There is the reality of the centrality of pregnancy for a woman’s status.
There is also the reality of death of the mother during labor.
There is also the agency of all the matriarchs in wanting to be pregnant and doing something in that direction.
(כב) וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים׃ (כג) וְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִהְיֶ֑ה וְנָתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ׃ (כד) עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל׃ (כה) כְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה׃ (ס)
(22) When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other ason ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning. (23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.
This is the chief source regarding abortion.
~ What is the case?
~ There are two possibilities for the word “ason” or אסון. What are they?
~ What is the punishment in the Torah for murder?
The contemporary Roman Catholic position is that ensoulment occurs at conception.
Abortion makes baptism impossible for Christians, leaving the fetus damned eternally by original sin.
Ensoulment is not a halachic (Jewish law) issue, since Jews do not have the concept of damnation by the original sin.
(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:
(6) A woman who was having trouble giving birth, they cut up the fetus inside her and take it out limb by limb, because her life comes before its life. If most of it had come out already they do not touch it because we do not push off one life for another.
יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש
its head came out: With a women that is experiencing difficulty giving birth and is in [mortal] danger. And it is taught in the first section [of this teaching], "the midwife extends her hand and cuts it up and extracts [the pieces];" as the entire time that that it has not gone out into the environment of the world, it is not a soul, and [so] it is possible to kill it and to save its mother. But when its head came out, we cannot touch it to kill it, as it is like a born [baby]; and we do not push off one soul for the sake of another.
(ה) כֵּיצַד מְאַיְּמִין אֶת הָעֵדִים עַל עֵדֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן וּמְאַיְּמִין עֲלֵיהֶן. שֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מֵאֹמֶד, וּמִשְּׁמוּעָה, עֵד מִפִּי עֵד וּמִפִּי אָדָם נֶאֱמָן שָׁמַעְנוּ, אוֹ שֶׁמָּא אִי אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין שֶׁסּוֹפֵנוּ לִבְדֹּק אֶתְכֶם בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה. הֱווּ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁלֹּא כְדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, אָדָם נוֹתֵן מָמוֹן וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ. דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, דָּמוֹ וְדַם זַרְעִיּוֹתָיו תְּלוּיִין בּוֹ עַד סוֹף הָעוֹלָם, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בְקַיִן שֶׁהָרַג אֶת אָחִיו, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית ד) דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ צֹעֲקִים, אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר דַּם אָחִיךָ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ, דָּמוֹ וְדַם זַרְעִיּוֹתָיו. דָּבָר אַחֵר, דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ, שֶׁהָיָה דָמוֹ מֻשְׁלָךְ עַל הָעֵצִים וְעַל הָאֲבָנִים. לְפִיכָךְ נִבְרָא אָדָם יְחִידִי, לְלַמֶּדְךָ, שֶׁכָּל הַמְאַבֵּד נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת [מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל], מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ אִבֵּד עוֹלָם מָלֵא. וְכָל הַמְקַיֵּם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת [מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל], מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ קִיֵּם עוֹלָם מָלֵא. וּמִפְּנֵי שְׁלוֹם הַבְּרִיּוֹת, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ אַבָּא גָדוֹל מֵאָבִיךָ. וְשֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ מִינִין אוֹמְרִים, הַרְבֵּה רָשֻׁיּוֹת בַּשָּׁמָיִם. וּלְהַגִּיד גְּדֻלָּתוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא, שֶׁאָדָם טוֹבֵעַ כַּמָּה מַטְבְּעוֹת בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד וְכֻלָּן דּוֹמִין זֶה לָזֶה, וּמֶלֶךְ מַלְכֵי הַמְּלָכִים הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא טָבַע כָּל אָדָם בְּחוֹתָמוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן וְאֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן דּוֹמֶה לַחֲבֵרוֹ. לְפִיכָךְ כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד חַיָּב לוֹמַר, בִּשְׁבִילִי נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם. וְשֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מַה לָּנוּ וְלַצָּרָה הַזֹּאת, וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד וְגוֹ'. וְשֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מַה לָּנוּ לָחוּב בְּדָמוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (משלי יא) וּבַאֲבֹד רְשָׁעִים רִנָּה:
