Letter of the Law vs. Spirit of the Law - Helping our Students Appreciate Ruach Chachimim

Defining the Spirit of the Law

(ד) ומוציאות את האנשים - וכן הסכימו הט"ז ומ"א והגר"א וש"א ומ"מ יש להחמיר לכתחלה שלא תוציא אשה אנשים שאינם מבני ביתה דזילא מילתא [א"ר ודה"ח]:

Mishnah Berurah 271:4

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משנה בבא בתרא ח׳:ה׳

הַכּוֹתֵב אֶת נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים וְהִנִּיחַ אֶת בָּנָיו, מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, אֲבָל אֵין רוּחַ חֲכָמִים נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, אִם לֹא הָיוּ בָנָיו נוֹהֲגִין כַּשּׁוּרָה, זָכוּר לְטוֹב:

Mishnah Bava Batra 8:5

In a case of one who says: So-and-so, my firstborn son, will not take a double portion of my estate; or one who says: So-and-so, my son, will not inherit my estate among his brothers, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah. With regard to one on his deathbed who apportions his property orally, granting it to his sons as a gift, and he increased the portion given to one of his sons and reduced the portion given to one son, or equated the portion of the firstborn to the portions of the other sons, his statement stands. But if he said that they will receive the property not as a gift but as inheritance, he has said nothing. If he wrote in his will, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, that he is granting them the property as a gift, his statement stands. In a case of one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah concerning the order of inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands, but if it was about one for whom it was not fit to inherit from him, his statement does not stand. With regard to one who wrote a document granting his property to others as a gift and left his sons with nothing, what he did is done, i.e., it takes effect; but the Sages are displeased with him. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he did so because his sons were not acting properly, he is remembered positively.

בבא מציעא מ״ח א

מי שפרע מאנשי דור המבול ומאנשי דור הפלגה ומאנשי סדום ועמורה וממצרים בים הוא עתיד ליפרע ממי שאינו עומד בדיבורו והנושא ונותן בדברים לא קנה והחוזר בו אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו ואמר רבא אנו אין לנו אלא אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו

Bava Metzia 48a

Rabbi Shimon says: Even though the Sages said that when one party takes possession of a garment, the other party acquires a gold dinar, but when one party takes possession of a gold dinar, the other party does not acquire a garment, in any case, that is what the halakha would be. But the Sages said with regard to one who reneges on a transaction where one party pulled the gold dinar into his possession: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians in the Red Sea, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement. The baraita concludes: And one who negotiates, where the negotiation culminates with a statement committing himself to acquire the item, did not acquire the item without a formal act of acquisition. But with regard to one who reneges on his commitment, the Sages are displeased with him. And Rava says: With regard to one who reneges on his commitment, we have only the statement that the Sages are displeased with him, but not that he is subject to a curse. The Gemara explains: If there is a statement of commitment and there is the payment of money accompanying it, he stands subject to the curse: But the Sages said: He Who exacted payment. If there is a statement of commitment and there is no payment of money accompanying it, he does not stand subject to the curse: But the Sages said: He Who exacted payment. § Rava says: A verse and a baraita support the opinion of Reish Lakish that money does not effect acquisition of movable property by Torah law. A verse, as it is written: “And deal falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or oppressed his colleague” (Leviticus 5:21). The verse is referring to cases similar to a deposit where there is denial of an item and not merely a debt. With regard to the term “pledge,” Rav Ḥisda says: This is referring to a case where the debtor designated a vessel as collateral for his loan and then denies his debt. With regard to the term “oppressed,” Rav Ḥisda says: This is referring to a case where the employer designated a vessel for him to guarantee payment of his wages and withheld payment, resulting in his oppression. And when the verse repeats three of these cases after stating that each individual admitted that he lied and is liable to return the item that he misappropriated, it is written: “And then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing that he has gotten by oppression, or the deposit that was deposited with him” (Leviticus 5:23), while the verse does not repeat the term “pledge.” What is the reason that the verse omits that case? Is it not because it lacks pulling by the lender? Since the lender did not pull the item designated as collateral for the loan, he did not acquire the item and is not liable to bring an offering for taking a false oath if he fails to pay, as he denied owing an abstract debt, not an actual item. Apparently, there is no full-fledged acquisition without pulling the item into one’s possession. Rav Pappa said to Rava: Say that it suffices that the verse repeated the case of oppression. In that case, there is also no denial of an actual item, merely of an obligation to pay one’s worker. The halakha would be the same in the case of a pledge, i.e., of a loan where the lender designated an item although there was no pulling. The Gemara rejects that contention: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the workers took the item for their payment from the employer, and then deposited that item with him, and the employer than denied having received that deposit. Accordingly, he is denying owing an actual item, not an abstract debt. The Gemara challenges this explanation: That is precisely the case of a deposit that is already mentioned in the verse. What novel element is introduced by this case? The Gemara explains: There are two types of deposit: A standard deposit and the case where one deposits with a bailee an item that had previously belonged to the bailee. The Gemara asks: If so, and that is the explanation of the verse, let the verse repeat the case of a pledge as well, and interpret it in a case where the lender took the item from him by pulling it into his possession, and then deposited that item with the debtor. The Gemara responds: If the verse had repeated the case of a pledge it would be neither a refutation of nor a support for the opinion of Reish Lakish, as the cases could be explained otherwise. Now that the verse does not repeat the case of a pledge, it supports his opinion that one acquires movable property only by means of pulling it into his possession. The Gemara asks: And does the verse not repeat the case of a pledge? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: From where is it derived to apply that which is stated above, in the first verse cited from Leviticus, to the verse stated below, i.e., the second verse cited from Leviticus? It is derived as it is written: “Or anything about which he has taken a false oath” (Leviticus 5:24). And Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: This clause serves to include the case of a pledge in the requirement of return, teaching that even in the case where the debtor designated an item as collateral for a loan, the lender is obligated to return the item although there was no pulling. The Gemara rejects that contention: In any event, the verse did not repeat the case of a pledge explicitly, and one derives support for the opinion of Reish Lakish from that omission. From where do we derive support for the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita? It is as it is taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a bathhouse attendant [leballan] as payment for use of the bath, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property as soon as he pays him, even before he uses the bathhouse. And Rav says: One can infer that it is specifically with regard to one giving the consecrated money to a bathhouse attendant that he is liable immediately, as in that case there is no lack of pulling, since he is paying for usage of the bathhouse, not for an item. But one can infer that in cases involving other matters, where the one giving the consecrated money is acquiring an item and there is a lack of pulling, he is liable for misuse only once he pulls the item he is purchasing. Apparently, by Torah law, it is only by means of pulling an item into his possession, not through payment of money, that one acquires an item. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a barber, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property immediately, as soon as he gives him the money, and in the case of a barber, doesn’t he need to pull the haircut utensils in order for their transaction to be finalized? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a gentile barber, who is not subject to the requirement of pulling, which applies only to Jews, as it is written: “And if you sell to your colleague something that is sold.” Everyone agrees that a transaction with gentiles is finalized with the payment of money. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a barber, or to a sailor, or to any craftsmen, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property only once he pulls the item belonging to the worker. The Gemara asks: These two baraitot are difficult, as they contradict each other. The first baraita states that if one had consecrated money and he gave it to a barber, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property as soon as he gives the money. The second baraita states that he is liable for misuse of consecrated property only once he pulls the item. Rather, must one not conclude from it that here, the halakha in the first baraita is with regard to one who gives consecrated money to a gentile barber, who is liable when he gives the money to the barber, and there, the halakha in the second baraita is with regard to one who gives consecrated money to a Jewish barber, who is liable only once he pulls the item? The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. The Gemara comments: And so says Rav Naḥman, in agreement with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: By Torah law, the giving of money effects acquisition of movable property. The Gemara adds: And Levi examined his compendium of baraitot, and he discovered this baraita: If one had a consecrated ma’a and he gave it to a wholesaler [siton] as the first payment for a large quantity of produce, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property. This baraita describes a situation where the buyer did not pull the produce, yet he is liable for misuse. Apparently, by Torah law the giving of money effects acquisition.

