תוס’ נדה (מד.) ד”ה איהו
וא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי’ מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת שמביאין סכין דרך ר”ה לקרוע האם כדמוכח בפ’ קמא דערכין (דף ז:) וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו דהא גוסס בידי אדם ההורגו פטור… ומחללין את השבת עליו…
Now, were you to ask – if it is permissible to kill a fetus in the mother’s womb [even after the mother has died], and it is not considered to just be placed in a box, then why can we violate Shabbat for him? For we bring a knife by way of the public domain to surgically remove him from the mother, as it is stated in Arakhin (7a). One can say: that nevertheless, for the sake of saving a life, we violate Shabbat even though it is permissible to kill him. For behold for a gosses by human hands, one who kills him is exempt… and we can nevertheless violate Shabbat to save his life…
(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:
(6) If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.
תורת האדם שער המיחוש – ענין הסכנה
ואע”ג דתנן (אהלות פ”ז) האשה המקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, דאלמא מעיקרא לית ביה משום הצלת נפשות, ותנן נמי (נדה מ”ד א’) גבי תינוק בן יום אחד וההורגו חייב, ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא, וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות, אפילו הכי לענין שמירת מצות מחללין עליה, אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת שמא ישמור שבתות הרבה. הלכך אפי’ בהצלת עובר פחות מבן ארבעים יום שאין לו חיות כלל מחללין עליו כדעת בעל הלכות.
ואיכא דסבירא ליה שאין מחללין משום נפלים…
The Mishna in Ohalot however states (7:6), ‘If a woman is in hard travail, one cuts up the child in her womb and brings it forth member by member, because her life comes before that of [the child]. But if the greater part has proceeded forth, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person’s life for that of another’. Now this implies that beforehand [before birth] there is no concept of ‘saving of a life’. Similarly the Mishna states (Niddah 44a) that if a person murders a one day old child he is liable the death penalty – that is, only a one day old child, not a fetus – and the verse also states that one pays monetary compensation for [causing a miscarriage] of a fetus. Nevertheless, regarding the issue of mitzvah observance, we can violate Shabbat for a fetus. The Torah says: violate one Shabbat for him, for perhaps he might keep many Shabbats. Therefore, even to save a fetus less than 40 days old, which has no [current] viability, we would desecrate Shabbat according to Hilkhot Gedolot.
There are those who are of the opinion that we do not violate Shabbat for fetuses…
יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואם תאמר מעשה דשבע בן בכרי (שמואל ב כ׳:כ״א) הנה ראשו מושלך אליך דדחו נפש מפני נפש התם משום דאפילו לא מסרוהו לו היה נהרג בעיר כשיתפשנה יואב והן נהרגין עמו אבל אם היה הוא ניצול אע"פ שהן נהרגין לא היו רשאין למסרו כדי להציל עצמן אי נמי משום דמורד במלכות הוה והכי מפרש לה בתוספתא (דתמורה): משמיא קא רדפי לה - לאמיה:
its head came out: With a women that is experiencing difficulty giving birth and is in [mortal] danger. And it is taught in the first section [of this teaching], "the midwife extends her hand and cuts it up and extracts [the pieces];" as the entire time that that it has not gone out into the air of the world, it is not [considered] a soul, and [so] it is possible to kill it and to save its mother. But when its head came out, we cannot touch it to kill it, as it is like a born [baby]; and we do not push off one soul for the sake of another. And if you will ask [from] the story of Sheva ben Bichri - [wherein it is written] (II Samuel 20:21), "behold, his head is sent to you" - they pushed off one life for the sake of another; there, it was because even if they had not delivered him, he would have been killed in the city when Yoav would have seized it, and they would have been killed with him. But if he would have [otherwise] been saved - even though they would have been killed - they would not have been allowed to deliver him [to Yoav] in order to save themselves. And also (another answer) is that it is because he was a rebel to the kingdom, and so is it explained in the Tosefta (of Terumah).
