"מחלוקת לשם שמים" או "כיום שנעשה בו עגל"? טיבה של מחלוקת בית הלל ובית שמאי?

Every dispute that is for the sake of Heaven, will in the end endure; But one that is not for the sake of Heaven, will not endure. Which is the controversy that is for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Hillel and Shammai. And which is the controversy that is not for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Korah and all his congregation.

“And who is like Your people, Israel, one nation in the land?” (I Chronicles 17:21). The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya also commenced his lecture and taught: It is written: “The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails well fastened are those that are composed in collections; they are given from one shepherd” (Ecclesiastes 12:11). Why are matters of Torah compared to a goad? To tell you that just as this goad directs the cow to her furrow to bring forth sustenance for life to the world, so too the words of Torah direct those who study them from the paths of death to the paths of life. The Gemara asks: If so, derive the following from that same analogy: Just as this goad is movable and not rigid, so too matters of Torah are movable in accordance with circumstance and are not permanent. Therefore, the verse states: “Nails,” which are permanent. The Gemara further asks: If so, one can explain as follows: Just as this nail is diminished in size and does not expand, as it wastes away over time, so too matters of Torah are gradually diminished and do not expand. Therefore, the verse states: “Well fastened [netuim].” Just as this plant [neti’a] flourishes and multiplies, so too matters of Torah flourish and multiply. “Those that are composed in collections [ba’alei asufot]”: These are Torah scholars who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. There are often debates among these groups, as some of these Sages render an object or person ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah when it contains so many different opinions? The verse states that they are all “given from one shepherd.” One God gave them; one leader, i.e., Moses, said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He, as it is written: “And God spoke all these words” (Exodus 20:1). The plural form “words” indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments. Since the Sages invariably utilize the Torah itself or the statements of the prophets as the sources for their opinions, there is a certain unity to the study of Torah, despite the numerous explanations and applications. So too you, the student, make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. When Rabbi Yehoshua heard these interpretations, he said to them in these words: No generation is considered orphaned, i.e. without a leader, if Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya dwells among it.

And why do they record the opinions of Shammai and Hillel for naught? To teach the following generations that a man should not [always] persist in his opinion, for behold, the fathers of the world did not persist in their opinion.

And Rabbi Ḥelbo says: A person must always be careful about sustaining the honor of his wife, as blessing is found in a person’s house only because of his wife, as it is stated in allusion to this: “And he dealt well with Abram for her sake, and he had sheep and oxen” (Genesis 12:16). And that is what Rava said to the residents of Meḥoza, where he lived: Honor your wives, so that you will become rich. § Apropos the topic of verbal mistreatment, we learned in a mishna there (Kelim 5:10): If one cut an earthenware oven widthwise into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, Rabbi Eliezer deems it ritually pure. Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, as it is functionally a complete oven. And this is known as the oven of akhnai. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake, which often forms a coil when at rest, and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day, when they discussed this matter, Rabbi Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. After failing to convince the Rabbis logically, Rabbi Eliezer said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward and began flowing in the opposite direction. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? The Gemara relates: The walls did not fall because of the deference due Rabbi Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due Rabbi Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with Rabbi Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: It is written: “It is not in heaven” (Deuteronomy 30:12). The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase “It is not in heaven” in this context? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai, in the Torah: “After a majority to incline” (Exodus 23:2). Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara relates: Years after, Rabbi Natan encountered Elijah the prophet and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time, when Rabbi Yehoshua issued his declaration? Elijah said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. The Sages said: On that day, the Sages brought all the ritually pure items deemed pure by the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the oven and burned them in fire, and the Sages reached a consensus in his regard and ostracized him. And the Sages said: Who will go and inform him of his ostracism? Rabbi Akiva, his beloved disciple, said to them: I will go, lest an unseemly person go and inform him in a callous and offensive manner, and he would thereby destroy the entire world.

