת֙ מֵאִשֵּׁ֣י יְהוָ֔ה וְאִכְל֥וּהָ מַצּ֖וֹת אֵ֣צֶל הַמִּזְבֵּ֑חַ כִּ֛י קֹ֥דֶשׁ קָֽדָשִׁ֖ים הִֽוא׃ (יג) וַאֲכַלְתֶּ֤ם אֹתָהּ֙ בְּמָק֣וֹם קָדֹ֔שׁ כִּ֣י חָקְךָ֤ וְחָק־בָּנֶ֙יךָ֙ הִ֔וא מֵאִשֵּׁ֖י יְהוָ֑ה כִּי־כֵ֖ן צֻוֵּֽיתִי׃ (יד) וְאֵת֩ חֲזֵ֨ה הַתְּנוּפָ֜ה וְאֵ֣ת ׀ שׁ֣וֹק הַתְּרוּמָ֗ה תֹּֽאכְלוּ֙ בְּמָק֣וֹם טָה֔וֹר אַתָּ֕ה וּבָנֶ֥יךָ וּבְנֹתֶ֖יךָ אִתָּ֑ךְ כִּֽי־חָקְךָ֤ וְחָק־בָּנֶ֙יךָ֙ נִתְּנ֔וּ מִזִּבְחֵ֥י שַׁלְמֵ֖י בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל... (טז) וְאֵ֣ת ׀ שְׂעִ֣יר הַֽחַטָּ֗את דָּרֹ֥שׁ דָּרַ֛שׁ מֹשֶׁ֖ה וְהִנֵּ֣ה שֹׂרָ֑ף וַ֠יִּקְצֹף עַל־אֶלְעָזָ֤ר וְעַל־אִֽיתָמָר֙ בְּנֵ֣י אַהֲרֹ֔ן הַנּוֹתָרִ֖ם לֵאמֹֽר׃ (יז) מַדּ֗וּעַ לֹֽא־אֲכַלְתֶּ֤ם אֶת־הַֽחַטָּאת֙ בִּמְק֣וֹם הַקֹּ֔דֶשׁ כִּ֛י קֹ֥דֶשׁ קָֽדָשִׁ֖ים הִ֑וא וְאֹתָ֣הּ ׀ נָתַ֣ן לָכֶ֗ם לָשֵׂאת֙ אֶת־עֲוֺ֣ן הָעֵדָ֔ה לְכַפֵּ֥ר עֲלֵיהֶ֖ם לִפְנֵ֥י יְהוָֽה׃ (יח) הֵ֚ן לֹא־הוּבָ֣א אֶת־דָּמָ֔הּ אֶל־הַקֹּ֖דֶשׁ פְּנִ֑ימָה אָכ֨וֹל תֹּאכְל֥וּ אֹתָ֛הּ בַּקֹּ֖דֶשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוֵּֽיתִי׃ (יט) וַיְדַבֵּ֨ר אַהֲרֹ֜ן אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֗ה הֵ֣ן הַ֠יּוֹם הִקְרִ֨יבוּ אֶת־חַטָּאתָ֤ם וְאֶת־עֹֽלָתָם֙ לִפְנֵ֣י יְהוָ֔ה וַתִּקְרֶ֥אנָה אֹתִ֖י כָּאֵ֑לֶּה וְאָכַ֤לְתִּי חַטָּאת֙ הַיּ֔וֹם הַיִּיטַ֖ב בְּעֵינֵ֥י יְהוָֽה׃ (כ) וַיִּשְׁמַ֣ע מֹשֶׁ֔ה וַיִּיטַ֖ב בְּעֵינָֽיו׃ (פ)

Leviticus 10:2-20

(1) On the eighth day Moses called Aaron and his sons, and the elders of Israel. (2) He said to Aaron: “Take a calf of the herd for a sin offering and a ram for a burnt offering, without blemish, and bring them before the LORD. (3) And speak to the Israelites, saying: Take a he-goat for a sin offering; a calf and a lamb, yearlings without blemish, for a burnt offering; (4) and an ox and a ram for an offering of well-being to sacrifice before the LORD; and a meal offering with oil mixed in. For today the LORD will appear to you.” (5) They brought to the front of the Tent of Meeting the things that Moses had commanded, and the whole community came forward and stood before the LORD. (6) Moses said: “This is what the LORD has commanded that you do, that the Presence of the LORD may appear to you.” (7) Then Moses said to Aaron: “Come forward to the altar and sacrifice your sin offering and your burnt offering, making expiation for yourself and for the people; and sacrifice the people’s offering and make expiation for them, as the LORD has commanded.” (8) Aaron came forward to the altar and slaughtered his calf of sin offering. (9) Aaron’s sons brought the blood to him; he dipped his finger in the blood and put it on the horns of the altar; and he poured out the rest of the blood at the base of the altar. (10) The fat, the kidneys, and the protuberance of the liver from the sin offering he turned into smoke on the altar—as the LORD had commanded Moses; (11) and the flesh and the skin were consumed in fire outside the camp. (12) Then he slaughtered the burnt offering. Aaron’s sons passed the blood to him, and he dashed it against all sides of the altar. (13) They passed the burnt offering to him in sections, as well as the head, and he turned it into smoke on the altar. (14) He washed the entrails and the legs, and turned them into smoke on the altar with the burnt offering. (15) Next he brought forward the people’s offering. He took the goat for the people’s sin offering, and slaughtered it, and presented it as a sin offering like the previous one. (16) He brought forward the burnt offering and sacrificed it according to regulation. (17) He then brought forward the meal offering and, taking a handful of it, he turned it into smoke on the altar—in addition to the burnt offering of the morning. (18) He slaughtered the ox and the ram, the people’s sacrifice of well-being. Aaron’s sons passed the blood to him—which he dashed against every side of the altar— (19) and the fat parts of the ox and the ram: the broad tail, the covering [fat], the kidneys, and the protuberances of the livers. (20) They laid these fat parts over the breasts; and Aaron turned the fat parts into smoke on the altar, (21) and elevated the breasts and the right thighs as an elevation offering before the LORD—as Moses had commanded. (22) Aaron lifted his hands toward the people and blessed them; and he stepped down after offering the sin offering, the burnt offering, and the offering of well-being. (23) Moses and Aaron then went inside the Tent of Meeting. When they came out, they blessed the people; and the Presence of the Lord appeared to all the people. (24) Fire came forth from before the LORD and consumed the burnt offering and the fat parts on the altar. And all the people saw, and shouted, and fell on their faces. (1) Now Aaron’s sons Nadab and Abihu each took his fire pan, put fire in it, and laid incense on it; and they offered before the LORD alien fire, which He had not enjoined upon them. (2) And fire came forth from the LORD and consumed them; thus they died at the instance of the LORD. (3) Then Moses said to Aaron, “This is what the LORD meant when He said: Through those near to Me I show Myself holy, And gain glory before all the people.” And Aaron was silent. (4) Moses called Mishael and Elzaphan, sons of Uzziel the uncle of Aaron, and said to them, “Come forward and carry your kinsmen away from the front of the sanctuary to a place outside the camp.” (5) They came forward and carried them out of the camp by their tunics, as Moses had ordered. (6) And Moses said to Aaron and to his sons Eleazar and Ithamar, “Do not bare your heads and do not rend your clothes, lest you die and anger strike the whole community. But your kinsmen, all the house of Israel, shall bewail the burning that the LORD has wrought. (7) And so do not go outside the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, lest you die, for the LORD’s anointing oil is upon you.” And they did as Moses had bidden. (8) And the LORD spoke to Aaron, saying: (9) Drink no wine or other intoxicant, you or your sons, when you enter the Tent of Meeting, that you may not die. This is a law for all time throughout the ages, (10) for you must distinguish between the sacred and the profane, and between the unclean and the clean; (11) and you must teach the Israelites all the laws which the LORD has imparted to them through Moses. (12) Moses spoke to Aaron and to his remaining sons, Eleazar and Ithamar: Take the meal offering that is left over from the LORD’s offerings by fire and eat it unleavened beside the altar, for it is most holy. (13) You shall eat it in the sacred precinct, inasmuch as it is your due, and that of your children, from the LORD’s offerings by fire; for so I have been commanded. (14) But the breast of elevation offering and the thigh of gift offering you, and your sons and daughters with you, may eat in any clean place, for they have been assigned as a due to you and your children from the Israelites’ sacrifices of well-being. (15) Together with the fat of fire offering, they must present the thigh of gift offering and the breast of elevation offering, which are to be elevated as an elevation offering before the LORD, and which are to be your due and that of your children with you for all time—as the LORD has commanded. (16) Then Moses inquired about the goat of sin offering, and it had already been burned! He was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron’s remaining sons, and said, (17) “Why did you not eat the sin offering in the sacred area? For it is most holy, and He has given it to you to remove the guilt of the community and to make expiation for them before the LORD. (18) Since its blood was not brought inside the sanctuary, you should certainly have eaten it in the sanctuary, as I commanded.” (19) And Aaron spoke to Moses, “See, this day they brought their sin offering and their burnt offering before the LORD, and such things have befallen me! Had I eaten sin offering today, would the LORD have approved?” (20) And when Moses heard this, he approved. (1) The LORD spoke to Moses and Aaron, saying to them: (2) Speak to the Israelite people thus: These are the creatures that you may eat from among all the land animals: (3) any animal that has true hoofs, with clefts through the hoofs, and that chews the cud—such you may eat. (4) The following, however, of those that either chew the cud or have true hoofs, you shall not eat: the camel—although it chews the cud, it has no true hoofs: it is unclean for you; (5) the daman—although it chews the cud, it has no true hoofs: it is unclean for you; (6) the hare—although it chews the cud, it has no true hoofs: it is unclean for you; (7) and the swine—although it has true hoofs, with the hoofs cleft through, it does not chew the cud: it is unclean for you. (8) You shall not eat of their flesh or touch their carcasses; they are unclean for you. (9) These you may eat of all that live in water: anything in water, whether in the seas or in the streams, that has fins and scales—these you may eat. (10) But anything in the seas or in the streams that has no fins and scales, among all the swarming things of the water and among all the other living creatures that are in the water—they are an abomination for you (11) and an abomination for you they shall remain: you shall not eat of their flesh and you shall abominate their carcasses. (12) Everything in water that has no fins and scales shall be an abomination for you. (13) The following you shall abominate among the birds—they shall not be eaten, they are an abomination: the eagle, the vulture, and the black vulture; (14) the kite, falcons of every variety; (15) all varieties of raven; (16) the ostrich, the nighthawk, the sea gull; hawks of every variety; (17) the little owl, the cormorant, and the great owl; (18) the white owl, the pelican, and the bustard; (19) the stork; herons of every variety; the hoopoe, and the bat. (20) All winged swarming things that walk on fours shall be an abomination for you. (21) But these you may eat among all the winged swarming things that walk on fours: all that have, above their feet, jointed legs to leap with on the ground— (22) of these you may eat the following: locusts of every variety; all varieties of bald locust; crickets of every variety; and all varieties of grasshopper. (23) But all other winged swarming things that have four legs shall be an abomination for you. (24) And the following shall make you unclean—whoever touches their carcasses shall be unclean until evening, (25) and whoever carries the carcasses of any of them shall wash his clothes and be unclean until evening— (26) every animal that has true hoofs but without clefts through the hoofs, or that does not chew the cud. They are unclean for you; whoever touches them shall be unclean. (27) Also all animals that walk on paws, among those that walk on fours, are unclean for you; whoever touches their carcasses shall be unclean until evening. (28) And anyone who carries their carcasses shall wash his clothes and remain unclean until evening. They are unclean for you. (29) The following shall be unclean for you from among the things that swarm on the earth: the mole, the mouse, and great lizards of every variety; (30) the gecko, the land crocodile, the lizard, the sand lizard, and the chameleon. (31) Those are for you the unclean among all the swarming things; whoever touches them when they are dead shall be unclean until evening. (32) And anything on which one of them falls when dead shall be unclean: be it any article of wood, or a cloth, or a skin, or a sack—any such article that can be put to use shall be dipped in water, and it shall remain unclean until evening; then it shall be clean. (33) And if any of those falls into an earthen vessel, everything inside it shall be unclean and [the vessel] itself you shall break. (34) As to any food that may be eaten, it shall become unclean if it came in contact with water; as to any liquid that may be drunk, it shall become unclean if it was inside any vessel. (35) Everything on which the carcass of any of them falls shall be unclean: an oven or stove shall be smashed. They are unclean and unclean they shall remain for you. (36) However, a spring or cistern in which water is collected shall be clean, but whoever touches such a carcass in it shall be unclean. (37) If such a carcass falls upon seed grain that is to be sown, it is clean; (38) but if water is put on the seed and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it shall be unclean for you. (39) If an animal that you may eat has died, anyone who touches its carcass shall be unclean until evening; (40) anyone who eats of its carcass shall wash his clothes and remain unclean until evening; and anyone who carries its carcass shall wash his clothes and remain unclean until evening. (41) All the things that swarm upon the earth are an abomination; they shall not be eaten. (42) You shall not eat, among all things that swarm upon the earth, anything that crawls on its belly, or anything that walks on fours, or anything that has many legs; for they are an abomination. (43) You shall not draw abomination upon yourselves through anything that swarms; you shall not make yourselves unclean therewith and thus become unclean. (44) For I the LORD am your God: you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy. You shall not make yourselves unclean through any swarming thing that moves upon the earth. (45) For I the LORD am He who brought you up from the land of Egypt to be your God: you shall be holy, for I am holy. (46) These are the instructions concerning animals, birds, all living creatures that move in water, and all creatures that swarm on earth, (47) for distinguishing between the unclean and the clean, between the living things that may be eaten and the living things that may not be eaten.

