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Mishpatim ~ Lost, found: love and hate
(ד) כִּ֣י תִפְגַּ֞ע שׁ֧וֹר אֹֽיִבְךָ֛ א֥וֹ חֲמֹר֖וֹ תֹּעֶ֑ה הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֶ֖נּוּ לֽוֹ׃ {ס} (ה) כִּֽי־תִרְאֶ֞ה חֲמ֣וֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ֗ רֹבֵץ֙ תַּ֣חַת מַשָּׂא֔וֹ וְחָדַלְתָּ֖ מֵעֲזֹ֣ב ל֑וֹ עָזֹ֥ב תַּעֲזֹ֖ב עִמּֽוֹ׃ {ס}

(4) When you encounter your enemy’s ox or donkey wandering, you must take it back. (5) When you see the donkey of your enemy lying under its burden and would refrain from raising it, you must certainly help raise it.

(א) לֹֽא־תִרְאֶה֩ אֶת־שׁ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ אֶת־שֵׂיוֹ֙ נִדָּחִ֔ים וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֵ֖ם לְאָחִֽיךָ׃ (ב) וְאִם־לֹ֨א קָר֥וֹב אָחִ֛יךָ אֵלֶ֖יךָ וְלֹ֣א יְדַעְתּ֑וֹ וַאֲסַפְתּוֹ֙ אֶל־תּ֣וֹךְ בֵּיתֶ֔ךָ וְהָיָ֣ה עִמְּךָ֗ עַ֣ד דְּרֹ֤שׁ אָחִ֙יךָ֙ אֹת֔וֹ וַהֲשֵׁבֹת֖וֹ לֽוֹ׃ (ג) וְכֵ֧ן תַּעֲשֶׂ֣ה לַחֲמֹר֗וֹ וְכֵ֣ן תַּעֲשֶׂה֮ לְשִׂמְלָתוֹ֒ וְכֵ֣ן תַּעֲשֶׂ֗ה לְכׇל־אֲבֵדַ֥ת אָחִ֛יךָ אֲשֶׁר־תֹּאבַ֥ד מִמֶּ֖נּוּ וּמְצָאתָ֑הּ לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם׃ {ס} (ד) לֹא־תִרְאֶה֩ אֶת־חֲמ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ שׁוֹרוֹ֙ נֹפְלִ֣ים בַּדֶּ֔רֶךְ וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם הָקֵ֥ם תָּקִ֖ים עִמּֽוֹ׃ {ס}
(1) If you see your fellow Israelite’s ox or sheep gone astray, do not ignore it; you must take it back to your peer. (2) If your fellow Israelite does not live near you or you do not know who [the owner] is, you shall bring it home and it shall remain with you until your peer claims it; then you shall give it back. (3) You shall do the same with that person’s ass; you shall do the same with that person’s garment; and so too shall you do with anything that your fellow Israelite loses and you find: you must not remain indifferent. (4) If you see your fellow Israelite’s ass or ox fallen on the road, do not ignore it; you must raise it together.

~ What are the ethical imperatives in these verses?

~ Why are the verses highlighting the enemy? What is the basic logical jump the text wants you to do?

~ Why is returning property of your enemy an ethical imperative?

שור אויבך. בחירק תחת היו"ד. והוא פועל. כי מלת ואיבתי. מהפעלים היוצאים. והטעם אע"פ שתדע שהוא אויבך וככה שונאך. ונאמר אויבך כי נכון לדבר ככה גם כן שונאך. אולי באה זו הפרשה אם היה השור והחמור של עני יהיה שכרך הרבה מאד שעשית מצות השם. וגם גמילות חסד עם עני:

THINE ENEMY’S OX. Oyivkha (thine enemy’s) is spelled with a chirik beneath the yod. Oyivkha is a verb, for the word ve-ayavti (then I will be an enemy) (v. 22) is a transitive verb. Its meaning is, even though you know that he is your enemy. The same is true of the word sona’akha (him that hateth thee) (v. 5). Scripture uses the term oyivkha because it is proper usage. This is also the case with sona’akha. It is possible that this section was written because if the ox and the ass belong to a poor person, then the reward for returning them is very great. One observes God’s law and one also acts kindly with the poor.

~ Ibn Ezra is trying to make sense of the law. What does he add? Why?

~ When he writes "section" he means how it is written in the Torah scroll, meaning, as a specific paragraph.

וַיִּשְׁלַח יִשְׂרָאֵל מַלְאָכִים (במדבר כא, כא), זֶה שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּב (תהלים לז, ג): בְּטַח בַּה' וַעֲשֵׂה טוֹב שְׁכָן אֶרֶץ וּרְעֵה אֱמוּנָה, וְאוֹמֵר (תהלים לד, טו): סוּר מֵרָע וַעֲשֵׂה טוֹב בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם וְרָדְפֵהוּ, וְלֹא קָפְדָה הַתּוֹרָה לִרְדֹף אַחַר הַמִּצְווֹת, אֶלָּא (דברים כב, ו): כִּי יִקָּרֵא קַן צִפּוֹר, (שמות כג, ד): כִּי תִפְגַע, כִּי תִרְאֶה, (שמות כג, ה): כִּי תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר, (דברים כד, כ): כִּי תַחְבֹּט זֵיתְךָ, (דברים כד, כא): כִּי תִבְצֹר כַּרְמְךָ, (דברים כג, כה): כִּי תָבֹא בְּכֶרֶם רֵעֶךָ. אִם בָּאוּ לְיָדְךָ אַתְּ מְצֻוֶּה עֲלֵיהֶם וְלֹא לִרְדֹּף אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אֲבָל הַשָּׁלוֹם, בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם בִּמְקוֹמְךָ, וְרָדְפֵהוּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר, וְכֵן עָשׂוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶם הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא (דברים ב, כד): הָחֵל רָשׁ וְהִתְגָּר בּוֹ מִלְחָמָה, רָדְפוּ אֶת הַשָּׁלוֹם, וַיִּשְׁלַח יִשְׂרָאֵל מַלְאָכִים אֶל סִיחֹן אֶעְבְּרָה נָא.