רמב"ן על ויקרא י״ט:ב׳:ב׳

קדושים תהיו - והענין כי התורה הזהירה בעריות ובמאכלים האסורים והתירה הביאה איש באשתו ואכילת הבשר והיין א"כ ימצא בעל התאוה מקום להיות שטוף בזמת אשתו או נשיו הרבות ולהיות בסובאי יין בזוללי בשר למו וידבר כרצונו בכל הנבלות שלא הוזכר איסור זה בתורה והנה יהיה נבל ברשות התורה לפיכך בא הכתוב אחרי שפרט האיסורים שאסר אותם לגמרי וצוה בדבר כללי שנהיה פרושים מן המותרות...

Ramban on Leviticus 19:2:2

YE SHALL BE HOLY. “Abstain from the forbidden sexual relationships [mentioned in the preceding section] and from [other] sin, because wherever you find [in the Torah] a warning to guard against immorality, you find the mention of ‘holiness.’” This is Rashi’s language. But in the Torath Kohanim I have seen it mentioned without any qualification [i.e., without any particular reference to immorality, as Rashi expressed it], saying: “Be self-restraining.” Similarly, the Rabbis taught there: “And ye shall sanctify yourselves, and be ye holy, for I am Holy. Just as I am Holy, so be you holy. Just as I am Pure, so be you pure.” And in my opinion, this abstinence does not refer only to restraint from acts of immorality, as the Rabbi [Rashi] wrote, but it is rather the self-control mentioned throughout the Talmud, which confers upon those who practice it the name of P’rushim (Pharisees), [literally: “those who are separated” from self-indulgence, as will be explained, or those who practice self-restraint]. The meaning thereof is as follows: The Torah has admonished us against immorality and forbidden foods, but permitted sexual intercourse between man and his wife, and the eating of [certain] meat and wine. If so, a man of desire could consider this to be a permission to be passionately addicted to sexual intercourse with his wife or many wives, and be among winebibbers, among gluttonous eaters of flesh, and speak freely all profanities, since this prohibition has not been [expressly] mentioned in the Torah, and thus he will become a sordid person within the permissible realm of the Torah! Therefore, after having listed the matters which He prohibited altogether, Scripture followed them up by a general command that we practice moderation even in matters which are permitted...

רמב"ן על דברים ו׳:י״ח:א׳

ועשית הישר והטוב בעיני ה' ...לרבותינו בזה מדרש יפה אמרו זו פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין והכוונה בזה כי מתחלה אמר שתשמור חקותיו ועדותיו אשר צוך ועתה יאמר גם באשר לא צוך תן דעתך לעשות הטוב והישר בעיניו כי הוא אוהב הטוב והישר וזה ענין גדול לפי שאי אפשר להזכיר בתורה כל הנהגות האדם עם שכניו ורעיו וכל משאו ומתנו ותקוני הישוב והמדינות כלם אבל אחרי שהזכיר מהם הרבה... חזר לומר בדרך כלל שיעשה הטוב והישר בכל דבר עד שיכנס בזה הפשרה ולפנים משורת הדין...

Ramban on Deuteronomy 6:18:1

Our Rabbis have a beautiful Midrash on this verse. They have said: “[That which is right and good] refers to a compromise and going beyond the requirement of the letter of the law.” The intent of this is as follows: At first he [Moses] stated that you are to keep His statutes and His testimonies which He commanded you, and now he is stating that even where He has not commanded you, give thought, as well, to do what is good and right in His eyes, for He loves the good and the right. Now this is a great principle, for it is impossible to mention in the Torah all aspects of man’s conduct with his neighbors and friends, and all his various transactions, and the ordinances of all societies and countries. But since He mentioned many of them... he reverted to state in a general way that, in all matters, one should do what is good and right, including even compromise and, going beyond the requirements of the law. Other examples are the Rabbis’ ordinances concerning the prerogative of a neighbor, and even what they said [concerning the desirability] that one’s youthful reputation be unblemished, and that one’s conversation with people be pleasant. Thus [a person must seek to refine his behavior] in every form of activity, until he is worthy of being called “good and upright.”