(5) How does the court intimidate the witnesses in giving testimony for cases of capital law? They would bring the witnesses in and intimidate them by saying to them: Perhaps what you say in your testimony is based on conjecture, or perhaps it is based on a rumor, perhaps it is testimony based on hearsay, e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, or perhaps it is based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation, and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered. The court tells them: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law. In cases of monetary law, a person who testifies falsely, causing money to be given to the wrong party, can give the money to the proper owner and his sin is atoned for. In cases of capital law, if one testifies falsely, the blood of the accused and the blood of his offspring that he did not merit to produce are ascribed to the witness’s testimony until eternity. The proof for this is as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated concerning him: “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse does not state: Your brother’s blood [dam], in the singular, but rather: “Your brother’s blood [demei],” in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both his brother’s blood and the blood of his brother’s offspring are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: Alternatively, the phrase “your brother’s blood [demei],” written in the plural, teaches that that his blood was not gathered in one place but was splattered on the trees and on the stones. The court tells the witnesses: Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul [from the Jewish people], the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul [from the Jewish people], the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world. The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: And this was done due to the importance of maintaining peace among people, so that one person will not say to another: My father, i.e., progenitor, is greater than your father. And it was also so that the heretics who believe in multiple gods will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person. And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all of them are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me, as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions. The court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say: Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)?
~ How does this source help us understand the question of not choosing between mother and child once the head is out of the birth canal?
(ג) תנוקת בת יום אחד מיטמאה בנדה בת עשרה ימים מיטמאה בזיבה. תנוק בן יום אחד מיטמא בזיבה. ומיטמא בנגעים. ומיטמא בטמא מת. וזוקק ליבום ופוטר מן היבום ומאכיל בתרומה ופוסל מן התרומה ונוחל ומנחיל. וההורגו חייב. והרי הוא לאביו ולאמו ולכל קרוביו. כחתן שלם:
(3) A baby girl one day old can become impure as a niddah. At ten days old she can become impure as a zavah A baby boy one day old.... can become impure as a zav, or impure by having nega'im, or impure through [contact with] the impurity of a corpse; and he creates a bond for yibum [the obligation to perform Levirate marriage]; and he can exempt one from requiring yibum and he can feed terumah and he can render terumah to be forbidden and he can inherit or cause others to inherit and one who kills him is liable [for murder]; and he is thereby fully a family member to his father and to his mother and for all his relatives.
מתני' גהאשה שיצאה ליהרג אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד האשה שישבה על המשבר ממתינין לה עד שתלד האשה שנהרגה נהנין בשערה בהמה שנהרגה אסורה בהנאה: גמ' פשיטא גופה היא איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הואיל וכתיב (שמות כא, כב) כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה ממונא דבעל הוא ולא ליפסדיה מיניה קמ"ל
Mishnah: If a woman is about to be executed, one does not wait for her until she gives birth. But if she had already sat on the birthstool, one waits for her until she gives birth. If a woman has been put to death one may use her hair; if an animal has been put to death it is forbidden to make any use of it.
Gemara: But that is self-evident, for it is her body! It is necessary to teach it, for one might have assumed since Scripture says: According as the woman's husband shall lay upon him, that it (the unborn child) is the husband's property, of which he should not be deprived, therefore we are informed (that it is not so).
~ Why do they NOT wait for the woman to finish pregnancy?
~ When are proceedings stopped?
~ What is the possibility that is shut down?
