Kol Isha: From the Torah through the Rishonim

The goal of this source sheet is to present a decently comprehensive outline of how the halakhot of Kol Isha developed from the Torah, to the statement of Shmuel, and then to the various explanations in the Rishonim. This will not discuss the related issue of if it is permitted to listen to music to begin with. I hope to trace some of the reasoning behind various aspects of the law, and encourage thinking about it. My goal is to present, to the best of my abilities, the halakhic rationale for various opinions, as opposed to my own conclusion on the issue. When I suggest the implications or meaning of a particular passage, this reflects the interpretation I came up with and nothing more - the reader should feel encouraged to disagree with it.

Any discussion about what requirements women may have as a result of the prohibition or similar questions about if there are 'corresponding' laws incumbent upon women, for example, within the opinion that it is a problem of being distracted from prayer are not really discussed in the time range I am focusing on, but I would encourage any reader who is interested in such questions to think for themselves how they could relate to the sources I present. One interesting source that explicitly views the prohibitions as being reciprocal, which will be included only in the additional sources is Sefer Chassidim 614

In general, I have left 'erva' untranslated when I write, to reflect that I feel that most translations don't seem to me to work well enough in context. However, I have not changed it from other translations

Part 1: Scriptural Sources

Part 2: Tannaitic Material

These are the only plausibly relevant sources I can find in Tannaitic materials - given that there is no explicit mention, nor even strong implication of a possible prohibition until Shmuel, it seems logical that there was no official prohibition until that time

Part Three: Sources in the Talmudim

The underlined parts of the following two gemarot reflect the overlap in their form. Those who are interested in investigating further should look at the broader sugya in Berakhot, which was too long to include here in its entirety.

The common structure of these two sources in a prayer-related context seems to most simply indicate that the 'prohibition' of hearing a woman's voice is a prayer-specific prohibition. Note that the verse quoted in the Yerushalmi seems to potentially indicate a more general prohibition, whereas the verse mentioned in the Bavli is more simply understood as being specifically a problem for prayer. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand how exactly the verse in the Yerushalmi is meant to connect to the prohibition, whatever the prohibition is understood as being.

This source seems to encourage against singing together. However, we should ask a few questions on what this intends. It is worth noting that this statement appears in the general context of other forms of prohibited types of singing, and we should ask if this is an aspect of that (as seems to be the understanding of the Meiri) or if it is connected (as Rashi suggests). We may further question how it is to be applied in a modern context. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that the implications of listening to music at those times is different than it is now.

This next source is very important for understanding the varying opinions we will see later, and due to that and its unique issues will be presented as its own section.

Part Four: The Gemara Kiddushin 70a

In Kiddushin 70a, there is a case where a number of rulings are cited in the name of Shmuel. One of these is the ruling of kol b'isha erva, here seemingly referring to any hearing of a womens voice. However, the inclusion of this ruling in the text is unclear, as it does not appear in all manuscripts. Below are presented 4 forms of the Gemara. The first text is from a standard Vilna Sha"s, the second from the Munich manuscript, the third from the Sheiltot, which often contains variant texts in the gemara, and the fourth is from the halakhot of the Rif

If we look at these sources, we see that the 2nd and 4th seem to not have the statement of "kol b'isha erva" which would result in a reading of the sources as indicating no general prohibition to hear a woman's (singing) voice. [Alternative explanations of the Rif will be cited below.] On the other hand, in the 1st and 3rd sources, which contain the statement, the implication of a simple read would be that this includes any and all hearing a women speak. One thing that may be worth thinking about is the question of how an interpretation given by someone with one version of the text will be interpreted by someone who has the other text, and what this could lead to. [For the question of which text is more accurate, perhaps see the discussion in the following (Hebrew) article here.]

Now, we will work through the approaches of various Rishonim to this issue. While a much larger list could be made of the various opinions in the Rishonim, I have decided to focus on the following: Rav Hai Gaon, Rif, Rambam, Ra'avyah, and Meiri. Other views and paradigms that are relevant will be quoted, but they will not be explored in depth. A few other sources will be given at the end, for those who want to explore the issue further.

