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Live Organ Donation

Saving Lives as Overarching Value

וּשְׁמַרְתֶּ֤ם אֶת־חֻקֹּתַי֙ וְאֶת־מִשְׁפָּטַ֔י אֲשֶׁ֨ר יַעֲשֶׂ֥ה אֹתָ֛ם הָאָדָ֖ם וָחַ֣י בָּהֶ֑ם אֲנִ֖י יְהֹוָֽה׃ {ס}
You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which man shall live: I am the LORD.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל:...״וְחַי בָּהֶם״ — וְלֹא שֶׁיָּמוּת בָּהֶם.
“You shall keep My statutes and My ordinances, which a person shall do and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), and not that he should die by them.

Duty to Save

...לֹ֥א תַעֲמֹ֖ד עַל־דַּ֣ם רֵעֶ֑ךָ אֲנִ֖י יְהֹוָֽה׃
...Do not stand by the blood of your fellow: I am the LORD.
כָּל הַיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל וְלֹא הִצִּיל עוֹבֵר עַל (ויקרא יט טז) "לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ". וְכֵן הָרוֹאֶה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ טוֹבֵעַ בַּיָּם. אוֹ לִסְטִים בָּאִים עָלָיו. אוֹ חַיָּה רָעָה בָּאָה עָלָיו. וְיָכוֹל לְהַצִּילוֹ הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ. אוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׂכֹּר אֲחֵרִים לְהַצִּילוֹ וְלֹא הִצִּיל.
Anyone who can save another's life and does not do so has broken the commandment "do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor." This is the case of someone who sees another drowning in the sea, or robbers attacking him, or a wild animal attacking him — and can save him by himself, or can hire others to save him, and doesn't do so.

Whose Blood is Redder?

ורבי יוחנן האי וחי אחיך עמך מאי עביד ליה מבעי ליה לכדתניא שנים שהיו מהלכין בדרך וביד אחד מהן קיתון של מים אם שותין שניהם מתים ואם שותה אחד מהן מגיע לישוב דרש בן פטורא מוטב שישתו שניהם וימותו ואל יראה אחד מהם במיתתו של חבירו עד שבא ר' עקיבא ולימד וחי אחיך עמך חייך קודמים לחיי חבירך
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? [Context: Leviticus 25:36, regarding charging of interest.]The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha.
Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other.
This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

Acceptable Risk

מַה שֶּׁכָּתַב הָרַב זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה כָּל הַיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל וְכוּלֵי אָיְירֵי בְּמִי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל לְהֶדְיָא בְּלֹא שֶׁיִּסְתַּכֵּן הַמַּצִּיל כְּלָל כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה יָשֵׁן תַּחַת כּוֹתֶל רָעוּעַ שֶׁהָיָה יָכוֹל לַהֲעִירוֹ מִשְּׁנָתוֹ וְלֹא הֱעִירוֹ אוֹ כְּגוֹן שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַלוֹ עֵדוּת לַהֲצִילוֹ עָבַר עַל לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ. וְלֹא זֹו בִלְבַד אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ יֵשׁ בּוֹ קְצָת סָפֵק סַכָּנָה כְּגוֹן רָאָה אוֹתוֹ טוֹבֵעַ בַּיָּם אֹו לִסְטִים בָּאִים עָלָיו אוֹ חַיָּה רָעָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּכָל אֵלּוּ סָפֵק סַכָּנָה אֲפִלּוּ הָכֵי חַיָּיב לְהַצִּיל וַאֲפִילוּ שֶּׁלֹּא הָיָה יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּגוּפוֹ לֹא נִפְטַר בִּשְׁבִיל כָּךְ אֶלָּא חַיָּיב לְהַצִּיל בְּמָמוֹנוֹ…מִכָּל מָקוֹם אִם הַסָּפֵק נוֹטֶה אֶל הַוַּדַּאי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִמְסוֹר עַצְמוֹ לְהַצִּיל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וַאֲפִילוּ בְסָפֵק מוּכְרָע אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִמְסוֹר נַפְשׁוֹ דְּמַאי חֲזֵית דִּדְּמָא דִּידָךְ סוּמָק טְפֵי דִּילְמָא דְּמָא דִּידֵיהּ סוּמָק טְפֵי אֲבָל אִם הַסָּפֵק אֵינוֹ מוּכְרָע אֶלָּא נוֹטֶה אֶל הַהֲצָלָה וְהוּא לֹא יִסְתַּכֵּן וְלֹא הִצִּיל עָבַר עַל לֹא תַעֲמֹדעַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ.
Regarding the statement of the Rabbi (Rambam), of blessed memory, "Anyone who is able to rescue...": this is referring to one who can be clearly rescued without the rescuer endangering himself in any way, such as one who is asleep under an unsteady wall who the would-be rescuer is able to wake him from his sleep but does not wake him, or one who knows of evidence to exonerate him [e.g. from capital punishment, and fails to come forward), he transgresses the prohibition of “Do not stand idly by the blood of your brother.”
Not only in this case, but even if [in saving him] there is a potential small risk of danger, such as the case when he sees him drowning, or bandits attacking, or wild animals [threatening] – for there exists in all of these cases a risk of danger, he is still obligated to rescue, and even if he cannot do it himself, he is not exempt for this reason, but is obligated to use his own finances [to save the victim]….
Nevertheless, if the potential risk inclines toward certainty, he is not obligated to sacrifice himself to save his fellow.
Similarly, if it is an "even risk" he is not obligated to risk his life because [of the rule] ‘What did you see to make you think that your blood is redder, maybe the other’s blood is redder.’ But if the risk is not "even,” and there is the probability of rescue and he chooses not to endanger himself and does not rescue, then he is in violation of the prohibition, "Do not stand idly...."

Scenarios:
  • No risk: must help
  • Small risk (safek sakanah): Try to help or spend money to help
  • Certain risk (safek vadai): Not required
  • 50/50 chance of risk (safek muchra/safek hashakul): Not required
  • Less than 50% chance of risk (safek eino muchra): must help
Eliezar Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezar, 9:45, par 11:
In truth, some thought is required to determine when it should be considered an act of piety and not the act of a foolish saint, since the Radbaz went to some length to explain that all limb removal entails danger to a person....So one must say that the view of the Radbaz is that if one comes to ask, we must define all limb removals as entailing potential danger. However, we should not be overly zealous lto discourage or forbid with one who wishes, of his own free will, to donate an organ the loss of which will not cause certain death...and we should say to such a person that the act is not one of a foolish saint, but rather constitutes the highest level of acts of piety....But if [experts] determine that the act entails significant potential danger, [the donor] would he a pious fool, since his case of doubtful danger supersedes even the certain danger of the other.
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