משנה שביעית י׳

(א) שְׁבִיעִית, מְשַׁמֶּטֶת אֶת הַמִּלְוָה בִּשְׁטָר וְשֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁטָר...

(ג) פְּרוֹזְבּוּל, אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. זֶה אֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהִתְקִין הִלֵּל הַזָּקֵן, כְּשֶׁרָאָה שֶׁנִּמְנְעוּ הָעָם מִלְּהַלְווֹת זֶה אֶת זֶה וְעוֹבְרִין עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה (דברים טו) הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן יִהְיֶה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְּלִיַּעַל וְגוֹ', הִתְקִין הִלֵּל לַפְּרוֹזְבּוּל:

Mishnah Sheviit 10

(1) The sabbatical year cancels a debt written in a document or one not written in a document. A debt to a shop is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into the form of a loan, then it is cancelled. Rabbi Judah says: the former debt is always cancelled. A wage-debt to a worker is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into a loan it is cancelled. Rabbi Yose says: the [payment for] any work that must cease with the seventh year, is cancelled, but if it need not cease with the seventh year, then it is not cancelled.

(2) One who slaughters a cow and divides it up on Rosh Hashanah [at the end of the seventh year]: If the month had been intercalated, [the debt] is remitted. But if it had not been intercalated, it is not remitted. [Fines for] rape, for seduction, for defamation, and all other obligations arising from legal procedure, are not remitted. One who loans and takes a pledge, and one who hands over his debt documents to a court, [these debts] are not remitted.

(3) [A loan secured by] a prozbul is not cancelled. This was one of the things enacted by Hillel the elder; for when he observed people refraining from lending to one another, and thus transgressing what is written in the Torah, “Beware, lest you harbor the base thought, [‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ so that you are mean to your needy kinsman and give him nothing.” Hillel enacted the prozbul.

(4) This is the formula of the prozbul: “I turn over to you, so-and-so, judges of such and such a place, that any debt that I may have outstanding, I shall collect it whenever I desire.” And the judges sign below, or the witnesses.

(5) A pre-dated prozbul is valid, but a post-dated one, is invalid. Pre-dated loan documents [of loans] are invalid, but post-dated one valid. If one borrows from five persons, then he writes a separate prozbul for each [creditor]. But if five borrow from the same person, then he writes only one prozbul for them all.

(6) A prozbul is written only for [a debt secured by] land. But if [the debtor] has none, then [the creditor] can give him title to a share, however small, of his own field. If he had land in pledge in a city, a prozbul can be written on it. Rabbi Hutzpit says: a prozbul may be written for a man on the security of his wife's property, or for an orphan on the security of property belonging to his guardian.

(7) A bee-hive:Rabbi Eliezer says: Behold, it is like land and a prozbul may be written [using it as security] and it is not susceptible to uncleanness while it remains in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is liable. But the sages say: it is not like land, a prozbul may not be written [using it as security], it is susceptible to uncleanness while in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is exempt.

(8) One who returns a debt [after] the seventh year, the [creditor] must say to [the debtor]: “I remit it.” But [the debtor] should say: “Even so [I will repay it].” [The creditor] may then accept it from him, because it says: “And this is the word of the release” (Deuteronomy 15:2). Similarly, when [an accidental] killer has been exiled to a city of refuge, and the citizens want to honor him, he must say to them: “I am a murderer.” If they say: “Even so, [we want to honor you], then he may accept [the honor] from them, because it says: “And this is the word of the murderer” (Deuteronomy 19:4).

(9) One who repays his debts after the seventh year, the sages are pleased with him. One who borrows from a convert whose sons had converted with him, the debt need not be repaid to his sons, but if he returns it the sages are pleased with him. All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing, but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him.

יבמות פ״ז ב

מתני׳ האשה שהלך בעלה למדינת הים ובאו ואמרו לה מת בעליך וניסת ואח"כ בא בעלה תצא מזה ומזה וצריכה גט מזה ומזה ואין לה כתובה ולא פירות ולא מזונות ולא בלאות לא על זה ולא על זה ואם נטלה מזה ומזה תחזיר והולד ממזר מזה ומזה ולא זה וזה מטמא לה...

גמ׳ מדקתני סיפא נשאת שלא ברשות מותרת לחזור לו שלא ברשות ב"ד אלא בעדים מכלל דרישא ברשות ב"ד ובעד אחד אלמא עד אחד נאמן ותנן נמי הוחזקו להיות משיאין עד מפי עד ואשה מפי אשה ואשה מפי עבד ומפי שפחה אלמא עד אחד מהימן...