בעי רבי ירמיה עובר במעי אשה הוי גלגלים או לא כיון דאמר מר עובר ירך אמו הלכך גופה הוא ולא הוי גלגלין או דלמא כיון דסופו לצאת מיפרש פריש מינה
Rabbi Yirmeya raised yet another dilemma: Does a dead fetus in its dead mother’s womb form a mixture with regard to her, so that the bodies are considered like two corpses buried together, or not? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the Master said that a fetus is considered as the thigh of its mother, it is therefore like her body and it does not form a mixture with it? Or perhaps one should maintain: Since in most cases a fetus will ultimately emerge from the womb at birth, it is already considered separated from her, and it is like any other corpse buried with the woman.
~ This source is explaining two possibilities. What are they?
(ג) וְאֵין רֶקֶב הַמֵּת מְטַמֵּא עַד שֶׁיִּקָּבֵר עֵרוֹם בְּאָרוֹן שֶׁל שַׁיִשׁ וְיִהְיֶה כֻּלּוֹ שָׁלֵם. חָסֵר מִמֶּנּוּ אֵיבָר אוֹ שֶׁנִּקְבַּר בִּכְסוּתוֹ אוֹ בְּאָרוֹן שֶׁל עֵץ אוֹ בְּשֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת אֵין לוֹ רֶקֶב. וְלֹא אָמְרוּ רֶקֶב אֶלָּא לְמֵת בִּלְבַד לְהוֹצִיא הָרוּג שֶׁהֲרֵי חָסֵר דָּמוֹ:
(ד) קָבְרוּ שְׁנֵי מֵתִים כְּאֶחָד. אוֹ שֶׁגָּזְזוּ שְׂעָרוֹ אוֹ צִפָּרְנָיו וּקְבָרוּם עִמּוֹ. אוֹ אִשָּׁה עֻבָּרָה שֶׁמֵּתָה וְנִקְבְּרָה וְעֻבָּרָהּ בְּמֵעֶיהָ אֵין הָרֶקֶב שֶׁלָּהֶם מְטַמֵּא. וְכֵן אִם טָחַן הַמֵּת עַד שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה רֶקֶב אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא עַד שֶׁיַּרְקִיב מֵאֵלָיו. טָחַן אֶת הַמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ עֲפָרוֹ עַד שֶׁהִרְקִיב כֻּלּוֹ. אוֹ [שֶׁהִרְקִיב] מִקְצָתוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא חַי וּמֵת וְהִרְקִיב הַכּל הֲרֵי זֶה סָפֵק וְאִם נִטְמָא לְרֶקֶב זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה סְפֵק טָמֵא. וְכֵן אִם נִטְמָא בְּרֹבַע עֲצָמוֹת הַבָּאִין מֵהַשִּׁדְרָה אוֹ מִן הַגֻּלְגּלֶת בְּאָהֳלָן הֲרֵי זֶה סְפֵק טָמֵא:
(3) The decomposed mass (rekev) of a corpse does not convey ritual impurity unless it was buried naked in a marble coffin and was entirely intact. If one limb was lacking or it was buried in garments or in a wooden or metal coffin, there is no concept of rekev. The concept of rekev applies with regard to a corpse alone. This excludes a person who was slain, for his blood is lacking.
(4) When two corpses are buried together or the hair and the nails of a corpse were cut off and buried together with it, or a woman was buried together with a fetus in her womb, the rekev does not convey ritual impurity.
Similarly, if one ground up a corpse until it became a decomposed mass, [these laws do not apply]. It must decompose naturally. If one ground the corpse and then left its remains until they decomposed naturally or a portion of the body decomposed while the person was alive, he died, and then the entire body decomposed, there is an unresolved doubt [concerning the ruling]. Hence, if [a nazirite] becomes impure because of this rekev, there is an unresolved doubt whether he is impure. Similarly, there is an unresolved doubt whether [a nazirite] is impure if he contacts impurity from a fourth of a kav of bones coming from the backbone or the skull when he is under the same shelter as they are.
Note that the codes eventually lean to the side that a fetus is a part of a woman's body. However...
