Questions to Ponder
What is the difference between Halakhah (Jewish law) and Minhagim (customs)?
How does a Minhag become interpreted as law?
What is the effect on the Jewish community when different communities/families practice different customs?
Halachah
Jewish law is called halacha (literally the path or the way) and is grounded in the Torah itself or later rabbinic rulings.
Minhag
A Jewish custom — known in Hebrew as a minhag — is a religious practice that, though sometimes very widely practiced, does not carry the force of Jewish law and is thus not considered mandatory by traditional Jews.
Rabbinic laws are of two types:
- A gezerah (literally “fence”) is a rabbinic rule imposed to serve as a guard against violating a more serious prohibition, such as the ban on touching objects used to perform forbidden actions on the Sabbath;
- A takkanah (literally remedy or fixing) is a piece of rabbinic legislation enacted for some other purpose, such as the celebration of the holiday of Hanukkah.
Customs are established practices that are not legally obligatory and do not derive from biblical or rabbinic mandates. They cover a very broad range of religious practices, including (but not limited to):
- The manner, order and liturgy of prayer;
- Certain wedding rituals;
- Styles of Torah chanting and of decorative Torah scroll coverings;
- Various holiday practices.
What are some minhagim (customs) that are specific to your family or community?
מַתְנִי׳ מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בְּעַרְבֵי פְסָחִים עַד חֲצוֹת עוֹשִׂין מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲשׂוֹת אֵין עוֹשִׂין.
In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so. In a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so.
Certain things are only noticeable, perhaps only exist, in transit. An accent, for example, is only relevant when it's different to other forms of speech, it doesn't even exist in a community that all speak similarly. Maybe minhag fits that description too. Our chapter has the refrain makom shenahagu osin, "In a place where X is customary, it is done, where X is not the custom, it is not done." Nobody needs a mishnah to tell them that. In a society where everyone stays within the community boundaries, it's not considered a minhag, it's just reality, what mama and grandma do, as obvious as the rules of grammar and pronunciation. In many ways, the minhag functions like a language that creates the community, not the other way around.
But then comes movement. Someone leaving the community, someone coming in from the outside. Now, normal behaviour is discovered as a minhag, now there's doubt and discord, now there needs to be some rules governing what to do. Which dialect is official and which is vulgar and how to translate between the two. Behind the orderliness of our chapter, there's this anxiety that comes with a realisation that Jews move and that minhag is shaky, seen from the outside. And that Outside is enormous.
יוֹצְאִים בְּקוֹרְדָּקֵיסוֹן בַּשַּׁבָּת וְאֵין יוֹצְאִין בְּקוֹרְדָּקֵיסוֹן בַּשַּׁבָּת בְּבֵירֵי וּמַעֲשֶׂה בִּיהוּדָה וְהִלֵּל בָּנָיו שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁיָּצְאוּ בְּקוֹרְדָּקֵיסוֹן בַּשַּׁבָּת בְּבֵירֵי וְלָעֲזָה עֲלֵיהֶן הַמְּדִינָה וְאָמְרוּ מִיָּמֵינוּ לֹא רָאִינוּ כָּךְ וּשְׁמָטוּם וּנְתָנוּם לְעַבְדֵיהֶן וְלֹא רָצוּ לוֹמַר לָהֶן מוּתָּרִין אַתֶּם
One may go out with wide slippers on Shabbat; however, one does not go out with wide shoes in the city of Birei. Once Yehuda and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamliel, went out with wide shoes in Birei, and the people of the city mocked them and said: In all our days we have never seen such behaviour! And Yehuda and Hillel removed their shoes, and gave them to their servants, rather than tell the residents of the city: You are permitted to go out with wide shoes on Shabbat.
"Rav Safra said to Rabbi Aba: I know about this minhag to keep two days of the festival in the diaspora, out of doubt. But what about someone like us, who has no doubt? In the cities, I don't work on the second day in order not to cause disputes, when people see me acting differently. But what about in the desert? Can I work on the second day?" Rabbi Aba answered him in the name of Rav Ami: "In the cities, it is forbidden. In the desert, it is permitted."