Yevamot 87b

was empty, and now her body is full with the child, and therefore she is no longer “as in her youth.” But in a situation where “she has no child,” when at the outset her body was empty and now her body is also empty, as she has given birth, you might say that she should not be disqualified. Therefore, it is necessary to write both verses. Parenthetically, the Gemara lists terms signifying the following discussions, to serve as a mnemonic device: Said to him, we should not make, by death, we should make and not make, by a child, yavam and teruma, levirate marriage and teruma. This list of terms, taken from the introductions or key phrases in each of the ensuing discussions, is the mnemonic. Rav Yehuda from De’iskarta said to Rava, in continuation of the discussion of the baraita: Should we not make the halakha concerning dead children like the halakha concerning living children with regard to levirate marriage by an a fortiori inference, and say: And if in a place where the Torah made the halakha with regard to a child from the first husband like the halakha with regard to a child from the second husband, to disqualify her from teruma, for as long as she has a child who is not a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, the Torah nevertheless did not make dead children like living ones; therefore, in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, is it not right that we should not make the dead like the living? Why, then, is a yevama exempt from levirate marriage if her late husband’s only child dies? The verse states: “Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17). In other words, since the ways of Torah are those of pleasantness, the Torah would not obligate a woman who has married in the meantime to subsequently perform ḥalitza, as this might demean her in her husband’s eyes. The Gemara inquires: And let us make the halakha with regard to dead children like the halakha with regard to living ones with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, it nevertheless made the living like the dead, as a woman whose husband died and left a child is exempt from levirate marriage even if that child subsequently dies; then, in a place where the Torah made a child from the first like a child from the second to disqualify her from teruma, is it not right that we should make the living like the dead? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states “and she have no child, she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth” (Leviticus 22:13), and here she does not currently have children. The Gemara further suggests: And let us make her child from the first husband like her child from the second one with regard to levirate marriage, again from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead with regard to teruma, it still made a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where it made the living like the dead, with regard to levirate marriage, is it not right that we should make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, and thereby exempt her from levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: The verse states about levirate marriage: “And he has no child” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and in fact he had none at the time of his death. The Gemara offers another possibility: And should we make a child from the first husband not like a child from the second one with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: If in a place where the Torah made the living like the dead to exempt her from levirate marriage, it still did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead, with regard to teruma, is it not right that we should not make the child from the first husband like the child from the second? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states: “And she have no child,” but in fact this woman has children. MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back from out of the country, she must leave both this man and that one, as they are both forbidden to her. And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and that one. And furthermore, she has a claim to neither payment of her marriage contract, nor the profits of her property used by either of them, nor sustenance, nor the worn clothes she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims neither against this man nor against that one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. And if she took any of these items from this man or from that one, she must return them to him. And the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one. Her child from the second husband is a definite mamzer, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a mamzer. And neither this man nor that man may become impure for her upon her death, if they are priests. And neither this one nor that one is entitled to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: Neither to her found articles, nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows. If she was a regular Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, and the daughter of a Levite is disqualified from partaking of the first tithe, and the daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And neither the heirs of this man nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract, as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. And if they both died childless, the brothers of this one and the brothers of this one must perform ḥalitza and they do not enter into levirate marriage. Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the first tanna and says that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found articles, to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows. Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. Rabbi Shimon says an even more far-reaching ruling: Her sexual relations or her ḥalitza with the brothers of the first husband exempts her rival wife, as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or ḥalitza, and certainly she does not require ḥalitza from the brother of the second husband. And if she returns to her first husband, the child from him is not a mamzer. All these halakhot refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. But if she married without the consent of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If she married by permission of the court, she must leave both of them and she is exempt from bringing the offering, i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress. If, however, she did not marry by permission of the court, she must leave her second husband and is liable to bring an offering for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from bringing an offering. If the court instructed her to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, and she went and ruined herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and not to engage in licentious relations. GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If she married without the consent of the court she is permitted to return to him, this indicates that she did so not by the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses, i.e., as there are two witnesses, she does not require special permission from the court. With this in mind, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna, which speaks of one who acted with the consent of the court, is referring to a situation when there was one witness. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible when he testifies about a husband’s death, i.e., the court will permit a wife to marry on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. And we also learned in a mishna (122a): They established that they would allow a woman to marry if her husband was reported dead by one witness, based solely on what he learned from the mouth of another witness, i.e., hearsay testimony, and also the testimony of a woman who heard from another woman, and even the testimony of a woman who heard from a slave or from a maidservant. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible in this regard, as whenever hearsay testimony is accepted, the testimony of one witness is also valid. And we also learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b) that if one witness says to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and the accused says: I did not eat it, the accused is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that the individual in question said: I did not eat it, which indicates that if he had been silent and failed to deny the accusation, the lone witness is deemed credible. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible by Torah law with regard to certain issues. § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “Or if his sin be known to him” (Leviticus 4:23, 28). This indicates that he himself must be aware of his sin, and not if it was made known to him by others. In other words, one is not obligated to bring an offering due to the testimony of others, even if they testify that he had transgressed. I might have thought he should be exempt even though he does not contradict the witness’s claim. Therefore, the verse states: If his sin be known to him, which indicates that in any case, however he comes by this knowledge, he is liable. The Gemara clarifies this halakha. What are the circumstances? If we say that two witnesses came and informed him and he does not contradict them, why do I need a verse to teach this ruling? After all, the testimony of two witnesses is always accepted. Rather, is it not referring to one witness, and yet if he does not contradict the sole witness, that witness is deemed credible? One can learn from this that one witness is deemed credible with regard to prohibitions. The Gemara refutes this claim: And from where do you infer that the reason is due to the fact that the one witness is deemed credible? Perhaps the accused must bring an offering because he remains silent, as there is a principle that silence is considered like an admission. And you should know that this is the reason, as the latter clause of that same baraita teaches that if two witnesses said to him: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, he is exempt, and Rabbi Meir obligates him to bring an offering. Rabbi Meir said that this is an a fortiori inference: If two witnesses can bring him to the severe penalty of death by testifying that he had committed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, should they not bring him to the more lenient obligation of an offering? The Rabbis said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as with regard to an offering, what is the halakha if he would choose to say: I was an intentional sinner? One who sins intentionally is not liable to bring an offering. Since the accused in the latter clause of the baraita can negate the testimony that would have rendered him liable to bring an offering, he can likewise deny the act itself, whereas if witnesses testify that he performed an action that incurs the death penalty, his denial has no bearing on the case. The Gemara clarifies: In the first clause

יבמות פ״ח א

סברא היא מידי דהוה אחתיכה ספק של חלב ספק של שומן ואתא עד אחד ואמר ברי לי דשומן הוא דמהימן מי דמי התם לא איתחזק איסורא הכא איתחזק איסורא דאשת איש ואין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים ... אמר ר' זירא מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה הקלת עליה בתחלה לא ליחמיר ולא ליקיל משום עיגונא אקילו בה רבנן:

Yevamot 88a

of the mishna, what is the reason that when he remains silent, the Rabbis obligate him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? If we say it is because the witness is deemed credible, but there is the case of an ordinary pair of witnesses, where even though he contradicts their claim they are deemed credible, and yet the Rabbis exempt him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. Rather, is it not because he remained silent, and silence is considered like an admission? If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted. Rather, this is evidently based on logical reasoning: Just as it is in the case of a piece of meat about which it is uncertain if it is forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and there is no way of clarifying which it is, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas here, the presumption of the prohibition with regard to a married woman is established, and there is a principle that nothing involving those with whom relations are forbidden can be determined by fewer than two witnesses. In fact, this is comparable only to a case involving a piece of meat that is definitely forbidden fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, as the halakha is that he is not deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this claim: Is it comparable? There, when it is established as forbidden fat, even if one hundred witnesses come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two witnesses come and say the husband is dead they would be deemed credible, let us also deem one witness credible. This is just as it is in the case of untithed produce, i.e., produce from which neither teruma nor tithe has been separated, consecrated property, and konamot, an alternative term for offerings [korbanot] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: Konamot. The Gemara asks: With regard to this case of untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If it is his, and he testifies that terumot and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. Rather, you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce of another, but if so, what does the anonymous Sage who cited this example hold in this case? The Gemara elaborates: If he holds that one who separates tithes from his produce for that of another does not require the owner’s knowledge, and he can prepare his friend’s produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds that the owner’s knowledge is required before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared, in that case, it itself, this very halakha, from where do we derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband? Similarly, with regard to consecrated property too, if it is merely sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is due to the fact that it is within his power to redeem it. And if this is referring to inherent sanctity, the matter still remains to be clarified: If it is his offering, then the reason is due to the fact that it is within his power to request from a Sage that the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. Rather, you must say that it is referring to the offering of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case itself, from where do we derive that he is deemed credible? In the case of konamot too, if he holds that there is misuse of consecrated objects with regard to konamot, i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a konam have the status of consecrated property, and that the sanctity that inheres in its value applies to them, then his claim is accepted because it is within his power to redeem it. And if he maintains that there is no misuse of consecrated objects in the case of konamot, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders, i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: If the property in question is his, it is permitted because it is within his power to request from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. Rather, you will say that the konam must belong to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this halakha itself, that one witness is deemed credible in this case, from where do we derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband? Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her, the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, at the end, i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the halakha is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, you are lenient with her at the beginning, by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us not be stringent at the end and not be lenient at the beginning. The Gemara answers: Due to the case of a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her. Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband’s death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts. § The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught this halakha only if she married by virtue of the testimony of one witness, but if she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she does not have to leave him. They laughed at him in the West, Eretz Yisrael: The man, the first husband, has come and stands before us, and yet you say she does not have to leave her second husband. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a situation when we do not know the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband. The Gemara asks: If we do not know him, even if she married by one witness, why should she leave? The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case when two others came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him, as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him” (Genesis 42:8), and Rav Ḥisda said that this verse teaches that Joseph left his brothers without a full beard, and he came with a full beard, which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one’s appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him. The Gemara asks: Even in this case, ultimately they are two against two. Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?