בבא מציעא ל׳ ב:י״ד

אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין:

Bava Metzia 30b:14

It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law.

רמב"ן על ויקרא כ״ג:כ״ד:א׳

יהיה לכם שבתון ...ונראה שהמדרש הזה לומר שנצטוינו מן התורה להיות לנו מנוחה בי"ט אפילו מדברים שאינן מלאכה לא שיטרח כל היום למדוד התבואות ולשקול הפירות והמתכות ולמלא החביות יין ולפנות הכלים וגם האבנים מבית לבית וממקום למקום ואם היתה עיר מוקפת חומה ודלתות נעולות בלילה יהיו עומסים על החמורים ואף יין וענבים ותאנים וכל משא יביאו בי"ט ויהיה השוק מלא לכל מקח וממכר ותהיה החנות פתוחה והחנוני מקיף והשלחנים על שלחנם והזהובים לפניהם ויהיו הפועלים משכימין למלאכתן ומשכירין עצמם כחול לדברים אלו וכיוצא בהן והותרו הימים הטובים האלו ואפילו השבת עצמה שבכל זה אין בהם משום מלאכה לכך אמרה תורה "שבתון" שיהיה יום שביתה ומנוחה לא יום טורח וזהו פירוש טוב ויפה

Ramban on Leviticus 23:24:1

Thus we are not to be engaged the whole day in wearisome tasks: measuring out crops of the field, weighing fruits and gifts, filling the barrels with wine and clearing away the vessels, and moving stones from house to house and from place to place [although none of these activities is “work” in the strict sense of the term]. Similarly, if it be a city encompassed by a wall and its gates are locked at night, [and it is therefore according to law of the Torah treated as one domain, and the prohibition against taking out aught from one domain to another is inapplicable there], they would be loading heaps on asses, as also wine, grapes, and figs and all manner of burdens they would bring on a festival; and the market place would be full for all business transactions, the shops standing open and the shopkeepers giving credit, the money-changers sitting before their tables with the golden coins before them, and the workers would rise early to go to their work and hire themselves out for such works [as described above] just as on weekdays, and so on! And since all these matters do not entail m’lachah, they would be permissible on a festival day and even on the Sabbath itself! Therefore the Torah said that [the festival should be a day of] shabbathon (solemn rest), meaning that it should be a day of rest and ease, not a day of labor [and weariness]. This is a good and beautiful interpretation.

משנה גיטין ה׳:ח׳

...אֵין מְמַחִין בְּיַד עֲנִיֵּי גוֹיִם בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה, מִפְּנֵי דַרְכֵי שָׁלוֹם:

Mishnah Gittin 5:8

Having mentioned a series of enactments instituted by the Sages for the sake of the betterment of the world, the Gemara continues: These are the matters that the Sages instituted on account of the ways of peace, i.e., to foster peace and prevent strife and controversy: At public readings of the Torah, a priest reads first, and after him a Levite, and after him an Israelite. The Sages instituted this order on account of the ways of peace, so that people should not quarrel about who is the most distinguished member of the community. Similarly, the Sages enacted that a joining of courtyards is placed in an old house where it had regularly been placed on account of the ways of peace, as will be explained in the Gemara. The Sages enacted that the pit that is nearest to the irrigation channel that supplies water to several pits or fields is filled first on account of the ways of peace. They established a fixed order for the irrigation of fields, so that people would not quarrel over who is given precedence. Animals, birds, or fish that were caught in traps are not acquired by the one who set the traps until he actually takes possession of them. Nevertheless, if another person comes and takes them, it is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. Similarly, a lost item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is not acquired by him, since he lacks the legal competence to effect acquisition. Nevertheless, taking such an item from him is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. If a poor person gleans olives at the top of an olive tree and olives fall to the ground under the tree, then taking those olives that are beneath it is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. One does not protest against poor gentiles who come to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], although they are meant exclusively for the Jewish poor, on account of the ways of peace.

