MJL Daf Yomi - Jan 18, 2024

איכא דאמרי (יש אומרים) - there are some authorities who say; some say; others say;

This term introduces another version of a statement in the Talmud or another version of an entire Talmudic discussion.

(1) In some instances, the two versions are substantially different;

(2) In some instances, the two versions differ -- not about the content of the statement -- but about its authorship or about the structure of a Talmudic discussion

בבא קמא ע׳ א:ב׳-ג׳

אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: לָא כָּתְבִינַן אוֹרָכְתָּא אַמִּטַּלְטְלִי. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: מַאי טַעְמָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גָּזַל וְלֹא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם אֵינָן יְכוֹלִין לְהַקְדִּישׁ; זֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ.

Bava Kamma 70a:2-3

§ The Sages of Neharde’a say: One cannot write a document of authorization [orakhta] to assign another to collect a debt or a deposit of movable property on his behalf. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: What is the reason for this halakha? Ameimar said to him: It is due to a principle stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one stole an item and the owners have not yet despaired of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it: This one, the thief, cannot consecrate the item because it does not belong to him, and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession. The granting of authority to collect a debt involves the transfer of ownership of the item or money from the owner to the collector; otherwise the debtor could refuse to convey it to the collector. In the case of movable property, as it is being held by another, it is not in the possession of the owner; just as the owner cannot consecrate this item he cannot transfer ownership of it.

קידושין נ״ב א:ט׳

כִּי סְלֵיק רַבִּי זֵירָא אַמְרַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי אָמַר רַב הָכִי? וְהוּא לָא אֲמַר?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גָּזַל וְלֹא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם אֵינָם יְכוֹלִים לְהַקְדִּישׁ, זֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: מִי אָמַר רַב כְּווֹתִי?

Kiddushin 52a:9

The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael he stated this halakha before Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said to him: Did Rav actually say so? This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with the statement of Rav that these halakhot can be learned from the mishna, which leads the Gemara to ask: But didn’t he himself say so? And didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If one robbed another of an item and its owner has not despaired of recovering it, neither of them can consecrate the stolen item? This one, the robber, cannot consecrate it because it is not his, and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession. By the same logic, one should not be able to betroth a woman with stolen property, as it is not his. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan was not objecting to Rav’s opinion, but this is what he said to him: Did Rav actually say in accordance with my opinion?

בבא קמא ע׳ א:ד׳

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: לָא כָּתְבִינַן אוֹרָכְתָּא אַמִּטַּלְטְלִי דְּכַפְרֵיהּ. טַעְמָא דְּכַפְרֵיהּ, דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּשִׁיקְרָא; אֲבָל לָא כַּפְרֵיהּ – כָּתְבִינַן.

Bava Kamma 70a:4

There are those who state a different version of this halakha. The Sages of Neharde’a say: One cannot write a document of authorization for the collection of movable property that the bailee or debtor has denied owing. The Gemara infers: According to this version, the only reason the document cannot be written is that the bailee or debtor has denied owing the item, as a document written under these circumstances has the appearance of falsehood, since the purported owner is transferring ownership of an item over which his own ownership is in doubt. But it can be inferred that if the bailee or debtor did not deny owing the item, one can write a document of authorization.

איכא דמתני לה -- There is someone who teaches it

After the Talmud has presented a statement of an amora as referring to a mishna or a beraita, this formula is used to introduce a different tradition that contends that the same amoraic statement refers to a different mishna or beraita.

בבא קמא ע״ב א:ד׳-ה׳

הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה וְכוּ׳.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חֲבִיבִי מָחוֹזְנָאָה לְרַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף. דְּאִי יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁחַט בַּהּ פּוּרְתָּא – אַסְרַהּ, אִידַּךְ – לָא דְּמָרַיהּ קָא טָבַח!

