Human-Divine Interactions / Covenants and Cross-Purposes in the Torah

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Vayishretzu is a term with a very particular connotation of its own. In the story of the creation, humans are not blessed with a cognate of vayishretzu, but God does use it in connection with the creatures of the sea (Gen. 1:20). More generally, the cognate noun of vayishretzu, namely sheretz, is used widely in scripture to denote “swarming animals” (e.g., Lev. 11:41). Such creatures reproduce in an especially uncontrolled and animalistic fashion, producing innumerable swarms of of spring. The verb vesharatz is used to describe how the Nile swarmed with the frogs which plagued Egypt (Ex. 7:28). There is something ofensive about this swarming fecundity; such creatures are not categorized as beasts or birds (Gen. 7:21) and the Torah’s dietary laws forbid consumption of insects and other vermin designated as sheratzim (Lev. 11: 23). This prohibition is not a mere formality; it expresses a distinct attitude of disgust toward such lowly creatures:

see Leviticus 11: 41-45

All of this points to a particular connotation implied by the use of the term vayishretzu in describing the growth of the Israelite human population. It is a word which is otherwise associated with swarms of what we would call relatively primitive and perhaps “yucky” animals. The narrator seems to be signaling to us that there was something animalistic about the growth of the Israelite population. Another passage appears to support this idea. When the midwives have to explain to Pharaoh why they failed to execute his order to kill the newborn male Israelites, they tell him that the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian women; they are vigorous [Hebrew: hayyot]. Before the midwife can come to them they have already given birth (Ex. 1:19). The JPS translation renders the word hayyot as vigorous but anyone acquainted with biblical Hebrew know that hayyot usually denotes undomesticated beasts.

The midwives’ alibi exploits Pharaoh’s bigoted acceptance of the ever-popular belief that ethnic minorities are animal-like and not quite human; the Israelite mothers give birth quickly and without assistance, like the beasts of the field. Israelite reproduction is untethered from the usual human cultural framework. The innumerable shratzim of the sea have no use for the learned obstetric interventions of midwives, and neither do the Israelite women whose fecundity is described with the term vayishretzu.

Human-Divine Interactions in the Hebrew ScripturesCovenants and Cross-Purposes, By Berel Dov Lerner 2024 p

The two books of the Hebrew Scriptures whose stories best speak to a world devoid of prophecy and supernatural miracles are named after women: the Book of Esther and the Book of Ruth. Perhaps this should not surprise us. Even in the books loaded with miraculous goings-on, it is the women who best actualize natural human agency. We have already seen how Rebekah intervened to ensure that Jacob would receive his father’s blessing; Tamar took action to become pregnant and successfully explained her decision when threatened by Judah (Gen. 38); the midwives undermined Pharaoh’s genocidal decree (Ex. 1:15–21); Moses’ mother hid him away and his sister Miriam arranged for his care with Pharaoh’s daughter (Ex. 2:1–9); and unlike Lot who lost his wits trying to protect his angelic guests (Gen. 19:8), when Rahab hosted Joshua’s spies in Jericho, she cleverly sent the men hunting them out on a wild goose chase (Josh. 2) and so on.

Lerner ibid. p. 148

Abraham is not directly disapproving a verdict already reached by God, rather he is intervening in God’s ongoing decision-making process. In fact, God has explicitly expressed interest in Abraham’s input by first asking Himself, Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do? (p. 15)

Abraham is made aware that whole cities are being judged. He does not grapple with theories of divine justice and the limitations of human understanding, but rather rushes in headlong to recklessly protect human lives. If he had hesitated in order to ponder the theological implications of of ering God moral advice, Abraham would have entertained what Bernard Williams’ famously called “one thought too many.” I will set aside these considerations and ask whether Abraham’s intervention on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah was not only laudable in emotional and psychological terms but also defensible in strictly philosophical terms. Even if it would have been “one thought too many” on Abraham’s part to ponder the theological justification of his intervention on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah, would that superfluous yet rigorous bit of cerebration ultimately endorse Abraham’s reaction? Could there be a legitimate role for human input in divine decision-making?

Human and Divine Moral Obligations

Here we return to the central philosophical thesis of this book.

I argue that humans and God can hold incompatible yet mutually justified positions on moral questions and, accordingly, that Abraham can justifiably disagree with God without implying that God is in the wrong. Furthermore, since God has entered a special covenant with Abraham – for I have singled him out – He is required to take notice of Abraham’s divergent moral point of view. In order to understand how this could be, first consider a moral disagreement between human parties that was the subject of much debate some years ago in Israel. On the 25th of June 2006, an Israeli soldier named Gilad Shalit was taken hostage by Hamas fighters who had reached his post through tunnels passing under the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Shalit’s parents called upon the Israeli government to secure his release “at any price.”15 Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel was willing to pay a heavy price for the release of Shalit, but not “at any price.”16 I have no intention of revisiting here the painful political debate that divided Israelis over the handling of negotiations for Shalit’s release, but rather mean to illustrate a philosophical point. Few people would condemn the Shalit parents for demanding that any price be paid for the release of their son. After all, they are his parents, and parents are expected to fi ght fiercely for the wellbeing of their children. A prime minister has other responsibilities. He or she is specifically charged with promoting the public good of the country and must think in terms of a “bigger picture” that cannot be sacrificed for the sake of a single captured soldier.

pp 28-29

This book addresses central theological issues and biblical narratives in terms of a bold thesis regarding relations between God and humans: that the actions of God and the actions of humans are informed by independently valid moral viewpoints which do not entirely overlap. The author suggests that God’s plans and actions refl ect the interests and obligations appropriate to His goal of creating a worthy world, but not necessarily our world. In contrast, humans must attend to special obligations grounded in their dependence on their existing created world and in their particular places in the human family. However, in acts of grace, God voluntarily takes on special obligations toward the created world by entering covenants with its inhabitants. When the covenant involves reciprocal obligations, as in the case of God’s covenant with Israel, it also recruits human beings to play conscious roles in God’s larger plans. These covenants frame the moral parameters of human-divine interaction and cooperation in which each party strains to negotiate conflicts between its original duties and the new obligations generated by covenants. The interpretive discussions in this book involve close readings of the Hebrew text and are also informed by rabbinic tradition and Western philosophy. They address major issues that are of relevance to scholars of the bible, theology, and philosophy of religion, including the relationship between divine commands and morality, God’s responsibility for human suff ering, God’s role in history and the intersection between politics and religion.

Berel Dov Lerner was born in Washington D.C. and is a member of Kibbutz Sheluhot in Israel’s Beit Shean Valley. He received a BA in social and behavioral sciences from Johns Hopkins University, an MA in philosophy from the University of Chicago, and a PhD in philosophy from Tel Aviv University. He also studied Judaism at Yeshivat HaKibbutz HaDati. Berel is currently an associate professor of philosophy at the Western Galilee College in Akko and also teaches at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. He is the author of many articles in philosophy and Jewish studies and of the book Rules, Magic, and Instrumental Reason (Routledge 2002).

His current research at the Herzl Institute deals with various aspects of agency in the Hebrew Scriptures, including the relationship between divine plans and human action as well as the roles of temporality and knowledge in human agency. This project involves close readings of much of Genesis, Exodus, and Ruth.