דרש רב שמלאי למה הולד דומה במעי אמו לפנקס שמקופל ומונח ידיו על שתי צדעיו שתי אציליו על ב' ארכובותיו וב' עקביו על ב' עגבותיו וראשו מונח לו בין ברכיו ופיו סתום וטבורו פתוח ואוכל ממה שאמו אוכלת ושותה ממה שאמו שותה ואינו מוציא רעי שמא יהרוג את אמו וכיון שיצא לאויר העולם נפתח הסתום ונסתם הפתוח שאלמלא כן אינו יכול לחיות אפילו שעה אחת ונר דלוק לו על ראשו וצופה ומביט מסוף העולם ועד סופו שנאמר (איוב כט, ג) בהלו נרו עלי ראשי לאורו אלך חשך ואל תתמה שהרי אדם ישן כאן ורואה חלום באספמיא ואין לך ימים שאדם שרוי בטובה יותר מאותן הימים שנאמר (איוב כט, ב) מי יתנני כירחי קדם כימי אלוה ישמרני ואיזהו ימים שיש בהם ירחים ואין בהם שנים הוי אומר אלו ירחי לידה ומלמדין אותו כל התורה כולה שנאמר (משלי ד ד) ויורני ויאמר לי יתמך דברי לבך שמור מצותי וחיה ואומר (איוב כט, ד) בסוד אלוה עלי אהלי מאי ואומר וכי תימא נביא הוא דקאמר ת"ש בסוד אלוה עלי אהלי וכיון שבא לאויר העולם בא מלאך וסטרו על פיו ומשכחו כל התורה כולה שנאמר (בראשית ד, ז) לפתח חטאת רובץ ואינו יוצא משם עד שמשביעין אותו שנאמר (ישעיהו מה, כג) כי לי תכרע כל ברך תשבע כל לשון כי לי תכרע כל ברך זה יום המיתה שנאמר (תהלים כב, ל) לפניו יכרעו כל יורדי עפר תשבע כל לשון זה יום הלידה שנאמר (תהלים כד, ד) נקי כפים ובר לבב אשר לא נשא לשוא נפשו ולא נשבע למרמה ומה היא השבועה שמשביעין אותו תהי צדיק ואל תהי רשע ואפילו כל העולם כולו אומרים לך צדיק אתה היה בעיניך כרשע והוי יודע שהקב"ה טהור ומשרתיו טהורים ונשמה שנתן בך טהורה היא אם אתה משמרה בטהרה מוטב ואם לאו הריני נוטלה ממך
R. Simlai delivered the following discourse: What does an embryo resemble when it is in the bowels of its mother? Folded writing tablets. Its hands rest on its two temples respectively, its two elbows on its two legs and its two heels against its buttocks. Its head lies between its knees, its mouth is closed and its navel is open, and it eats what its mother eats and drinks what its mother drinks, but produces no excrements because otherwise it might kill its mother. As soon, however, as it sees the light the closed organ opens and the open one closes, for if that had not happened the embryo could not live even one single hour. A light burns above its head and it looks and sees from one end of the world to the other, as it is said, then his lamp shined above my head, and by His light I walked through darkness (Job 29:3). And do not be astonished at this, for a person sleeping here might see a dream in Spain. And there is no time in which a man enjoys greater happiness than in those days, for it is said, O that I were as the months of old, as in the days when God watched over me (Job 29:2); now which are the days' that make up 'months' and do not make up years? The months of pregnancy of course. It is also taught all the Torah from beginning to end, for it is said, And he taught me, and said to me: 'Let your heart hold fast my words, keep my mitzvot and live' (Prov. 4:4), and it is also said, When the converse of God was upon my tent (Job 29:4). Why the addition of 'and it is also said'? — In case you might say that it was only the prophet who said that. Come and hear: 'when the converse of God was upon my tent’. As soon it comes to the air of the world, an angel approaches, slaps it on its mouth and causes it to forget all the Torah completely, as it is said, Sin couches at the door (Gen. 4:7). It does not emerge from there before it is made to take an oath, as it is said, That to Me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear (Isaiah 45:23). 'That to Me every knee shall bow' refers to the day of dying of which it is said All they that go down to the dust shall kneel before Him (Ps. 22:30) 'Every tongue shall swear' refers to the day of birth of which it is said, One that has clean hands, and a pure heart, who has not taken My name in vain, and has not sworn deceitfully (Ps. 24:4). What is the nature of the oath that it is made to take? Be righteous, and be never wicked; and even if all the world tells you, You are righteous', consider yourself wicked. Always bear in mind that the Holy One of Blessing is pure, that God’s ministers are pure and that the soul which God gave you is pure; if you preserve it in purity, well and good, but if not, I will take it away from you.