It was taught in a baraita: There was a distinguished disciple at Yavne who could with his incisive intellect purify the creeping animal, explicitly deemed ritually impure by the Torah, adducing one hundred and fifty reasons in support of his argument. Ravina said: I too will deliberate and purify it employing the following reasoning: And just as a snake that kills people and animals and thereby increases ritual impurity in the world, as a corpse imparts impurity through contact, through being carried, and by means of a tent, is ritually pure and transmits no impurity, a creeping animal that does not kill and does not increase impurity in the world, all the more so should it be pure. The Gemara rejects this: And it is not so; that is not a valid a fortiori argument, as it can be refuted. A snake is performing a mere act of a thorn. A thorn causes injury and even death; nevertheless, it is not ritually impure. The same applies to a snake, and therefore this a fortiori argument is rejected. Rabbi Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. Ultimately, a Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and those are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara asks: Since both these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to have the halakha established in accordance with their opinion? The reason is that they were agreeable and forbearing, showing restraint when affronted, and when they taught the halakha they would teach both their own statements and the statements of Beit Shammai. Moreover, when they formulated their teachings and cited a dispute, they prioritized the statements of Beit Shammai to their own statements, in deference to Beit Shammai.

Reish Lakish said to him: Do you hold that Beit Shammai actually acted in accordance with their own statement? Beit Shammai did not in fact act in accordance with their own statement, as the dispute was merely theoretical. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Beit Shammai certainly did act in accordance with their opinion. The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner. The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority. And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority. And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

Even though Beit Shammai were divided against Beit Hillel regarding rival wives and sisters, and regarding women of doubtful marital status, and regarding old bills of divorce, and regarding one who betroths a woman with the equivalent of a perutah, and regarding [the marital status of] one who divorces his wife and then lodges with her in an inn, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel from Beit Shammai. Rather, they conducted themselves with truth and peace between them, as it is said (Zech. 8:19), "Love truth and peace." [Similarly,] even though these prohibited and those permitted [in matters of purity], they did not refrain from the preparation of ritually pure foods [using the vessels of the other], to fulfill what is said (Prov. 21:2), "All the ways of a man seem meritorious in his own eyes, but God measures the hearts." Rabbi Shimon says, they would not refrain in matters of doubt; however, [they would refrain] in matters of certainty. The halacha is always according to the words of Beit Hillel. One who desires to be stringent on himself to conduct himself according to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and according to the stringencies of Beit Hillel, concerning him it is said (Ecc. 2:14), "A fool walks in darkness." One who grabs onto the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the leniencies of Beit Hillel is an evildoer; rather if [one conducts himself] according to the words of Beit Shammai, [one does so] according to their leniencies and according to their stringencies, [and] if according to the words of Beit Hillel, [one does so] according to their leniencies and according to their stringencies.

The Sages taught in a baraita that Beit Hillel say: One may recite Shema in any situation: Standing and reciting, sitting and reciting, reclining and reciting, walking and reciting and even working and reciting. And in the Tosefta an incident is related where two tanna’im, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who were both disciples of Beit Hillel, were reclining at a meal in one place together with their students, and Rabbi Yishmael was reclined as was the customary dining position, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was upright. When the time to recite the evening Shema arrived, Rabbi Elazar reclined to recite Shema in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, while Rabbi Yishmael sat upright to recite Shema. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya appeared to take offense, and said to Rabbi Yishmael: Yishmael, my brother, I will tell you a parable to which this is similar. It is comparable to a situation where one to whom people say as a compliment: Your beard is full and suits you. That man says to them: May it be against those who shave and destroy their beards, i.e., the only reason I grow my beard is to irritate those who cut their own (Rashba). You are the same. As long as I am upright, you are reclined, and now when I reclined lauding your conduct and emulating you, you sat upright as if to demonstrate that whatever I do, you do the opposite. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: I acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, according to whom one may recite Shema in any position, while you acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. I am the one who acted in accordance with the halakha. And furthermore, I was concerned lest the students see your conduct and establish the halakha for generations accordingly. It was therefore necessary for me to demonstrate that there is no obligation to do so. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And furthermore? Why was it necessary for Rabbi Yishmael to add additional justification for his actions when the reason that he acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel was sufficient? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to add this reason, as if you say: Beit Hillel also hold that one is permitted to recite Shema while reclining and Rabbi Yishmael could have remained reclining even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, but this only applies when one had already been reclining originally, in which case it is like any other position. However, here, since until now he had been upright, and now he is reclined, the students will say: Conclude from this, that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. Due to the concern that the students might see and establish the halakha for generations in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, it was necessary for Rabbi Yishmael to sit upright. Rav Yeḥezkel taught: One who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai has acted appropriately and is not in violation of the halakha. One who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel acted appropriately as well. According to this opinion, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that one who acted in accordance with the opinion of the other fulfilled his obligation. Although the halakha was ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, Beit Hillel would agree that one who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai fulfilled his obligation. However, Rav Yosef said: One who acts in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai has done nothing and must repeat Shema in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, as we learned in the mishna with regard to the halakhot of a sukka: One who had his head and most of his body in the sukka, and his table upon which he was eating inside the house, Beit Shammai invalidate his action, as he is liable to be drawn after the table and end up eating outside the sukka. And Beit Hillel validate his action, since his head and most of his body remain inside the sukka.

