(יז) כָּל מַחֲלֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם. וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, אֵין סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם. אֵיזוֹ הִיא מַחֲלֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, זוֹ מַחֲלֹקֶת הִלֵּל וְשַׁמַּאי. וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, זוֹ מַחֲלֹקֶת קֹרַח וְכָל עֲדָתוֹ:
(17) Every dispute that is for the sake of Heaven, will in the end endure; But one that is not for the sake of Heaven, will not endure. Which is the controversy that is for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Hillel and Shammai. And which is the controversy that is not for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Korach and all his congregation.
(א) כָּל מַחֲלֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם. כְּלוֹמַר שֶׁאַנְשֵׁי הַמַּחֲלֹקֶת הַהִיא מִתְקַיְּמִים וְאֵינָם אוֹבְדִין, כְּמַחֲלֹקֶת הִלֵּל וְשַׁמַּאי שֶׁלֹּא אָבְדוּ לֹא תַּלְמִידֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וְלֹא תַּלְמִידֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל. אֲבָל קֹרַח וַעֲדָתוֹ אָבְדוּ. וַאֲנִי שָׁמַעְתִּי, פֵּרוּשׁ סוֹפָהּ, תַּכְלִיתָהּ הַמְבֻקָּשׁ מֵעִנְיָנָהּ. וְהַמַּחֲלֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, הַתַּכְלִית וְהַסּוֹף הַמְבֻקָּשׁ מֵאוֹתָהּ מַחֲלֹקֶת לְהַשִּׂיג הָאֱמֶת, וְזֶה מִתְקַיֵּם, כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ מִתּוֹךְ הַוִּכּוּחַ יִתְבָּרֵר הָאֱמֶת, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁנִּתְבָּאֵר בְּמַחֲלֹקֶת הִלֵּל וְשַׁמַּאי שֶׁהֲלָכָה כְּבֵית הִלֵּל. וּמַחֲלֹקֶת שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, תַּכְלִית הַנִּרְצֶה בָּהּ הִיא בַּקָּשַׁת הַשְּׂרָרָה וְאַהֲבַת הַנִּצּוּחַ, וְזֶה הַסּוֹף אֵינוֹ מִתְקַיֵּם, כְּמוֹ שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַחֲלֹקֶת קֹרַח וַעֲדָתוֹ שֶׁתַּכְלִית וְסוֹף כַּוָּנָתָם הָיְתָה בַּקָּשַׁת הַכָּבוֹד וְהַשְּׂרָרָה וְהָיוּ לְהֶפֶךְ:
(1) Every argument that is for [the sake of] heaven's name, it is destined (literally, its end is) to endure: That is to say that the [parties to] the argument are destined to endure and not perish, as with the argument between Hillel and Shammai, [whereby] neither the students of the School of Hillel nor the students of the School of Shammai perished. But Korach and his congregation perished. And I heard the explanation of “its end” is its purpose that is sought from its subject. And [with] the argument which is for the sake of Heaven, the purpose and aim that is sought from that argument is to arrive at the truth, and this endures; like that which they said, "From a dispute the truth will be clarified," and as it became elucidated from the argument between Hillel and Shammai - that the law was like the school of Hillel. And [with] argument which is not for the sake of Heaven, its desired purpose is to achieve power and the love of contention, and its end will not endure; as we found in the argument of Korach and his congregation - that their aim and ultimate intent was to achieve honor and power, and the opposite was [achieved].
(3) They combined against Moses and Aaron and said to them, “You have gone too far! For all the community are holy, all of them, and ה' is in their midst. Why then do you raise yourselves above ה’s congregation?”
§ The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: “God has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God” (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “Is not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.
וְאַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶבְיָתָר לְאֵלִיָּהוּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קָא עָבֵיד הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עָסֵיק בְּפִילֶגֶשׁ בַּגִּבְעָה. וּמַאי קָאָמַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֶבְיָתָר בְּנִי כָּךְ הוּא אוֹמֵר, יוֹנָתָן בְּנִי כָּךְ הוּא אוֹמֵר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חַס וְשָׁלוֹם, וּמִי אִיכָּא סְפֵיקָא קַמֵּי שְׁמַיָּא?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ דִּבְרֵי אֱלֹקִים חַיִּים הֵן – ...
And Rabbi Evyatar found Elijah the prophet and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? Elijah said to him: He is currently engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Gibeah. Rabbi Evyatar asked him: And what is He saying about it? Elijah said to him that God is saying the following: Evyatar, My son, says this and Yonatan, My son, says that. It is seen here that God saw fit to cite the statement of Rabbi Evyatar. Rabbi Evyatar said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? Doesn’t God know what happened? Why does He mention both opinions? Elijah said to him: Both these and those are the words of the living God, i.e., both incidents happened. ...
(25) [nonetheless,] you should know that permission is given to explain the meaning of the verses by the ways of investigation and logic, even if the first [scholars of the Mishnaic period] came before us and made a different sense of it, since there are 'seventy faces to the Torah.' And we are not warned not to deviate from the words of the first ones, except with explanations that would result in a change in the law. And for this [reason], you will find that the Amoraim (scholars of the Talmudic period who came later) do not have the power to disagree with Tannaim (scholars of the Mishnaic period) concerning the 'statutes of God,' but concerning the sense and meaning of the verses, we have found that they explain [it] in a different way in several places.
The Jewish tradition—the tradition of the argumentative Jew—is a long and great challenge to the consensualist mentality. It repudiates, sometimes in theory, always in practice, the cult of unanimity. It displays an almost erotic relationship to controversy. ... In the Jewish tradition, disagreement is not only real, it is also ideal—at least in the unredeemed world, which is the only world we know. ... Minority opinions are not obsolete opinions: They are preserved alongside majority opinions because their reasoning may one day be useful again. Arguments that are adjudicated practically remain alive theoretically. Indeed, both sides of a particular argument may be “the words of the living God.” (Leon Wieseltier, The Argumentative Jew)
Learning to live with disagreement, moreover, is a way of learning to live with each other. Etymologically, the term machloket refers to separation and division, but the culture of machloket is not in itself separatist and divisive. This is in part because all the parties to any particular disagreement share certain metaphysical and historical assumptions about the foundations of their identity. But beyond those general axioms, the really remarkable feature of the Jewish tradition of machloket is that it is itself a basis for community. The community of contention, the contentious community, is not as paradoxical as it may seem. The parties to a disagreement are members of the disagreement; they belong to the group that wrestles together with the same perplexity, and they wrestle together for the sake of the larger community to which they all belong, the community that needs to know how Jews should behave and live. A quarrel is evidence of coexistence. The rabbinical tradition is full of rival authorities and rival schools—it owes a lot of its excitement to those grand and even bitter altercations—but the rivalries play themselves out within the unified framework of the shared search. There is dissent without dissension, and yet things change. Intellectual discord, if it is practiced with methodological integrity, is compatible with social peace. (Leon Wieseltier, The Argumentative Jew)
"Sometimes it is our duty to make a quarrel . . . For the sake of truth we are not only permitted to make a quarrel, we are obligated to make a quarrel.” (Rabbi Moses Schick, Hungary, 19th century.)