~ Note that the fetus has a life.
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר י”ג:ק”א
יא סיון תשל”ה
השאלה היא, אודות הפסקת הריון בגלל המחלה הנקראת תיי – סקס.. הטכניקה בה ניתן כיום לבצע בדיקות מעבדה אלה, אינה נותנת תוצאות לפני תום שלשה חדשי הריון. לזאת נפשו בשאלתו, אם: האם לראות במחלה זו אשר תוצאותה כה חמורות וכה וודאיות, מספיק חמור בכדי לאפשר הפסקת הריון גם אחרי שלשה חדשים, או האם התקופה הזו של שלשה חדשים היא אבסולוטית ואין שום סיבה פרט לסיבה של פקוח נפש ישיר באם, אשר מאפשר הפסקת הריון אחר ג’ חדשי עיבור, ע”כ.
והנה אחרי העיון בדבר בכובד ראש בכל צדדי הנתונים שבבעיה האמורה, נלפענ”ד על יסוד הבירורים הנרחבים שכתבתי בדבר הפסקת הריון בספרי שו”ת צ”א חלק ט’ סי’ נ”א שער ג’… כי שבמקרה המיוחד הזה אשר תוצאות כה חמורות בכנפיו עם המשכת ההריון והלידה, אפשר להתיר הפסקת הריון עד שבעה חדשים, ובאופן שבביצוע הפסקת ההריון לא יהא כרוך בשום סכנה לאם. משבעה חדשים והלאה הדבר כבר יותר חמור, (והחומרא בזה אז כבר הוא יותר מדעת נוטה ומסברת הכרס כביטויו של החו”י להלן באות ד’). מכיון שבמלאות ז’ חדשים בא כבר הולדבהרבה מקרים לידי גמרו.
ברור ופשוט הדבר בהלכה, דישראל אינו נהרג על העוברין, ומלבד דעה יחידית סוברים הפוסקים שאיסור מיהא ישנו, אבל דעת הרבה מהפוסקים שהאיסור אינו אלא מדרבנן, או הוא רק משום גדר בנינו של עולם, אבל מחמת איבוד נפשות אין נדנוד כלל, ומשום כך מתיר בשו”ת מהרי”ט ח”ט סי’ צ”ז – צ”ט לסדר בישראלית הפלת ולד בכל היכא שהדבר נחוץ משום רפואת אמו, אפילו באין סיבה של פקו”נ לאם…
ובכזאת, ויותר מזאת, צידד להתיר בהדיא בשו”ת שאילת יעב”ץ ח”א סי’ מ”ג… וא”כ הגע בעצמך האם יש צורך, צער וכאב, יותר גדול מזה של נידוננו, אשר יגרם לאם בהולד לה יצור כזה, שכולו אומר יסורים ומכאובים ומיתתו בטוח במשך מספר שנים, ועיני ההורים רואות וכלות באין לאל ידם להושיע?… נראה שזהו המקרה הקלאסי ביותר שיש להתיר. ולא משנה באיזה צורה מתבטאים הכאבים והיסורים, גופיים, או נפשיים. ויסורים וכאבים נפשיים המה במדה מרובה הרבה יותר גדולים ויותר מכאיבים מיסורים גופיים…
(ב) וזאת לדעת, כי בדבריהם של המהרי”ט והיעב”ץ לא נזכר כלל שישנו כאלו הפרש בזה בין תוך ג’ חדשים לבין לאחר ג’ חדשים, וההגבלה הסתמית בזה היא רק שיש חילוק בין עקר לצאת לבין לא עקר לצאת, ואדרבה היעב”ץ כותב בהדיא בלשון: כל כמה דלא עקר, ומינה דהא כל כמה דלא עקר אין חילוק באיזה חודש שהיא נמצאת…
(ד) גם בשו”ת חוות יאיר סי’ ל”א שהעלה והזכיר בתשובתו שם מדבר זה שניתן לחלק בין קודם מ’ יום לבין אחר מ’ יום, או בין קודם ג’ חדשים לבין אחר ג’ חדשים, הביע כלאחר יד את הסתייגותו מחילוקים כאלה, וכותב בלשון: – מכל מקום אין מבוקשנו לדון מדעת נוטה וסברת הכרס יעו”ש.
