MISHNA: In a case where one discovers lost items, which found items belong to him, and for which items is one obligated to proclaim his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them? These found items belong to him: If one found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles of grain in a public area, round cakes of pressed figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are taken from their state of origin directly after shearing, bound flax stalks, or bound strips of combed purple wool, these belong to him, as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one finds any anpurya vessels, since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is not obligated to proclaim his find. GEMARA: The mishna teaches as an example of items that one finds without any distinguishing mark: If one found scattered produce. The Gemara asks: And how much produce in how large an area constitutes scattered produce? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: It is considered scattered produce when it has a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he found the produce scattered in a manner indicating that it came there by falling and was not deliberately placed there, then even if the volume of produce in that area was greater than this limit, it should also belong to him, because there is no distinguishing mark that would enable the owner to reclaim it. And if he found produce scattered in a manner indicating intentional placement, then even if the volume of produce in an area that size was less than this limit, he should also not be allowed to keep the produce, as clearly the owner plans on returning to reclaim his produce. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor. For kernels scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, whose gathering requires great exertion, a person does not exert himself and does not return and take them. Therefore, he renounces his ownership of them and one who finds the kernels may keep them. For kernels scattered in an area smaller than that, the owner exerts himself and returns and takes them. And therefore, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a half-kav of kernels were scattered in an area of two by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces his ownership of the kernels? It is due to the fact that gathering the kernels requires great exertion. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since they are certainly not of significant value, he renounces his ownership of the kernels. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a related dilemma: If two kav of kernels were scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: If one kav of kernels is scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. This is true all the more so in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, and since gathering them requires even greater exertion, the owner renounces his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces his ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. But in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, since they are of significant value, he does not renounce his ownership of them. If one kav of sesame seeds was scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value. And in the case of sesame seeds, since they are of significant value he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. That is true all the more so in the case of sesame seeds. Since gathering them requires even greater exertion, he renounces his ownership of them. If one kav of dates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, or if one kav of pomegranates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value; and also in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since they are not of significant value he renounces ownership of the fruit. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. And in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion he does not renounce his ownership of them. In all these cases, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved. § It was stated: With regard to one’s despair of recovering his lost item that is not a conscious feeling, i.e., were he aware of the loss of his property, he would have despaired of its recovery, but he was unaware of his loss when the finder discovered the item, Abaye said: It is not considered despair; the owner maintains ownership of the item, and the finder may not keep it. And Rava said: It is considered despair and the finder may keep it. The Gemara limits the scope of the dispute. In the case of an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, everyone agrees that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. And even though we hear that he ultimately despairs of recovering the item, it is not considered despair, as when the item came into the possession of the finder, it was in a prohibited manner that it came into his possession. It is prohibited because when the owner learns that it fell from his possession, he does not despair of its recovery immediately. Instead, he says: I have a distinguishing mark on the item; I will provide the distinguishing mark to the finder, and I will take it. With regard to an item swept away by the tide of the sea or by the flooding of a river, even though the item has a distinguishing mark, the Merciful One permits the finder to keep it as we seek to state below, later in the discussion. When they disagree, it is with regard to an item in which there is no distinguishing mark. Abaye said: Despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, as he did not know that the item fell from him; therefore, he cannot despair of recovering it. Rava said: Despair that is not conscious is considered despair, as when he discovers that it fell from him, he will despair of its recovery; as he says upon this discovery: I have no distinguishing mark on the item. Therefore, it is considered from now, when the item fell, that he despairs. The Gemara proceeds to cite a series of proofs for and against the opinions of Abaye and Rava and provides a mnemonic representing those proofs: Peh, mem, gimmel, shin; mem, mem, kuf, gimmel, tet, yod; kaf, kaf, samekh, ayin, zayin. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered produce, it belongs to him. The Gemara asks: Why does it belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: Didn’t Rav Ukva bar Ḥama say: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor? The owner knowingly left the kernels on the threshing floor because it was not worth his while to gather them. That is a deliberate loss, and therefore the despair is conscious. Therefore, this clause in the mishna is not relevant to the dispute in question. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered coins, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly. Here too, a person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found round cakes of pressed figs or baker’s loaves, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since these items are heavy he knows that they fell, and it is reasonable to assume that shortly after they fell the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found strips of purple wool, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: And why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since they are significant and valuable, the owner feels around for them to ensure that they are not lost, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the strips fell, the owner became aware of his loss. This reasoning is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak with regard to coins. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who finds coins in synagogues, and in study halls, and in any place where the multitudes are found, these coins belong to him due to the fact that the owners despair of their recovery. Why do they belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that the coins fell from him? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Pe’a 8:1): From when is it permitted for any person to collect gleanings, which the Torah designates as exclusively for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9–10)? It is permitted once the nemushot have walked in the field. And we say in interpreting the mishna: What are nemushot? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are the elderly people who walk leaning on a cane. Since they walk slowly, they will see any stalks that remain and take them. Reish Lakish said: They are the second wave of gleaners who pass through the field after the initial gleaners, collecting any stalks that remain. The Gemara asks: And why is it permitted for any person to take the stalks, given that although the poor who are here renounce ownership of the stalks after seeing the nemushot pass through the field, there are poor people in another place who are unaware of the passing of the nemushot and do not renounce ownership? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: Since there are poor people here, those poor people in the other places despair of the gleanings from the outset, and they say: The poor people who are there gather the gleanings. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma’asrot 3:4): If dried figs are found on the path, and even if they were found at the side of a field where dried figs are spread to dry, and likewise, if there is a fig tree whose branches extend over a path and one found figs beneath it, those figs are permitted and taking them is not prohibited due to the prohibition of robbery. And as these are ownerless property, one who finds them is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Granted, the first clause of the mishna is not difficult according to the opinion of Abaye, as he can explain that one consciously despairs of recovering the dried figs. Since dried figs are significant and valuable, one feels around for them to ensure that they have not become lost. It is reasonable to assume that shortly after the fruits fell, the owner became aware of his loss and despaired of recovering them. In the case of the fig tree, too, one knows that it is a common occurrence for the fruit of the fig tree to fall from the tree and he renounces ownership from the outset. But the latter clause of the mishna is difficult according to the opinion of Rava, as it teaches: In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha of an olive is different, since its appearance proves the identity of the owner, as the fruit fallen from the tree appears similar to the fruit on that tree, and even though the olives fall off the tree, the one who finds the olives knows that an olive tree that is located in a place that is owned by a specific person belongs to that person and the owner will not renounce ownership of his fruit. The Gemara asks: If so, then even in the first clause as well, it should be prohibited to take the fruit that fell from the fig tree. Rav Pappa said: A fig becomes disgusting with its fall from the tree. Even if the fruit can be attributed to the tree of origin, since it is no longer fit for consumption, the owner would not want the fruit and consequently renounces his ownership of it. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: A thief who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, a robber who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, in the case of the Jordan River or another river that took an item from this person and gave it to that person, in all those cases, that which the person took, he took, and that which the person gave, he gave. Likewise, that which the river took, it took, and that which the river gave, it gave. The person who received the item need not return it. The Gemara asks: Granted in the cases of the robber and the Jordan River, one could say that the owner sees them take the item and despairs of its recovery; but in the case of the thief, who takes the item surreptitiously, does the owner see him take the item and would that lead him to despair? The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa interpreted the term thief in the baraita to be referring to armed bandits [listim]; therefore, the owner is aware that the item was taken and he despairs of its recovery. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as a robber, why mention two identical cases? The Gemara answers: The baraita mentioned two types of robbers; in both cases the owner was aware that his item was taken. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a river swept away one’s beams, one’s wood, or one’s stones and placed them into the field of another, these items belong to the owner of the field due to the fact that the respective owners despaired of their recovery. The Gemara infers from the baraita: The reason they belong to the finder is that the owners despaired; but in an unspecified case, where it is not definitively known that the owners despaired, they do not belong to the finder. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. The Gemara rejects the proof: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the beams, wood, or stones; therefore, their decision not to rescue them is a clear indication of despair. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita: If the owners were pursuing the items, the finder is obligated to return them. If it is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items, why did the baraita specifically cite a case where the owners were pursuing the items? Even if they were not pursuing the lost items, the items also remain in their ownership, as they did not despair of their recovery. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items with difficulty. In that case, if the owners pursue the items, it indicates that they did not despair of their recovery, but if the owners do not pursue the items, it indicates that they despaired of their recovery. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:5): When did the Sages say that in the case where one separates teruma without the owner’s consent, his teruma is considered teruma? It is in a case where there was someone who entered another’s field and gathered produce from it and separated teruma without the owner’s permission. If the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery, his teruma is not teruma, but if he is not concerned, his teruma is teruma. The baraita continues: And from where would does he know whether the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery or not? If the owner came and found him separating teruma and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that, then if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma, since the owner is assumed to have been sincere and pleased that the other has separated teruma from his produce. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, as it may be assumed that the owner was angry at him and was speaking sarcastically. The baraita adds: If the owners were gathering and adding to the teruma he had separated, indicating that they agree to his act of separation, either way, whether or not better-quality produce was found, his teruma is considered teruma. The Gemara questions the ruling of the baraita: But why is that the halakha, that if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found his teruma is teruma? At the time that he separated the teruma, he did not know that the owner would ultimately agree. The baraita states that the teruma is teruma from the moment he separated it, despite the fact that it was only later that he learned that the owner agreed. Apparently, in the case of despair as well, despair that is not conscious is considered despair, contrary to the opinion of Abaye. Rava interpreted the matter in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: This is a case where the owner designated him as an agent. So too, it is reasonable, as if it enters your mind that the owner did not designate him as an agent, would his teruma be teruma? But doesn’t the Merciful One state: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28)? Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent. Therefore, an agent separating teruma has the same halakhot as an owner separating teruma. Just as when you, the owner, separate teruma, it is with your knowledge, so too when your agent separates teruma, it must be with your knowledge. Evidently, in any event, one needs to be appointed as an agent to be capable of separating teruma for another. Rather, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner designated him as an agent and said to him: Go and separate teruma, but he did not say to him: Separate teruma from these specific crops. And when the owner’s intent is unspecified, and it is unclear which of his crops are meant to be separated when the agent separates teruma, it is from the crops of intermediate quality that he separates teruma. And in this case, the agent went and separated teruma from higher-quality produce, and the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that. If produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, The Gemara digresses with a related incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi happened to come to the orchard [levustana] of Mari bar Isak. His sharecropper came and placed dates and pomegranates before them. Ameimar and Rav Ashi ate the fruit, but Mar Zutra did not eat the fruit due to the concern that the sharecropper had provided them with the fruit without the approval of the owner of the field. Meanwhile, Mari bar Isak came and found them eating his fruit and said to his sharecropper: Why didn’t you bring the Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits? Ameimar and Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: Now why is the Master not eating the fruit? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that; if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. Here too, it is clear that Mari bar Isak approved of the actions of his sharecropper. Mar Zutra said to them that this is what Rava said: The Sages said that the statement: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma, indicates consent of the owner only with regard to the matter of teruma, due to the fact that it is a mitzva and the owner is amenable to having the mitzva fulfilled. But here, in this incident, it is due to shame that he said this: Why did you not bring these Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits? He did not really want to give them the fruit. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a baraita with regard to despair that is not conscious. It is written: “And if any part of their carcass falls upon any sowing seed that is to be sown, it is ritually pure. But when water is placed upon the seed, and any part of their carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). Produce becomes susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only after coming into contact with one of seven liquids: Wine, honey, oil, milk, dew, blood, and water. It is taught in the baraita: If the dew is still upon the produce and has not yet dried, and if the owner was glad that the dew moistened the produce and kept it fresh, that produce falls into the category of: “But when water is placed upon the seed,” and the produce is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. If the produce had dried when the owner found it, then even though he was glad that the dew had moistened the produce, the produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed [khi yuttan] upon the seed,” and the produce is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. What is the reason that if the produce dried, the fact that the owner is glad does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity? Is it not due to the fact that we do not say: Since the matter was revealed that he is amenable to the moisture now, he was also amenable from the outset? The same should be true with regard to despair that is not conscious. The fact that when he becomes aware of his loss he despairs of its recovery does not indicate that he despaired from the outset, contrary to the opinion of Rava. The Gemara rejects the proof: It is different there, as although the phrase is vocalized to mean: “When it is placed,” it is written: When one places [ki yitten], from which it is derived that the produce is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity only if the owner places the liquid on the produce. The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause of the baraita, too, the produce should not be rendered susceptible to contracting impurity, because the dew fell on the produce and was not placed there by the owner. The Gemara answers: There, the explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: The verse states: “But when water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:38). The word “yuttan” is written in the defective form, as if it says “ki yitten.” Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet, we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, as if it is written “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled? Rav Pappa explains that we require that the situation described by the words “when water is placed [ki yuttan]” be similar to the situation described by the words: When one places [dekhi yitten]: Just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is with the knowledge of the owner that the produce becomes wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is with his knowledge that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. Therefore, no proof may be cited with regard to the matter of despair, where there is no Torah derivation requiring awareness from the outset. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it. And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation. And although in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha is typically ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rava, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye in the disputes represented by the mnemonic: Yod, ayin, lamed; kuf, gimmel, mem. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that the opinion of Rava was conclusively refuted, and the halakha is that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, if those dates are blown off the tree by the wind, how do we eat them? Perhaps their owner did not despair of their recovery. Rav Ashi said to him: Since there are repugnant creatures and creeping animals that eat the dates after they fall, the owner despairs of their recovery from the outset. Therefore, one who finds the dates may keep them. Rav Aḥa asked: Perhaps the tree belonged to minor orphans who, because they are not capable of relinquishing property, cannot despair of recovering the dates from the outset. Accordingly, what is the justification for eating found dates? Rav Ashi said to him: We do not presume a valley to be land belonging to orphans, and therefore that is not a concern. Rav Aḥa asked: If the presumptive status of the trees was previously established as belonging to orphans, what is the halakha? If the trees are surrounded by fences that prevent repugnant creatures and creeping animals from gaining access, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to him: The dates are forbidden in those cases.