(ו) אֶחָד הַהוֹרֵג אֶת הַגָּדוֹל אוֹ אֶת הַקָּטָן בֶּן יוֹמוֹ. בֵּין זָכָר בֵּין נְקֵבָה. הֲרֵי זֶה נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו אִם הָרַג בְּזָדוֹן. אוֹ גּוֹלֶה אִם הָרַג בִּשְׁגָגָה. וְהוּא שֶׁכָּלוּ לוֹ חֳדָשָׁיו. אֲבָל אִם נוֹלַד לְפָחוֹת מִתִּשְׁעָה חֳדָשִׁים הֲרֵי הוּא כְּנֵפֶל עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶה שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְהַהוֹרְגוֹ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אֵינוֹ נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו:
(6) Whether a man killed an adult or an infant of one day, male or female, he must be executed if he committed deliberate murder, or exiled if he killed unwittingly. And for a child that was born premature- If it was born in less than nine months, it is not viable until it lives thirty days. If it is killed within the thirty days, it is not considered murder.
לְפִיכָךְ הוֹרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָעֻבָּרָה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד מֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ הָעֵבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ בֵּין בְּסַם בֵּין בְּיָד מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּרוֹדֵף אַחֲרֶיהָ לְהָרְגָהּ. וְאִם מִשֶּׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ וְזֶהוּ טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם:
(9) This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef. On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.
(ב) לפיכך העוברת שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להרגה ואם הוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם:
...If the head comes out, you can't kill it
(שו“ת מהרי“ט חלק א סימן צז שאלה עובר רך /ירך/ אמו... ובפ“ב דחולין אין מזמנין גוי על בני מעיים וכתב שם התוספות נהי דפטור על הנפלי‘ אבל לא שרי וכו‘ דהא דאסור מדין חבלה הוא ותנן בפ‘ שביעי דאהלות... טעמא משום דחייה קודמין לחייו הא אם לא היה לה סכנת נפשות יש בחיי הוולד בית מיחוש והיכי אמרינן בערכין דהורגין את הוולד בידים מפנ‘ /מפני/ ניול האם.
שו“ת מהרי“ט, א:צט ומדפריך פשיטא משמע דמחמת איבוד נפשות אין נדנוד כלל... הילכך בישראלית מפני צורך אמו נראה שמותר להתעסק עמהם שתפילנה כיון דרפואת אמו היא
Rabbi Joseph ben Moses Trani (Maharit), the son of Mabit (q.v.), was born in Safed in 1568 and died in Constantinople in 1639...
Question. Regarding a fetus which is considered the thigh …of its mother - In the second chapter of Hullin… Tosafot wrote that while one is exempt from killing a fetus, it is nevertheless not permitted to do so… [The reason is] that it is forbidden on the basis of bodily injury.
The Mishna in chapter 7 of Ohalot states… And it is only because the mother’s life takes precedence that we can abort it, but were it not that there was a risk to her life, there is a matter of concern regarding [taking] the life of a fetus. So how then can we say in Arakhin that we would kill the fetus directly (lit., with our hands) because of concern of disfigurement of the mother?