(ו) באשר על כן כאשר גיליתי דעתי מראש, נלפענ”ד דיש להתיר לכגון נידוננו לסדר הפסקת הריון מיד עם הוודע המבחן הברור והוודאי שאכן יולד ילוד כזה, אפילו עד שבעה חדשים להריונה. ובאופן שסידור הפסקת ההריון תתבצע בצורה כזאת שלא יהא כרוך בה כל סכנה לאם…
(ז) אוסיף לומר לרווחא דמילתא, שמה טוב יהא אם אפשר הדבר לסדר שאשה רופאה תבצע את הפסקת ההריון, דבאופן כזה יתווסף עוד דבר המקיל בזה, וזאת לפי דעתם של החו”י והיעב”ץ בתשובותיהם שם. ועוד, שס”ל שהאיסור בישראל בהריגת עובר הוא משום השחתת זרע יעו”ש, ונשים הא אינן מצוות על כך לדעת רוב הפוסקים.
1975
The question is regarding terminating a pregnancy because of the Tay-Sachs disease… The technology today which allows testing for this disease cannot giver reliable results prior to three months into the pregnancy. Thus his question is if one can view such a disease with such severe and certain consequences, sufficient severity to allow for a termination of the pregnancy even after three months, or if the period of three months is absolute, and there is no justification, short of direct risk to the life to the mother, that would allow for a termination of pregnancy after three months.
Behold after investigation into the matter with great seriousness, and with consideration of all the relevant circumstances, it seems in my humble opinion, on the basis of the analysis that I wrote in my responsa, 9:51.3… that in a case such as this, in which the consequences are so grave if the pregnancy and childbirth are allowed to continue, it is permissible to terminate the pregnancy until 7 months have elapsed, and in a way in which no danger will befall the mother. Beyond 7 months the issue is more serious (and the stringency here is more based on how the matter seems and the “knowledge of the gut”, to use the phrase of the Havot Yair) since at the end of 7 months the fetus is often fully developed.
It is clear that capital punishment is not prescribed for abortion, and with the exception of a single opinion, the decisors conclude that there is nevertheless some form of a prohibition. But the opinion of most rabbis is that the prohibition is only of Rabbinic origin, or that it is in the category of the well-being of the world, but that there is not even the slightest element of destroying a life. Therefore, Maharit, in his responsum, permitted abortion for a Jewish woman whenever the matter was necessary for her health even when her life was not at stake.