27 (Numb. 21:21) “Then Israel sent messengers [to Sihon …]”: This text is related (to Ps. 37:3), “Trust in the Lord and do good, abide in the land and remain loyal.” And it states (in Ps. 34:15), “Depart from evil and do good; seek peace and pursue it.” The Torah did not command [them] to go in pursuit of the commandments. Rather [it states] (in Deut. 22:6), “When you come on a bird's nest”; (in Exod. 23:4) “When you encounter [the ox of one who hates you]”; (in Exod. 23:5) “When you see the donkey [of one who hates you]”; (in Deut. 24:20) “when you beat your olive tree”; (in Deut. 24:21), “When you gather the grapes of your vineyard”; and (in Deut. 23:25) “When you go into your neighbor's vineyard.” If [these situations] present themselves to you, you are given a command concerning them; but [you are] not to go in pursuit of them. In the case of peace, however, (according to Ps. 34:15), “seek peace,” wherever you are; “and pursue it,” wherever else it may be. And this is what Israel did. Although the Holy One, blessed be He, had said to them (in Deut. 2:24), “begin to take possession, and engage him in battle,” they went in pursuit of peace. So is it stated (in Numb. 21:21) “Then Israel sent messengers….”

~ What is the overall idea behind the way some commandments are written?

(א) הֲשָׁבַת אֲבֵדָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כב א) "הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֵם". וְהָרוֹאֶה אֲבֵדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנָּה וֶהֱנִיחָהּ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כב א) "לֹא תִרְאֶה אֶת שׁוֹר אָחִיךָ" (דברים כב א) "וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם". וּבִטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה. וְאִם הֱשִׁיבָהּ קִיֵּם מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה:

(ב) לָקַח אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְלֹא הֱשִׁיבָהּ בִּטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְעָבַר עַל שְׁנֵי לָאוִין עַל (דברים כב ג) "לֹא תוּכַל לְהִתְעַלֵּם" וְעַל (ויקרא יט יג) "לֹא תִגְזל". אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה בַּעַל הָאֲבֵדָה רָשָׁע וְאוֹכֵל נְבֵלָה לְתֵאָבוֹן וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ מִצְוָה לְהָשִׁיב לוֹ אֲבֵדָתוֹ. אֲבָל אוֹכֵל נְבֵלָה לְהַכְעִיס הֲרֵי הוּא אֶפִּיקוֹרוֹס וְהָאֶפִּיקוֹרוֹסִים וְעוֹבְדֵי עַכּוּ''ם וּמְחַלְּלֵי שַׁבָּת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא אָסוּר לְהַחְזִיר לָהֶן אֲבֵדָה כְּעַכּוּ''ם:

(ג) אֲבֵדַת עוֹבֵד עַכּוּ''ם מֻתֶּרֶת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כב ג) "אֲבֵדַת אָחִיךָ". וְהַמַּחֲזִירָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה עוֹבֵר עֲבֵרָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַחֲזִיק יַד רִשְׁעֵי עוֹלָם. וְאִם הֶחֱזִירָהּ לְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּפָאֲרוּ אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיֵדְעוּ שֶׁהֵם בַּעֲלֵי אֱמוּנָה הֲרֵי זֶה מְשֻׁבָּח. וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ חִלּוּל הַשֵּׁם אֲבֵדָתוֹ אֲסוּרָה וְחַיָּב לְהַחְזִירָהּ. וּבְכָל מָקוֹם מַכְנִיסִין כְּלֵיהֶם מִפְּנֵי הַגַּנָּבִים כִּכְלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִפְּנֵי דַּרְכֵי שָׁלוֹם:

(ד) טָעוּת הָעַכּוּ''ם כַּאֲבֵדָתוֹ וּמֻתֶּרֶת. וְהוּא שֶׁטָּעָה מֵעַצְמוֹ אֲבָל לְהַטְעוֹתוֹ אָסוּר:

(ה) כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָשָׂה הָעַכּוּ''ם חֶשְׁבּוֹן וְטָעָה. וְצָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל רְאֵה שֶׁעַל חֶשְׁבּוֹנְךָ אֲנִי סוֹמֵךְ וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה אוֹמֵר אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לְךָ כְּגוֹן זֶה מֻתָּר. אֲבָל אִם לֹא אָמַר לוֹ כֵּן אָסוּר שֶׁמָּא יִתְכַּוֵּן הַגּוֹי לְבָדְקוֹ וְנִמְצָא שֵׁם שָׁמַיִם מִתְחַלֵּל:

(1) It is a positive commandment to return an object lost by a fellow Jew, as Deuteronomy 22:1 states: "And you shall certainly return it."
A person who sees an object lost by a fellow Jew and ignores it, leaving it in its place, transgresses a negative commandment, as it states Ibid.:4: "Do not see your brother's ox... and ignore it." He also negates the fulfillment of a positive commandment. If he returns the object, he fulfills the positive commandment.

(2) If a person takes a lost object and does not return it, he negates the fulfillment of a positive commandment and transgresses two negative commandments: "You may not ignore it" Ibid.:3 and Leviticus 19:13: "Do not rob."
Even if the owner of the lost object is wicked and eats non-kosher meat for his own satisfaction and the like, it is a mitzvah to return an object that he lost. If, however, he eats non-kosher meat as a conscious act of rebellion against God, he is considered a non-believer. And just as it is forbidden to return a lost object belonging to a gentile, it is forbidden to return a lost object belonging to a Jew who is a non-believer, heretic, idol-worshiper or violator of the Sabbath in public.

