Summary of this Week's Torah Portion:
- Moses reviews a wide variety of laws regarding family, animals, and property. (21:10–22:12)
- Various civil and criminal laws are delineated, including those regarding sexual relationships, interaction with non-Israelites, loans, vows, and divorce. (22:13–24:5)
- Laws of commerce pertaining to loans, fair wages, and proper weights and measures are given. (24:10–25:16)
- The parashah concludes with the commandment to remember for all time the most heinous act committed against the Israelites—Amalek’s killing of the old, weak, and infirm after the Israelites left Egypt. (25:17–19)
What questions/queries/difficulties/Kushiyot arise for you after reading this passage?
סורר. סָר מִן הַדֶּרֶךְ:
ומורה. מְסָרֵב בְדִבְרֵי אָבִיו, לְשׁוֹן מַמְרִים (דברים ט'):
But did it really happen? Did they ever execute the Rebellious Son? This is likely a situation where the sages delimit the application of a law by making it next to impossible to carry out. Whatever the purpose and application of this law in biblical times (something that it is next to impossible to assess), Rabbinic Judaism obviously wanted to limit or deny its application through the interpretative process.
(א) בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, מֵאֵימָתַי נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, מִשֶּׁיָּבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת וְעַד שֶׁיַּקִּיף זָקָן, הַתַּחְתּוֹן וְלֹא הָעֶלְיוֹן, אֶלָּא שֶׁדִּבְּרוּ חֲכָמִים בְּלָשׁוֹן נְקִיָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא), כִּי יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן, בֵּן וְלֹא בַת, בֵּן וְלֹא אִישׁ. הַקָּטָן פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא בָא לִכְלָל מִצְוֹת:
(ב) מֵאֵימָתַי חַיָּב, מִשֶּׁיֹּאכַל טַרְטֵימַר בָּשָׂר וְיִשְׁתֶּה חֲצִי לֹג יַיִן הָאִיטַלְקִי. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, מָנֶה בָּשָׂר וְלֹג יָיִן. אָכַל בַּחֲבוּרַת מִצְוָה, אָכַל בְּעִבּוּר הַחֹדֶשׁ, אָכַל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, אָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, אָכַל טֶבֶל וּמַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁלֹּא נִטְּלָה תְרוּמָתוֹ וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְהֶקְדֵּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא נִפְדּוּ, אָכַל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִצְוָה וְדָבָר שֶׁהוּא עֲבֵרָה, אָכַל כָּל מַאֲכָל וְלֹא אָכַל בָּשָׂר, שָׁתָה כָל מַשְׁקֶה וְלֹא שָׁתָה יַיִן, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, עַד שֶׁיֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר וְיִשְׁתֶּה יַיִן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא) זוֹלֵל וְסֹבֵא. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי כג) אַל תְּהִי בְסֹבְאֵי יָיִן בְּזֹלְלֵי בָשָׂר לָמוֹ:
(ג) גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, עַד שֶׁיִּגְנֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְיֹאכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, עַד שֶׁיִּגְנֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וּמִשֶּׁל אִמּוֹ:
(ד) הָיָה אָבִיו רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ אֵינָהּ רוֹצָה, אָבִיו אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ רוֹצָה, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם רוֹצִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אִם לֹא הָיְתָה אִמּוֹ רְאוּיָה לְאָבִיו, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה. הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶם גִּדֵּם אוֹ חִגֵּר אוֹ אִלֵּם אוֹ סוּמָא אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא) וְתָפְשׂוּ בוֹ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, וְלֹא גִדְּמִין. וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֹתוֹ, וְלֹא חִגְּרִין. וְאָמְרוּ, וְלֹא אִלְּמִין. בְּנֵנוּ זֶה, וְלֹא סוּמִין. אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ, וְלֹא חֵרְשִׁין. מַתְרִין בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה וּמַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ. חָזַר וְקִלְקֵל, נִדּוֹן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וְאֵינוֹ נִסְקָל עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שָׁם שְׁלֹשָׁה הָרִאשׁוֹנִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם) בְּנֵנוּ זֶה, זֶהוּ שֶׁלָּקָה בִּפְנֵיכֶם. בָּרַח עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן, פָּטוּר. וְאִם מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בָּרַח וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן, חַיָּב:
(1) A wayward and rebellious son: at what age does he become liable [to be stoned]? From the time that he produces two hairs until the beard is full by which is meant the hair of the genitals, not that of the face, but the Sages used euphemisms , for it says, “If a man has a son” (Deut. 21:18) a son, but not a daughter; ‘a son’, but not an adult man. The minor is exempt, since he does not come within the scope of the commandments.
