כִּֽי־יִהְיֶ֥ה רִיב֙ בֵּ֣ין אֲנָשִׁ֔ים וְנִגְּשׁ֥וּ אֶל־הַמִּשְׁפָּ֖ט וּשְׁפָט֑וּם וְהִצְדִּ֙יקוּ֙ אֶת־הַצַּדִּ֔יק וְהִרְשִׁ֖יעוּ אֶת־הָרָשָֽׁע׃ וְהָיָ֛ה אִם־בִּ֥ן הַכּ֖וֹת הָרָשָׁ֑ע וְהִפִּיל֤וֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט֙ וְהִכָּ֣הוּ לְפָנָ֔יו כְּדֵ֥י רִשְׁעָת֖וֹ בְּמִסְפָּֽר׃
When there is a dispute between two parties and they take it to court, and a decision is rendered declaring the one in the right and the other in the wrong—if the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have them lie down and shall supervise the giving of lashes, by count, as warranted by the offense.
(The above rendering comes from the RJPS translation, an adaptation of the NJPS translation. Before accounting for this rendering, I will analyze the plain sense of the Hebrew term containing אִישׁ—in this case, its plural form: אֲנָשִׁים—by employing a situation-oriented construal as outlined in this introduction, pp. 11–16.)
Prototypically, the label אֲנָשִׁים profiles its referent in terms of the depicted situation; that is, it relates the depicted situation’s key participant to that situation. Such is its function here.
By their very nature, almost all so-called male personal nouns (such as אֲנָשִׁים) implicitly include women when they are used to make reference to a type in the absence of gender contrast, as here. Subsequent co-references are masculine simply for the sake of gender concord; the scope of reference remains gender inclusive. (This feature of the language is demonstrated by biblical narratives in which the characters confirm such inclusion by their words and actions; Stein 2008, Stein 2013.) Thus women are in view by default unless the topic under discussion is restricted to men by convention, or if such a restriction is explicitly stated.
In this case, the text’s ancient Israelite audience surely would have known of women as disputants because of the friction naturally arising during daily life. In that society, people were “probably more often with people of their own gender during much of the work day” (Carol Meyers, pers. comm.); this is inferred from what anthropologists know of other societies with social structures and economies similar to that of ancient Israel. And the Bible’s portrayals are consistent with this picture: the narrator of a story set in Haran mentions “the time when women come out to draw water,” Gen 24:11; the female speaker in Song of Songs repeatedly addresses her remarks to the “daughters of Jerusalem,” expecting them to be familiar with her concerns; the book of Ruth highlights a larger community of women around its main female protagonists; 1:8; 4:11–12, 17. For women as parties to judicial procedures, see Gen 38:25; Deut 21:19–20; 22:15; 22:25–27; 2 Samuel 14; 1 Kings 3:16–28; 2 Kings 8:3–6.
Furthermore, the punishment of flogging did not necessarily exclude women. Adele Berlin notes the practice elsewhere in the ancient Near East: “There are at least two cases of women being flogged, in the Middle Assyrian laws, parag 7 and 40” (pers. comm.). Another (later) datum is that the Sages, for whom women’s modesty was a paramount concern, nonetheless considered both women and men liable to be flogged (Mishnah Makkot 3:14).
In short, we lack clear evidence that the parties involved would have been construed as exclusively male. Women are not definitely excluded from view, as would be necessary for a gendered English rendering.
As for rendering into English, there is no warrant for rendering in gendered terms. The NJPS “men” is nowadays construed as gendered. The revised rendering is not.
Rendering as “parties” is not to claim that this is the meaning of אֲנָשִׁים per se, but rather that in the context of a lawsuit, this role term is nowadays the closest gender-inclusive English equivalent to the Hebrew situating noun. See further my comment at Josh 10:24.
(Meanwhile, the word “two” has been added for the sake of English idiom, to clarify the nature of a רִיב “dispute.” Similarly, because the NJPS phrase “go to law” is not idiomatic in contemporary American English, it has been replaced with “take it to court.”)