(3) It is permissible to keep an object lost by an idolater, for Deuteronomy 22:3 speaks of returning "an object lost by your brother." Indeed, if one returns such an article, one transgresses a prohibition, for one strengthens the power of the wicked peoples of the world. If, however, one returns it to sanctify God's name, so that others will praise the Jewish people and know that they are trustworthy, this is praiseworthy.
When there is a possibility of the desecration of God's name, it is forbidden to keep an object lost by an idolater, and it must be returned. As part of "the ways of peace," we should always bring in their utensils from the outside, lest they be taken by thieves, as we do for utensils owned by Jews.

(4) A mistake in accounts made by a gentile is considered like a lost article, and it is permissible to benefit from it. This applies if he makes the mistake himself. It is, however, forbidden to cause him to make a mistake.

(5) What is implied? A gentile made an account and made an error in a Jew's favor. The Jew must tell him: "Look, I am relying on your account. I know only what you tell me." In an instance like this, if the gentile does not correct himself, it is permitted to take advantage of his error. If, however, one does not tell him this, it is forbidden. It is possible that the gentile's intent is to check the Jew's honesty. By keeping the money, one may cause God's name to be desecrated.

~ What are the limits to returning the lost object that the Rambam first mentions? Why can you disregard those limits, even according to him?

~ What is "because of the sanctification of God's name"? Is this similar or different, in your opinion, to "ways of peace"?

(א) מה בין האהבה שלנו לאהבה של הנצרות?

(ב) ישו הנוצרי אמר: ״‎שמעתם כי נאמר: ואהבת לרעך ושנאת את אויביך, ואני מלמד לכם: אהבו את אויביכם והתפללו בעד רודפיכם״‎.

(ג) אין מן הצורך כלל להראות כי בזה עבר ישו על הציווי המוסרי: ״‎נְצֹר לְשׁוֹנְךָ מֵרָע וּשְׂפָתֶיךָ מִדַּבֵּר מִרְמָה״‎ (תהלים לד, יד). כי היהדות מטיפה לכך שאנו צריכים לאהוב גם את השונאים, כמו: ״‎כִּי תִפְגַּע שׁוֹר אֹיִבְךָ אוֹ חֲמֹרוֹ תֹּעֶה – הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֶנּוּ לוֹ. כִּי תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ רֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ – וְחָדַלְתָּ מֵעֲזֹב לוֹ?! עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב עִמּוֹ!״‎ (שמות כג, ד-ה); ״‎אִם רָעֵב שֹׂנַאֲךָ – הַאֲכִלֵהוּ לָחֶם, וְאִם צָמֵא – הַשְׁקֵהוּ מָיִם״‎ (משלי כה, כא). ויפה מעיר חוקר נוצרי אחד, על הפסוק (דברים כג, ח): ״‎לֹא תְתַעֵב מִצְרִי – כִּי גֵר הָיִיתָ בְאַרְצוֹ״‎ (דברים כג): ״‎אם כן, גם בשביל הכנסת אורחים כזו שקיבלו היהודים במצרים אחרי שעינו אותם שם בכל מיני עבודה קשה ואכזריה, וגם שפכו דמם, ציוותה התורה לבלי לשנוא את המצריים ולהכיר להם תודה יען כי גרים היו בארצם – אם מצוה זו איננה קרובה לאהבת אויבים, אז איני מבין באמת את השפה העברית״‎. והדברים עתיקים.

(ד) אבל באמת, לא רק שמצות אהבת אויבים נמצאה ב״‎ברית הישנה״‎, אלא שהיהדות עוד הרחיקה לכת בזה הרבה יותר, ועל החדשה שחידשה בזה ״‎הברית החדשה״‎, נאמר: ״‎יש קנקן חדש שאפילו ישן אין בו״‎... כי הנוצרי מכוון במצות אהבת אויבים – רק לאויבים במילי דארעא. לשונאים במילי דשמיא הוא מתייחס באופן אחר לגמרי... כאשר באה לפניו אשה כנענית אחת לבקש ממנו רפואה לבתה החולה לא ענה לה דבר, וכאשר הפצירו בו תלמידיו על כך, השיב להם: ״‎לא שולחתי בלתי אל הצאן האובדות אשר לבית ישראל״‎. כאשר באה עוד פעם אומללה זאת ותשתחווה לפניו, ותאמר: ״‎אדוני, עזרני!״‎ השיב ישו בדברים כאלה: ״‎לא טוב לקחת את לחם הבנים ולהשליך לפני צעירי הכלבים״‎.

(ה) ומה אומרת היהדות על כך? היא אומרת על הכתוב: ״‎כי תראה חמור שונאך״‎, כדברים האלה: ״‎מי שרי למיסני? והכתיב: ״‎לֹא תִשְׂנָא אֶת אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ״‎? דחזי ביה דבר ערווה״‎ (עיין פסחים קג, ב). ובכן, הכתוב מדבר בשונא במילי דשמיא שמצוה לשנאותו לכאורה, ובכל זאת, גם על שונא כזה אמרו: ״‎אוהב לפרוק ושונא לטעון – מצוה לטעון לשונא, כדי לכוף את יצרו״‎ (עיין בבא מציעא לב, ב).

(ו) ומה גדולים ונשגבים דברי התוס׳ בזה, שהקשו באמת קושיא חמורה על זה – כיון שהכתוב מדבר בשונא כזה שמצוה לשנאותו, אם כן, מה שייכת בזה כפיית היצר? ומתרצים: ״‎דכיון שהוא שונא אותו – מסתמא גם חבירו שונאו, ובאים מתוך כך לשנאה גמורה, ושייך כפיית יצר״‎ (עיין שם בפסחים).

What is the difference between our love and love in Christianity?

Jesus the Christian said: "you heard that it is said: love your neighbor and hate your enemy, but I teach you: love your enemy and pray for those who persecute you" (Matthew 5:43-44).