משנה יבמות ט״ז:ז׳

אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, כְּשֶׁיָּרַדְתִּי לִנְהַרְדְּעָא לְעַבֵּר הַשָּׁנָה, מָצָאתִי נְחֶמְיָה אִישׁ בֵּית דְּלִי, אָמַר לִי, שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁאֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה בְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, אֶלָּא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶן בָּבָא. וְנוּמֵתִי לוֹ, כֵּן הַדְּבָרִים. אָמַר לִי, אֱמֹר לָהֶם מִשְּׁמִי, אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִים שֶׁהַמְּדִינָה מְשֻׁבֶּשֶׁת בִּגְיָסוֹת, מְקֻבְּלָנִי מֵרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן, שֶׁמַּשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. וּכְשֶׁבָּאתִי וְהִרְצֵיתִי הַדְּבָרִים לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שָׂמַח לִדְבָרַי, וְאָמַר, מָצָאנוּ חָבֵר לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶן בָּבָא. מִתּוֹךְ הַדְּבָרִים נִזְכַּר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגוּ הֲרוּגִים בְּתֵל אַרְזָא, וְהִשִּׂיא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, וְהֻחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. וְהֻחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מִפִּי עֶבֶד, מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמְרִים, אֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, לֹא עַל פִּי אִשָּׁה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי עֶבֶד וְלֹא עַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי קְרוֹבִים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, מַעֲשֶׂה בִבְנֵי לֵוִי שֶׁהָלְכוּ לְצֹעַר עִיר הַתְּמָרִים, וְחָלָה אַחַד מֵהֶם בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וֶהֱבִיאוּהוּ בְפֻנְדָּק, וּבַחֲזָרָתָם אָמְרוּ לַפֻּנְדָּקִית אַיֵּה חֲבֵרֵנוּ, אָמְרָה לָהֶם מֵת וּקְבַרְתִּיו, וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, וְלֹא תְהֵא כֹהֶנֶת כַּפֻּנְדָּקִית. אָמַר לָהֶם, לִכְשֶׁתְּהֵא פֻּנְדָּקִית נֶאֱמֶנֶת. הַפֻּנְדָּקִית הוֹצִיאָה לָהֶם מַקְלוֹ וְתַרְמִילוֹ וְסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁהָיָה בְיָדוֹ:

Mishnah Yevamot 16:7

Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.

יבמות פ״ט

שלח ליה רב חסדא לרבה ביד רב אחא בר רב הונא ואין ב"ד מתנין לעקור דבר מן התורה והתניא מאימתי אדם יורש את אשתו קטנה ב"ש אומרים משתעמוד בקומתה וב"ה אומרים משתכנס לחופה רבי אליעזר אומר משתבעל ויורשה ומיטמא לה ואוכלת בגינו תרומה ב"ש אומרים משתעמוד בקומתה אע"ג דלא נכנסה לחופה... קתני מיהת יורשה והא הכא דמדאורייתא אבוה ירית לה ומדרבנן ירית לה בעל הפקר ב"ד היה הפקר ... ומיטמא לה והא הכא דמדאורייתא אביה מיטמא לה ומדרבנן מיטמא לה בעל משום דהויא לה מת מצוה ומי הוי מת מצוה והתניא אי זהו מת מצוה כל שאין לו קוברין קורא ואחרים עונין אותו אין זה מת מצוה הכא נמי כיון דלא ירתי לה קריא ולא ענו לה