Minhag doesn't make sense, and God forbid it should make sense. We observe fast days (or not), work days and holidays (or not), eat special foods at special times and sing funny songs that we think our grandparents also sung (or not). A hundred minhagim shape our rhythm of living, Jewish minhagim and plenty of others. They keep us rooted, our behaviour creates the roots that create the behaviour. It's not the halacha or logic or lawbooks that drive Jewish life, but the strange and contradictory minhagim decided upon by the collective Jewish unconscious.
Do you agree or disagree with the above statement? Why or why not?
How do minhagim add or detract from your understanding of Judaism?
How does different minhagim affect the unity of the Jewish people?
בני ביישן נהוג דלא הוו אזלין מצור לצידון במעלי שבתא אתו בנייהו קמיה דרבי יוחנן אמרו לו אבהתין אפשר להו אנן לא אפשר לן אמר להו כבר קיבלו אבותיכם עליהם שנאמר שמע בני מוסר אביך ואל תטוש תורת אמך:
As the mishna discusses the requirement to observe local customs, the Gemara relates: The residents of Beit She’an were accustomed not to travel from Tyre to market day in Sidon on Shabbat eve. In deference to Shabbat, they adopted a stringency and would not interrupt their Shabbat preparations even for a short sea voyage. Their children came before Rabbi Yoḥanan to request that he repeal this custom. They said to him: Due to their wealth, it was possible for our fathers to earn a living without traveling to the market on Friday; however, it is not possible for us to do so. He said to them: Your fathers already accepted this virtuous custom upon themselves, and it remains in effect for you, as it is stated: “My son, hear your father’s rebuke and do not abandon your mother’s teaching” (Proverbs 1:8). In addition to adhering to one’s father’s rebuke, i.e., halakha, one is also required to preserve his mother’s teaching, i.e., ancestral customs.
... ולא ינהגו בעיר אחת מקצת מנהג זה מנהג זה ומקצת מנהג זה, משום "לא תתגודדו" (דברים יד, א) וכל שכן שאין לנהוג היתר בשתיהן.
... And within one city, it should not be that some follow one custom, and some follow another, because of "lo titgodedu" ("do not cut yourselves" - Deut. 14:1, interpreted in Yevamot 13b as "lo te'asu agudot agudot," "Do not become seperate groups"); all the more so, one may not follow both leniencies.
Although l’chatchilah every person should pray according to his family’s minhag, if this necessitates the establishment of dozens of small synagogues, making it difficult to assemble a minyan and organize regular Torah classes, it is preferable that ethnic groups with similar minhagim merge to form a stronger community. For example, all Jews from North Africa should pray together and if that is not sufficient, then all people who pray in the Sephardic nusach should pray together.
(“Peninei Halakha” is a series of books on Jewish Law (halakha) by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, Rosh Yeshiva and Rabbi of the community Har Bracha)
פניני הלכה > > תפילת נשים > > כ"ד - נוסחי התפילה ומנהגי העדות > > ד – אשה שנישאה לבן עדה אחרת
אשה שנישאה לבעל מעדה אחרת, דינה כדין מי שעובר לגור במקום שהכל נוהגים בו באופן שונה מכפי שהיה רגיל, שאם בכוונתו לגור שם תמיד, עליו לבטל את מנהגיו הקודמים ולנהוג כמנהג אנשי מקומו החדש (עפ"י שו"ע יו"ד ריד, ב; או"ח תסח, ד, מ"ב יד). וכן אשה שנישאה לבעל מעדה אחרת, הרי היא כמי שעברה לביתו לתמיד, ועליה לנהוג כמנהגיו. למשל, אם מנהג עדתו של בעלה לאכול קטניות בפסח – תאכל, ואם נהגו שלא לאכול – לא תאכל. אם נהגו להמתין שש שעות בין בשר לחלב – תמתין שש, ואם נהגו להמתין שעה – תמתין שעה. וכפי שכתב רבי שמעון בן צמח דוראן (תשב"ץ ג, קעט), שדבר פשוט הוא בלא ספק, שלא יתכן שישבו שניהם באופן קבוע על שולחן אחד, ומה שמותר לזה אסור לזה. ולכן צריכה האשה לילך אחר מנהגי בעלה, שאשתו כגופו.
