הרי שאמר לו אביו עלה לבירה והבא לי גוזלות ועלה לבירה ושלח את האם ונטל את הבנים ובחזירתו נפל ומת היכן טובת ימיו של זה והיכן אריכות ימיו של זה אלא למען ייטב לך לעולם שכולו טוב ולמען יאריכון ימיך לעולם שכולו ארוך ודלמא לאו הכי הוה ר' יעקב מעשה חזא ודלמא מהרהר בעבירה הוה מחשבה רעה אין הקב"ה מצרפה למעשה ודלמא מהרהר בעבודת כוכבים הוה וכתיב (יחזקאל יד, ה) למען תפוש את בית ישראל בלבם איהו נמי הכי קאמר אי סלקא דעתך שכר מצוה בהאי עלמא אמאי לא אגין מצות עליה כי היכי דלא ליתי לידי הרהור והא א"ר אלעזר שלוחי מצוה אין נזוקין התם בהליכתן שאני והא אמר רבי אלעזר שלוחי מצוה אינן נזוקין לא בהליכתן ולא בחזירתן סולם רעוע הוה דקביע היזיקא וכל היכא דקביע היזיקא לא סמכינן אניסא דכתיב (שמואל א טז, ב) ויאמר שמואל איך אלך ושמע שאול והרגני
Despite this, it occurred that there was one whose father said to him: Climb to the top of the building and fetch me chicks. And he climbed to the top of the building and dispatched the mother bird and took the young, thereby simultaneously fulfilling the mitzva to dispatch the mother bird from the nest and the mitzva to honor one’s parents, but upon his return he fell and died. Where is the goodness of the days of this one, and where is the length of days of this one? Rather, the verse “that it may be well with you” means in the world where all is well, and “that your days may be long” is referring to the world that is entirely long. The Gemara asks: But perhaps this incident never occurred? It is possible that everyone who performs these mitzvot is rewarded in this world, and the situation described by Rabbi Ya’akov never happened. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ya’akov himself saw an incident of this kind. The Gemara asks: But perhaps that man was contemplating sin at the time, and he was punished for his thoughts? The Gemara answers that there is a principle that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not link a bad thought to an action, i.e., one is not punished for thoughts alone. The Gemara asks: But perhaps he was contemplating idol worship at the time, and it is written with regard to idol worship: “So I may take the house of Israel in their own heart” (Ezekiel 14:5), which indicates that one is punished for idolatrous thoughts. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ya’akov was saying this as well: If it enters your mind that there is reward for performing a mitzva in this world, why didn’t these mitzvot protect him so that he should not come to contemplate idol worship? Since that man was not protected from thoughts of idol worship at the time, this indicates that the performance of mitzvot does not entitle one to merit reward in this world. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm? How is it possible that this individual, who was sent by his father to perform a mitzva, could have died? The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Elazar is referring those on their way to perform a mitzva, which is different, as one is not susceptible to harm when he is on his way to fulfill a mitzva. In this case the individual was harmed on his return, and one is not afforded protection after having performed a mitzva. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm, neither when they are on their way to perform the mitzva nor when they are returning from performing the mitzva? The Gemara answers: In that case it was a rickety ladder, and therefore the danger was established; and anywhere that the danger is established one may not rely on a miracle, as it is written with regard to God’s command to Samuel to anoint David as king in place of Saul: “And Samuel said: How will I go, and Saul will hear and kill me; and God said: Take in your hand a calf and say: I have come to sacrifice an offering to God” (I Samuel 16:2). Although God Himself issued the command, there was concern with regard to the established dangers.
רבי חייא בר אשי הוה רגיל כל עידן דהוה נפל לאפיה הוה אמר הרחמן יצילנו מיצר הרע יומא חד שמעתינהו דביתהו אמרה מכדי הא כמה שני דפריש ליה מינאי מאי טעמא קאמר הכי יומא חדא הוה קא גריס בגינתיה קשטה נפשה חלפה ותנייה קמיה אמר לה מאן את אמרה אנא חרותא דהדרי מיומא תבעה אמרה ליה אייתי ניהליה להך רומנא דריש צוציתא שוור אזל אתייה ניהלה כי אתא לביתיה הוה קא שגרא דביתהו תנורא סליק וקא יתיב בגויה אמרה ליה מאי האי אמר לה הכי והכי הוה מעשה אמרה ליה אנא הואי לא אשגח בה עד דיהבה ליה סימני אמר לה אנא מיהא לאיסורא איכווני כל ימיו של אותו צדיק היה מתענה עד שמת באותה מיתה
The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi was accustomed to say, whenever he would fall on his face in prayer: May the Merciful One save us from the evil inclination. One day his wife heard him saying this prayer. She said: After all, it has been several years since he has withdrawn from engaging in intercourse with me due to his advanced years. What is the reason that he says this prayer, as there is no concern that he will engage in sinful sexual behavior? One day, while he was studying in his garden, she adorned herself and repeatedly walked past him. He said: Who are you? She said: I am Ḥaruta, a well-known prostitute, returning from my day at work. He propositioned her. She said to him: Give me that pomegranate from the top of the tree as payment. He leapt up, went, and brought it to her, and they engaged in intercourse. When he came home, his wife was lighting a fire in the oven. He went and sat inside it. She said to him: What is this? He said to her: Such and such an incident occurred; he told her that he engaged in intercourse with a prostitute. She said to him: It was I. He paid no attention to her, thinking she was merely trying to comfort him, until she gave him signs that it was indeed she. He said to her: I, in any event, intended to transgress. The Gemara relates: All the days of that righteous man he would fast for the transgression he intended to commit, until he died by that death in his misery.