Yevamot 89

the last one gave her a bill of divorce, he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered a divorcée at all, this proves by inference that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. The reason is that if she requires a bill of divorce, even if it is only due to uncertainty, why has he not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood? A bill of divorce of any validity would bar her from marrying a priest. Rather, a bill of divorce given by a man to a woman who is not his wife is clearly of no account, and the reason for the ruling in the latter clause, with regard to betrothal, is that people will say there was no need for a bill of divorce because it was a mistaken betrothal. The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause too, they will say it was a mistaken marriage. The Gemara answers: The Sages penalized her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, lest people say she divorced this man and went back and married the first one. The Gemara counters: If so, in the latter clause of the mishna let us also penalize her. The Gemara responds: The first clause involves a situation where she violated a prohibition through her intercourse, and therefore the Sages penalized her. Conversely, in the latter clause, when she did not violate a prohibition, as she simply became betrothed, the Sages did not penalize her. § The mishna taught that this woman does not have, i.e., she is not entitled to, the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages instituted a marriage contract in general, for an ordinary woman? So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The necessity to find money for her marriage contract will prevent a hasty decision to divorce her. However, in the case of this woman, on the contrary, the Sages actually prefer that she will be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as the marriage was forbidden and she may not remain with him. Consequently, they eliminated her marriage contract to encourage him to divorce her. § The mishna further states that she does not have claim to profits, or sustenance, or worn clothes. Why not? Because the stipulations in the marriage contract, i.e., all the rights of a wife stemming from the stipulations that are part of a marriage contract, are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she has no marriage contract, she does not have the stipulations in a marriage contract either. § The mishna also teaches that if she took any of the above from this man or from that one she must return anything she took. The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Since she is not entitled to these articles, of course she must give them back. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that since she has already taken hold of them we do not remove them from her possession, as this is merely a penalty and she obtained nothing that did not legally belong to her. The tanna therefore teaches us that the court requires her to return even these items. § The mishna taught that the child of either of the men is a mamzer. To clarify this issue, the Gemara cites a different discussion. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Terumot 2:2): One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce in order to exempt ritually pure food, and if he separated teruma from impure food unwittingly, his teruma is considered teruma. If he acted intentionally, he has done nothing, that is, his action is of no effect. The Sages debated: What is the meaning of the expression: He has done nothing? Rav Ḥisda said: He has done nothing at all, meaning that even that griva of produce he set aside as teruma returns to its former untithed state, as his entire act is completely disregarded. Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, said: He has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce from which he separated teruma, but the fruit he separated is itself teruma. Although the portion he set aside is sanctified as teruma, this does not exempt him from separating more teruma from ritually pure produce. The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda did not say his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, as, if you say it is teruma, on occasion he will be negligent and not separate anything more, assuming that if the portion he set aside has the status of teruma he must certainly have done everything required. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:1): With regard to one who separates teruma from a serpent melon [kishut] and it was discovered to be bitter, or from a watermelon and it was discovered to be spoiled, it is teruma, and yet he must go back and separate teruma from another serpent melon or watermelon. No concern is expressed in this mishna that one might neglect to set aside teruma a second time. The Gemara answers: Are you raising a contradiction between the case of an unwitting sinner and that of an intentional sinner? There is a difference between them, as one who was unwitting did not commit a transgression and consequently does not deserve to be penalized, whereas one who was an intentional sinner did commit a transgression. And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this ruling involving an unwitting sinner and another halakha of an unwitting sinner: Here, it is taught that if the one who separated ritually impure produce instead of ritually pure produce was unwitting, his teruma is teruma, which indicates that he does not have to separate teruma again. However, there, with regard to rotten fruit, it is taught that it is teruma and yet he must separate teruma again. The Gemara explains: There, his was an unwitting act that is close to an intentional one, as he should have tasted it first to ensure that he was separating quality fruit. His failure to do so renders him virtually a willful sinner, and therefore the Sages penalized him by obligating him to set aside teruma again. In the case of impure teruma, in contrast, he may not have been able to investigate the matter when he separated the portion. And the Gemara also raises a contradiction between one case involving an intentional sinner and another case of an intentional sinner. Here, it is taught that in the case of an intentional sinner who separates teruma, he has done nothing. There, we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10), that with regard to one who separates teruma from produce growing in a vessel that is not perforated, for produce that grew in a perforated vessel, which is considered connected to the ground, it is teruma, but he must go back and separate teruma a second time. This ruling is based on the principle that anything that grew in a pot without a hole does not require separation of teruma by Torah law. In this case, the fact that he must again set aside teruma does not mean that the portion he separated is not consecrated at all. The Gemara answers: In a case involving two vessels he will listen. Since the difference between the two vessels is clear to the eye, if the owner is told he must separate teruma again, it can be assumed that he will comply. In contrast, in the case of one vessel he will not listen, as ritually impure and pure produce look the same to him. Consequently, if he is informed that he must set aside teruma a second time despite the fact that the produce he already set aside has the status of teruma, he will take no notice. The Gemara asks another question: And according to the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, who said that he has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce but it is nevertheless teruma, in what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10): If one separates teruma from that which grew in a perforated pot for that which is from a non-perforated pot, his teruma is teruma, but it may not be eaten until he removes on behalf of that portion itself teruma and tithe from another place? In other words, the portion he separated as teruma is not entirely consecrated, as it too is considered untithed produce in the sense that teruma must be separated for it. In contrast, one who sets aside impure teruma does not have to separate teruma from that portion itself. The Gemara answers: Here, with regard to ritually impure teruma, it is different, as by Torah law it is in fact full-fledged teruma, but the Sages penalized him by making him separate teruma again. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elai, as Rabbi Elai said: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is teruma? As it is written with regard to teruma: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it its best” (Numbers 18:32). This verse that if one separated teruma from inferior-quality produce he has committed a sin, which shows that his action is effective, as Rabbi Elai proceeds to explain. Rabbi Elai elaborates: And if this inferior portion is not sanctified as teruma at all, why is there a bearing of sin? If the produce does not have the status of teruma he has not done anything, which means that his action cannot be considered a transgression. From here we learn with regard to one who separated from the bad for the good that his teruma is teruma after the fact. Similarly, the teruma of one who separates ritually impure food for pure food is valid teruma by Torah law. After clarifying the opinions themselves, the Gemara analyzes the case in greater detail. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to your opinion, that you said he has done nothing at all, meaning that even that se’a he set aside returns to its former untithed state, what is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will be negligent and will not separate teruma a second time. However, is there anything that by Torah law is teruma, as stated by Rabbi Elai, and yet due to the concern: Perhaps he will be negligent, the Sages removed its status as sacred and gave to it the status of non-sacred food? And can the court stipulate and enact a decree to uproot something that applies by Torah law? Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: And you, do you not hold that the Sages have the power to do so? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the child is a mamzer from this one and from that one? Granted, the child from the second man is a mamzer, as he was born to a married woman from a man who was not her husband. However, with regard to the child from the first husband, why is he a mamzer? After all, she is his wife, and by Torah law their son is a full-fledged Jew. And the Sages’ declaration that he is a mamzer cannot be seen as a mere stringency, as they thereby permit him to a mamzeret. This shows that a rabbinical decree can uproot a Torah prohibition. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda that Shmuel said as follows: It is forbidden for the child of the first husband to marry a mamzeret. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the child is forbidden to a mamzeret. And if so, why does the mishna call him a mamzer? This is to teach us that the Sages are stringent and render it prohibited for him to marry a regular Jewish woman. With regard to the issue at hand, as he may not marry a mamzeret, the Sages did not in fact uproot a mitzva that applies by Torah law. Rav Ḥisda sent a proof to Rabba, in the hand of Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna: And can the court not stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: From when does a man inherit from his minor wife, who was married off by her mother or brother, as enacted by the Sages, a marriage that is not valid by Torah law? Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her fully developed height, i.e., when she grows up and reaches the age of maturity. And Beit Hillel say: From when she enters the wedding canopy. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. As soon as she is considered his wife, all the halakhot of a wife apply to her. And he inherits from her and becomes impure for her if she dies, even if he is a priest, and she eats teruma on his account if he is a priest. The Gemara first clarifies various details of this baraita. Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her height. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is this the case even though she has not yet entered the wedding canopy? Betrothal alone, without the marriage canopy, is not enough to enable a man to inherit from an adult woman, let alone a minor. The Gemara answers: You must say that Beit Shammai meant from when she stands at her fully developed height and enters the wedding canopy. And Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel as follows: That which you said, that he inherits her from when she enters the wedding canopy, is not enough. Rather, if she stands at her fully developed height, the wedding canopy is effective for bringing about her marriage, and if not, the wedding canopy is not effective for bringing about her marriage. The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. The Gemara again expresses surprise: But didn’t Rabbi Eliezer say that the actions of a minor girl are nothing, which indicates that marriage and intercourse with her are not considered an act of acquisition. Rather, we must say that he meant from when she matures and has sexual relations. The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. In any event the baraita is teaching that he inherits from her. But here is a case where by Torah law her father, i.e., his relatives, as he is dead, inherits from her, as a minor orphan cannot marry by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law the husband inherits from her. This shows that the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as in monetary matters property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless, and therefore the court can allocate her inheritance as they see fit. As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone’s possessions. Rabbi Elazar says that the proof that the court can declare property ownerless is from here: “These are the inheritances that Elazar the priest, and Joshua, son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance” (Joshua 19:51). What do heads have to do with fathers? The expression “the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes” is unusual and vague. Rather, this comes to tell you: Just as fathers bequeath to their sons anything they want to, so too, the heads, i.e., the leaders and judges of the people, bequeath to the people anything they want to. This shows that the leaders can take property from one individual and give it to another. It was stated that the husband of a minor becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The Gemara asks: But here is a case where by Torah law her father, not the man she married, is obligated to become impure for her, as the latter is not his wife by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law her husband defiles himself for her. The Gemara answers: This is because she is considered like a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], for which even a priest must become impure. Once she is married, her relatives from her father’s family no longer care for her welfare, which means her husband is the only one who is entrusted with her burial. The Gemara asks: And is she in fact a met mitzva? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Which corpse is a met mitzva? Any corpse that does not have anyone to bury it. If it was in a place where if one calls and others would answer him, this is not a met mitzva. In contrast, this girl does have relatives who can bury her, if necessary. The Gemara answers: Here too, since the members of her father’s family do not inherit from her, she would call and they would not answer her, as they have no desire to go to any trouble for her. Since her husband inherits from her, it is his duty to tend to her burial, and he must therefore become impure for her, as she has the status of a met mitzva.

יבמות צ׳

תא שמע דם שנטמא וזרקו בשוגג הורצה במזיד לא הורצה והא הכא דמדאורייתא ארצויי מרצה... סוף סוף קמתעקרא אכילת בשר וכתיב (שמות כט, לג) ואכלו אתם אשר כפר בהם מלמד שהכהנים אוכלים ובעלים מתכפרים א"ל שב ואל תעשה שאני ... ת"ש (דברים יח, טו) אליו תשמעון אפילו אומר לך עבור על אחת מכל מצות שבתורה כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל הכל לפי שעה שמע לו שאני התם דכתיב אליו תשמעון וליגמר מיניה מיגדר מילתא שאני:

Yevamot 90

It was further taught: And she eats teruma on his account. The Gemara explains: This is referring to teruma that applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law. The Gemara attempts to offer a proof for this claim. Come and hear a baraita: If a non-priest ate ritually impure teruma of a priest, he must pay him with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. In a case where he paid with impure, non-sacred food, Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir that if he did so unwittingly, his payment is considered payment, but if he acted intentionally, his payment is not payment at all. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and that one his payment is a valid payment, and the food has the sanctity of teruma, although it is ritually impure, and he must also go back and pay him again with pure, non-sacred food. And we discussed this baraita with regard to the following question: Why is it that according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, when the non-priest pays the priest with ritually impure, ordinary food intentionally, his payment is not considered payment? On the contrary, the non-priest should be blessed, as he ate something of his that is not fit for him even during the priest’s days of impurity, as impure teruma must be burned, and he pays him with impure, ordinary food, which is something that is fit for him during his days of impurity. Admittedly, once he gives it to him, the produce becomes impure teruma, but at the time of his payment the food was available to be eaten. And Rava said, and some say this statement unattributed to any particular Sage: The baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: If he ate ritually impure teruma, he pays with anything, even impure, non-sacred produce. If he ate pure teruma he pays with pure, non-sacred food, and if he paid with impure, non-sacred produce, the Sages disagreed about this case: Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If done unwittingly, his payment is payment; if intentionally, his payment is not payment. And the Rabbis say: Whether unwittingly or intentionally, his payment is payment, and he must go back and pay with pure, non-sacred produce. The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. And here it is a case where by Torah law the produce he gave him is proper payment, and is fully owned by the priest, to the extent that if a priest betroths a woman with them, the betrothal with her is valid. And yet the Sages said, i.e., it is a rabbinic law, according to Sumakhos in the name of Rabbi Meir, that his payment is not payment. And this means that we permit a married woman to all men, as she is betrothed by Torah law but in practice she is treated as an unmarried woman. Evidently, a rabbinical prohibition overrides a betrothal that is effective by Torah law. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the phrase: His payment is not payment, that Rabbi Meir said? It means that he is required to go back and pay with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. However, the food he initially gave is also consecrated. The Gemara asks: If so, the opinion of Sumakhos is the same as that of the Rabbis. The Gemara answers that Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The practical difference between them is whether they decreed against an unwitting sinner due to an intentional sinner. According to Sumakhos, if he unwittingly paid with impure, non-sacred produce his payment is valid and the Sages did not penalize him with a second payment, whereas the Rabbis maintain that even if his sin was accidental he must repay the priest, as the Sages issue the decree in a case of a mistaken transgression due to the case of one who sinned intentionally. The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear another proof. With regard to blood that became ritually impure, and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, the following distinction applies: If he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. And here it is a case where by Torah law the blood effects acceptance, as it is taught in a baraita: For what does the High Priest’s frontplate effect acceptance? For blood, for meat, and for fat that became impure, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident or willingly, whether in the case of an individual offering or an offering of the community. And the Sages said that if a priest sprinkled impure blood intentionally the frontplate does not effect acceptance, and its owner must bring another offering. The Gemara infers: Since he is not obligated to bring this extra offering by Torah law, in essence he subsequently brings in a non-sacred animal to the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said that there is no proof from here, as what is the meaning of the phrase: Does not effect acceptance, that the tanna of the baraita said? It means that it does not effect acceptance in the sense that it permits the meat of the offering to be eaten. However, the owners themselves attain atonement through it, and they do not have to bring another offering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Ultimately, the Torah mitzva of eating the meat of this offering is uprooted, and it is written: “And they shall eat those things with which atonement was made” (Exodus 29:33). This verse teaches that the priests eat the offering and the owner thereby gains atonement. He said to him: The case of sit and refrain from action [shev ve’al ta’aseh] is different. In other words, the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva by instructing one to sit and refrain from action, i.e., to remain passive and do nothing. They cannot, however, uproot a mitzva by telling him to perform an action. Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: I wanted to raise a difficulty against you from the halakha of an uncircumcised man. The Sages decreed that one who converts on the eve of Passover may not partake of the Paschal lamb, due to his ritual impurity. According to Beit Hillel, one who separates from the foreskin by being circumcised is ritually impure like one who separates from the grave (Pesaḥim 92a). This is the halakha despite the fact that by Torah law he is obligated to bring the offering. Rav Ḥisda continued: And I also thought of asking from the case of sprinkling the waters of a purification offering for one who became ritually impure through contact with a corpse, as the Sages rendered it prohibited for one who is impure to receive the sprinkling on the eve of Passover that occurred on Shabbat, although this prevents him from partaking of the Paschal lamb. And I was likewise going to raise a question from the case of a circumcision knife, which the Sages decreed may not be carried on Shabbat, despite the fact that this entails the neglect of a Torah mitzva. And I also wanted to raise a question from the case of a linen cloak, on which the Sages did not allow one to place ritual fringes made of wool. This is a decree that was issued lest he do the same with a garment worn only at night, which is exempt from fringes, and therefore this would be a mixture of wool and linen that is forbidden, although this means that he is unable to fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes. And likewise I wanted to mention a difficulty from the case of the lambs sacrificed on Shavuot. When the festival of Shavuot occurs on Shabbat, the Sages rendered it prohibited to sprinkle the blood of its sacrificial lambs if the offerings had not been slaughtered with the proper intention, despite the fact that the sprinkling itself is not prohibited by Torah law. And similarly, there is a difficulty with regard to the halakha of the shofar, which is sounded on Rosh HaShana, and yet the Sages rendered it prohibited for it to be blown on Shabbat, lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain. And finally I wished to raise a difficulty from the case of a lulav, which may not be carried on the first day of Sukkot that occurred on Shabbat, for the same reason the Sages rendered it prohibited to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat. However, now that you have resolved for us that an action defined as a case of: Sit and refrain from action, is not considered uprooting, all these are also cases of sit and refrain from action. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof. The verse states with regard to a true prophet: “To him you shall listen” (Deuteronomy 18:15). From here it is derived that even if the prophet says to you: Transgress one of the mitzvot of the Torah, for example, as in the case of Elijah at Mount Carmel, who brought an offering to God on that mountain during a period when it was forbidden on pain of karet to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple, with regard to everything that he permits for the requirement of the hour, you must listen to him. This indicates that a Torah mitzva can indeed be uprooted in an active manner. The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is written: “To him you shall listen,” which means that it is a positive mitzva to obey a prophet, and a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition. The Gemara asks: And let him derive from this case a principle that the Sages have the same power as a prophet. The Gemara answers: Safeguarding a matter is different. Since Elijah acted with the aim of preventing the Jewish people from worshipping idols, it was temporarily permitted for him to override a mitzva, in order to strengthen Torah observance with regard to a particular matter in which the people are lax. The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear: The Sages rendered it prohibited for a man who has sent a bill of divorce to his wife to cancel it in the presence of a court without her knowledge after he has given the bill of divorce to his messenger but before she gets the document. The prohibition was instituted to prevent a situation where the messenger, who is unaware of the cancellation, gives her the bill of divorce and she marries another man under the mistaken impression that she is divorced. If he proceeded to nullify it regardless, it is nullified; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot nullify or add to its condition in a case where the bill of divorce included a stipulation. For if so, i.e., if he has the ability to cancel the bill of divorce, what good is the power of the court in their decree that one may not do so? The Gemara explains the proof from this source: And here it is a case where by Torah law, the bill of divorce is nullified, and yet due to the reason of: What good is the power of the court, his nullification is ineffective, which means that we permit a married woman to all men. The Gemara answers: The halakhot of marriage afford no proof, as with regard to one who betroths a woman, he betroths on the authorization of the Sages, and in this case the Sages nullified the betrothal, which they can do because their consent was required for the betrothal to be effective in the first place. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case when he betrothed with money, as it can be explained that the Sages declared the money ownerless, thereby negating the betrothal. However, if he betrothed by means of sexual relations, what can be said? The Gemara answers: The Sages equated his relations with this woman with licentious sexual intercourse. Since in this situation as well the acquisition of betrothal is effective only by authorization of the Sages, they have the power to declare it invalid. The Gemara cites yet another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov said: I have heard that the reason why the court may administer lashes and punish not by Torah law, i.e., in response to actions for which one is not liable to receive punishment by Torah law, is not so as to transgress matters of Torah, but to establish a safeguard for the Torah. And an example of this is an incident involving a certain person who rode on a horse on Shabbat in the days of the Greeks, an act that is prohibited by rabbinic law, and they brought him to the court and they stoned him as a desecrator of Shabbat. They did so not because he was deserving of this, as riding a horse is not punishable by stoning by Torah law, but because the hour required it, as at that time Jews were negligent with regard to Shabbat observance. And again, an incident occurred involving a certain person who cohabited with his own wife under a fig tree in plain view, and they brought him to the court and flogged him, not because this punishment was fitting for him, as it is not prohibited by the Torah for one to engage in relations with his wife wherever he chooses, but because the hour required it, to discourage others from engaging in licentious behavior. This shows that the court can uproot a Torah mitzva even by means of a positive action such as stoning. The Gemara answers: Safeguarding a matter is different. As stated above, the court may uproot a Torah mitzva so as to strengthen Torah observance in general, as was the case with the prophet Elijah. § The mishna taught: Neither this one, her first husband, nor that one, her second, may become impure for her, if they were priests. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara explains that it is written: “But to his relative, who is close to him, for her he may defile himself” (Leviticus 21:2), and the Master said: “His relative” is his wife. And it is further written: “He shall not defile himself, a husband among his people, to profane himself” (Leviticus 21:4). It may be inferred from this apparent contradiction between the verses that there is a husband who becomes impure for his wife, and there is a husband who does not become impure. How so? He becomes impure for his fit wife, but he does not become impure for his disqualified wife. Since in the case of the mishna, the woman in question is disqualified with regard to both men, neither of them may become impure for her. § The mishna further taught: Neither this one nor that one is entitled to her found articles. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages said that the found object of a wife belongs to her husband? So that he should not harbor enmity toward her, due to her refusal to give him the item she found. Here, however, let him harbor much enmity toward her, as the Sages want him to divorce her. § And the mishna also taught that neither man is entitled to her earnings. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages said that a wife’s earnings belong to her husband? Because she eats his food. In this case here, since she does not have rights to his food, her earnings are not his either. § And the mishna further taught that they may not nullify her vows. The Gemara similarly explains: What is the reason that the Merciful One states that a husband may nullify his wife’s vows? So that she should not have to fulfill a vow that will cause her to become repulsive to him, such as refraining from washing or from applying cosmetics. Here, let her be highly repulsive, as the Sages want their relationship to end. § The mishna taught that if she was an Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

תוספות על יבמות פ״ח א:י׳:א׳

מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה כו' - נראה לר"י דלית לן למימר אנן סהדי דדייקא ומינסבא ונאמן עד אחד בכך מן התורה אלא מתקנת חכמים הוא דנאמן ואין זה עקירת דבר מן התורה כיון שדומה הדבר הגון להאמין כמו שאפרש לקמן בפרקין (יבמות דף פט:) שבדבר שיש קצת טעם וסמך לא חשיב עוקר דבר מן התורה:

Tosafot on Yevamot 88a:10:1

...