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וכן לעניין נוסח התפילות, על האשה להתפלל ולברך כנוסח בעלה, כדי שלא יהיו באותו בית שני נוסחים שונים. אמנם, אם אין הדבר מפריע לבעלה, וקשה לה לעבור לנוסח שלו, במה שהיא מתפללת בשקט – יכולה להמשיך להתפלל בנוסח של בית אביה, אבל לא תתפלל או תברך בקול בנוסח אחר. וכשילדיה יגיעו לגיל חינוך, עליה לחנכם להתפלל ולברך בנוסח בעלה. ולכן גם אם בעלה הסכים שתמשיך להתפלל ולברך בנוסח שהתרגלה בו, כאשר יגיעו ילדיה לגיל חינוך, ראוי לה לעבור לנוסח בעלה, כדי שיקל עליה לחנכם לתפילה ולברכות.[2]
[2]. כפי שלמדנו, יסוד הדין שלא יתפללו במקום אחד בשני נוסחים שונים וינהגו בשני מנהגים שונים הוא כדי שלא תעשה מחלוקת, וכיוון שמנהג הבית נקבע על פי הבעל, הדבר תלוי בו, והוא יכול להסכים שאשתו תמשיך להתפלל כמנהג בית אביה. וכן מובא בהליכות שלמה תפילה א, ז, שרשאי הבעל להרשותה לנהוג כמנהגי בית אביה. וכן מקובל בבתים רבים, שהבעל מסכים שאשתו תמשיך להתפלל כמסורת בית אביה. ואם נהגה בתחילה כמנהגי בית אביה ואח"כ רצתה לשנות למנהגי בעלה, צריכה לעשות התרת נדרים. ע"כ. אולם בענייני מנהגי כשרות, נראה שאין להסכים לשני מנהגים באותו בית, מפני שהדבר ניכר לעין, ויש בזה משום איסור "לא תתגודדו", מה עוד שהדבר יכול לגרום להפרת שלום הבית. ולכן כתבתי שלא תתפלל ותברך בקול בנוסח אחר. וע' בתפילה כהלכתה ד, הערה ד', שכתב בשם הרב אלישיב, שוודאי מן הדין עליה לעבור לנוסח הבעל, אלא שאי אפשר לחייבה לעשות זאת בהקדם אחר שנתרגלה בנוסחה, ומ"מ תשתדל לעבור לנוסחו בטרם יגיעו בניה לגיל חינוך לתפילה.
Peninei Halakha > Laws of Women's Prayer > Chapter 24: Prayer Rites (Nusaĥ) and Customs of Different Communities > 04. The Status of a Woman who Married a Man from a Different Community
The status of a woman who married a man from a different ethnic community is similar to that of one who migrates to a place where local custom differs from what he is accustomed to: if he intends to live there forever, he must cease practicing his earlier customs and accept the local custom (based on SA YD 214:2; OĤ 468:4; MB 14). Likewise, a woman who marries a member of a different ethnic community is considered to be moving into his home permanently, and she must adopt his customs. For instance, if the custom of her husband’s community is to eat kitniyot on Pesaĥ, she eats them too, and if it is not to eat them, she may not. If they wait six hours between meat and milk, she waits six, and if they wait an hour, she waits an hour. As R. Shimon b. Tzemaĥ Duran (Tashbetz 3:179) writes, it is inconceivable that they regularly eat at the same table, and what is permitted to one is forbidden to the other. Therefore, a woman must follow her husband’s customs, for one’s wife is like himself.
