Swimming in the Talmud ~ Yom Kippur

(7) On the tenth day of the same seventh month you shall observe a sacred occasion when you shall practice self-denial. You shall do no work. (8) You shall present to ה' a burnt offering of pleasing odor: one bull of the herd, one ram, seven yearling lambs; see that they are without blemish. (9) The meal offering with them—of choice flour with oil mixed in—shall be: three-tenths of a measure for a bull, two-tenths for the one ram, (10) one-tenth for each of the seven lambs. (11) And there shall be one goat for a sin offering, in addition to the sin offering of expiation and the regular burnt offering with its meal offering, each with its libation.

(1) On Yom Kippur, one mustn't engage in eating and in drinking, and in bathing, and in smearing oil on one’s body, and in wearing shoes, and in conjugal relations. However, the king and the bride may wash their faces on Yom Kippur. A woman after childbirth may wear shoes. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Rabbis prohibit all those.

(2) The mishna elaborates: One who eats a large date-bulk of food, equivalent to a date and its pit, or who drinks a cheekful of liquid on Yom Kippur is liable to receive the punishment of karet. All foods that one eats join together to constitute a date-bulk; and all liquids that one drinks join together to constitute a cheekful. However, if one eats and drinks, the food and beverage do not join as each is measured separately.

(3) If one ate and drank unwittingly within one lapse of awareness, e.g., one forgot that it is Yom Kippur, one is liable to bring only a single sin-offering. However, if one ate and performed labor unwittingly, one is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as by doing so he violated two separate prohibitions. If one ate foods that are not fit for eating, or drank liquids that are not fit for drinking, or drank fish brine or the briny liquid, he is exempt.

(5) With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving, one feeds her until she recovers. If a person is sick, one feeds the sick person according to the advice of medical experts. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him/her according to his/her own instructions, until s/he says "enough".

(6) In the case of one who is seized with bulmos, one may feed him even impure foods until his eyes recover. In the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one may not feed him from the lobe of the dog’s liver. And Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash permits feeding it to him. And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat. This is because there is uncertainty whether or not it is a life-threatening situation. And a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat.

(8) A sin-offering, which atones for unwitting performance of transgressions punishable by karet, and a definite guilt-offering, which is brought for robbery and misuse of consecrated items, atone for those sins. Death and Yom Kippur atone for all sins when accompanied by repentance. Repentance alone atones for minor transgressions, for both positive mitzvot and negative mitzvot. And regarding severe transgressions repentance places punishment in suspension until Yom Kippur comes and atones for the transgression.

(9) With regard to one who says: I will sin and then I will repent, I will sin and I will repent, Heaven does not provide that person the opportunity to repent. With regard to one who says: I will sin and Yom Kippur will atone for my sins, Yom Kippur does not atone for those sins. Furthermore, for transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases the other person. Similarly, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya taught that point from the verse: “From all your sins you shall be cleansed before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). For transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until that person appeases the other person. In conclusion, Rabbi Akiva said: How fortunate are you, Israel; before Whom are you purified, and Who purifies you? It is your Father in Heaven, as it is stated: “And I will sprinkle purifying water upon you, and you shall be purified” (Ezekiel 36:25). And it says: “The ritual bath of Israel is God” (Jeremiah 17:13). Just as a ritual bath purifies the impure, so too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, purifies Israel.