תוספות על יבמות פ״ט ב:י״ד:א׳

כיון דלא ירתי לה קרי ולא ענו לה - משמע דכל היכא דירית לה מטמא לה דהוי מטמא למת מצוה ולפי זה אלמנה לכ"ג גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט לא ירית לה מדאמר (לקמן יבמות דף צ:) ואין מטמא לאשתו פסולה דאי הוה ירית לה הוה מטמא לה כמו למת מצוה ... ונראה לר"י דמשום דירית לה לא הויא מת מצוה אלא משום דיש כח ביד חכמים לעקור דבר שהוא מן התורה בדבר הדומה כדפירשתי לעיל דכיון דלא ירתי לה דומה למת מצוה ומיהו אינה מת מצוה גמור...

Tosafot on Yevamot 89b:14:1

...

Joseph Ber Soloveitchik (Hebrew: יוסף דב הלוי סולובייצ׳יק‬ Yosef Dov ha-Levi Soloveychik; February 27, 1903 - April 9, 1993) a Rosh Yeshiva of Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary at Yeshiva University. The Rov (variantly spelled The Rav), as he came to be known, ordained close to 2,000 rabbis over the course of almost half a century.

נפש הרב
מכתב הרב שכטר על הרב לאחר פטירתו

מה דודך מדוד
מכתב הרב על דודו הגרי׳׳ז לאחר פטירתו

Eliezer Berkovits
Essential Essays in Judaism:
The Nature and Function of Jewish Law and
Conversion and The Decline of The Oral Law

במדבר כ״ז

(א) וַתִּקְרַ֜בְנָה בְּנ֣וֹת צְלָפְחָ֗ד בֶּן־חֵ֤פֶר בֶּן־גִּלְעָד֙ בֶּן־מָכִ֣יר בֶּן־מְנַשֶּׁ֔ה לְמִשְׁפְּחֹ֖ת מְנַשֶּׁ֣ה בֶן־יוֹסֵ֑ף וְאֵ֙לֶּה֙ שְׁמ֣וֹת בְּנֹתָ֔יו מַחְלָ֣ה נֹעָ֔ה וְחָגְלָ֥ה וּמִלְכָּ֖ה וְתִרְצָֽה׃ (ב) וַֽתַּעֲמֹ֜דְנָה לִפְנֵ֣י מֹשֶׁ֗ה וְלִפְנֵי֙ אֶלְעָזָ֣ר הַכֹּהֵ֔ן וְלִפְנֵ֥י הַנְּשִׂיאִ֖ם וְכָל־הָעֵדָ֑ה פֶּ֥תַח אֹֽהֶל־מוֹעֵ֖ד לֵאמֹֽר׃ (ג) אָבִינוּ֮ מֵ֣ת בַּמִּדְבָּר֒ וְה֨וּא לֹא־הָיָ֜ה בְּת֣וֹךְ הָעֵדָ֗ה הַנּוֹעָדִ֛ים עַל־יְהוָ֖ה בַּעֲדַת־קֹ֑רַח כִּֽי־בְחֶטְא֣וֹ מֵ֔ת וּבָנִ֖ים לֹא־הָ֥יוּ לֽוֹ׃ (ד) לָ֣מָּה יִגָּרַ֤ע שֵׁם־אָבִ֙ינוּ֙ מִתּ֣וֹךְ מִשְׁפַּחְתּ֔וֹ כִּ֛י אֵ֥ין ל֖וֹ בֵּ֑ן תְּנָה־לָּ֣נוּ אֲחֻזָּ֔ה בְּת֖וֹךְ אֲחֵ֥י אָבִֽינוּ׃ (ה) וַיַּקְרֵ֥ב מֹשֶׁ֛ה אֶת־מִשְׁפָּטָ֖ן לִפְנֵ֥י יְהוָֽה׃ (ס) (ו) וַיֹּ֥אמֶר יְהוָ֖ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֥ה לֵּאמֹֽר׃ (ז) כֵּ֗ן בְּנ֣וֹת צְלָפְחָד֮ דֹּבְרֹת֒ נָתֹ֨ן תִּתֵּ֤ן לָהֶם֙ אֲחֻזַּ֣ת נַחֲלָ֔ה בְּת֖וֹךְ אֲחֵ֣י אֲבִיהֶ֑ם וְהַֽעֲבַרְתָּ֛ אֶת־נַחֲלַ֥ת אֲבִיהֶ֖ן לָהֶֽן׃ (ח) וְאֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל תְּדַבֵּ֣ר לֵאמֹ֑ר אִ֣ישׁ כִּֽי־יָמ֗וּת וּבֵן֙ אֵ֣ין ל֔וֹ וְהַֽעֲבַרְתֶּ֥ם אֶת־נַחֲלָת֖וֹ לְבִתּֽוֹ׃ (ט) וְאִם־אֵ֥ין ל֖וֹ בַּ֑ת וּנְתַתֶּ֥ם אֶת־נַחֲלָת֖וֹ לְאֶחָיו׃ (י) וְאִם־אֵ֥ין ל֖וֹ אַחִ֑ים וּנְתַתֶּ֥ם אֶת־נַחֲלָת֖וֹ לַאֲחֵ֥י אָבִֽיו׃ (יא) וְאִם־אֵ֣ין אַחִים֮ לְאָבִיו֒ וּנְתַתֶּ֣ם אֶת־נַחֲלָת֗וֹ לִשְׁאֵר֞וֹ הַקָּרֹ֥ב אֵלָ֛יו מִמִּשְׁפַּחְתּ֖וֹ וְיָרַ֣שׁ אֹתָ֑הּ וְֽהָ֨יְתָ֜ה לִבְנֵ֤י יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ לְחֻקַּ֣ת מִשְׁפָּ֔ט כַּאֲשֶׁ֛ר צִוָּ֥ה יְהוָ֖ה אֶת־מֹשֶֽׁה׃ (ס) (יב) וַיֹּ֤אמֶר יְהוָה֙ אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֔ה עֲלֵ֛ה אֶל־הַ֥ר הָעֲבָרִ֖ים הַזֶּ֑ה וּרְאֵה֙ אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֥ר נָתַ֖תִּי לִבְנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (יג) וְרָאִ֣יתָה אֹתָ֔הּ וְנֶאֱסַפְתָּ֥ אֶל־עַמֶּ֖יךָ גַּם־אָ֑תָּה כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר נֶאֱסַ֖ף אַהֲרֹ֥ן אָחִֽיךָ׃ (יד) כַּאֲשֶׁר֩ מְרִיתֶ֨ם פִּ֜י בְּמִדְבַּר־צִ֗ן בִּמְרִיבַת֙ הָֽעֵדָ֔ה לְהַקְדִּישֵׁ֥נִי בַמַּ֖יִם לְעֵינֵיהֶ֑ם הֵ֛ם מֵֽי־מְרִיבַ֥ת קָדֵ֖שׁ מִדְבַּר־צִֽן׃ (פ) (טו) וַיְדַבֵּ֣ר מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֶל־יְהוָ֖ה לֵאמֹֽר׃ (טז) יִפְקֹ֣ד יְהוָ֔ה אֱלֹהֵ֥י הָרוּחֹ֖ת לְכָל־בָּשָׂ֑ר אִ֖ישׁ עַל־הָעֵדָֽה׃ (יז) אֲשֶׁר־יֵצֵ֣א לִפְנֵיהֶ֗ם וַאֲשֶׁ֤ר יָבֹא֙ לִפְנֵיהֶ֔ם וַאֲשֶׁ֥ר יוֹצִיאֵ֖ם וַאֲשֶׁ֣ר יְבִיאֵ֑ם וְלֹ֤א תִהְיֶה֙ עֲדַ֣ת יְהוָ֔ה כַּצֹּ֕אן אֲשֶׁ֥ר אֵין־לָהֶ֖ם רֹעֶֽה׃ (יח) וַיֹּ֨אמֶר יְהוָ֜ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֗ה קַח־לְךָ֙ אֶת־יְהוֹשֻׁ֣עַ בִּן־נ֔וּן אִ֖ישׁ אֲשֶׁר־ר֣וּחַ בּ֑וֹ וְסָמַכְתָּ֥ אֶת־יָדְךָ֖ עָלָֽיו׃ (יט) וְהַֽעֲמַדְתָּ֣ אֹת֗וֹ לִפְנֵי֙ אֶלְעָזָ֣ר הַכֹּהֵ֔ן וְלִפְנֵ֖י כָּל־הָעֵדָ֑ה וְצִוִּיתָ֥ה אֹת֖וֹ לְעֵינֵיהֶֽם׃ (כ) וְנָתַתָּ֥ה מֵהֽוֹדְךָ֖ עָלָ֑יו לְמַ֣עַן יִשְׁמְע֔וּ כָּל־עֲדַ֖ת בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (כא) וְלִפְנֵ֨י אֶלְעָזָ֤ר הַכֹּהֵן֙ יַעֲמֹ֔ד וְשָׁ֥אַל ל֛וֹ בְּמִשְׁפַּ֥ט הָאוּרִ֖ים לִפְנֵ֣י יְהוָ֑ה עַל־פִּ֨יו יֵצְא֜וּ וְעַל־פִּ֣יו יָבֹ֗אוּ ה֛וּא וְכָל־בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֥ל אִתּ֖וֹ וְכָל־הָעֵדָֽה׃ (כב) וַיַּ֣עַשׂ מֹשֶׁ֔ה כַּאֲשֶׁ֛ר צִוָּ֥ה יְהוָ֖ה אֹת֑וֹ וַיִּקַּ֣ח אֶת־יְהוֹשֻׁ֗עַ וַיַּֽעֲמִדֵ֙הוּ֙ לִפְנֵי֙ אֶלְעָזָ֣ר הַכֹּהֵ֔ן וְלִפְנֵ֖י כָּל־הָעֵדָֽה׃ (כג) וַיִּסְמֹ֧ךְ אֶת־יָדָ֛יו עָלָ֖יו וַיְצַוֵּ֑הוּ כַּאֲשֶׁ֛ר דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהוָ֖ה בְּיַד־מֹשֶֽׁה׃ (פ)

Numbers 27

מי השלוח, חלק א, ספר דברים, ואתחנן ז׳

ועשיתם וכו' תמונת כל אשר צווך ה' אלקיך. היינו שלא יחזיק האדם באיזה גוון אף ממצות אשר צוה ה' כדאיתא בזוה"ק, וזה פי' תבנית זכר היינו גוון ממצות עשה ותבנית נקבה היינו גוון ממצות לא תעשה.