Bava Kamma 72a:4-5

§ The mishna teaches: A thief who slaughters the animal but it was found to be a tereifa, and likewise a thief who slaughters a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard, pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: Conclude from the mishna that the act of slaughtering is considered to have been performed only at the end of the slaughtering process. Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza explains: As, if you say that the act of slaughtering lasts from beginning to end, i.e., the halakhic ramifications of slaughtering are in effect throughout the process, one could raise a question with regard to the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard: Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, he has prohibited the animal, with regard to deriving benefit, as a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. When he slaughters the other part, it is already prohibited with regard to deriving benefit, which means that it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters. Since deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, it has no value; therefore, there is no ownership.

בבא קמא ע״ב א:ח׳

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא – אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי לֵוִי סָבָא: אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

Bava Kamma 72a:8

There are those who teach that the preceding exchange took place with regard to the following dispute: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Levi the Elder: The act of slaughtering is considered to have been performed only at the end of the slaughtering process. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The act of slaughtering lasts from beginning to end.

קידושין ס״ג א:י״א

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַאי תַּנָּא בָּרָא סָבַר: אֵינָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף. וְתַנָּא דִידַן סָבַר יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

Kiddushin 63a:11

The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish could have said to you: This tanna of the baraita maintains that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired. Consequently, she is betrothed via money rather than by a loan. And the tanna of our mishna maintains that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end. Since the debt accumulates throughout the duration that the service is performed, by the time he has finished the work she owes him the entire sum, and a debt cannot be used for a betrothal.

גופא -- "The body""; [Let us now return to] the statement itself

This term regularly introduces the text of an amoraic statement, or a beraita, or occasionally a mishna that has been quoted in part during the course of a previous Talmudic discussion. Now the Talmud quotes that text in full and discusses it further, usually presenting one of the following:

1) an explanation of it

2) an objection to it

3) a corroboration of it from another source

4) a dissenting view

5) another statement (or several others from the same author)

בבא קמא ע״ד ב:י״ז-י״ח

אָמְרִי: הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – דּוּמְיָא דְּעַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד; מָה עַל פִּי [עֵד] אֶחָד – כִּי אָתֵי עֵד אֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף בַּהֲדֵיהּ, מִיחַיַּיב; עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ נָמֵי – כִּי אָתוּ עֵדִים, מִיחַיַּיב. לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר.

Bava Kamma 74b:17-18

The Sages say in response: By stating this case, the mishna teaches us this halakha: The case of the thief slaughtering the animal established based on the testimony of one witness is similar to a case where it is established based on his own admission. Just as in the case where the slaughter is established based on the testimony of one witness, if one other witness comes and corroborates the testimony of the first, he joins together with the first witness and together their testimony is rendered a valid testimony of two, and the thief becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, so too, where the slaughter is established based on his own admission, if witnesses come after his admission he becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara comments: This interpretation of the mishna serves to exclude that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability.

בבא קמא ע״ד ב:י״ט

גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב הוּנָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁסִּימֵּא אֶת עֵין טָבִי עַבְדּוֹ, וְהָיָה שָׂמֵחַ שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה.

Bava Kamma 74b:19

Since Rav Huna’s halakha was mentioned, the Gemara discusses in detail the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who blinded the eye of his Canaanite slave Tavi, and he experienced great joy as a result. Rabban Gamliel had long wanted to emancipate Tavi, but it is generally prohibited to emancipate a Canaanite slave. The injury provided a fortuitous opportunity for Rabban Gamliel to emancipate his slave, as blinding the eye of one’s slave results in his emancipation (see Exodus 21:27).

שמות כ״א:כ״ז

וְאִם־שֵׁ֥ן עַבְדּ֛וֹ אֽוֹ־שֵׁ֥ן אֲמָת֖וֹ יַפִּ֑יל לַֽחׇפְשִׁ֥י יְשַׁלְּחֶ֖נּוּ תַּ֥חַת שִׁנּֽוֹ׃ {פ}

Exodus 21:27

If the owner knocks out the tooth of a slave, male or female, that person shall let the slave go free on account of the tooth.