MISHNA: On Yom Kippur, one mustn't engage in eating and in drinking, and in bathing, and in smearing oil on one’s body, and in wearing shoes, and in conjugal relations. However, the king, and a new bride may wash their faces on Yom Kippur. A woman after childbirth, who is suffering, may wear shoes because going barefoot causes her pain. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Rabbis prohibit these activities for a king, a new bride, and a woman after childbirth. The mishna elaborates: One who eats a large date-bulk of food, equivalent to a date and its pit, or who drinks a cheekful of liquid on Yom Kippur is liable. All foods that one eats join together to constitute a date-bulk; and all liquids that one drinks join together to constitute a cheekful. However, if one eats and drinks, the food and beverage do not join together to constitute a measure that determines liability, as each is measured separately. GEMARA: Why does the mishna use one mustn't? It is, after all, punishable by karet! The mishna should have used the more accurate word liable. Rabbi Ila said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya said: This term is needed only for a half-measure, meaning that if one eats less than the amount that incurs the punishment of karet, one still sinned. The Gemara asks: This explanation works out well according to the one who said that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law even though it does not incur a punishment. But according to the one who says that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, and that it is the Sages who prohibit eating less than a full measure, what is there to say about the terminology? The Gemara explains: as it was stated that amora’im debated the nature of a half-measure of a forbidden substance: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited by Torah law, and the Torah prohibits even a minute amount of forbidden substance. Reish Lakish said: It is permitted by Torah law. This explanation works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish concedes that a half-measure is prohibited by rabbinic law. Reish Lakish would agree that eating or drinking a half-measure is prohibited by rabbinic law. ... The Gemara’s initial assumption is that the mishna’s use of the word prohibited is referring to a transgression not punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that it teaches that transgressing is punishable by karet, does it never teach using the word prohibited? Was it not taught in a baraita: Although they said the word prohibited with all of the five Yom Kippur afflictions, they said that the punishment of karet applies only to one who eats, or drinks, or performs prohibited labor. This means that the word prohibit is used with transgressions punishable by karet as well. The Gemara rejects this. This is what the baraita is saying: When they said that those five activities are prohibited, they said that only with regard to a half-measure; but a full measure is punishable by karet. And although a violation is punishable by karet, it is punishable by karet only if one eats, or drinks, or performs prohibited labor; these alone are the cases where karet is incurred. And if you wish, say instead that when it is taught in the mishna using the language of prohibited, it is referring to the other transgressions, which do not incur karet. As Rabba and Rav Yosef taught this in other books of Rav’s school, i.e., the Sifrei, the halakhic midrash on Numbers and Deuteronomy: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to engage in bathing, and in smearing oil on one’s body, and in wearing shoes, and in having relations on Yom Kippur? The verse states: “Shabbaton” (Leviticus 16:31), meaning resting and refraining from certain activities. Therefore, the word prohibit is used with these activities, but they are not punishable by karet.

MISHNA: With regard to the children, one does not afflict them by withholding food on Yom Kippur; however, one trains them one year before or two years before they reach majority, so that they will be accustomed to fulfill mitzvot. GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the wording of the mishna: Since it is stated that one trains children two years before their maturity, is it necessary to say that one trains them one year before? This expression in the mishna is superfluous. Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This statement that one trains children one year before is referring to a feeble child; that statement that one trains children two years before is referring to a healthy child. Rav Huna said: One trains a healthy child of eight years and nine years to fast for several hours; at ten years and eleven years, they complete the fast by rabbinic law; at twelve years they complete the fast by Torah law. This applies to girls. And Rav Naḥman said: At nine years and ten years one trains them to fast for several hours; at eleven and twelve years they complete the fast by rabbinic law; at thirteen years they complete the fast by Torah law. This applies to boys. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no obligation with regard to children completing the fast by rabbinic law. Rather, at ten and eleven years, one trains them to fast for several hours; and at twelve years girls are obligated to complete their fast by Torah law.

MISHNA: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving to eat it, one feeds her until she recovers, as failure to do so could lead to a life-threatening situation. If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts who determine that he indeed requires food. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him according to his own instructions, until he says that he has eaten enough and needs no more. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled consecrated meat or pig meat and craved those specific foods, one inserts a thin reed into the juice of that item and places it on her mouth. If her mind become settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the gravy itself of that forbidden food. If her mind becomes settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the fat of the forbidden food itself, as there is no halakha that stands in the way of saving a life except for the prohibitions against idol worship, and forbidden sexual relationships, and bloodshed. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to the halakha that the prohibition against idol worship takes precedence over saving one’s life, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 6:5), why is it stated in the continuation of the verse: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? Rather, it is to teach that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” And if there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” § With regard to the concept that one must surrender his life rather than have forbidden sexual relations or shed blood through murder, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated about the rape of a betrothed woman: “For as when a man rises against his fellow and slays him, even so is this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). One might ask: What idea did we learn about a betrothed woman from a murderer? The halakha of a betrothed woman is clear; what new point is learned by comparing it to the halakha of a murderer? Rather, this halakha about the murderer, which appears to come to teach about the betrothed woman, is found to actually be the subject of teaching. The inference is as follows: Just as with regard to the betrothed woman, permission is given to save her at the cost of the life of her attacker, so too, the murderer may be saved from committing the crime at the cost of his life, i.e., one may save the victim by killing the attacker. Just as the murderer is subject to the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, i.e., one must even allow himself to be killed rather than take the life of another, so too, a man must surrender his life rather than engage in forbidden sexual relations with a betrothed young woman. By inference, the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, applies to all forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the murderer himself, from where do we derive this halakha that he should be killed rather than transgress the prohibition against murder? The Gemara answers: It is derived through reason, as it was told: A certain person came before Rava. He said to Rava: The master of the village where I live said to me: Kill so-and-so, and if you do not do so, I will kill you. What should I do? Rava said to him: Let yourself be killed, and you should not kill. Rava reasoned: What did you see to make you think that your blood is redder and more important than his? Perhaps the blood of that man is redder, and he is more important than you. If so, it is logical that one must not kill another person to save himself.