Like this, and even to a greater degree, was it argued to be permissible in Responsa Yavet, 1:43… And therefore ask yourself where is there a great need regarding pain and suffering greater than the woman in our case which will be inflicted upon her if she gives birth to such a creature whose very being is one of pain and suffering and his death is certain within a few years… and added to that is the pain and suffering of the infant. This would seem to be the classic case in which abortion may be permitted, and it doesn’t matter what type of pain and suffering is endured, physical or emotional, as emotional pain and suffering is to a large extent much greater than physical pain and suffering…
(2) And you should know that in the words of Maharit and Yavetz, there is not mentioned at all that there should be a distinction between within 3 months and after 3 months. And the clear distinction given is only regarding once it has been “uprooted to emerge” and beforehand. To the contrary, Yavetz writes thusly: “As long as it has not uprooted to emerge,” and from this we can infer that as long as this is not the case, there is no distinction regarding what month it is in…
(4) Also in Responsa Havot Yair, 31, where he raises the possibility of distinguishing between before and after 40 days, or before and after 3 months, he expresses in passing his reservations about such distinctions, and he writes thusly: “Nevertheless, it is not our desire to make a decision based on what seems, and a knowledge of the gut”…
(6) Thus, as I have indicated at the outset, it would seem in my humble opinion that one can allow in a case such as ours to arrange for a termination of the pregnancy immediately once the test results are definitive that the child has this disease, even up to 7 months of pregnancy, provided that there is no risk to the mother…
(7) I will add that, to do it in the best possible way, it would be ideal if the operation could be performed by a woman doctor, for in such a case there would be another aspect of leniency, according to Havot Yair and Yavetz in their responsa. For they are of the opinion that the prohibition for a Jew to kill a fetus is because of wasting of seed, see there, and women are not prohibited in doing such according to most decisors.
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר, כ:ב
ח”י טבת תשנ”ג.
עובדא הוה באשה אחת שהרתה רביעיה, אחרי בדיקות רפואיות החליטו הרופאים שמן ההכרח להמית עובר אחד דאזי יוולדו שלשת הנותרים חיים, אחרת יוולדו כולם מתים, ונשאלתי מבעלה שהוא ת”ח אם מותר זאת על פי דין להמית אחד מהם כדי שהאחים ישארו בחיים ואם זה לא דומה לההלכה הנפסקה ברמב”ם בפ”ה מה’ יסודי התורה הלכה ה’ דאם אמרו להם עכו”ם תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגהו ואם לאו נהרוג כולכם יהרגו כולם ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל…
ועל האמור שההורג את העובר אין שם רוצח אליו ושלא נכלל בהג’ עבירות שנאמר בהם יהרג ואל יעבור שאחד מהם שפ”ד, אין מי שחולק, ונחלקו רק איזה עבירת לאו יש בזה, אי משום לאו דחבלה, או משום השחתת זרע, וכיוצא בזה, אבל אין זה אפילו בגדר של אביזרייהו דשפ”ד, ואמבוהא דספרי סוברים שאינו אלא מדרבנן, ומהם מכנים זאת רק בשם קצת איסור…
לאור כל האמור נלפענ”ד להלכה בנידון שאלתנו שמותר להמית עובר אחד כדי להציל עי”כ חיי יתר שלשת העוברין אשר כל אחד מהם הוא בבחיה על רודף את משנהו
1993.
The case is of a certain woman who is pregnant with quadruplets, and after a medical exam the doctors have determined that it is necessary to kill one fetus, and then the other three will definitely live, but without this, all of them will die. I was asked by her husband, who is a talmid chakham, if it is permissible by law to kill one of them so that his siblings live, or if this is similar to the law that is ruled in Rambam, Foundations of Torah 5:5, that if non-Jews tell you to give us one person to be killed, or else we will kill all of you, that you must let everyone die rather than giving over one Jewish soul…
Now, we have shown, that one who kills a fetus is not considered a murdered, and that this is not included in the three cardinal sins for which it is said that one must die rather than transgressing, one of which is murder, and on this point no one argues. The only debate is which negative prohibition applies to this case, whether the prohibition of wounding or that of wasting seed, or something similar, but that this is not even in the category of appurtenances to murder. And the majority of the decisors are of the opinion that it is only a Rabbinic violation, and some frame it merely as “a minor violation”…
Based on all the above, it appears to me, in my humble opinion, that the ruling regarding our question is, that it is permissible to kill one fetus so that more than three fetuses (each one of whom is in the category of a pursuer of the other) will survive…
I. Diverse opinions of modern rabbinic scholars.
Excerpted from "Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law"
by David M. Feldman.