Contemporary Perspectives

Rabbi Hershel Schachter

Behold a verse is written, "my spirit that is upon you, and my words that I placed in your mouth shall not be removed"... People are accustomed to say, that in America there is an English phrase, that there are two matter: the letter of the law and there is the spirit of the law. And "my spirit that is upon you" - the intention is to the spirit of the Torah and the spirit of the law. "And my word that I placed in your mouth" - the intention is to the "letter of the law" and the actual ruling. To create new practices, it is not sufficient that it be in accordance with the letter of the law. Rather, we require that the new practice be in accordance with the spirit of the law. And for this we require the agreement of the greats of the generations who have knowledge in the entirety of Torah, and through which they can come to understand what is the spirit of the law.

Rabbi Mayer Twersky - Halakhic Values and Halakhic Decisions: Rav Soloveitchik's Pesak Regarding Women's Prayer Groups

The dimension of Torah which we are reviewing is composed of concepts, values, attitudes, emotions and the like. In some instances these broad imperatives constitute separate mitsvot, while in others they are integrated with concrete particulars in the same mitsva. For instance, in addition to the issur melakha which bans specific forms of labor on Shabbat, the Torah ordains that the character of Shabbat must be safe-guarded-i.e., it must be a day of rest and repose. This requirement of Shabbaton is not defined in terms of a particular action or actions; rather, it obligates us to maintain the spirit or elan of Shabbat... A contemporary addition to Nahmanides' list of prohibited non-melakha activities would be taking advantage of an eruv to dress in shorts and t-shirts and engage in sports on Shabbat. Such anomalous behavior does not involve any technical violations of the particulars of Shabbat,but it certainly conflicts with the principle of Shabbaton, the elan of Shabbat; such behavior is therefore unequivocally wrong.

...One must initially observe and ultimately share the experience of Torah with Torah personalities... One who studies with a Torah sage can master the technical prescriptions, prohibitions and legal formulae of Torah; one who apprentices himself to a Torah sage can assimilate the existential rhythm, ontological emotions, and cardinal values of halakhic living.

A striking formulation of the need for an existential link with Torah sages is provided by the Sefer Hasidim, interpreting the rabbinic aphorism that "a person should always be cunning in his fear of God." Sefer Hasidim explains that in situations not specifically addressed by the Torah one is obligated to intuit and subsequently, in accord with this intuition, comply with the divine will. Significantly, reflecting the previously quoted teaching of Hazal, Sefer Hasidim emphasizes that such powers of intuition cannot be gleaned from book knowledge; rather they must be fostered as part of the oral transmission from master to disciple.

In sum, halakha is a two-tiered system consisting of concrete, particularized commandments governing our actions as well as abstract, general imperatives governing the matrix of our actions. Some abstract imperatives focus exclusively on the elan of a specific mitsva; e.g., the commandment Shabbaton ensures the spiritual character of Shabbat. Others are all-encompassing, establishing universal values and standards of conduct; e.g. kedoshim te-hiyu. The Torah legislates not only actions, but also de'ot (ethical-moral-religious-intellectual dispositions). It prescribes ritual but also establishes boundaries for the concomitant religious experience.

The reason for halakha's binary system is self-evident. The Torah is not content with ensuring technically correct behavior; it also seeks to mold the human personality. Accordingly, it is concerned not only with our actions but also the etiology and telos of those actions as well. The dual focus of Torah law has important repercussions for the methodology of pesak. Any contemplated action or course of action must be evaluated on two levels. We must investigate if it is technically correct and permissible-viz, are any particulars of Torah violated. In addition, we must determine if the proposal is consistent with Torah principles, attitudes, values and concepts...