There is no need to show that through this Jesus transgressed the ethical commandment

Guard your tongue from evil, your lips from deceitful speech (Ps. 34:14), since Judaism preaches that we need to love our enemies as well, [by commandments] such as: "When you encounter your enemy’s ox or donkey wandering, you must take it back. When you see the donkey of your enemy lying under its burden and would refrain from raising it, you must certainly help raise it" (Exodus 23:4-5); "If your enemy is hungry, give him bread to eat, if he is thirsty, give him water to drink" (Proverbs 25:21). And a certain Christian researcher remarked well, on the verse "Do not abhor an Egyptian, since you were a stranger in his land" (Deuteronomy 23): "If so, due to the hospitality that the Jews received in Egypt even though they tortured them there with all kinds of hard and cruel labor, and even though they spilled their blood, the Torah commanded not to hate the Egyptians, but to give thanks, since they were strangers in their land - if this commandment is not close to love your enemies, I do not really understand the Hebrew language." And these disputes are old.
But in truth, it is not just that the mitzvah is found in the "Old Testament" but that Judaism is even more extreme than that, and regarding these new words of the "New Testament" we can say: "there are new flasks that do not carry even old wine"... since the Christian is intending here regarding the love of enemies - just the enemies on worldly matters, Regarding the enemies in spiritual matters, he deals with them in a very different way... a certain Caananite woman came to him to ask healing for her sick daughter he did not answer her at all, and when his students pleaded with him, he answered them: "I was only sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matthew 15:22-24). When this wretched woman came a second time and bowed down to him, and said: "My lord, help me!" Jesus responded with the following words: "It is not right to take the children’s bread and toss it to the dogs" (Matthew 15:26).
And what does Judaism say about that? Regarding the verse "when you see your enemy's donkey" the following words: "who permitted you to hate him? Maybe he saw a licentious matter on him" (Pesachim 113b) and therefore the text is talking about a spiritual matter, about which one would be commanded to hate, and despite that it is also regarding this one that they said "[one encounters] a friend [whose donkey collapsed and it is necessary] to unload and [at the same time] an enemy to load [the donkey] the mitzva is to the enemy, in order to subjugate one’s evil inclination (Bava Metzia 32b).
And the words of the Tosafot regarding this are great, since they did ask a great question regarding this, since the text gives as a mitzvah to hate such an enemy, what is the point of subjugating the evil inclination? And they answer: "because he hates him, maybe his friend also hates him, and from this they come to a complete hate, and regarding this subjugating the evil inclination is necessary" (see Tosafot on Pesachim 113b:2:1)

(ז) והגעו בעצמכם, אם הנצרות, בכל ימי הביניים, היתה מתנהגת על פי רוח המוסר הזה – האם היה אפשר לה לבוא לידי ״‎אינקוויזיציה קדושה״‎? האינקוויזיציה באה בשביל השונאים במילי דשמיא לפי דעתה. והלוא, אדרבא, על שונאים כאלה נאמר ״‎מצוה בשונא״‎; ולא עלה על דעת הנצרות, כי מתוך השנאה במילי דשמיא באה ״‎השנאה הגמורה״‎ ועליה לכפות את יצרה. הנצרות לא ידעה לגמרי מכפיית יצר כזו והעבירה רבבות ורבוא־רבבות שונאים כאלה למוקד.

And let's be frank, if Christianity had followed this ethical vision through the Middle Ages, would there have existed a "holy Inquisition"? The Inquisition only happened due to hatred towards those who disagreed in regards to spiritual matters. And on the contrary, regarding those hated ones, it did not occur to Christianity that there is a "mitzvah regarding the one you hate", that through such hate regarding spiritual amtters one can arrive to "complete hate", and it would be incumbent upon christianity to subjugate its inclination. And Christianity did not know at all such a subjugation, and sent thousands upon thousands of such hated ones to the fire.

~ How does Rav Kook understand our verse? What is the main idea in his argument?