The Gemara explains: Actually, Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, and this is not a novelty with regard to their basic dispute. Instead, the statement comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is not a mamzer; rather, one is a mamzer only if he is born of a union punishable by karet. § The Gemara returns to the initial question of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their own opinion. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to several cases, nevertheless, they did not refrain from marrying women from each other’s communities. The cases with regard to which they disagreed include rival wives, and sisters, i.e., if two sisters had been married to two brothers and simultaneously became obligated in levirate marriage, Beit Hillel prohibit both in levirate marriage, and if they violated the prohibition and married regardless, they require a divorce. By contrast, Beit Shammai permit them to remain married. Furthermore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to an outdated bill of divorce that had been written but not delivered. Beit Shammai maintain that if the husband and wife continued to live together after the writing of the bill of divorce, the same bill of divorce can still be used later, whereas Beit Hillel dispute this. And they likewise disagreed with regard to an uncertain married woman, i.e., whether a minor who was actually married, and not merely betrothed, may perform refusal. And they also disagreed with regard to one who divorces his wife and later she lodged together with him at an inn, as to whether or not this is sufficient grounds for assuming that they remarried. Additionally, they disagreed with regard to the issue of betrothal by money and with the equivalent value of money, and by a peruta or with the equivalent value of a peruta. According to Beit Shammai, the minimal amount of money effective for betrothal is a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar, whereas Beit Hillel maintain that even the less valuable peruta or its equivalent is sufficient. Despite the fact that these halakhot entail important ramifications depending on whether or not these women were married or fit for marriage, or whether their offspring are fit for marriage, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. This serves to teach you that they practiced affection and camaraderie between them, to fulfill that which is stated: “Love truth and peace” (Zechariah 8:19). Rabbi Shimon says: They did refrain in the certain cases, but they did not refrain in the uncertain cases. In other words, Beit Hillel were not worried that any ordinary woman from Beit Shammai might be one of those of uncertain status. The Gemara infers from the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they refrained in the certain cases. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, why did they refrain from marriage? The Gemara replies: And how can you understand it that way, that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion? Even if they acted in accordance with their opinion, granted that Beit Hillel refrained from marrying into Beit Shammai, as those rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are liable to receive karet and their children are mamzerim according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, why did Beit Shammai refrain from marrying the offspring of rival wives of Beit Hillel? The parents are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and therefore their children are fit. The Gemara answers as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said with regard to a different matter: This halakha was necessary not for the children of the rival wife, but only for the rival wife herself. Here too, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. The halakha was not taught with regard to the children of the rival wives; rather, it is referring only to the rival wives. The Gemara asks further: And in what way are uncertain cases different from the certain cases, such as forbidden rival wives? If you say that certain cases are undoubtedly prohibited in the opinion of Beit Hillel, the cases involving uncertain circumstances, e.g., one who divorced his wife and then stayed with her in the same inn, are also prohibited. Even if Beit Hillel render these cases prohibited only due to some uncertainty, the ruling is the same. The Gemara answers: Do not say: In the uncertain cases, i.e., that the halakha involved doubtful circumstances. Rather, say: From the unspecified case. In other words, barring clear knowledge of an uncertain betrothal within a specific family, they would take women from that family in marriage. The reason is that Beit Shammai would notify Beit Hillel of the prohibition according to their opinion, and they would refrain from the marriage. If there was no notification, this was a clear sign that no doubt was involved in this case at all. The Gemara asks: But if so, what does this come to teach us? Is it that they had relations of affection and camaraderie between them, i.e., that each trusted that the other side would never cause them to err with regard to something they held to be prohibited? This is the same as the first clause of the baraita. What is Rabbi Shimon adding by his statement? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that the entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is not a dispute between two Sages. Rather, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion elucidates the earlier statement. § The Gemara offers an alternative resolution: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: How should one act with regard to this halakha of rival wives? In what form should it become widespread among the Jewish people? If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and permit a rival wife in levirate marriage, the offspring will be a mamzer according to the statement of Beit Hillel. If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel and grant full exemption to the rival wives, the offspring will be of flawed lineage according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as he is the child of a woman prohibited in marriage by a regular prohibition. Although he is not a mamzer, his lineage is nevertheless defective. Instead, let us enact a general decree for rival wives that they should perform ḥalitza and not enter into levirate marriage. If they act in this manner, they will be permitted to marry others and the problem will be solved according to all opinions. They were unable to finalize the matter according to the proposition raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri before times of trouble arrived. Due to the outbreak of war they were unable to gather together to vote and establish an accepted halakhic ruling. Sometime later, when they returned to discuss the issue, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to the other Sages: What shall we do with those earlier rival wives from now onward? Since in the meantime some rival wives had entered into levirate marriage, if we issue a collective ruling that rival wives may not do so, their children will be declared mamzerim. Therefore, it is better not to establish this halakha at all. The Gemara analyzes this episode in relation to the matter at hand. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their own opinion, this is the meaning of what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do? Since these rival wives had already entered into levirate marriage, it was impossible to change the status of their children retroactively. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, what is the meaning of: What shall we do? If Beit Shammai did not act upon their ruling, they never actually permitted a yavam to take a rival wife in levirate marriage. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This amendment was necessary, not for the benefit of the children of rival wives, as Beit Shammai never in fact acted on their ruling; rather, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. If these rival wives married others, in the opinion of Beit Shammai their marriages were flawed, as they did not perform ḥalitza. And as for the question: What shall we do, this is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is saying: With regard to those rival wives who were entirely exempt according to Beit Hillel, what should we do with them according to Beit Shammai, as these rival wives had already married others without performing ḥalitza? The Gemara elaborates: If you say let them perform ḥalitza, they will be repulsive to their husbands, as it will seem to the husband that the woman he has been living with for some time suddenly requires a permit for marriage. And if you would say, let them be repulsive to their husbands, as that is not our concern, this is not the case, as the Torah says: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17). § The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another source, as Rabbi Tarfon said: I yearn for the following scenario: When shall my daughter’s rival wife come before me and I will marry her? In other words, in this hypothetical case I would act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai and take her in levirate marriage. This statement indicates that those who held by the traditions of Beit Shammai did indeed act upon their opinion. The Gemara amends this statement. Say: And I will marry her off, i.e., I shall act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and marry her off to others. The Gemara asks: But he said: I yearn, and if he meant that he would follow the ruling of Beit Hillel, which is the common practice, what is the novelty of Rabbi Tarfon’s statement? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Tarfon comes to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that all rival wives perform ḥalitza. Rabbi Tarfon yearned for an opportunity to demonstrate that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident involving Rabban Gamliel’s daughter, who was married to Abba, his brother, and Abba died childless, and Rabban Gamliel entered into levirate marriage with her rival wife. This is apparently conclusive proof that the rival wife of a daughter may enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it that way? Was Rabban Gamliel among the disciples of Beit Shammai? In fact, Rabban Gamliel, who was a descendant of Hillel himself, certainly followed the opinion of Beit Hillel. Rather, the case of Rabban Gamliel’s daughter is different, as she was a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], and therefore the prohibition against marrying her rival wife does not apply, as explicitly stated in the mishna. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the same baraita: Others say that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was an aylonit, it can be derived by inference that the first tanna holds that she was not an aylonit. The Gemara answers: The dispute between the tanna’im was not about whether or not she was an aylonit, as she certainly was. Rather, the practical difference between them is whether he knew that she was an aylonit at the time of marriage and decided to marry her regardless. Some maintain in general that if the husband was aware of her condition prior to marriage, her rival wife is forbidden, but if he did not know about her status, the rival wife is permitted. And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a different case, that of one who married and ultimately divorced. This is referring to an issue discussed above of whether a woman is considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation simply by virtue of her marriage to the specific man or whether she must be married to him at the time when the mitzva of levirate obligation takes effect, i.e., at the time of the brother’s death. And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a case where there is a condition in sexual relations. In other words, the first tanna holds that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was married only conditionally, and since the condition was never fulfilled the marriage was nullified. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could marry the other wife regardless of his daughter’s status as an aylonit, as she was never married to his brother at all. However, according to the other tanna, even if the marriage was dependent upon a condition that was not fulfilled, because the man engaged in sexual relations with her the act of intercourse itself serves to nullify the condition. Accordingly, he maintains that the only reason Rabban Gamliel could enter into levirate marriage with his daughter’s rival wife was not because of the condition, but due to the fact that his daughter was an aylonit. Whichever explanation is accepted, this case provides no proof with regard to the issue of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their ruling. § Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection against those who claim that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion. It is taught in a mishna: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who collected an etrog on the first of the month of Shevat and performed with it two tenths. In other words, he separated two tithes from the fruit, as though it belonged to two different tithing years. He removed both the second tithe and the poor man’s tithe at the same time, two tithes that should not be separated in the same year. The mishna explains: One tithe he removed in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, who hold that the new year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat, which means that the etrog required tithing according to the regulations of the upcoming year. And one tithe was in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, who hold the new year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat, and therefore the etrog required tithing in accordance with the previous year. The Gemara infers: Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, as Rabbi Akiva took care to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Shammai. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva was uncertain as to his tradition, and he did not know if Beit Hillel said that the New Year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat or if they said it is on the fifteenth of Shevat. He did not act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai at all; rather, he sought to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel but was uncertain about their opinion on this matter. § Mar Zutra raised an objection to this issue from a different source: There was an incident in which the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth to a son. In Shammai’s opinion this newborn baby is immediately obligated in the mitzva to sit in a sukka, and he therefore removed the mortar [ma’aziva] covering the ceiling and he placed sukka covering over the bed for the minor. Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara answers: There is no proof from there, as anyone watching would say that he did it merely to increase the air. Since people would not necessarily think that he removed the mortar as a ruling of halakha, this behavior is not considered the formation of a faction. Mar Zutra raised a further objection: There was an incident involving the Yehu water trough in Jerusalem, which had a hole that connected it to a ritual bath, and all the ritual purifications in Jerusalem were performed in it, i.e., people immersed their utensils in this trough. And Beit Shammai sent messengers and they widened the opening in the water trough, as in the opinion of Beit Shammai the hole was not large enough for the trough to be considered connected to the adjacent ritual bath as Beit Shammai say: The two areas are not connected unless the majority of it is opened. In other words, they require the major portion of the barrier between the ritual bath and the nearby trough to be open. And we learned in a mishna: Beit Hillel hold that a joining of ritual baths is effective if the hole has the width of the tube used to pour water in and out of a wineskin, and in its open space there is enough room for about two fingers that can return to their place. In other words, if it is possible to insert into the hole two fingers that can move around on all sides, the cavity is sufficiently large to be considered a connection. According to Beit Shammai, however, the hole must open up the majority of the barrier between the two areas. If so, conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara rejects this contention: There, anyone watching would say that he did it to increase the water flow, and he did not intend to change the halakha. Rather, they would think that he widened the water trough only because there was not enough water flow. § The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: When I studied Torah with Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani, who was a disciple of Beit Shammai, I saw that he would eat dry bread in salt in years of drought. I went and informed my father of his meager meal, and he said to me: Take olives for him, and I took for him some olives. Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that they were moist with the liquid that oozes from olives, which renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Concerned that they had already become ritually impure, he said to me: I do not eat olives. He spoke politely and stated that he did not eat olives because he did not wish to embarrass his benefactor by disclosing that he feared they had become ritually impure. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok continued his account. I went and informed my father. He said to me: Go and say to him that the barrel containing the olives was perforated, but it was clogged by sediments in the oil and therefore some moisture remained inside. However, due to the presence of the hole, the olives were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. And we learned this in a mishna: With regard to a barrel of preserved olives, Beit Shammai say it does not need to be perforated, as the juice issuing from the olives does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel say that it does need to be perforated, as they maintain that the juice of olives is considered oil and it therefore renders the olives susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel concede that if the barrel was perforated and subsequently clogged by sediments it is ritually pure, despite the moisture on the olives. Since liquids render food susceptible to ritual impurity only if they were placed on them intentionally, the hole in the barrel clearly shows that one did not intend for the juice to be there. By boring a hole in the barrel he has rendered it obvious that he did not desire the presence of the olive juices, and therefore it does not matter that the hole became blocked. The baraita adds: And although Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani was a disciple of Shammai, he always acted only in accordance with the statements of Beit Hillel. The Gemara infers: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani’s greatness, i.e., he is praised for acting in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own rulings, what is the greatness and uniqueness of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani? From here it can be inferred that Beit Shammai generally did act in accordance with their opinions. § The Gemara adds: Come and hear a different proof. They asked Rabbi Yehoshua: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said to them: It is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They continued to ask him: And in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: Why are you inserting my head between two great mountains, i.e., between two great disputing opinions, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? I fear lest these two mountains break my skull. However, I shall testify to you about two great families that were in Jerusalem, the Beit Tzevo’im family who came from the town of Ben Akhmai, and the Beit Kofai family from the town of Ben Mekoshesh: They were the descendants of rival wives who married others, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and from them came High Priests who served on the altar. Accordingly, I can testify that this was the accepted halakhic practice throughout the generations. The Gemara infers from this statement: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is why Rabbi Yehoshua said: I fear, since a conclusive halakhic ruling would mean that certain children are mamzerim, and the descendants of that family might take vengeance upon him. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinions, why did he say: I fear? The Gemara retorts: And even if Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their rulings, what is the reason that he said: I fear? Didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua say that in his opinion a mamzer is only someone born from a union of those liable to receive the court-imposed capital punishments, not from those liable to receive karet. If so, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, the children of rival wives who entered into levirate marriage would not be mamzerim at all, and therefore he had no reason to fear reprisals. The Gemara answers: Even if this is the case, nevertheless, he had something to fear, as, although the child of a rival wife would not be a mamzer, he would nevertheless be of flawed lineage and disqualified from the priesthood. The Gemara adds that this can be derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a widow: Just as in the case of a widow, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is forbidden in marriage only to a High Priest and not to any other man, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed, as he is disqualified from the priesthood, the son of this rival wife should certainly be disqualified from the priesthood, as her prohibition applies equally to all, even regular Israelites. § Incidentally, the Gemara notes a problem with the above discussion: They asked Rabbi Yehoshua about rival wives, and he answered them about the children of rival wives. He did not refer to the rival wives themselves. The Gemara explains: They asked him questions on two matters: First, what is the halakha with regard to rival wives? And if you say that the halakha in the case of rival wives is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and they are exempt, what is the halakha according to Beit Shammai in the case of the children of rival wives who, following Beit Hillel, married others without ḥalitza? The Gemara asks: What difference does this question make? Since Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel, why even discuss Beit Shammai’s opinion on this matter? The Gemara explains: His answer enables one to resolve a different issue, the case of a child of one who remarries his divorcée according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. Is the child of a divorcée who remarried her previous husband after she had been married to another man fit or disqualified from the priesthood? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say the following an a fortiori inference: And just as with regard to a widow married to a High Priest, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is prohibited in marriage only to a High Priest, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed as he is disqualified from the priesthood, so too, in the case of this rival wife, whose prohibition applies equally to all men, is it not right that her son should be of flawed lineage? Or perhaps this comparison can be refuted: What about the fact that a widow is different, as she herself is disqualified from marrying a priest, i.e., if a High Priest has intercourse with her she is disqualified from marrying any member of the entire priesthood, including common priests, whereas a remarried divorcée herself is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood? And Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I fear that if I issue a