This latter concern, which we have dubbed axiological, may alternatively be described as hashkafic or public policy. Phraseology and nomenclature per se are unimportant. It is, however, vitally important that we recognize that the axiological concern is not optional or supererogatory. It is not, in halakhic terminology, merely a middat hasidut or mitsva min ha-muvhar. Instead it is an integral part of our Torah and tradition, and compliance therewith is mandatory. Accordingly, hakhmei ha-mesora transmit and implement both tiers of our mesora - viz, the technical-practical as well as the emotional-axiological. Questions regarding the kashrut of food are submitted to Torah sages; so too are inquiries regarding aspects of kedoshim te-hiyu.

Moreover, the axiological questions are oftentimes more subtle and intricate. It can be exceedingly difficult to discern in which situations abstract or broadly formulated concepts are relevant. A profound understanding of Torah coupled with keen insight into reality is necessary to initially recognize and ultimately resolve axiological questions.

Rabbi Dovid Tzvi Hoffman on Conditional Kiddushin

I will say one more thing which to my mind is exceedingly important . . . if we who are zealous for the word of God will imitate the heretics to negate the institution of gittin and halitsa by means of conditional kidushin, even if we would say that it is being accomplished in a permissible fashion, nevertheless what will the reformist rabbis say: behold those Orthodox [rabbis] have conceded that their laws are no good and the temper of the times cannot tolerate them . . . and they have thereby conceded that the temper of the times is mightier than antiquated laws. And what can we possibly say in response? Is there, God forbid, a greater desecration of God's name? Consequently in my opinion conditional kidushin should not be instituted under any circumstances.

מנחת אביב - הרב אהרון ליכטנשטיין, דפים 581-582

The Scope of Rabbinic Authority

הקדמת הרמב"ם למשנה י״ב:א׳

והחלק הרביעי הם הגזרות שתקנו הנביאים והחכמים בכל דור ודור כדי לעשותם סייג לתורה. ועליהם צוה הקדוש ברוך הוא לעשותם והוא מה שאמר במאמר כללי (ויקרא יח) ושמרתם את משמרתי ובאה בו הקבלה (יבמות דף כא.) עשו משמרת למשמרתי. והחכמים יקראו אותם גזרות.

החלק החמישי הם הדינים העשויים על דרך חקירה וההסכמה בדברים הנוהגים בין בני אדם. שאין בם תוספת במצוה ולא גרעון. או בדברים שהם תועלת לבני אדם בדברי תורה. וקראו אותם תקנות ומנהגים.

Rambam Introduction to the Mishnah 12:1

And the fourth division are the ordinances that the prophets and the sages ordained in each and every generation, in order to make a fence around the Torah. And about them did the Holy One, blessed be He, command to do them, and it is what He said in the general statement (Leviticus 18:30), "And you will guard My guarding" – and the received tradition came [to explain] (Yevamot 21a), "Make a guarding around my guarding." And the sages called them ordinances.

משנה תורה, הלכות ממרים א׳:ב׳

כָּל מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה כְּהוֹרָאָתָן עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יז יא) "לֹא תָסוּר מִכָּל הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל"... וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁעֲשָׂאוּם סְיָג לַתּוֹרָה וּלְפִי מַה שֶּׁהַשָּׁעָה צְרִיכָה וְהֵן הַגְּזֵרוֹת וְהַתַּקָּנוֹת וְהַמִּנְהָגוֹת... הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברים יז יא) "עַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ" אֵלּוּ הַתַּקָּנוֹת וְהַגְּזֵרוֹת וְהַמִּנְהָגוֹת שֶׁיּוֹרוּ בָּהֶם לָרַבִּים כְּדֵי לְחַזֵּק הַדָּת וּלְתַקֵּן הָעוֹלָם.

