Week 2 Treatment of Animals

Proof Text: Treatment of an animal in distress

(ה) כִּֽי־תִרְאֶ֞ה חֲמ֣וֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ֗ רֹבֵץ֙ תַּ֣חַת מַשָּׂא֔וֹ וְחָדַלְתָּ֖ מֵעֲזֹ֣ב ל֑וֹ עָזֹ֥ב תַּעֲזֹ֖ב עִמּֽוֹ׃ {ס}

Exodus 23:5

(5) When you see the ass of your enemy lying under its burden and would refrain from raising*raising For this use of the verb ‘zb, cf. Neh. 3.8, 34. For the whole verse, see Deut. 22.4. it, you must nevertheless help raise it.

בבא קמא נ״ד ב:ו׳

מַתְנִי' אֶחָד שׁוֹר וְאֶחָד כׇּל בְּהֵמָה לִנְפִילַת הַבּוֹר וּלְהַפְרָשַׁת הַר סִינַי וּלְתַשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל וְלַהֲשָׁבַת אֲבֵידָה לִפְרִיקָה לַחֲסִימָה לַכִּלְאַיִם וְלַשַּׁבָּת

Bava Kamma 54b:6

MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat.

בבא מציעא ל״ב א:ו׳

פרק וטען פרק וטען אפילו ארבעה וחמשה פעמים חייב שנאמר (שמות כג, ה) עזב תעזב

Bava Metzia 32a:6

If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta’azov] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.

בבא מציעא ל״ב א:י״ז

מצוה מן התורה לפרוק אבל לא לטעון: מאי אבל לא לטעון אילימא אבל לא לטעון כלל מאי שנא פריקה דכתיב עזב תעזב עמו טעינה נמי הכתיב (דברים כב, ד) הקם תקים עמו

Bava Metzia 32a:17

§ The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn’t it written: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4)?

בבא מציעא ל״ב ב:א׳

מדברי שניהם נלמד צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא ואפי' ר"ש לא קאמר אלא משום דלא מסיימי קראי אבל מסיימי קראי דרשי' ק"ו משום מאי לאו משום צער בעלי חיים דרשינן

Bava Metzia 32b:1

From the statements of both of these tanna’im it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?

בבא מציעא ל״ב ב:ט׳-ט״ז

לימא מסייע ליה בהמת עובד כוכבים מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אי אמרת בשלמא צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא משום הכי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אלא אי אמרת צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא אמאי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל התם משום איבה הכי נמי מסתברא דקתני אם היתה טעונה יין אסור אין זקוק לה אי אמרת בשלמא לאו דאורייתא משום הכי אין זקוק לה אלא אי אמרת דאורייתא אמאי אין זקוק לה ה"ק ולהטעינה יין אסור אין זקוק לה תא שמע בהמת עובד כוכבים ומשאוי ישראל וחדלת ואי אמרת צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא אמאי וחדלת עזב תעזב מבעי ליה לעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא התם בטעינה אי הכי אימא סיפא בהמת ישראל ומשאוי עובד כוכבים עזב תעזב ואי בטעינה אמאי עזב תעזב משום צערא דישראל אי הכי אפילו רישא נמי רישא בחמר עובד כוכבים סיפא בחמר ישראל מאי פסקת סתמא דמלתא איניש בתר חמריה אזיל והא וחדלת ועזב תעזב בפריקה הוא דכתיבי א"ל הא מני רבי יוסי הגלילי היא דאמר צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא ת"ש אוהב לפרוק ושונא לטעון מצוה בשונא כדי לכוף את יצרו ואי סלקא דעתך צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא הא עדיף ליה אפ"ה כדי לכוף את יצרו עדיף

Bava Metzia 32b:9-16

Let us say that a baraita supports Rava’s opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals. So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn’t the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase “you shall forgo,” the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: “You shall forgo”? The Torah should have commanded only: “You shall release it with him.” The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: “You shall release it.” And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: “You shall release it”? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded. The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile’s donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew’s donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew. The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn’t it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: “You shall forgo passing him by,” and: “You shall release it,” are written? The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one’s evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend’s animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy’s animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.

Proof Text: Deuteronomy 25:4

דברים כ״ה:ד׳

(ד) לֹא־תַחְסֹ֥ם שׁ֖וֹר בְּדִישֽׁוֹ׃ {ס}

Deuteronomy 25:4

(4) You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.

בבא קמא נ״ד ב:י׳

לַחֲסִימָה יָלֵיף שׁוֹר שׁוֹר מִשַּׁבָּת

Bava Kamma 54b:10

With regard to the prohibition against muzzling an animal, mentioned in the verse: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

בבא מציעא פ״ח ב:ב׳

אלא כנפשך למאי אתא לכדתניא כנפשך מה נפשך אם חסמת פטור אף פועל אם חסמת פטור

Bava Metzia 88b:2

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself and did not eat from your field’s produce, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

Proof Text: Mishnah Shabbat 18:1

משנה שבת י״ח

(א) מְפַנִּין אֲפִלּוּ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ קֻפּוֹת שֶׁל תֶּבֶן וְשֶׁל תְּבוּאָה מִפְּנֵי הָאוֹרְחִים וּמִפְּנֵי בִטּוּל בֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הָאוֹצָר. מְפַנִּין תְּרוּמָה טְהוֹרָה, וּדְמַאי, וּמַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁנִּטְּלָה תְרוּמָתוֹ, וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְהֶקְדֵּשׁ שֶׁנִּפְדּוּ, וְהַתֻּרְמוֹס הַיָּבֵשׁ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַאֲכָל לַעֲנִיִּים. אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַטֶּבֶל, וְלֹא מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁלֹּא נִטְּלָה תְרוּמָתוֹ, וְלֹא אֶת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וְהֶקְדֵּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא נִפְדּוּ, וְלֹא אֶת הַלּוּף, וְלֹא הַחַרְדָּל. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מַתִּיר בְּלוּף, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַאֲכַל עוֹרְבִין:

(ב) חֲבִילֵי קַשׁ וַחֲבִילֵי עֵצִים וַחֲבִילֵי זְרָדִים, אִם הִתְקִינָן לְמַאֲכַל בְּהֵמָה, מְטַלְטְלִין אוֹתָן. וְאִם לָאו, אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין אוֹתָן. כּוֹפִין אֶת הַסַּל לִפְנֵי הָאֶפְרוֹחִים, כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲלוּ וְיֵרְדוּ. תַּרְנְגֹלֶת שֶׁבָּרְחָה, דּוֹחִין אוֹתָהּ עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס. מְדַדִּין עֲגָלִין וּסְיָחִין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. אִשָּׁה מְדַדָּה אֶת בְּנָהּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא נוֹטֵל אַחַת וּמֵנִיחַ אַחַת, אֲבָל אִם הָיָה גוֹרֵר, אָסוּר:

(ג) אֵין מְיַלְּדִין אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה בְיוֹם טוֹב, אֲבָל מְסַעֲדִין. וּמְיַלְּדִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה בְּשַׁבָּת, וְקוֹרִין לָהּ חֲכָמָה מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם, וּמְחַלְּלִין עָלֶיהָ אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, וְקוֹשְׁרִין אֶת הַטַּבּוּר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, אַף חוֹתְכִין. וְכָל צָרְכֵי מִילָה עוֹשִׂין בְּשַׁבָּת:

Mishnah Shabbat 18

(1) On Shabbat, one may move even four or five baskets of straw and baskets of produce, due to the guests, who require that place to sit, and due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall, where space is required to seat the students. However, one may not move these items to create space in the storeroom. One may move ritually pure teruma, although it may only be eaten by a priest; and doubtfully tithed produce [demai], which may not be eaten until tithes are separated from it due to concern that an am ha’aretz did not separate its tithes; and first tithe whose teruma of the tithe has already been taken and given to priests; and second tithe and consecrated items that were redeemed; and even dry lupine, which is not fit for consumption by a person, because it is goat food. However, one may neither move untithed produce, nor first tithe whose teruma has not been taken, nor second tithe and consecrated items that were not redeemed, nor raw arum and raw mustard, as all of these items are not fit for consumption and are therefore set aside. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving in the case of arum because it is food for ravens.

(2) With regard to bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs, if one prepared them on Shabbat eve for animal food, one may move them. And if not, one may not move them. One may overturn a basket in front of the chicks so that they can climb on and climb off of it. Likewise, with regard to a hen that fled that one seeks to retrieve, one may push it even with his hands until it reenters the house. One may help calves and foals to walk, and likewise a woman may help her son to walk. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is it permitted? When her son picks one foot up and puts one foot down by himself. However, if her son were dragging both his feet, it would be prohibited because it would be like carrying him in the public domain.

שבת קכ״ח ב:ד׳-ז׳

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנָּפְלָה לְאַמַּת הַמַּיִם — מֵבִיא כָּרִים וּכְסָתוֹת וּמַנִּיחַ תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְאִם עָלְתָה — עָלְתָה. מֵיתִיבִי: בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנָּפְלָה לְאַמַּת הַמַּיִם — עוֹשֶׂה לָהּ פַּרְנָסָה בִּמְקוֹמָהּ בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא תָּמוּת. פַּרְנָסָה — אִין, כָּרִים וּכְסָתוֹת — לָא! לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא — דְּאֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָסָה, הָא — דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָסָה. אֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָסָה — אִין, וְאִי לָא — מֵבִיא כָּרִים וּכְסָתוֹת וּמַנִּיחַ תַּחְתֶּיהָ. וְהָא קָא מְבַטֵּל כְּלִי מֵהֵיכֵנוֹ! סָבַר מְבַטֵּל כְּלִי מֵהֵיכֵנוֹ דְּרַבָּנַן, צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאָתֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא וְדָחֵי דְּרַבָּנַן.

Shabbat 128b:4-7

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With regard to an animal that fell into an aqueduct, one brings cushions and blankets, and throws them into the water ditch, and places them beneath the animal in the aqueduct. And if the animal thereby emerges, it emerges. The Gemara raises an objection from a Tosefta: With regard to an animal that fell into an aqueduct on Shabbat, one provides it with sustenance in its place so that it will not die. This implies that providing it with sustenance, yes, that is permitted, providing it with cushions and blankets, no, that it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is room to distinguish between the cases. This, the Tosefta in which it was taught that one provides the animal with sustenance, is referring to a case where it is possible to provide it with sustenance. That, the mishna in which Rav said that one brings cushions and blankets, is referring to a case where it is impossible to provide it with sustenance. Where it is possible to provide it with sustenance, yes, he does so. And if it is not possible to provide it with sustenance, he brings cushions and blankets and places them beneath the animal. The Gemara asks: Does he not, by placing the cushions and blankets, negate a vessel’s preparedness? The cushions and blankets are no longer fit for their designated use on Shabbat, and this negation of their designated use is similar to the prohibited labor of dismantling. The Gemara answers: Rav holds that negating a vessel’s preparedness is prohibited by rabbinic law. Causing a living creature to suffer is a Torah prohibition. And a matter prohibited by Torah law comes and overrides a matter prohibited by rabbinic law.