(מ) וּלְקַחְתֶּ֨ם לָכֶ֜ם בַּיּ֣וֹם הָרִאשׁ֗וֹן פְּרִ֨י עֵ֤ץ הָדָר֙ כַּפֹּ֣ת תְּמָרִ֔ים וַעֲנַ֥ף עֵץ־עָבֹ֖ת וְעַרְבֵי־נָ֑חַל וּשְׂמַחְתֶּ֗ם לִפְנֵ֛י יְהֹוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֵיכֶ֖ם שִׁבְעַ֥ת יָמִֽים׃
(40) On the first day you shall take the product of hadar trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of leafy trees, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the LORD your God seven days.
מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִצְוָה הַבָּאָה בַּעֲבֵירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַהֲבֵאתֶם גָּזוּל וְאֶת הַפִּסֵּחַ וְאֶת הַחוֹלֶה״. גָּזוּל דּוּמְיָא דְּפִסֵּחַ, מָה פִּסֵּחַ לֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא — אַף גָּזוּל לֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא, לָא שְׁנָא לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ וְלָא שְׁנָא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ. בִּשְׁלָמָא לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ — ״אָדָם כִּי יַקְרִיב מִכֶּם״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא. אֶלָּא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ — הָא קַנְיֵיהּ בְּיֵאוּשׁ! אֶלָּא לָאו, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִצְוָה הַבָּאָה בַּעֲבֵירָה. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי: מַאי דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי אֲנִי ה׳ אוֹהֵב מִשְׁפָּט שׂוֹנֵא גָזֵל בְּעוֹלָה״ — מָשָׁל לְמֶלֶךְ בָּשָׂר וָדָם שֶׁהָיָה עוֹבֵר עַל בֵּית הַמֶּכֶס, אָמַר לַעֲבָדָיו: תְּנוּ מֶכֶס לַמּוֹכְסִים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: וַהֲלֹא כׇּל הַמֶּכֶס כּוּלּוֹ שֶׁלְּךָ הוּא? אָמַר לָהֶם: מִמֶּנִּי יִלְמְדוּ כׇּל עוֹבְרֵי דְּרָכִים וְלֹא יַבְרִיחוּ עַצְמָן מִן הַמֶּכֶס. אַף הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אָמַר: ״אֲנִי ה׳ שׂוֹנֵא גָזֵל בְּעוֹלָה״, מִמֶּנִּי יִלְמְדוּ בָּנַי וְיַבְרִיחוּ עַצְמָן מִן הַגָּזֵל. אִתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: יָבֵשׁ פָּסוּל מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין הָדָר, גָּזוּל פָּסוּל מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִצְוָה הַבָּאָה בַּעֲבֵירָה. וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר נַחְמָנִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ, אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם טוֹב רִאשׁוֹן, אֲבָל בְּיוֹם טוֹב שֵׁנִי, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיּוֹצֵא בְּשָׁאוּל — יוֹצֵא נָמֵי בְּגָזוּל. מֵתִיב רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לוּלָב הַגָּזוּל וְהַיָּבֵשׁ — פָּסוּל, הָא שָׁאוּל — כָּשֵׁר. אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא בְּיוֹם טוֹב רִאשׁוֹן, הָא כְּתִיב: ״לָכֶם״ — מִשֶּׁלָּכֶם, וְהַאי לָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא. אֶלָּא לָאו, בְּיוֹם טוֹב שֵׁנִי, וְקָתָנֵי גָּזוּל — פָּסוּל! (רָבָא אָמַר:) לְעוֹלָם בְּיוֹם טוֹב רִאשׁוֹן, וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא שָׁאוּל דְּלָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, אֲבָל גָּזוּל, אֵימָא: סְתַם גְּזֵילָה יֵאוּשׁ בְּעָלִים הוּא, וּכְדִידֵיהּ דָּמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
It is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes to be fulfilled by means of a transgression, which renders the mitzva unfulfilled, as it is stated: “And you have brought that which was stolen and the lame, and the sick; that is how you bring the offering; should I accept this of your hand? says the Lord” (Malachi 1:13). Based on the juxtaposition in the verse, it is derived that the legal status of a stolen animal is equivalent to that of a lame animal. Just as a lame animal, because it is blemished, has no remedy and is unfit for use, so too, a stolen animal has no remedy. There is no difference before the owners reach a state of despair of recovering the stolen animal, and there is no difference after despair. In both cases there is no remedy. The Gemara elaborates: Granted, before the despair of the owner, the robber may not sacrifice the animal because the animal does not belong to him. The Merciful One says: “When a person sacrifices from yours an offering” (Leviticus 1:2). The term “from yours” indicates that the animal must belong to the one sacrificing it, and this stolen animal is not his. However, after the despair of the owner, didn’t the robber acquire the animal with the despair? Once the owner despairs, the animal belongs to the robber, despite the fact that he incurs a debt that he must repay the owner. Since the animal is legally his, why is it prohibited for the robber to sacrifice it as an offering? Rather, is it not because the offering is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression? Since the animal came into his possession by means of a transgression, it is unfit for use in fulfilling a mitzva. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For I the Lord love justice, I hate robbery in a burnt-offering” (Isaiah 61:8)? The Gemara cites a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who was passing by a customs house. He said to his servants: Pay the levy to the taxmen. They said to him: Doesn’t all the tax in its entirety belong to you? If the taxes will ultimately reach the royal treasury, what is the point of paying the levy? He said to them: From my conduct, all travelers will learn and will not evade payment of the tax. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “I the Lord... hate robbery in a burnt-offering.” Although the whole world is His and the acquisitions of man have no impact upon Him, God says: From My conduct, My children will learn and distance themselves from robbery, even from robbery unrelated to the needs of offerings. It was also stated: Rabbi Ami said: A dry lulav is unfit because it does not meet the criterion of beauty, and a stolen lulav is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Ami disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzhak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that the halakha that a stolen lulav is unfit applies only with regard to the first day of the festival of Sukkot. However, beginning on the second day of the Festival, there is no longer a Torah requirement to use a lulav from one’s own property. Since one fulfills his obligation with a borrowed lulav, one fulfills his obligation with a stolen one as well. Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raises an objection from the mishna: A lulav that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. By inference, one concludes that a borrowed lulav is fit for use. The Gemara asks: When does this halakha apply? If you say that it applies only on the first day of the Festival, isn’t it written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day,” indicating that the four species must be taken from your own property, and this borrowed lulav is not his? Clearly, the mishna is not referring to the first day. Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to the second day of the Festival, and the mishna teaches that a stolen lulav is unfit on this day too, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion? Rava said: Actually, the mishna can be explained as referring to the first day of the Festival, and the tanna is stating the halakha employing the didactic style: It was not necessary. It was not necessary to state that one does not fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav, as it is not his. However, with regard to a stolen lulav, say: Barring extraordinary circumstances, standard robbery is a case that leads to despair of the owners, and despite the fact that a stolen lulav was acquired by means of a transgression, its legal status is like the robber’s own property. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not so. One does not fulfill his obligation with a stolen lulav. The mishna is not a refutation of Shmuel’s opinion.
(א) לוּלָב הַגָּזוּל וְהַיָּבֵשׁ, פָּסוּל. שֶׁל אֲשֵׁרָה וְשֶׁל עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, פָּסוּל. נִקְטַם רֹאשׁוֹ, נִפְרְצוּ עָלָיו, פָּסוּל. נִפְרְדוּ עָלָיו, כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, יֶאֶגְדֶנּוּ מִלְמָעְלָה. צִנֵּי הַר הַבַּרְזֶל, כְּשֵׁרוֹת. לוּלָב שֶׁיֶּשׁ בּוֹ שְׁלשָׁה טְפָחִים כְּדֵי לְנַעְנֵעַ בּוֹ, כָּשֵׁר:
(1) A lulav that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva of the four species. The lulav of a tree worshipped as idolatry [asheira] and a lulav from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, which must be burned along with all the city’s property, are unfit. If the top of the lulav was severed or if the palm leaves were severed from the spine of the lulav, it is unfit. If its leaves, although still attached, were spread and are no longer completely joined to the spine, it is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: In that case, one should bind the lulav from the top, to join the leaves that spread to the spine. A lulav from the palms of the Iron Mountain are fit for use, although it differs from one taken from a standard palm tree, in that its leaves are shorter and do not cover the entire spine. A lulav that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva.
