MISHNA: One may testify that a man died only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [partzuf ] of the face with the nose. Although there are distinguishing marks [simanim] on his body and his personal belongings, Furthermore, one may not testify that a person died until his soul actually departs. And even if one saw him cut open and severely wounded, or crucified, or with a wild animal eating parts of him, he may not testify that he died. Additionally, one may testify to someone’s death only when the body was witnessed up to three days following death and not after that, since the appearance may change due to decomposition. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: not every person, nor every place, nor every hour is identical.
Questions:
-Would you have chosen the same criteria for identifying a corpse?
-why do you think the rabbis instituted a 3-day limit for the indentification?
By “face” Levinas means the human face (or in French, visage), but not thought of or experienced as a physical or aesthetic object. Rather, the first, usual, unreflective encounter with the face is as the living presence of another person and, therefore, as something experienced socially and ethically. “Living presence,” for Levinas, would imply that the other person (as someone genuinely other than myself) is exposed to me and expresses him or herself simply by being there as an undeniable reality that I cannot reduce to images or ideas in my head. This impossibility of capturing the other conceptually or otherwise indicates the other’s “infinity” (i.e., irreducibility to a finite [bounded] entity over which I can have power). The other person is, of course, exposed and expressive in other ways than through the literal face (e.g., through speech, gesture, action, and bodily presence generally), but the face is the most exposed, most vulnerable, and most expressive aspect of the other’s presence.
Bruce Young, introduction to Levinas.
To better understand the symbolic at play here, lets have a quick look at the Egla Arufa ritual.
First, read the psukim (verses) in Devarim, then have a look at the seemingly far-fetched debate between the sages. If, at first glance, it seems that we're merely measuring which city is the closest to the corpse, there's an underlying question that is directly connected to our sugya (Talmudic passage) in Yevamot.
From where on the body would they measure the distance? The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds: A person’s life is sustained mainly in his nose And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds: His life is mainly in the area of his navel,. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that these tanna’im are like those tanna’im, who had a dispute as it is taught in a baraita: From where is an embryo formed? From its head, and so the verse states: “Out of my mother’s womb You pulled me [gozi]” (Psalms 71:6). And the proof that “gozi” is referring to the head is from the verse that states: “Cut off [gozi] your hair, and cast it away” (Jeremiah 7:29). In this verse, the term gozi relates to the hair of the head. Abba Shaul says: An embryo is formed from its navel, and it sends its roots forth. This dispute concerning the initial formation of an embryo also appears to depend on where the main source of life in a person is.
Question:
What's at stake? What's the difference, biologically between the nose and the navel? What's the symbolic dimension of those two places?
Now back on the gmara.
PART II: deepfake and tax-evasion
Question:
Why should their be a difference between signs on objects and on bodies?
is an unambiguous distinguishing mark what they disagree about? One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is an unambiguous distinguishing mark and may be relied upon by Torah law. Consequently, if a man’s corpse was identified in this manner, his wife may remarry. And one Sage, the anonymous first tanna, holds that a mole is not an unambiguous distinguishing mark. The Gemara asks: According to the first version, that Rava said that distinguishing marks are recognized as valid identification by Torah law, there is a question: Isn’t it taught in the mishna: Although there are distinguishing marks on his body and his personal belongings, one may not rely on these as identification, implying that distinguishing marks are not valid identification by Torah law? The Gemara answers: The mishna’s intent is that ordinary distinguishing marks on one’s body, which constitute only weak evidence to a person’s identity, e.g., that he was tall or short, are not valid identification. Additionally, one cannot rely upon distinguishing marks on his personal belongings, as we are concerned about borrowing, i.e., perhaps the deceased had borrowed the clothes he was wearing from someone else. The Gemara asks: But if we are concerned about borrowing, then, with regard to returning lost property, how can we return a donkey based solely upon distinguishing marks on the saddle? Why don’t we consider the possibility that the saddle was borrowed? The Gemara answers: People do not normally borrow a saddle because it bruises the donkey, as the saddle must fit exactly to the donkey’s measurements. The Gemara raises further objections based upon the baraita cited earlier: If he found the lost bill of divorce tied to a purse, or a money bag, or a ring, he may rely upon the distinguishing marks on those items and deliver the bill of divorce to the woman. But how can we return it and not be concerned that these belongings may have been lent to someone else whose bill of divorce is tied to them? The Gemara answers: The case of the ring is referring to a signet ring, which one does not lend, because he is concerned about forgery, i.e., that the borrower might use it to forge his consent on documents without his knowledge. With regard to a purse or a money bag, people consider it a bad omen to lend them out and do not lend them to others. And if you wish, say that the reason not to permit a woman to remarry and not to accept that her husband is dead based upon the distinguishing marks found on his personal belongings is that the distinguishing marks referred to are only general ones, e.g., he wore white or red clothing, but they are not unambiguous distinguishing marks.
Make a list of the probabilities : what, in the mind of the rabbis, is more or less liketly to be borrowed, and for what reason?
Part III: Saw, the Jewish edition.
In the upcoming (graphic) sugya, we'll examine the probability of a cut person staying alive (and trying it out on a camel). I suggest you make a chart with our Mishna, the Mishna in Ohalot that I've kindly added to the source sheet, and the 'maassee' or anecdote brought in the gmara. See where does Rabbi Shimon Ben Elazar fit, where does the Sages fit.
(ו) אָדָם אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא, עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשׁוֹ. וַאֲפִלּוּ מְגֻיָּד, וַאֲפִלּוּ גוֹסֵס. זוֹקֵק לַיִּבּוּם וּפוֹטֵר מִן הַיִּבּוּם, מַאֲכִיל בַּתְּרוּמָה וּפוֹסֵל בַּתְּרוּמָה. וְכֵן בְּהֵמָה וְחַיָּה אֵינָן מְטַמְּאִין, עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשָׁם. הֻתְּזוּ רָאשֵׁיהֶם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמְּפַרְכְּסִים, טְמֵאִים, כְּגוֹן זָנָב שֶׁל לְטָאָה שֶׁהִיא מְפַרְכָּסֶת:
(6) A person does not defile [as a corpse] until he dies. Even he is cut up or even if he is about to die, he [still] makes levirate marriage obligatory and exempts from levirate marriage, he feeds [his mother] terumah and disqualifies [his mother] from eating terumah. Similarly in the case of cattle or wild animals, they do not defile until they die. If their heads have been cut off, even though they are moving convulsively, they are unclean, like a lizard's tail, which moves convulsively.