דתניא (במדבר ל, יג) אישה הפרם וה' יסלח לה במה הכתוב מדבר באשה שנדרה בנזיר ושמע בעלה והפר לה והיא לא ידעה שהפר לה בעלה והיתה שותה יין ומטמאה למתים רבי עקיבא כי הוה מטי להאי פסוקא הוה בכי אמר ומה מי שנתכוין לאכול בשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה אמרה תורה צריכה כפרה וסליחה מי שנתכוין לאכול בשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר חזיר על אחת כמה וכמה כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (ויקרא ה, יז) ולא ידע ואשם ונשא עונו כשהיה רבי עקיבא מגיע לפסוק זה היה בוכה ומה מי שנתכוין לאכול שומן ועלה בידו חלב אמרה תורה ולא ידע ואשם ונשא עונו מי שנתכוין לאכול חלב ועלה בידו חלב על אחת כמה וכמה איסי בן יהודה אומר ולא ידע ואשם ונשא עונו על דבר זה ידוו כל הדווים
The Gemara explains the source that one who intended to transgress is punished even though he did not actually sin. As it is taught in a baraita concerning a husband who nullified the vow of his wife: “Her husband has made them null; and the Lord will forgive her” (Numbers 30:13). With regard to what case is the verse speaking? Why would the woman require forgiveness if her husband has nullified her vow? It is referring to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and her husband heard and nullified her vow. And she did not know that her husband had nullified her vow, and she drank wine and contracted impurity from a corpse, violating her presumed vow. The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Akiva came to this verse he would cry. He said: And if with regard to one who intended to eat pork, and kosher lamb came up in his hand, like this woman who intended to violate her vow but in fact did not, the Torah nevertheless says: She requires atonement and forgiveness, all the more so does one who intended to eat pork and pork came up in his hand require atonement and forgiveness. In a similar manner, you can say that the same lesson can be derived from the verse: “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). When Rabbi Akiva came to this verse he would cry. He said: And if with regard to one who intended to eat permitted fat, and forbidden fat mistakenly came up in his hand, the Torah states: “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity,” all the more so is this true for one who intended to eat forbidden fat and forbidden fat came up in his hand. Isi ben Yehuda says with regard to the verse “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity”: With regard to this matter all sufferers shall grieve, since the verse teaches that one is punished even for sinning unawares.
תָּא שְׁמַע הָיָה עוֹבֵר אֲחוֹרֵי בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בֵּיתוֹ סָמוּךְ לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת וְשָׁמַע קוֹל שׁוֹפָר אוֹ קוֹל מְגִילָּה אִם כִּוֵּון לִבּוֹ יָצָא וְאִם לָאו לֹא יָצָא מַאי לָאו אִם כִּוֵּון לִבּוֹ לָצֵאת לֹא לִשְׁמוֹעַ לִשְׁמוֹעַ וְהָא שָׁמַע סְבוּר חֲמוֹר בְּעָלְמָא הוּא אֵיתִיבֵיהּ נִתְכַּוֵּון שׁוֹמֵעַ וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּון מַשְׁמִיעַ מַשְׁמִיעַ וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּון שׁוֹמֵעַ לֹא יָצָא עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּון שׁוֹמֵעַ וּמַשְׁמִיעַ בִּשְׁלָמָא נִתְכַּוֵּון מַשְׁמִיעַ וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּון שׁוֹמֵעַ כְּסָבוּר חֲמוֹר בְּעָלְמָא הוּא אֶלָּא נִתְכַּוֵּון שׁוֹמֵעַ וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּון מַשְׁמִיעַ הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לָאו בְּתוֹקֵעַ לָשִׁיר
The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear that which we learned in our mishna: If one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Scroll of Esther, if he focused his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. What, is it not that he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, and if he failed to do so, he has not fulfilled his duty, therefore implying that the fulfillment of mitzvot requires intent? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the mishna means that he intended to hear the sound of the shofar. The Gemara immediately asks: To hear? But he already hears it, since the mishna explicitly states: And he heard the sound of the shofar. The Gemara answers: We are discussing one who thinks that it is merely the sound of a donkey that he is hearing, and in this case, where the listener thinks that the sound was not that of a shofar, he does not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, the mishna teaches that it is sufficient that one have intent and know that he is hearing the sound of a shofar. The Gemara raised an objection to this answer from a baraita: If the hearer of the shofar had intent, but the sounder of the shofar did not have intent, or if the sounder of the shofar had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, he has not fulfilled his obligation, until both the hearer and the sounder have intent. Granted, with regard to the case where the sounder had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, Rava can say that this is referring to a case where the hearer thinks that it is merely the sound of a donkey and he did not have intent to hear the sound of a shofar. But with regard to the case where the hearer had intent, but the sounder did not have intent, under what circumstances can this case be found? Is it not where he sounds a shofar for music and despite the intent of the hearer he has not fulfilled his obligation? This implies that unless the sounder of the shofar has intent to fulfill the mitzva the hearer does not fulfill his obligation.