...And from the fact that the Gemara (Arakhin 7a) says, “It is obvious!” [that we can abort the fetus of the woman who is condemned], it implies that as far as taking a [fetal] life is concerned, there is not the slightest issue of concern… Therefore, regarding a Jewish woman, in a case of the mother’s need, it would appear that it is permissible to assist them to have an abortion, since it is for the sake of the mother’s health
(ט) ועל דבר שאלתך אשת איש שהרה לזנונים ואחר המעשה נתחרט' ונתנה קולה בבכי גם יום גם לילה אל תתני פוגת בת עינה רק הורידה כנחל דמעה והטיחה ראשה בכותל עד כי זוב דמה מראשה והגידה לבעלה וגם בקשה מחכם שיסדרו לה תשוב' וככל אשר יושבת עלי' תעשה. רק כאשר חששה שנתעברה ממנ' באשר מאז שנעשה המעשה פסק וסתה אשר היה לה תמידין כסדרן בהיותה תחת בעלה כמה שנים הלכה אל חכם ושאלו לו אם רשאית לגמוע דבר מאבקת רוכל לשלשל זרע המקולל אשר בקרבה ובקשת דעתי בזה. הקשית לשאול שאלה בזו אשה י תשט' תחת אישה ותעיז פניה לשאלת חכם כזה ואחשבה כי תכונת השאלה באשת איש דבר בדוי הוא לא היה ולא נברא כאשר באמת בתשובתי על השאלה אין חילוק בין היות המעוברת אשתו הנשוא וכשירה שבנשים או ממזר מאשת איש שהרי לא נפלאת היא ממך דדין ממזר לכל דבר כדין ישראל כשר וראוי להיות דדין הגדול בח"ל רק שאסור לבא בקהל ולישב בסנהדרין וכבר שנינו דלענין לפדותו ממזר ת"ח קודם לכה"ג ע"ה רק שמהרי"ל כתב שאין מבקשים עליו רחמים לומר קיים אל הילד הזה בעת שמלין אותו דודאי לא ניחא לן ובכה"ג כתבו התוס' בשם ר"ת גיטין דמ"א דאין זו תקנה להרבו' ממזרים בישראל ואין מזה ראיה להתיר הקלקול בפועל.
Regarding your question of a married woman who became pregnant through adultery… and the question is whether she is permit to swallow some medicine that will cause her to abort. And you wanted to know my opinion regarding this …matter And it seems that your question is whether in general there is a sin of destroying a life in this case. Now, it would be possible to make a number of distinctions, such as whether 40 days have passed – for before this time it is “mere water”, as is stated in Yevamot and Kriot – or whether three months have passed which is the time when the pregnancy is visible, or if she sensed in her womb the movement of the infant, which occurs a brief time after the 3 months, nevertheless it is not our interest to decide based on how we would be inclined to .think or the “logic of the gut”, but only according to Torah law The Mishnah in Niddah states that only one who murders a …one day old child is liable for execution, but not for a fetus Nevertheless, before the fetus has detached, it would seem that it is permitted to abort it according to everyone, based on the Talmud in Arakhin, where a condemned woman can be hit …so that the fetus’ death will not lead to her disgrace And you cannot ask from the fact that we violate Shabbat to save the life of a fetus… for perhaps that is really because of the life of the mother, for any danger to the fetus is a danger to …the mother And you cannot say [that if it is permitted,] why did the Gemara imply that were it not for the principle of it being part of her body [which is condemned to death] we would wait for the child to be born, how much more so not to cause it death. For it certainly is forbidden ab initio. For it is no better than a case of masturbation, which is considered to be a “slaughtering of children.” And masturbation is considered a grave offense, and the reason is because every drop of semen has the potential to create holy progeny. And one cannot say that the prohibition of masturbation is because of auto-eroticism… Thus even women are prohibited from …]wasting seed [and destroying potential life Therefore, based on what we have written, it would be completely permissible in your case according to Torah law, were it not for the widespread practice amongst us and amongst them [not to abort], because of a safeguard against …fornicators and those who fornicate after them Nonetheless, in Hullin 33, Tosafot wrote as a matter of obvious fact that “while one is exempt [who aborts], nevertheless it is …”not permissible to do so This is implicit in the Gemara’s discussion, that had it not been for the reason that “the fetus is her body,” [and can be executed with her], there would be a logic to wait to save the fetus, and how much more so should we not cause its death at the outset. The reason for this is that to do so is no better than those who “inflame themselves under every leafy tree and slaughter (or ‘squeeze out’ children” (Niddah 13a based on Isa. 57:5), and the Rabbis spoke in extreme terms regarding the prohibition to waste semen, and the reason is because it is possible that a holy life (lit., seed) will be created from every drop. One cannot say that the reason for all these problems is because of provoking the evil inclination, for if that were the case, there would be no need to bring a proof from the verses.. And this prohibition of wasting semen applies even to women (to destroy the man’s semen in their body), and is only …permitted in three special cases of women We see that it is also Rashi’s opinion that regarding other women (not the special cases), the problem is only regarding the man to waste his seed, and it is not a problem for the women, thus there is no inherent problem to destroy the semen after it has been “absorbed” (i.e., possibly caused conception). Nevertheless, just because we can make an argument does not mean that we can make a ruling tht is should be allowed for a woman (to destroy the semen in her body), and how much more so after the semen has been “absorbed”. Thus, one who assists in this is aiding those who …are sinning Thus, anyone who is involved in this act, or who causes it, I fear that he may be deserving a sin offering… Although we have made arguments, to actually act on it, we cannot permit. And no more needs to be said about this. Now, please, my brother, do not burden me any more with questions such as .these, for it is only with difficulty that I answered you this time
אמנם נדון השואל בא"א שזנתה שאלה הגונה היא. וקרוב בעיני להתירה...וגם בעובר כשר הי' צד להקל לצורך גדול. כל כמה דלא עקר. אפי' אינו משום פקוח נפש אמו. אלא להציל לה מרעתו. שגורם לה כאב גדול וצ"ע.