§ It was taught in the mishna: If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts. Rabbi Yannai said: If an ill person says he needs to eat, and a doctor says he does not need to eat, one listens to the ill person. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because the verse states: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10). The Gemara asks: It is obvious that a person knows himself better than anyone else does. Why does this need to be stated explicitly? The Gemara answers: It is lest you say that the doctor is more certain because he has had more experience with this condition. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even so, it is the ill person who knows his own suffering better than anyone else. However, in the opposite case, if a doctor says that the ill person needs food, but the ill person himself says he does not need to eat, one listens to the doctor. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because confusion has taken hold of the ill person on account of his illness, and his judgment is impaired. § We learned in the mishna: If a person is ill, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts. This implies that if there are experts present, then according to the advice of experts, yes, one feeds the ill person; but at his own instructions, no, one does not feed him, contrary to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion. It further implies that according to the advice of several experts, yes, one feeds an ill person; however, according to the advice of only one expert, no, one does not feed him. There appears to be a requirement for at least two doctors, which also contradicts Rabbi Yannai’s opinion that the opinion of one expert is sufficient to override the opinion of the ill person. The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a unique circumstance: The ill person says I do not need food, and the consultation of experts is required. The Gemara suggests: But let them feed him according to the advice of one expert, as Rabbi Yannai said that in such a circumstance one feeds the ill person based on the advice of one doctor. The Gemara answers: No, the requirement of two experts is necessary in a case where there is another, third expert with him who says that the ill person does not need to eat. In such a case, one feeds the ill person according to the advice of two experts who agree that he requires it. The Gemara asks: If so, this is obvious, since it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, and in all cases of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient. The Gemara answers: No, this halakha is necessary in a case where there are two other doctors who, along with the ill person, say that he does not need food. And although Rav Safra said that two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses, and one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, that rule applies specifically to the matter of testimony; however, in the matter of assessing a situation, we follow the majority of opinions. However, this principle of following the majority applies specifically to assessing monetary issues, but here it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. Therefore, the ill person must eat. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna that if there are no experts present one feeds him according to his own opinion, by inference, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where the ill person said he needs to eat. In that case, the mishna states that one follows the experts’ opinion, not his own, and feeds him. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement that he may eat only based on the advice of experts said? It is when the ill person said: I do not need to eat. But if he said: I do need to eat, and instead of two experts there is only one who says that he does not need to eat, one feeds him according to his own opinion. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Any instance where an ill person says: I need to eat, even if there are one hundred expert doctors who say that he does not need to eat, we listen to his own opinion and feed him, as it is stated: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10). We learned in the mishna: If an ill person himself says he needs to eat and there are no experts present, one feeds him according to his own opinion. This implies that the reason one feeds him is because there are no experts present. One may infer from this that if there were experts present, no, one would not feed the ill person based on his own opinion but would instead listen to the advice of the experts. The Gemara rejects this: This is what the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement that one follows the opinion of the experts said? It is when the ill person said: I do not need to eat. However, if he said: I do need to eat, it is considered as if there were no experts there at all; we feed him based on his opinion, as it is stated: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10). All the experts are ignored in the face of the ill person’s own sensitivities.