מַתְנִי׳ יוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁל חַג שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת, כׇּל הָעָם מוֹלִיכִין אֶת לוּלְבֵיהֶן לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת. לַמׇּחֳרָת מַשְׁכִּימִין וּבָאִין, כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מַכִּיר אֶת שֶׁלּוֹ וְנוֹטְלוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּלוּלָבוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַחַג — אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּלוּלָבוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁל חַג שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַלּוּלָב לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ בִּרְשׁוּת. גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וּלְקַחְתֶּם״, שֶׁתְּהֵא לְקִיחָה בְּיַד כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. ״לָכֶם״, מִשֶּׁלָּכֶם — לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַשָּׁאוּל וְאֶת הַגָּזוּל. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁל חַג בְּלוּלָבוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נְתָנוֹ לוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה. וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שֶׁהָיוּ בָּאִין בִּסְפִינָה, וְלֹא הָיָה לוּלָב אֶלָּא לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בִּלְבַד, שֶׁלְּקָחוֹ בְּאֶלֶף זוּז. נְטָלוֹ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְיָצָא בּוֹ, וּנְתָנוֹ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּמַתָּנָה. נְטָלוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְיָצָא בּוֹ, וּנְתָנוֹ לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה בְּמַתָּנָה. נְטָלוֹ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְיָצָא בּוֹ, וּנְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. נְטָלוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְיָצָא בּוֹ, וְהֶחְזִירוֹ לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר הֶחְזִירוֹ? מִלְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: מַתָּנָה עַל מְנָת לְהַחְזִיר — שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה. כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא: ״הֵא לְךָ אֶתְרוֹג זֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחְזִירֵהוּ לִי״. נְטָלוֹ וְיָצָא בּוֹ, הֶחְזִירוֹ — יָצָא, לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ — לֹא יָצָא. לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר שֶׁלְּקָחוֹ בְּאֶלֶף זוּז? לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כַּמָּה מִצְוֹת חֲבִיבוֹת עֲלֵיהֶן.
MISHNA: If the first day of the festival of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, all of the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Shabbat eve, as it is prohibited to carry in a public domain on Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, everyone rises early and comes to the synagogue. Each and every one recognizes his lulav and takes it. This emphasis that each and every one recognizes his own lulav and takes it is because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation to take the lulav on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another, and on the rest of the days of the Festival a person fulfills his obligation even with the lulav of another. Rabbi Yosei says: If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression because he carried it out with permission, i.e., he was preoccupied with the performance of the mitzva and carried it out. GEMARA: From where are these matters derived, that one does not fulfill his obligation with the lulav of another on the first day of the Festival? It is as the Sages taught that it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). The use of second person plural in the phrase: “And you shall take,” indicates that there should be taking in the hand of each and every person. The word yourselves in the phrase “take for yourselves” means: From your own, to exclude a borrowed or stolen lulav. From here the Sages stated: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another unless the other gave it to him as a full-fledged gift, as in that case it belongs to him. There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were all traveling on a ship during the festival of Sukkot and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav, which he had bought for one thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and then gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift. Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Akiva as a gift. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and returned it to Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel? The crux of the story is that each of the Sages fulfilled his obligation with the same lulav after receiving it as a gift. The Gemara answers: By including that detail, the tanna teaches us another matter in passing, namely that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a full-fledged gift. Even if the owner stipulates from the outset that the gift would be returned, since he gives it as a gift in the interim, its halakhic status is that of a full-fledged gift. This is like that which Rava said, that in the case of one who says to another: Here is an etrog for you on condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, if he returned the etrog, he fulfilled his obligation of taking the etrog. However, if he did not return the etrog, he did not fulfill his obligation. Since he did not fulfill the condition, retroactively he never acquired the gift at all. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabban Gamliel bought this lulav for one thousand zuz? The Gemara answers: It is to inform you how beloved mitzvot were to them to the extent that he was willing to pay an exorbitant sum to purchase a lulav.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק גְּדוֹלָה עֲבֵירָה לִשְׁמָהּ מִמִּצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב לְעוֹלָם יַעֲסוֹק אָדָם בְּתוֹרָה וּבְמִצְוֹת אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן שֶׁמִּתּוֹךְ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן בָּא לִשְׁמָן אֶלָּא אֵימָא כְּמִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ דִּכְתִיב תְּבֹרַךְ מִנָּשִׁים יָעֵל אֵשֶׁת חֶבֶר הַקֵּינִי מִנָּשִׁים בָּאֹהֶל תְּבֹרָךְ מַאן נָשִׁים שֶׁבָּאֹהֶל שָׂרָה רִבְקָה רָחֵל וְלֵאָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן שֶׁבַע בְּעִילוֹת בָּעַל אוֹתוֹ רָשָׁע בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בֵּין רַגְלֶיהָ כָּרַע נָפַל שָׁכָב וְגוֹ׳ וְהָא קָא מִתְהַנְיָא מִבְּעִילָה דִילֵיהּ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כׇּל טוֹבָתָן שֶׁל רְשָׁעִים אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא רָעָה אֵצֶל צַדִּיקִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ מִדַּבֵּר עִם יַעֲקֹב מִטּוֹב וְעַד רָע בִּשְׁלָמָא רַע שַׁפִּיר אֶלָּא טוֹב אַמַּאי לָא אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ טוֹבָתוֹ רָעָה הִיא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ:
§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Greater is a transgression committed for its own sake, i.e., for the sake of Heaven, than a mitzva performed not for its own sake. The Gemara questions this comparison: But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav said: A person should always occupy himself with Torah and mitzvot even not for their own sake, as it is through acts performed not for their own sake that good deeds for their own sake come about? How, then, can any transgression be considered greater than a mitzva not for the sake of Heaven? Rather, one must emend the above statement and say as follows: A transgression for the sake of Heaven is equivalent to a mitzva not for its own sake. The proof is as it is written: “Blessed above women shall Yael be, the wife of Hever the Kenite, above women in the tent she shall be blessed” (Judges 5:24), and it is taught: Who are these “women in the tent?” They are Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah. Yael’s forbidden intercourse with Sisera for the sake of Heaven is compared to the sexual intercourse in which the Matriarchs engaged. The Gemara asks: How is it derived that Yael engaged in sexual intercourse with Sisera? As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That wicked one, Sisera, engaged in seven acts of sexual intercourse with Yael at that time, as it is stated: “Between her feet he sunk, he fell, he lay; between her feet he sunk, he fell; where he sunk, there he fell down dead” (Judges 5:27). Each mention of falling is referring to another act of intercourse. The Gemara asks: But Yael at least enjoyed the sexual intercourse with him; why is the verse so effusive in her praise? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: All the good of the wicked, i.e., anything good received from wicked people, is nothing other than evil for the righteous, and therefore she certainly derived no pleasure from the act. The Gemara asks: From where is this principle derived? As it is stated in the verse that God warned Laban the Aramean, when he was chasing Jacob: “Guard yourself from speaking to Jacob, from good to evil” (Genesis 31:24). Granted, with regard to the warning against speaking evil, it is fine that Laban was warned not to harm Jacob. However, why shouldn’t he say anything good to Jacob? Rather, must one not conclude from this verse that even Laban’s good is bad in Jacob’s eyes? The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that it is so.
Is a mitzvah annulled because it was achieved through illegal means? What would you do if a congregant who acquired wealth through illegitimate means wants to make a significant donation to a synagogue or charity? The prophetic tradition differs from the Talmudic tradition in answering these questions. If I make a conditional gift of my lulav to a friend but the friend does not return it, did he steal my lulav? If he decided not to return it after performing the mitzvah, did his mitzvah count?