Rabbi Jacob Emden Responsa She’elat Ya”vetz 1:43 (1739-1759)
The questioner asks about an adulterous married woman (who is pregnant) is a good question. It appears to me to permit her (to abort)...And even in the case of a legitimate fetus there is reason to be lenient if there is a great need, as long as the fetus has not begun to emerge; even if the mother’s life is not in jeopardy, but only so as to save her from an evil associated with it that would cause her great pain…
I was asked and searched my heart/intellect to examine and explore what I had heard about a small group of women who become pregnant and do not want to give birth again, and who do not want to remain pregnant any more [once they had already conceived]. And some of these women, if they become pregnant while nursing [another child] and they suspect the ayin hara [evil eye] or danger of the new birth to the living child, and they make a medication and drugs that are known to them to terminate a child, and he will become a nefel– a nonviable fetus....Here [in the case of the women of this teshuva] there is suspicion about the pregnancy [and is potential for harm is acknowledged, and women are therefore permitted to ingest this medication]. Behold– we have before us exactly what everyone acknowledges [is an acceptable situation where an abortion would be permitted], to illustrate the danger to the [living] child, and [the mother] is permitted to drink an abortive drug, so it seems, according to my understanding of the issue.
This above translation is by Rabbi Margaret Hughes-Robinson; you can find a full copy of the tshuvah here, which links to a pdf of the Hebrew.
It should be noted that ibn Ayyash refers to scenarios in which what we would now both call "self-managed abortion" and "medication abortion," are taking place--both of which are matters with strong contemporary resonance, and finds at least some situations in which to permit them.
Mental-health risk has been definitely equated with physical-health risk. This woman, in danger of losing her mental health unless the pregnancy is interrupted, would therefore accordingly qualify.
It is clear that abortion is not permitted without reason. That would be destructive and frustrative of the possibility of life. But for a reason, even if it is a slim reason, such as to prevent disgrace, then we have precedent and authority to permit it.
כשנשקפת סכנה לאשה בהמשכת ההריון יש להתיר הפלת העובר בשופי. גם כשמצב בריאותה של האשה רופף מאד ולשם רפואתה או השקטת מכאוביה הגדולים דרוש לבצע הפלת העובר, אע“פ שאין סכנה ממשית, גם כן יש מקום להתיר לעשות זאת, וכפי ראות עיני המורה המצב שלפניו.
Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer 9:51.3 (1967)
If there is a danger to the mother from continuing the pregnancy, one should permit abortion without hesitation. Also, if her health is poor and to cure her or to relieve her from great pain it is necessary to abort the fetus, even if she is not in actual danger, there is room to permit it, based on the halachic authority’s evaluation of the situation.