A first sugya
מתני׳ אלו מציאות שלו ואלו חייב להכריז אלו מציאות שלו מצא פירות מפוזרין מעות מפוזרות כריכות ברשות הרבים ועגולי דבילה ככרות של נחתום מחרוזות של דגים וחתיכות של בשר וגיזי צמר הלקוחין ממדינתן ואניצי פשתן ולשונות של ארגמן הרי אלו שלו דברי רבי מאיר ר' יהודה אומר כל שיש בו שינוי חייב להכריז כיצד מצא עגול ובתוכו חרס ככר ובתוכו מעות רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר כל כלי אנפוריא אין חייב להכריז: גמ׳ מצא פירות מפוזרין וכמה א"ר יצחק קב בארבע אמות היכי דמי אי דרך נפילה אפילו טובא נמי ואי דרך הינוח אפילו בציר מהכי נמי לא א"ר עוקבא בר חמא במכנשתא דבי דרי עסקינן קב בארבע אמות דנפיש טרחייהו לא טרח איניש ולא הדר אתי ושקיל להו אפקורי מפקר להו בציר מהכי טרח והדר אתי ושקיל להו ולא מפקר להו בעי רבי ירמיה חצי קב בשתי אמות מהו קב בארבע אמות טעמא מאי משום דנפיש טרחייהו חצי קב בשתי אמות כיון דלא נפיש טרחייהו לא מפקר להו או דלמא משום דלא חשיבי וחצי קב בשתי אמות כיון דלא חשיבי מפקר להו קביים בשמונה אמות מהו קב בארבע אמות טעמא מאי משום דנפיש טרחייהו וכ"ש קביים בשמונה אמות כיון דנפישא טרחייהו טפי מפקר להו או דלמא משום דלא חשיבי וקביים בשמונה אמות כיון דחשיבי לא מפקר להו קב שומשמין בארבע אמות מהו קב בארבע אמות טעמא מאי משום דלא חשיבי ושומשמין כיון דחשיבי לא מפקר להו או דלמא משום דנפיש טרחייהו וכ"ש שומשמין כיון דנפיש טרחייהו טפי מפקר להו קב תמרי בארבע אמות קב רמוני בארבע אמות מהו קב בארבע אמות טעמא מאי משום דלא חשיבי קב תמרי בארבע אמות קב רמוני בארבע אמות נמי כיון דלא חשיבי מפקר להו או דלמא משום דנפישא טרחייהו וקב תמרי בארבע אמות וקב רמוני בארבע אמות כיון דלא נפיש טרחייהו לא מפקר להו מאי תיקו איתמר יאוש שלא מדעת אביי אמר לא הוי יאוש ורבא אמר הוי יאוש בדבר שיש בו סימן כולי עלמא לא פליגי דלא הוי יאוש ואף על גב דשמעיניה דמיאש לסוף לא הוי יאוש דכי אתא לידיה באיסורא הוא דאתא לידיה דלכי ידע דנפל מיניה לא מיאש מימר אמר סימנא אית לי בגויה יהבנא סימנא ושקילנא ליה בזוטו של ים ובשלוליתו של נהר אע"ג דאית ביה סימן רחמנא שרייה כדבעינן למימר לקמן כי פליגי בדבר שאין בו סימן אביי אמר לא הוי יאוש דהא לא ידע דנפל מיניה רבא אמר הוי יאוש דלכי ידע דנפל מיניה מיאש מימר אמר סימנא לית לי בגויה מהשתא הוא דמיאש (סימן פמג"ש ממקגט"י ככסע"ז) תא שמע פירות מפוזרין הא לא ידע דנפל מיניה הא אמר רב עוקבא בר חמא הכא במכנשתא דביזרי עסקינן דאבידה מדעת היא ת"ש מעות מפוזרות הרי אלו שלו אמאי הא לא ידע דנפל מיניה התם נמי כדרבי יצחק דאמר אדם עשוי למשמש בכיסו בכל שעה ושעה הכא נמי אדם עשוי למשמש בכיסו בכל שעה ושעה ת"ש עיגולי דבילה וככרות של נחתום הרי אלו שלו אמאי והא לא ידע דנפל מיניה התם נמי אגב דיקירי מידע ידע בהו ת"ש ולשונות של ארגמן הרי אלו שלו ואמאי הא לא ידע דנפל מיניה התם נמי אגב דחשיבי משמושי ממשמש בהו וכדרבי יצחק ת"ש המוצא מעות בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות ובכל מקום שהרבים מצויין שם הרי אלו שלו מפני שהבעלים מתיאשין מהן והא לא ידע דנפל מיניה אמר רבי יצחק אדם עשוי למשמש בכיסו בכל שעה ת"ש מאימתי כל אדם מותרים בלקט משילכו בה הנמושות ואמרינן מאי נמושות וא"ר יוחנן סבי דאזלי אתיגרא ריש לקיש אמר לקוטי בתר לקוטי ואמאי נהי דעניים דהכא מיאשי איכא עניים בדוכתא אחריתא דלא מיאשי אמרי כיון דאיכא עניים הכא הנך מעיקרא איאושי מיאש ואמרי עניים דהתם מלקטי ליה ת"ש קציעות בדרך ואפילו בצד שדה קציעות וכן תאנה הנוטה לדרך ומצא תאנים תחתיה מותרות משום גזל ופטורות מן המעשר בזיתים ובחרובים אסור בשלמא רישא לאביי לא קשיא אגב דחשיבי ממשמש בהו תאנה נמי מידע ידיע דנתרא אלא סיפא לרבא קשיא דקתני בזיתים ובחרובים אסור אמר רבי אבהו שאני זית הואיל וחזותו מוכיח עליו ואע"ג דנתרין זיתי מידע ידיע דוכתא דאיניש איניש הוא אי הכי אפילו רישא נמי אמר רב פפא תאנה עם נפילתה נמאסת תא שמע הגנב שנטל מזה ונתן לזה וכן גזלן שנטל מזה ונתן לזה וכן ירדן שנטל מזה ונתן לזה מה שנטל נטל ומה שנתן נתן בשלמא גזלן וירדן דקא חזי להו ומיאש אלא גנב מי קא חזי ליה דמיאש תרגמה רב פפא בלסטים מזוין אי הכי היינו גזלן תרי גווני גזלן ת"ש שטף נהר קוריו עציו ואבניו ונתנו בתוך שדה חבירו הרי אלו שלו מפני שנתיאשו הבעלים טעמא דנתיאשו הבעלים הא סתמא לא הכא במאי עסקינן כשיכול להציל אי הכי אימא סיפא אם היו הבעלים מרדפין אחריהם חייב להחזיר אי ביכולין להציל מאי אריא מרדפין אפילו אין מרדפין נמי הכא במאי עסקינן ביכולין להציל על ידי הדחק מרדפין לא אייאוש אין מרדפין אייאושי מיאש ת"ש כיצד אמרו התורם שלא מדעת תרומתו תרומה הרי שירד לתוך שדה חבירו וליקט ותרם שלא ברשות אם חושש משום גזל אין תרומתו תרומה ואם לאו תרומתו תרומה ומנין הוא יודע אם חושש משום גזל ואם לאו הרי שבא בעל הבית ומצאו ואמר לו כלך אצל יפות אם נמצאו יפות מהן תרומתו תרומה ואם לאו אין תרומתו תרומה ליקטו הבעלים והוסיפו עליהן בין כך ובין כך תרומתו תרומה וכי נמצאו יפות מהן תרומתו תרומה אמאי בעידנא דתרם הא לא הוה ידע תרגמה רבא אליבא דאביי דשויה שליח ה"נ מסתברא דאי ס"ד דלא שוויה שליח מי הויא תרומתו תרומה והא אתם (במדבר יח, כח) גם אתם אמר רחמנא לרבות שלוחכם מה אתם לדעתכם אף שלוחכם לדעתכם אלא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דשויה שליח וא"ל זיל תרום ולא א"ל תרום מהני וסתמיה דבעל הבית כי תרום מבינונית הוא תרום ואזל איהו ותרם מיפות ובא בעל הבית ומצאו וא"ל כלך אצל יפות אם נמצאו יפות מהן תרומתו תרומה ואם לאו אין תרומתו תרומה אמימר ומר זוטרא ורב אשי אקלעו לבוסתנא דמרי בר איסק אייתי אריסיה תמרי ורימוני ושדא קמייהו אמימר ורב אשי אכלי מר זוטרא לא אכיל אדהכי אתא מרי בר איסק אשכחינהו וא"ל לאריסיה אמאי לא אייתית להו לרבנן מהנך שפירתא אמרו ליה אמימר ורב אשי למר זוטרא השתא אמאי לא אכיל מר והתניא אם נמצאו יפות מהן תרומתו תרומה אמר להו הכי אמר רבא לא אמרו כלך אצל יפות אלא לענין תרומה בלבד משום דמצוה הוא וניחא ליה אבל הכא משום כסיפותא הוא דאמר הכי תא שמע עודהו הטל עליהן ושמח הרי זה (ויקרא יא, לח) בכי יותן נגבו אף על פי ששמח אינן בכי יותן טעמא מאי לאו משום דלא אמרינן כיון דאיגלאי מילתא דהשתא ניחא ליה מעיקרא נמי ניחא ליה שאני התם דכתיב כי יתן עד שיתן אי הכי רישא נמי התם כדרב פפא דרב פפא רמי כתיב כי יתן וקרינן כי יותן הא כיצד בעינן כי יותן דומיא דכי יתן מה יתן לדעת אף כי יותן נמי לדעת ת"ש דא"ר יוחנן משום רבי ישמעאל בן יהוצדק מנין לאבידה ששטפה נהר שהיא מותרת דכתיב (דברים כב, ג) וכן תעשה לחמורו וכן תעשה לשמלתו וכן תעשה לכל אבידת אחיך אשר תאבד ממנו ומצאתה מי שאבודה הימנו ומצויה אצל כל אדם יצאתה זו שאבודה ממנו ואינה מצויה אצל כל אדם ואיסורא דומיא דהיתירא מה היתירא בין דאית בה סימן ובין דלית בה סימן שרא אף איסורא בין דאית בה סימן ובין דלית בה סימן אסורה תיובתא דרבא תיובתא והלכתא כוותיה דאביי ביע"ל קג"ם א"ל רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי וכי מאחר דאיתותב רבא הני תמרי דזיקא היכי אכלינן להו אמר ליה כיון דאיכא שקצים ורמשים דקא אכלי להו מעיקרא יאושי מיאש מנייהו יתמי דלאו בני מחילה נינהו מאי אמר ליה באגא בארעא דיתמי לא מחזקינן מוחזק ועומד מאי כרכתא מאי אמר ליה אסירן:
MISHNA: In a case where one discovers lost items, which found items belong to him, and for which items is one obligated to proclaim his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them? These found items belong to him: If one found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles of grain in a public area, round cakes of pressed figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are taken from their state of origin directly after shearing, bound flax stalks, or bound strips of combed purple wool, these belong to him, as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one finds any anpurya vessels, since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is not obligated to proclaim his find. GEMARA: The mishna teaches as an example of items that one finds without any distinguishing mark: If one found scattered produce. The Gemara asks: And how much produce in how large an area constitutes scattered produce? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: It is considered scattered produce when it has a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he found the produce scattered in a manner indicating that it came there by falling and was not deliberately placed there, then even if the volume of produce in that area was greater than this limit, it should also belong to him, because there is no distinguishing mark that would enable the owner to reclaim it. And if he found produce scattered in a manner indicating intentional placement, then even if the volume of produce in an area that size was less than this limit, he should also not be allowed to keep the produce, as clearly the owner plans on returning to reclaim his produce. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor. For kernels scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, whose gathering requires great exertion, a person does not exert himself and does not return and take them. Therefore, he renounces his ownership of them and one who finds the kernels may keep them. For kernels scattered in an area smaller than that, the owner exerts himself and returns and takes them. And therefore, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a half-kav of kernels were scattered in an area of two by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces his ownership of the kernels? It is due to the fact that gathering the kernels requires great exertion. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since they are certainly not of significant value, he renounces his ownership of the kernels. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a related dilemma: If two kav of kernels were scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: If one kav of kernels is scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. This is true all the more so in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, and since gathering them requires even greater exertion, the owner renounces his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces his ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. But in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, since they are of significant value, he does not renounce his ownership of them. If one kav of sesame seeds was scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value. And in the case of sesame seeds, since they are of significant value he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. That is true all the more so in the case of sesame seeds. Since gathering them requires even greater exertion, he renounces his ownership of them. If one kav of dates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, or if one kav of pomegranates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value; and also in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since they are not of significant value he renounces ownership of the fruit. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. And in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion he does not renounce his ownership of them. In all these cases, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved. § It was stated: With regard to one’s despair of recovering his lost item that is not a conscious feeling, i.e., were he aware of the loss of his property, he would have despaired of its recovery, but he was unaware of his loss when the finder discovered the item, Abaye said: It is not considered despair; the owner maintains ownership of the item, and the finder may not keep it. And Rava said: It is considered despair and the finder may keep it. The Gemara limits the scope of the dispute. In the case of an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, everyone agrees that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. And even though we hear that he ultimately despairs of recovering the item, it is not considered despair, as when the item came into the possession of the finder, it was in a prohibited manner that it came into his possession. It is prohibited because when the owner learns that it fell from his possession, he does not despair of its recovery immediately. Instead, he says: I have a distinguishing mark on the item; I will provide the distinguishing mark to the finder, and I will take it. With regard to an item swept away by the tide of the sea or by the flooding of a river, even though the item has a distinguishing mark, the Merciful One permits the finder to keep it as we seek to state below, later in the discussion. When they disagree, it is with regard to an item in which there is no distinguishing mark. Abaye said: Despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, as he did not know that the item fell from him; therefore, he cannot despair of recovering it. Rava said: Despair that is not conscious is considered despair, as when he discovers that it fell from him, he will despair of its recovery; as he says upon this discovery: I have no distinguishing mark on the item. Therefore, it is considered from now, when the item fell, that he despairs. The Gemara proceeds to cite a series of proofs for and against the opinions of Abaye and Rava and provides a mnemonic representing those proofs: Peh, mem, gimmel, shin; mem, mem, kuf, gimmel, tet, yod; kaf, kaf, samekh, ayin, zayin. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered produce, it belongs to him. The Gemara asks: Why does it belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: Didn’t Rav Ukva bar Ḥama say: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor? The owner knowingly left the kernels on the threshing floor because it was not worth his while to gather them. That is a deliberate loss, and therefore the despair is conscious. Therefore, this clause in the mishna is not relevant to the dispute in question. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered coins, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly. Here too, a person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found round cakes of pressed figs or baker’s loaves, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since these items are heavy he knows that they fell, and it is reasonable to assume that shortly after they fell the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found strips of purple wool, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: And why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since they are significant and valuable, the owner feels around for them to ensure that they are not lost, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the strips fell, the owner became aware of his loss. This reasoning is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak with regard to coins. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who finds coins in synagogues, and in study halls, and in any place where the multitudes are found, these coins belong to him due to the fact that the owners despair of their recovery. Why do they belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that the coins fell from him? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Pe’a 8:1): From when is it permitted for any person to collect gleanings, which the Torah designates as exclusively for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9–10)? It is permitted once the nemushot have walked in the field. And we say in interpreting the mishna: What are nemushot? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are the elderly people who walk leaning on a cane. Since they walk slowly, they will see any stalks that remain and take them. Reish Lakish said: They are the second wave of gleaners who pass through the field after the initial gleaners, collecting any stalks that remain. The Gemara asks: And why is it permitted for any person to take the stalks, given that although the poor who are here renounce ownership of the stalks after seeing the nemushot pass through the field, there are poor people in another place who are unaware of the passing of the nemushot and do not renounce ownership? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: Since there are poor people here, those poor people in the other places despair of the gleanings from the outset, and they say: The poor people who are there gather the gleanings. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma’asrot 3:4): If dried figs are found on the path, and even if they were found at the side of a field where dried figs are spread to dry, and likewise, if there is a fig tree whose branches extend over a path and one found figs beneath it, those figs are permitted and taking them is not prohibited due to the prohibition of robbery. And as these are ownerless property, one who finds them is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Granted, the first clause of the mishna is not difficult according to the opinion of Abaye, as he can explain that one consciously despairs of recovering the dried figs. Since dried figs are significant and valuable, one feels around for them to ensure that they have not become lost. It is reasonable to assume that shortly after the fruits fell, the owner became aware of his loss and despaired of recovering them. In the case of the fig tree, too, one knows that it is a common occurrence for the fruit of the fig tree to fall from the tree and he renounces ownership from the outset. But the latter clause of the mishna is difficult according to the opinion of Rava, as it teaches: In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha of an olive is different, since its appearance proves the identity of the owner, as the fruit fallen from the tree appears similar to the fruit on that tree, and even though the olives fall off the tree, the one who finds the olives knows that an olive tree that is located in a place that is owned by a specific person belongs to that person and the owner will not renounce ownership of his fruit. The Gemara asks: If so, then even in the first clause as well, it should be prohibited to take the fruit that fell from the fig tree. Rav Pappa said: A fig becomes disgusting with its fall from the tree. Even if the fruit can be attributed to the tree of origin, since it is no longer fit for consumption, the owner would not want the fruit and consequently renounces his ownership of it. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: A thief who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, a robber who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, in the case of the Jordan River or another river that took an item from this person and gave it to that person, in all those cases, that which the person took, he took, and that which the person gave, he gave. Likewise, that which the river took, it took, and that which the river gave, it gave. The person who received the item need not return it. The Gemara asks: Granted in the cases of the robber and the Jordan River, one could say that the owner sees them take the item and despairs of its recovery; but in the case of the thief, who takes the item surreptitiously, does the owner see him take the item and would that lead him to despair? The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa interpreted the term thief in the baraita to be referring to armed bandits [listim]; therefore, the owner is aware that the item was taken and he despairs of its recovery. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as a robber, why mention two identical cases? The Gemara answers: The baraita mentioned two types of robbers; in both cases the owner was aware that his item was taken. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a river swept away one’s beams, one’s wood, or one’s stones and placed them into the field of another, these items belong to the owner of the field due to the fact that the respective owners despaired of their recovery. The Gemara infers from the baraita: The reason they belong to the finder is that the owners despaired; but in an unspecified case, where it is not definitively known that the owners despaired, they do not belong to the finder. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. The Gemara rejects the proof: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the beams, wood, or stones; therefore, their decision not to rescue them is a clear indication of despair. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita: If the owners were pursuing the items, the finder is obligated to return them. If it is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items, why did the baraita specifically cite a case where the owners were pursuing the items? Even if they were not pursuing the lost items, the items also remain in their ownership, as they did not despair of their recovery. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items with difficulty. In that case, if the owners pursue the items, it indicates that they did not despair of their recovery, but if the owners do not pursue the items, it indicates that they despaired of their recovery. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:5): When did the Sages say that in the case where one separates teruma without the owner’s consent, his teruma is considered teruma? It is in a case where there was someone who entered another’s field and gathered produce from it and separated teruma without the owner’s permission. If the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery, his teruma is not teruma, but if he is not concerned, his teruma is teruma. The baraita continues: And from where would does he know whether the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery or not? If the owner came and found him separating teruma and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that, then if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma, since the owner is assumed to have been sincere and pleased that the other has separated teruma from his produce. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, as it may be assumed that the owner was angry at him and was speaking sarcastically. The baraita adds: If the owners were gathering and adding to the teruma he had separated, indicating that they agree to his act of separation, either way, whether or not better-quality produce was found, his teruma is considered teruma. The Gemara questions the ruling of the baraita: But why is that the halakha, that if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found his teruma is teruma? At the time that he separated the teruma, he did not know that the owner would ultimately agree. The baraita states that the teruma is teruma from the moment he separated it, despite the fact that it was only later that he learned that the owner agreed. Apparently, in the case of despair as well, despair that is not conscious is considered despair, contrary to the opinion of Abaye. Rava interpreted the matter in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: This is a case where the owner designated him as an agent. So too, it is reasonable, as if it enters your mind that the owner did not designate him as an agent, would his teruma be teruma? But doesn’t the Merciful One state: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28)? Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent. Therefore, an agent separating teruma has the same halakhot as an owner separating teruma. Just as when you, the owner, separate teruma, it is with your knowledge, so too when your agent separates teruma, it must be with your knowledge. Evidently, in any event, one needs to be appointed as an agent to be capable of separating teruma for another. Rather, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner designated him as an agent and said to him: Go and separate teruma, but he did not say to him: Separate teruma from these specific crops. And when the owner’s intent is unspecified, and it is unclear which of his crops are meant to be separated when the agent separates teruma, it is from the crops of intermediate quality that he separates teruma. And in this case, the agent went and separated teruma from higher-quality produce, and the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that. If produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, The Gemara digresses with a related incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi happened to come to the orchard [levustana] of Mari bar Isak. His sharecropper came and placed dates and pomegranates before them. Ameimar and Rav Ashi ate the fruit, but Mar Zutra did not eat the fruit due to the concern that the sharecropper had provided them with the fruit without the approval of the owner of the field. Meanwhile, Mari bar Isak came and found them eating his fruit and said to his sharecropper: Why didn’t you bring the Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits? Ameimar and Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: Now why is the Master not eating the fruit? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that; if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. Here too, it is clear that Mari bar Isak approved of the actions of his sharecropper. Mar Zutra said to them that this is what Rava said: The Sages said that the statement: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma, indicates consent of the owner only with regard to the matter of teruma, due to the fact that it is a mitzva and the owner is amenable to having the mitzva fulfilled. But here, in this incident, it is due to shame that he said this: Why did you not bring these Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits? He did not really want to give them the fruit. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a baraita with regard to despair that is not conscious. It is written: “And if any part of their carcass falls upon any sowing seed that is to be sown, it is ritually pure. But when water is placed upon the seed, and any part of their carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). Produce becomes susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only after coming into contact with one of seven liquids: Wine, honey, oil, milk, dew, blood, and water. It is taught in the baraita: If the dew is still upon the produce and has not yet dried, and if the owner was glad that the dew moistened the produce and kept it fresh, that produce falls into the category of: “But when water is placed upon the seed,” and the produce is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. If the produce had dried when the owner found it, then even though he was glad that the dew had moistened the produce, the produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed [khi yuttan] upon the seed,” and the produce is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. What is the reason that if the produce dried, the fact that the owner is glad does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity? Is it not due to the fact that we do not say: Since the matter was revealed that he is amenable to the moisture now, he was also amenable from the outset? The same should be true with regard to despair that is not conscious. The fact that when he becomes aware of his loss he despairs of its recovery does not indicate that he despaired from the outset, contrary to the opinion of Rava. The Gemara rejects the proof: It is different there, as although the phrase is vocalized to mean: “When it is placed,” it is written: When one places [ki yitten], from which it is derived that the produce is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity only if the owner places the liquid on the produce. The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause of the baraita, too, the produce should not be rendered susceptible to contracting impurity, because the dew fell on the produce and was not placed there by the owner. The Gemara answers: There, the explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: The verse states: “But when water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:38). The word “yuttanis written in the defective form, as if it says ki yitten.” Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet, we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, as if it is written ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled? Rav Pappa explains that we require that the situation described by the words “when water is placed [ki yuttan]” be similar to the situation described by the words: When one places [dekhi yitten]: Just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is with the knowledge of the owner that the produce becomes wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is with his knowledge that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. Therefore, no proof may be cited with regard to the matter of despair, where there is no Torah derivation requiring awareness from the outset. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it. And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation. And although in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha is typically ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rava, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye in the disputes represented by the mnemonic: Yod, ayin, lamed; kuf, gimmel, mem. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that the opinion of Rava was conclusively refuted, and the halakha is that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, if those dates are blown off the tree by the wind, how do we eat them? Perhaps their owner did not despair of their recovery. Rav Ashi said to him: Since there are repugnant creatures and creeping animals that eat the dates after they fall, the owner despairs of their recovery from the outset. Therefore, one who finds the dates may keep them. Rav Aḥa asked: Perhaps the tree belonged to minor orphans who, because they are not capable of relinquishing property, cannot despair of recovering the dates from the outset. Accordingly, what is the justification for eating found dates? Rav Ashi said to him: We do not presume a valley to be land belonging to orphans, and therefore that is not a concern. Rav Aḥa asked: If the presumptive status of the trees was previously established as belonging to orphans, what is the halakha? If the trees are surrounded by fences that prevent repugnant creatures and creeping animals from gaining access, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to him: The dates are forbidden in those cases.

~ What are similar discussions we can have, nowadays, regarding lost and found objects?

~ What about love and hate? How do we live, nowadays, in America? Are those categories ("ways of peace" and "sanctification of God's name") still valid?

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