The first position can be identified especially with Chief Rabbi Unterman, who sees any abortion as "akin to homicide", and therefore permissible only in cases of corresponding gravity, such as saving the life of the mother. It then builds down from this strict position to embrace a broader interpretation of life-saving situations which include a threat to her health, for example, as well as a threat to her life.
The other viewpoint (identifiable with the late Chief Rabbi Uziel and others...), assumes no real prohibition against abortion at any time, except perhaps during the most advanced stage of pregnancy, and builds up from this lenient position to safeguard against indiscriminate abortion.
"It follows that we may not induce an abortion to save her from a disease deriving from....other "fevers" (not directly caused by the pregnancy itself)...in the 6th month of her pregnancy...We must save her by other treatments." (Pachad Yitzhak, by R. Isaac Lampronti. Italy, 18th C)
"Mental health risk has been definitely equated to physical-health risk. This woman who is in danger of losing her mental health unless the pregnancy is interrupted, therefore, would accordingly qualify." (Responsum L'vushai Mord'khai, 1913)
"There is room to permit abortion for "great need"; as long as the birth process has not yet begun, even if the reason is not yet to save her life - even if only to save her from the "great pain" it causes her." (She'elat Ya'avetz, R. Jacob Emden, Hamburg, 18th C)
It continues with Bachrach (seventeenth century), whose famous Responsum saw no legal bar to abortion but would not permit it in the case before him. The case was one of a pregnancy conceived in adultery; the woman, in "deep remorse", wanted to destroy the fruit of her sin....
(Quoting that responsum:) "Therefore, according to what we have shown, strict Torah law would permit what you ask, were it not for the practice among us and among them to seek to curb immorality....Whoever assists [in making the abortion possible] gives a hand to transgressors."
It is clear that abortion is not permitted without reason. That would be destructive and frustrative of the possibility of life. But for a reason, even if it is a slim reason, such as to prevent her disgrace, then we have precedent and authority to permit it. (Responsum of Chief Rabbi Uziel)
Rabbi Jacob Emden (Germany, 1697-1776)
"And even in the case of a legitimate fetus there is reason to be lenient if there is a great need, so long as labor has not begun (or: as long as the child has not yet begun to move); even if the mother's life is not in jeopardy, but only so as to save her from an evil associated with it that would cause her great pain...("When Life is in the balance", p. 92)
*Rabbi Yehiel Jacob Weinberg: 1966 ruling permitting a woman who contracted rubella during the 1st trimester to abort due to fear it would be born "without some organ or without intelligence...causing her pain."
*Rabbi Ben Zion Uzziel (former chief Rabbi of Israel) - case of a woman in danger of becoming totally deaf in both ears if she continued the pregnancy, ruled that "[deafness] will ruin the rest of her life, make her miserable al her days and make her undesirable in the eyes of her husband...Therefore...she should be permitted to abort her fetus.
*Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (Jerusalem): In the case of a baby who will have Tay-Sachs, "One should permit...abortion as soon as it becomes evident without doubt from the test that, indeed such a baby shall be born...if, indeed, we may permit an abortion according to the halachah because of 'a great need' and because of pain and suffering, it seems that this is the classic case for such permission. And it is irrelevant in what way the pain and suffering is expressed, whether it is physical or psychological. Indeed, psychological suffering is in many ays much greater than the suffering of the flesh.
*Rabbi Kassel Abelson (Conservative, 1980s): "If the tests indicate that the child will be born with major defects that would preclude a normal life and that make the mother and the family anxious about the future, it is permitted to abort the fetus.
*Rabbi Isaac Klein (1979): Abortion is permissible in all cases that the mother's physical or mental health is threatened by the likelihood of bearing a deformed child. However, "...when in abortion is desired for reasons of convenience...it is forbidden."
("When Life is in the Balance, pp. 93-95)