ברור ופשוט הדבר בהלכה דישראל אינו נהרג על העוברין, ומלבד דעה יחידית סוברים הפוסקים שאיסור מיהא ישנו, אבל דעת הרבה מהפוסקים שהאיסור אינו אלא מדרבנן, או הוא רק משום גדר בנינו של עולם, אבל מחמת איבוד נפשות אין נדנוד כלל, ומשום כך מתיר בשו"ת מהרי"ט ט:צ"ז–צ"ט לסדר בישראלית הפלת ולד בכל היכא שהדבר נחוץ משום רפואת אמו, אפילו באין סיבה של פקו"נ לאם... ובכזאת, ויותר מזאת, צידד להתיר בהדיא בשו"ת שאילת יעב"ץ א:מג, וכותב בלשון: "וגם בעובר כשר יש צד להקל לצורך גדול כל כמה דלא עקר אפילו אינו משום פקוח נפש אמו, אלא להציל לה מרעתו שגורם לה כאב גדול." הרי בהדיא שדבר הצעת ההיתר בזה של היעב"ץ הוא אפילו כשליכא בכאן שאלת פקו"נ של האם, והמדובר רק כדי להצילה מכאב גדול שיש לה בגללו, ושבכלל יש להקל בזה לצורך גדול. וא"כ הגע בעצמך האם יש צורך, צער וכאב, יותר גדול מזה של נידוננו, אשר יגרם לאם בהולד לה יצור כזה, שכולו אומר יסורים ומכאובים ומיתתו בטוח במשך מספר שנים, ועיני ההורים רואות וכלות באין לאל ידם להושיע? )וברור שלא משנה ולא מפחית כלום באם הילוד הזה ילקח למוסד מיוחד ולא יתנו גישה להורים עד מותו (. ומתוסף לזה פיתולי היסורים והמכאובים של היילוד בעצמו... ויסורים וכאבים נפשיים המה במדה מרובה הרבה יותר גדולים ויותר מכאיבים מיסורים גופיים...
Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer 13:102 (1978)
It is clear and obvious as law that a Jew is not killed for a fetus. Aside from one view, the authorities rule that there is a prohibition, but many authorities believe that this prohibition is rabbinic, or it is under “building the world.” But there is no concern for destroying a life, and therefore Maharit 1:97-99 permits arrangement for a Jewish woman to abort a fetus where it is needed for the mother’s health, even without it being a matter of saving the mother’s life… And in such a case, and beyond this, Rabbi Yaakov Emden permitted, writing, “And even with a legitimate fetus, there is room to be lenient for great need, so long as it has not been uprooted [for birth], even without a need to save the mother’s life, but only to save her from her evil, which causes her great pain.” We see clearly that this permission of Rabbi Yaakov Emden is even when it is not a matter of saving the mother’s life, and it is only to save her from great pain because of the child, and that in general there is room to be lenient for great need. If so, ask yourself: Is there any need, pain or ache greater than in our case, which will cause the mother in birthing such a creation, whose whole existence is suffering and pain, and whose death is certain in a matter of years, and whose parents watch and deteriorate without any power to save? (And certainly, it would not change or reduce anything if the child would be taken to a special institution without access for the parents until his death). And added to this are the suffering and pain of the child himself… And suffering and emotional pain in great measure are greater and more painful than physical pain…
Here it is clear that saving a life is not the only sanction for permitting an abortion. This is evident from the Talmudic passage that permits a nursing mother to cohabitate using a mokh (a barrier of cotton or wool) to prevent pregnancy… Since this prohibition is waived to facilitate normal family relations (which is why the emission in this context is not “wasteful”), it would follow that other ethical and humane factors may also be taken into account. It would seem to me that issues such as kevod ha-beriyot (dignity of persons), shalom bayit (domestic peace) and tza’ar (pain), which all carry significant halakhic weight in other contexts, should be considered in making these decisions.
There is clear precedent in the tradition...to permit abortion of a fetus to save a mother’s life, to safeguard her health, or even for “a very thin reason,” such as to spare her physical pain or mental anguish.
In the words of Rashi, only when the fetus "comes into the world" is it a "person." The basis, then, for denying capital crime status to feticide in Jewish law, even for those rabbis who may have wanted to rule otherwise....
Murder (of the innocent) is forbidden even to save life. But with abortion removed from the category of murder, then therapeutic abortion becomes permissible and, in fact, mandated.