Mishneh Torah, Rebels 1:2

Any person who does not carry out their directives transgresses a negative commandment, as Ibid. continues: "Do not deviate from any of the statements they relate to you, neither right nor left."
Lashes are not given for the violation of this prohibition, because it also serves as a warning for a transgression punishable by execution by the court. For when a sage rebels against the words of the court, he should be executed by strangulation, as the following verse states: "A person who will act deliberately...."
We are obligated to heed their words whether they:
a) learned them from the Oral Tradition, i.e., the Oral Law,
b) derived them on the basis of their own knowledge through one of the attributes of Biblical exegesis and it appeared to them that this is the correct interpretation of the matter,
c) instituted the matter as a safeguard for the Torah, as was necessary at a specific time. These are the decrees, edicts, and customs instituted by the Sages.
It is a positive commandment to heed the court with regard to each of these three matters. A person who transgresses any of these types of directives transgresses a negative commandment. This is derived from the continuation of the above verse in the following manner: "According to the laws which they shall instruct you" - this refers to the edicts, decrees, and customs which they instruct people at large to observe to strengthen the faith and perfect the world. "According to the judgment which they relate" - this refers to the matters which they derive through logical analysis employing one of the methods of Biblical exegesis. "From all things that they will tell you" - This refers to the tradition which they received one person from another.

דרשות הר"ן ה׳:נ״ד

וכמו שנצטווינו לילך אחר הסכמתם במשפטי התורה, כן נצטווינו לכל מה שאמרו לנו על צד הקבלה מהדעות ומדרשי הפסוקים, יהיה המאמר ההוא מצווה או לא יהיה, ישראל הנוטה מדבריהם אפילו במה שאינו מביאורי המצות, הוא אפיקורוס ואין לו חלק לעולם הבא.

Derashot HaRan 5:54

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שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט כ״ה:א׳

הגה - אין להקל בדבר שהחמירו בו החבורים שנתפשטו ברוב ישראל אם לא שקבל מרבותיו שאין נוהגין באותה חומרא

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 25:1

Every Judge who adjudicated monetary cases and gave an erroneous decision — [the law is that] if he erred in evident and known matters, e.g., laws that are explicitly stated in the Mishna or in the Gemara or in the rulings of the Codifiers, the verdict is reversed and it [the case] is adjudicated in accordance with the law. Gloss: Yet some say that if it appears to the Judge and to his contemporaries on the strength of indisputable proof that the law does not accord with that mentioned in the Codifiers, he can differ with it, since it is [a law that is] not mentioned [explicitly] in the Gemara. Nevertheless, one should not adopt a leniency in a matter that the [authors of] the [former] compilations [on Hebrew Law] that have spread among the large majority of Israelites were stringent, unless one has it on tradition from his teachers that we do not adopt that stringency. However, if it is impossibe to reverse [the verdict], e.g., where the one who received the money illegally [as a result of the erroneous decision] left for abroad or [in a case] where he is a stern individual [and refuses to return the money] or where [the Judge] pronounced aught that, is 'clean,' 'unclean,' or gave a decision regarding a Kosher animal that it is Terefah and they gave it to the dogs to eat, or anything similar to this, — [the law is that] these are [cases where] he [the Judge] is exempt from making compensation and although he was the cause of the damage, he did not cause damage intentionally. Gloss: And some differ [with this opinion]. And with regards to decisions in ritual law, — if he [the Judge] has attained [the age of] ordination, although he is not [officially] ordained, his legal status is as that of an authoritative [Judge]. , Y.D. § 242 on the law of Ordination nowadays.

עבודה זרה ל״ה א:ט׳

דאמר עולא כי גזרי גזירתא במערבא לא מגלו טעמא עד תריסר ירחי שתא דלמא איכא איניש דלא ס"ל ואתי לזלזולי בה

Avodah Zarah 35a:9

The Gemara comments: But if so, let Rabbi Yehoshua simply say to Rabbi Yishmael: It is prohibited due to the concern for puncturing. Why did he choose to avoid answering? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehoshua reasoned in accordance with a statement of Ulla, as Ulla said: When the Sages decreed a decree in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they would not reveal the reason behind it until twelve months of the year had passed, lest there be a person who does not agree with it and will come to treat it with contempt.