Part Five: The Opinion of Rav Hai Gaon

And Rav Hai Gaon wrote that this same law applies in regard to any woman with a 'revealed cubit' in a normally covered location, that it is forbidden to recite (Shema) near her, as 'tefach b'isha erva.' Similarly, he should not recite (Shema) at a time when she is singing, since 'kol b'isha erva.' However, [to recite the Shema] near her when her face, or some other place which women do not generally cover, is revealed, or if she is speaking in an ordinary manner, it is permitted. Even if she is singing, if he is able to pay attention to his prayer such that he will not hear her and not pay her any attention, it is permitted [to recite the Shema], and he should not interrupt its recitation. Similarly, when she 'reveals a cubit' it is only forbidden [presumably, to recite Shema] if he is staring at her, but seeing it alone would be permitted.

(This is from Otsar haGeonim on Brachot, available on Hebrew books, section containing Peirushim. My translation takes some liberties, so it's much better to read the original if you can.)

(This is from Otsar haGeonim on Brachot, available on Hebrew books, section containing Peirushim. My translation takes some liberties, so it's much better to read the original if you can.)

There are a few things worth noting about the opinion of Rav Hai. First, he understands the issue as being specifically singing, and not ordinary speech. Second, the implication of his interpretation is that the prohibition is only in regards to reciting Keriat Shema, not a general one.

It would seem reasonable to suggest that according to Rav Hai, the issue, in all three cases in the Gemara, is one of being distracted - thus, if one is not distracted, there is no issue. From this perspective, it would make sense that only potentially distracting speech is an issue.

Part Six: The Opinion of the Rif

The Rif completely leaves out any mention from Kol Isha in his halakhic compilation, including the Gemara Brachot. We saw above that he skips that statement in the Gemara in Kiddushin as well. We may suggest several plausible reasons for this. One potential reason is that the Rif thought the statement of Shmuel was rejected by the Gemara, which is the suggestion of Ra'avad quoted by Rashba:

Another possibility is that the Rif considered these instructions to be advise, which would fit with the fact that he doesn't seem to have our version of the Gemara in Kiddushin where the Gemara is invoked halakhically. It could even be suggested that the Rif had the Gemara in Kiddushin, but interpreted it as being aggadic in nature, and therefore non-binding, although this approach presents us with several problems.

Part Seven: The Opinion of Rambam

Rambam has a very unusual way of conceptualizing Shmuel's statement that can open itself to many different interpretations.

As we can see, Rambam interprets the statement of Shmuel as fitting into a broader halakhic category of 'lo tikrav.' Conversely, this halakha is absent from the laws of reciting the Shema, where he only quotes the law of 'tefach b'isha' which is explicitly said in the Gemara refers to Keriat Shema:

There is nothing in the Rambam to indicate when he considers it a prohibition to hear a women's voice: Although he mentions in a halakhic ruling that this would apply to a female singer, the wording indicates that singing isn't the operative parameter.

It seems we are left here with two options: Either Rambam meant to prohibit all hearing women, or there is some distinction the Rambam makes, but is unclear about.

The simple reading of Rambam is like the first view; However, some think the phrase "לִשְׁמֹעַ קוֹל הָעֶרְוָה" indicates a particular focus on provocative speech. This seems difficult based on context, but it also seems difficult, as well as impractical, to ban hearing women speak in all cases. Another possibility, based on context, is that the issue is listening with (erotic) intent, not merely hearing. How this would work in practice, I am unclear. Ultimately, I leave the reader to interpret what Rambam intends. This being said, there are a couple sources which seem to adopt the general framework, and incorporate a degree of 'individualization':

What is meant by "even to hear her voice and think about them;" are these two separate statements or are they to be read together? On the one hand, the first is in the singular and the second plural. On the other hand, it's hard to explain why the statement "and to think about them" is inserted here otherwise.

As I argue implicitly near the end of my source sheet on Shomer Negiah, if we accept the premise of this Ritva, it would be reasonable to apply it for most things that are social norms, though it is a bit less clear how that would fit in here.

One question worth thinking about is what is meant by intent to derive pleasure? Is it any form of pleasure, or something more specific?