Mei HaShiloach, Volume I, Deuteronomy, Vaetchanan 7

...

מי השלוח, חלק א, ספר שמות, יתרו ה׳

אנכי ה' אלקיך. ...וזה שנסמך מאמר לא תעשה לך פסל ואיתא בזוה"ק (שמות פ"ז:) משום דכתיב פסל לך ע"כ נאמר לא תעשה לך פסל ולא תעביד לך אורייתא אוחרא. והענין בזה כי מלת פסל הוא דבר מחותך במדה וקצב ובהשלמה בלי חסרון שום דבר בעולם וזאת אינו נמצא רק בתורת מרע"ה, אבל בשכל אנושי אין באפשר לתקן דבר כזה בשלימות הגמור, כמו דאיתא (בגמ')[רות רבה פרשה ג',ב'] שאמר ליה קיסר לר' יהושע בן חנניא גם אני יכול לעשות תורה כמשה וגזר שלא יבערו אש ג' ימים ובתוך כן ראה עשן יוצא מבית אחד והשיב לו הקיסר כי שר אחד חלה והוכרח להתיר לו. והאמנם כי גם אצלינו הדין ע"פ תורתנו הקדושה כי פקוח נפש דוחה שבת, אך החילוק כי המחלל שבת ע"פ פקוח נפש אינו מתנגד לתוה"ק, כי גם זאת נצטוינו שפקוח נפש ידחה שבת. וכן בכל מקום שהוא עת לעשות לה' נרמז הציוי של הפרו תורתך ולכן התורה כוללת כל הרפתקאות שיעברו, ואורה מקיף כל האופנים וכל ההתהוות שאפשר להתהוות, וזה אין בכח שום אדם לעשות, וזה שמפרש בזוה"ק על לא תעשה לך פסל היינו במצות עשה, וכל תמונה הוא במצות ל"ת, כי לא נגלה לאדם שום דבר עד תכליתו.

Mei HaShiloach, Volume I, Exodus, Yitro 5

The text does not say “Ani,” for if it had done so, it would have suggested that the Holy One Blessed Be He revealed all of His light to Israel, in its fullness, and that thereafter they would not have been able to go deeper in His words, for He had already revealed everything. Thus the kaf [separating ani from anochi – ed.] teaches that it was not in its fullness, but rather an image, a likeness, of the light that God will reveal in the future. And all that a man will grasp in going deeper in the words of Torah will show that, until this point, he was in darkness. Day and night suggest this reality. The day is when God opens the gates of wisdom to people. The night is so that the person will not think that he has grasped everything in its entirety. For all that he has grasped is like the nighttime, when compared to the daytime that will come afterwards. And so it always is. Thus everything is nighttime in comparison to the light that God will open up in the future. This is what is suggested by the conjunction of the verse “Do not make an idol (pesel).” The Zohar teaches that “this verse is taught on account of the [later verse], ‘Make for yourself (p’sol l’cha) [two tablets],’--therefore, do not make an idol, and do not make yourself a servant of another Torah.” The idea here is that the word pesel means something which is cut, delimited, finished and without anything missing. But this is only found in the Torah of Moses. In human thought, nothing can be finished and made completely whole. As the Midrash (Ruth Rabbah 3:2) tells: Caesar said to Rabbi Joshua ben Hanania, “I am also able to make a Torah like Moses.” And he decreed that no one light a fire for three days. But in those three days he saw smoke coming from a certain house. The Caesar was told that one of his ministers was ill, and he decided to allow [the minister to make the fire in his house]. Of course, in our holy Torah we have this same rule, that saving a life outweighs Shabbat. But the difference is that one who desecrates Shabbat to save a life does not transgress the holy Torah, because the commandment to do so is part of the Torah. Likewise, in every place in which we invoke “When it is time to do for God,” we have a hint of “abrogate your law” (Ps. 119:12). Thus the Torah contains within it all of its own future abrogations, and its light encompasses all contingencies and all circumstances that could possibly come to be. No man has the power to do this. This is how the Zohar interprets “Do not make a pesel” – this refers to the positive commandments. “Or image” – this refers to the negative commandments. For nothing is revealed to any person in its entirety.

איגרת צ Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook
ה. תורת ההתפתחות והתפתחות ושינוי בהלכה

אמרת שלפי דברַי התורה הולכת ומתפתחת, וחס וחלילה לא אמרתי מעולם דבר זר כזה. מושג ההתפתחות, שרגיל העםליחש, הוא מאורע של פנים חדשות, המביא קלות ראש. ומה שאנכי אומר, שהידיעה העליונה, הסוקרת כל המעשים מראש
ועד סוף, היא סובבת את כל התולדות כולם, היא אמתת קבלת
שהוכנו מראש כל הסיבות שיסבבו עול מלכות שמים,
ההבנות וההרגשות לבא לידי החלטות בכל דור ודור כראוי
וכנכון. על כן אי-אפשר לאמתתה של תורה להתגלות כי אם
בהיות עם ד' כולו בארצו, מבונה בכל תיקוניו הרוחניים
והחומריים גם יחד, שאז תשוב תורה שבע"פ לאיתנה, לפי
הכרת בית דין הגדול, היושב במקום אשר יבחר ד', על כל
דבר אשר יפלא למשפט, ואז אנו בטוחים שכל תולדה חדשה
תהיה מוכתרת בכל עז ובכל קודש, כי קודש ישראל לד' .
ואם תפול שאלה על איזה משפט שבתורה, שלפי מושגי
המוסר יהיה נראה שצריך להיות מובן באופן אחר, אז אם
באמת על פי בית דין הגדול יוחלט שזה המשפט לא נאמר כי
אם באותם התנאים שכבר אינם, ודאי ימצא על זה מקור
בתורה, והסכמת המאורעות עם כח בית דין ודרישת המקרא
יחד אינם דברים שמזדמנים במקרה, כי אם הם אותיות
מחכימות מאורה של תורה ואמתת תורה שבע"פ, שאנו
חייבים לשמע לשופט אשר יהיה בימים ההם, ואין כאן
"התפתחות" של גריעותא. אבל מי שבא לדון בזמן הזה,
שאנחנו מדולדלים וחיינו הכלכליים אינם נערכים לשם חיים
לגבי מצב האומה בצביונה הראוי, על פי אותן הדרישות
הרוממות, הוא נכון למועדי רגל, ורחמנא ליצלן מהאי דעתא.
וכל ענין הוה ועבר וכיו"ב, שהנני מזכיר תמיד ביח ש המעשה
לכללי התורה, הכל נמשך על פי הציור של חיי עמנו וארץ
חמדתנו בתכלית השלמות, בהיות אדירנו ממנו ומושלנו
מקרבנו, ארמון על משפטו ושופטנו ויועצנו כבתחילה, וארץ
צבי שתולה בנוה בקיבוץ כל בניה בתוכה וכל יושביה עליה אז
כל היוצא ממעין בית ד' יהיה קודש לד'. אבל בזמן החשך
והדלדול אמנם אין מעצור לאדם להתנהג על פי הרגשותיו
היותר עדינות, כשהוא מכוין בהן לרומם נפשו, ולקרבה אל
אבל אין זאת אור האמת והצדק, שהוא אור השי"ת וחסדו,
הדרכת של תורה כי אם מדה מוסרית פרטית, על כן אם
בהיותה מתרחבת תביא איזה דברים של הפסד באוצר הכלל,
על ידי אותו הדרך שנטיות הקדומות בזמן מביאות, יהפכו
מנטיות מוסריות לדברים שיש בהם נזק לרבים, שכל חכם-לב
ואיש-חסד יבין שהחוב היותר קדוש ונשגב הוא לקמץ גם הוד
מוסר נפשו לפי ערכו הפרטי, כדי להעמיד טובה למוסר
הכללי, שהוא יסוד הצדק העומד לעד. ועל זה נאמר " העם
ההולכים בחושך ראו אור גדול, יושבי בארץ צלמות אור נגה עליהם".