(2) When does he become liable [to be stoned]? Once he has eaten a tartemar of meat and drunk half a log of wine. Rabbi Yose said: “A maneh of meat and a log of wine. If he ate it in a company [celebrating] a religious act; or at a gathering for the purpose of intercalating the month; if he ate the second tithe in Jerusalem; if he ate the carrion or terefoth (meat that was not slaughtered in a kosher fashion), abominable and creeping things, or untithed produce, or the first tithe from which terumah had not been separated, or unredeemed second tithe, or unredeemed sacred food; if his eating involved a religious act or a transgression; if he ate any food but did not eat meat or drank any drink but did not drink wine, he does not become a ‘stubborn and rebellious son, unless he eats meat and drinks wine, for it is written, “This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice;] he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deut. 21:20). Although there is no clear proof for this, there is at least a hint, as it is says, “Do not be among wine drinkers, among gluttonous meat eaters of flesh (Proverbs 23:20).
(3) If he stole from his father and ate it on his father’s property, or of strangers and ate it on the property of the strangers, or of strangers and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a “wayward and rebellious son,” until he steals from his father and eats on other’s property. Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah said: “Until he steals from his father and mother.”
(4) If his father wants [to have him punished], but not his mother; or his father does not want [to have him punished] but his mother does, he is not treated as a ‘wayward a rebellious son’, unless they both desire it. Rabbi Judah said: “If his mother is not fit for his father, he does not become a ‘wayward and rebellious son”. If one of them [his father or his mother] had a hand cut off, or was lame, mute, blind or deaf, he cannot become a “wayward and rebellious son”, because it says “his father and mother shall take hold of him” (Deut. 21:19) not those with a hand cut off; “and bring him out”, not lame parents; “and they shall say”, and not mute parents; “this our son”, and not blind parents; “he will not obey our voice” (Deut. 21:20), and not deaf parents. He is warned in the presence of three and beaten. If he transgresses again after this, he is tried by a court of twenty three. He cannot be sentenced to stoning unless the first three are present, because it says, “this our son” (Deut. 21:20), [implying], this one who was whipped in your presence. If he [the rebellious son] fled before his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he is free. But if he fled after his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he remains liable.
What are the sages doing here? In what ways have they made it nearly impossible to carry out an execution of a rebellious son?
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future, as it is impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning, this being an aspect of the Torah that has only theoretical value. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who requires that the parents have certain identical characteristics, making it virtually impossible to apply the halakha. (Sanhedrin 71a)
What have you learned by "expounded" the understanding of this section of Torah?
How should we read this text as modern Jews?
Ishmael was the first stubborn and rebellious son, rejected by his parents (father Abraham and step-mother Sarah) for what he might become (“a wild donkey of a man; his hand will be against everyone, and everyone’s hand against him”). Yet the Torah, as interpreted by the Midrash, rejects the argument of R. Jose in favour of the logic of R. Shimon. Punishment as deterrence against future crimes is not divine justice. God does not judge people for what they might become. He judges them as they are now. Beneath this principle of justice is a deeper idea still: the principle of human freedom. Only the certainty that a juvenile delinquent will grow into a murderer can justify punishing him now to prevent acts he may commit in the future. But because we are free, and because even the most hardened criminal can repent and change, there is and can be no such certainty in human affairs. A stubborn and rebellious child can grow into a responsible adult. (Indeed, according to the Talmud, Ishmael repented in the lifetime of Abraham)
The story of Ishmael in Bereishit is an important commentary on the law in Devarim, and incidentally tells us something not only about the nature of biblical justice but also about why the Torah contains narrative as well as law. Law deals in generalities. Narrative focuses on particularities: this person, that family, this time, that place. Without law, society becomes chaos. But without narrative, law itself loses contact with the realities of human life. It becomes impersonal and at times inhuman (an American philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, has written an interesting book on this theme, Poetic Justice). It is one thing to discuss justice-as-deterrence in the abstract, quite another to do so with the image of the young Ishmael about to die of thirst before us. When R. Shimon bar Yochai stated that “There never was nor ever will be a stubborn and rebellious son ” he was articulating one of the deepest instincts of biblical justice. We do not condemn people for what they may become. We judge them for what they are.
- Rabbi Jonathan Sacks