בבא קמא ע״ד ב:כ׳

מְצָאוֹ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, אָמַר לוֹ: ״אִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁטָּבִי עַבְדִּי יָצָא לְחֵירוּת?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״לָמָּה?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״שֶׁסִּמִּיתִי אֶת עֵינוֹ״. אָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵין בִּדְבָרֶיךָ כְּלוּם, שֶׁכְּבָר אֵין לוֹ עֵדִים״.

Bava Kamma 74b:20

Rabban Gamliel encountered Rabbi Yehoshua and said to him: Do you know that my slave Tavi was emancipated? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Why? What circumstances enabled you to emancipate him? Rabban Gamliel said to him: I was able to do so, as I blinded his eye. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabban Gamliel: Your statement is nothing, and is not grounds for his emancipation, as he has no witnesses who can testify that you did this to him. The principle is that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. One pays a fine only based on the testimony of witnesses. The requirement to emancipate one’s slave after injuring his eye is a type of fine.

בבא קמא ע״ד ב:כ״א

הָא יֵשׁ לוֹ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב, וְשָׁמְעִינַן מִינַּהּ: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב!

Bava Kamma 74b:21

The Gemara infers from the baraita: But if Tavi had witnesses who could testify with regard to the injury, Rabban Gamliel would be obligated to emancipate him, even if they testify after Rabban Gamliel’s admission. And we can learn from this that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is liable, even if afterward witnesses come and testify with regard to his liability.

בבא קמא ע״ד ב:כ״ב

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּלָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אוֹדִי. וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַב בֵּית דִּין הֲוָה!

Bava Kamma 74b:22

Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥisda: This case involving Rabban Gamliel is different, as he admitted to his actions when he was not in the presence of a court. An admission not in the presence of a court does not exempt the perpetrator from paying the relevant fine. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehoshua was the president of the court, so it is likely that the encounter took place in court.

בבא קמא ע״ה א:א׳

שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין הֲוָה קָאֵי.

Bava Kamma 75a:1

The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehoshua was not present in court when Rabban Gamliel encountered him.

בבא קמא ע״ה א:ב׳

וְהָתַנְיָא, אָמַר לוֹ: אֵין בִּדְבָרֶיךָ כְּלוּם, שֶׁכְּבָר הוֹדִיתָ,

Bava Kamma 75a:2

The Gemara asks a question from a different source: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabban Gamliel: Your statement is nothing, as you have already admitted to inflicting the injury yourself? This indicates that even if witnesses would subsequently testify about the injury, Rabban Gamliel would not emancipate Tavi.

בבא קמא ע״ה א:ג׳

מַאי, לָאו תַּנָּאֵי הִיא – הַאי תַּנָּא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁכְּבָר אֵין לְךָ עֵדִים״, סָבַר: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב; וְהַאי תַּנָּא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁכְּבָר הוֹדִיתָ״, סָבַר: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר?

Bava Kamma 75a:3

The Gemara suggests: What, is it not the case that the difference between these two baraitot is a dispute between tanna’im? This tanna of the first baraita, who says that Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement was: As you have no witnesses, holds that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is liable to pay the fine if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability. And that tanna of the second baraita, who says that Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement was: As you have already admitted, holds that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability.

בבא קמא ע״ה א:ד׳

לָא; דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא, מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר; וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – הַאי תַּנָּא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁכְּבָר אֵין לְךָ עֵדִים״, סָבַר: חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין הֲוָה. וְהָךְ תַּנָּא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁכְּבָר הוֹדִיתָ״, סָבַר: בְּבֵית דִּין הֲוָה.

Bava Kamma 75a:4

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible to understand the baraitot differently. Everyone agrees that one who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability. And they disagree with regard to the following: This tanna, who says that Rabbi Yehoshua said: As you have no witnesses, holds that Rabbi Yehoshua was outside the court when Rabban Gamliel encountered him, and therefore his admission is disregarded. And that tanna, who says that Rabbi Yehoshua said: As you have already admitted, holds that Rabbi Yehoshua was in the court when Rabban Gamliel met him, so Rabban Gamliel’s admission is a valid admission.

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