...In analyzing such provisions, the Talmud suggested that the reason could well be that the fetus is in the category of an "aggressor"; its life is forfeit under the law which permits killing a "pursuer" in order to save the intended victim. The Talmud, however, dismisses this reasoning, since the fetus is an innocent being, and since one cannot know "who is pursuing whom"; the pursuit must therefore be deemed an "act of God," and this factor does not apply. In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides also used the term "aggressor," but only figuratively; in truth he and his commentators concluded that the argument does not apply. It is either inapplicable or at best superfluous, because the fetus is not yet a person and murder is not involved...
Some commentators of the Mishneh Torah suggest that although abortion is not technically murder, it is still so grave an offense that Maimonides resorted to the aggressor argument in order to buttress the permission for abortion; its justification is that the fetus is at least like an aggressor. The subsequent rabbinic tradition seems to align itself either to the right, in the direction of Maimonides, or to the left, in the direction of Rashi.
The first approach can be identified especially with the late Chief Rabbi of Israel, Issar Unterman, who sees any abortion as "akin to homicide" and therefore allowable only in cases of corresponding gravity, such as saving the life of the mother. This approach then builds down from that strict position to embrace a broader interpretation of life-saving situations, which include a threat to her health, for example, as well as a threat to her life.
The second approach, associated with another former Chief Rabbi of Israel, Ben Zion Uziel, and others, assumes that no real prohibition against abortion exists and builds up from that lenient position to safeguard against indiscriminate abortion. This includes the example of Rabbi Yair Bachrach in the 17th century, whose classic responsum saw no legal bar to abortion, but would not permit it in the case before him. The case was one of a pregnancy conceived in adultery; the woman, in "deep remorse," wanted to destroy the fruit of her sin.
The case was one of a pregnancy conceived in adultery; the woman, in "deep remorse," wanted to destroy the fruit of her sin. The author concludes by refusing to sanction the abortion, not on legal grounds but on sociological ones, as a safeguard against further immorality. Other authorities disagreed on this point, affirming the legal sanction of abortion for the woman's welfare, whether life or health, or even avoidance of "great pain."
The criterion in both approaches becomes maternal rather than fetal. The principle in Jewish law is tza'ar gufah kadim, that her welfare is primary. Rabbinic rulings on abortion are thus amenable to the following generalization: If a possibility or probability exists that a child may be born defective, and the mother seeks abortion on the grounds of pity for a child whose life would be less than normal, the rabbi would decline permission. Since we do not know for sure that it will be born defective, and since we do not know how bad such a defective life will be for the child, and since no permission exists in Jewish law to kill born defectives, permission on those grounds would be denied. If, however, an abortion for the same potentially deformed child were sought on the grounds that the possibility is causing severe anguish to the mother, permission would be granted....
Implicit in the Mishnah above is the teaching that the rights of the fetus are secondary to the rights of the mother all the way up until the moment of birth. This principle is obscured by the current phrase, "right to life." In the context of abortion questions, the issue is not the right to life, which is very clear in Jewish law, but the right to be born, which is not as clear. The right to be born is relative; the right to life for existing persons is absolute. "Life" may begin before birth, but it is not the life of a human person; animal life, plant life or even pre-human life are not the same as human life. Rabbinic law has determined that human life begins with birth. This is neither a medical nor a court judgment, but a metaphysical one. In the Jewish system, human life in this sense begins with birth. Of course, potential life already partakes of the potential sacredness of actual life, since the latter can have its inception only through the former.
...Accordingly, abortion for "population control" is repugnant to the Jewish system. Abortion for economic reasons is also not admissible. Taking precaution by abortion or birth control against physical threat remains a mitzvah, but never to forestall financial difficulty. Material considerations are improper in this connection. In the Jewish community, today, with a conscious or unconscious drive to replenish ranks decimated by the Holocaust, contemporary rabbis invoke not the more lenient, but rather the more stringent responsa of the earlier authorities. The more permissive decisions, they point out, were in any case rendered against the background of far greater instinctive hesitation to resort to abortion. Against today's background of more casual abortion, rabbis are moving closer to the position associated with Maimonides and Unterman, allowing abortion only for the gravest of reasons.