Shulchan Aruch
Joseph Caro (1488-1575)
Author of the Shulchan Aruch (literally, the “set table”). Caro was part of a Sephardic family that was expelled from Spain in 1492. After the death of his father, Caro was adopted by his uncle, Isaac Caro, the author of a commentary on the Bible. The Caro family eventually settled in Safed, the area of northern Israel where the mystical circle of Isaac Luria then flourished. Both Isaac and Joseph Caro became part of this community of mystics.
REMA (Polish Jew of 16th century)
"I viewed all his [Caro’s] statements in the Shulchan Aruch as having been presented as though they were given by Moses at divine command so that students would come and drink his words without challenging them. . . . I therefore decided that, at those places where his [Caro’s] statements do not seem to me to be correct, I would write down next to each such statement the opinions of the aharonim, in order to make the students aware of every instance where his statements are disputed."
Isserles criticized Caro for often ignoring the opinions of Ashkenazic scholars, commenting that, “Caro’s books are full of decisions that do not follow the interpretations of the sages from whose waters we drink …[the sages] whose children’s children we are.”
The Shulchan Aruch, sometimes dubbed in English as the Code of Jewish Law, is the most widely consulted of the various legal codes in Judaism. It was authored in Safed (today in Israel) by Joseph Karo in 1563 and published in Venice two years later.[2]
Together with its commentaries, it is the most widely accepted compilation of Jewish law ever written.
The halachic rulings in the Shulchan Aruch generally follow the Sephardic custom. The Rema (an acronym of Rabbi Moshe Isserles) added his glosses and published them as a commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, specifying whenever the Sephardic and Ashkenazic customs differ. These glosses are sometimes referred to as the mappah, literally, the 'tablecloth,' to the Shulchan Aruch's 'Set Table.' Almost all published editions of the Shulchan Aruch include this gloss.
The importance of the minhag ("prevailing local custom") is also a point of dispute between Karo and Isserles: while Karo held fast to original authorities and material reasons, Isserles considered the minhag as an object of great importance, and not to be omitted in a codex.
(יד) ואם פשט טליתו אפי' היה דעתו לחזור ולהתעטף בו מיד צריך לברך כשיחזור ויתעטף בו: הגה וי"א שאין מברכין אם היה דעתו לחזור ולהתעטף בו [אגור סימן ל"ה] וי"א דוקא כשנשאר עליו טלית קטן והכי נוהגין [שם] [עיין לקמן סימן כ"ה סעיף י"ב]:
(14) And if he take off his fringed garment, even if his intention was to go back and to wrap himself in it immediately, he needs to make another blessing when he goes back and wraps himself in it. Gloss: There are those who say that he does not make a blessing if his intention is to go back and wrap himself in it (Agur, siman 34), and there are those who say that [the ruling that he does not make another blessing] is precisely when there remains on him a small fringed garment. And this is what the custom is (ibid.), see later on in siman 25, seif 12.
(ו) י"א שאין לעשות טלית של פשתן אף על פי שאין הלכה כן ירא שמים יצא את כולם ועושה טלית של צמר רחלים שהוא חייב בציצית מן התורה בלי פקפוק: הגה ומיהו אם אי אפשר רק בטלית של פשתן מוטב שיעשה טלית של פשתן וציצית של פשתן משיתבטל מצות ציצית: [תשו' הרא"ש כלל ב']:
(6) Some say not to make a tallit out of linen even though there isn't a halacha [not to do so]. A G-d fearing individual should make a tallit out of wool that it is obligated in the precept of tzitzit from the Torah without a doubt. REMA : if it is only possible for an individual [to fufill the precept of tallit] only with a tallit of linen, better that he fulfilled the precept with a tallit made of linen with linen tzitzit then he void the precept of tzitzit. (Responsa of the Rosh, Section B)