Part Eight: The Opinion of the Ra'avyah

There are two main things to note in the Ra'avyah: First, he follows Rav Hayy in understanding the prohibition as only being by Kriat Shema. Second, he understands the issue as being 'hirhur,' which I have translated contextually as 'distracting thoughts,' though I believe it could also mean 'lustful thoughts.' Within this approach, Ra'avyah finds a basis to permit something which people are used to. From this approach, it would seem a natural extension to apply this to a community where there is no taboo against women singing, or where no women cover their hair [the halakhic permissibility of which is not a topic for now] even during Kriat Shema. The reader should be aware that the conclusion of the Ra'avya, which is not cited here, is very difficult to fully understand, and may contradict some of his earlier points.

A related framework to this, which views the issue of Kol Isha [and the related prohibitions in Berakhot 24a] as related to "לא יראה בך ערות דבר" [cf. Brachot 25a] can be found in the Sefer Yereim, and a few other Ashkenazic sources:

While the Yereim does not give a reason, it is worth pointing him out as he is the first source who explains views Shmuel's statement as intended only regarding singing.

This source is also used by the Smak, though interestingly, he makes no mention of Kol Isha:

Part Nine: The Opinion of the Meiri

At first glance, the Meiri's position is the closest opinion to the common Orthodox understanding nowadays, that the prohibition is a general one against hearing a woman's singing voice. However, looking at statements he makes elsewhere may indicate a more complex framework.

At first, Meiri appears to be operating in a manner similar to the Rambam; However, in his conclusion, we find that he adopts the approach that it is only a problem of singing voice. It seems reasonable that Meiri, who has the text with "Kol b'isha erva" in Kiddushin was aware of the interpretation - most likely originating from a source without that text - that this is only by a singing voice, and attempted to harmonize the opinion with the Gemara.

It is instructive to look at a few Meiri's elsewhere:

The indication of this Meiri is that there isn't some general prohibition to speak with women.

The implication of this Meiri is a bit unclear, but it is worth noting that he doesn't refer to the point of Kol Isha at all

Meiri here puts a 'spin' on the prohibition, understanding the issue to be due to 'hirhur,' similar to the Chinuch we saw above. This approach may also introduce a 'contextual' aspect of the prohibition, where the style and form of the speech is a factor in the final law. This could help explain Meiri's logic in differentiating speaking from singing.

Part Ten: A final note on 'overthinking' and 'chumra culture'

Note how the final line seems to contradict the earlier bit, and doesn't make much sense itself. Perhaps there is some difference between the first part, with the 'one who forbids' and the 'one who permits' and the second part with the 'machmir' and the 'meikil?'

Part Eleven: Some additional sources

It makes sense to me to leave off by giving some other sources that discuss the issue, who weren't able to be presented in the main sheet, with a brief summary of what they say. All the sources that are on Sefaria will be normal, if they are available on Hebrew Books, they will be in brackets. If they aren't available in either, they will be in parentheses.

The Rosh's opinion: See Rosh Berakhot 24a, Tur Even haEzer 21, (and Tosafot haRosh Berakhot 24a). He interprets Shmuel as a general prohibition but doesn't say what its boundaries are. [See also Rabbeinu Yerukham, his student, in Sefer haAdam, Netiv 3, Section 3]

Ohr Zarua, 1:133. He has an interesting argument, that it can't be by Keriat Shema as than women wouldn't be able to say it from the sound of their own voice. He doesn't give any implication what it requires instead, though. If it's general, wouldn't that lead to the fundamentally absurd conclusion that a woman can't hear her own voice?

The Ra'avad: We don't actually have the Ra'avad on Berakhot, but he is cited in the Rashba Berakhot 24a, [see also the varying presentations in Sefer haMeorot and Sefer haHashlamah there.] His opinion seems similar to that of the Meiri, and he has an interesting conclusion (not quoted in Rashba) to justify the practices of his time.

Some other sources: Sefer Chassidim 19 and 614; Kol Bo 45:4, 75:81, and 118:22; [Sefer haBatim hilkhot keriat shema 5:29, found on Hebrew Books in the volume headed 'Bet Tefilah']