decisive ruling concerning rival wives this might lead to a conflict, whereas with regard to the children of rival wives, I testify to you that they are not disqualified, since, as stated, their descendants served as High Priests. § The Gemara states: Come and hear another source that indicates Beit Shammai did act upon their opinions: In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, the rival wife of a daughter was permitted to the brothers. Conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara summarizes these proofs: Indeed, conclude from these sources that Beit Shammai did put their rulings into practice. § Since the last source is only part of a larger incident, the Gemara cites the matter itself. In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas the Sages permitted the rival wife of a daughter to the brothers. In other words, it became known that Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas deemed permitted a daughter’s rival wife. And this matter was difficult in the eyes of the Rabbis because he was a great Sage and his decision in favor of Beit Shammai carried great weight. They could not approach him immediately, as he was very old and his eyes had dimmed so much that he was incapable of coming to the study hall. They said: And who will go and notify him that this matter requires clarification? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I will go. They asked: And who shall go after him? They selected Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who was one of the great Sages of the generation, notwithstanding his youth. They further inquired: And who after him? Rabbi Akiva. They went and stood at the entrance of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas’s house. His maidservant entered and said to him: Rabbi, the Sages of Israel have come to you. He said to her: Let them enter, and they entered. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas grabbed Rabbi Yehoshua, with whom he was already acquainted, and sat him on a bed of gold, as Rabbi Dosa was extremely wealthy. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He asked him to call the other Sage as well, as it is a mark of respect when speaking to a great scholar to call every other Sage his disciple. He said to him: Who is it? Rabbi Yehoshua replied: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Dosa said: And does our colleague Azarya have a son? Due to his old age and prolonged absence from the study hall he had not heard of him. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas recited this verse about Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: “I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread” (Psalms 37:25). He interpreted this verse to mean that the son of a Torah scholar also becomes a Torah scholar. He grabbed him and sat him on a bed of gold. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He said to him: Who is that? He said to him: Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Dosa said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Even Rabbi Dosa had heard of Rabbi Akiva’s reputation as a great man. Sit, my son, sit. May the likes of you multiply in Israel. Out of courtesy, they did not wish to broach the subject immediately. Rather, they began to encircle him with deliberations on different halakhot, until they came to the case of the rival wife of a daughter. They said to him: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said that it is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They asked him: According to whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. They said to him: But didn’t they say in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? He said to them: Did you hear that Dosa ben Harkinas issued this ruling, or did you hear that it was stated by ben Harkinas? They said to him: On your life, Rabbi, we heard simply ben Harkinas. He said to them: If so, it is no wonder, as I have a younger brother who is the firstborn of the Satan, i.e., he is extremely sharp and as brazen as a demon. And his name is Yonatan, and he is among the disciples of Shammai. It is he who issued this ruling. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas added: And beware that he not batter you with halakhot in this matter, as he has with him three hundred proofs with regard to the rival wife of a daughter that she is permitted. However, you need not worry about the issue itself, as I call as witnesses before me the heavens and the earth that on this very mortar, which was preserved in my house due to its historical importance, Haggai the prophet sat, and I have a tradition that he said three matters of halakha: First, that the rival wife of a daughter is forbidden. Second, that the halakhic rulings for the territories of Ammon and Moab in Transjordan, although similar to those of Eretz Yisrael, are not exactly the same, as their residents tithe the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year. The total abandonment of fields in the seventh year does not apply in Ammon and Moab, as they are not part of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, in those areas one must bring the poor man’s tithe to the paupers of Eretz Yisrael, as there are no tithes in Eretz Yisrael in the Sabbatical Year. Lastly, Haggai testified: And one accepts converts from the Karduyin and the Tarmodim, without concern that there might be Jews mingled among them, which could render them mamzerim and prohibited from entering the community. The Sage taught: When they entered, they all entered through one entrance. When they left, they left through three entrances, in an effort to try to find Rabbi Dosa’s brother. Rabbi Akiva encountered him. Yonatan ben Harkinas raised against him all of his objections to the opinion of Beit Hillel, and he withstood him, i.e., Rabbi Akiva was able to respond to all of them. Yonatan ben Harkinas grew angry and said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Be happy that you have merited a great name, and yet you have not yet reached the level of cattle herders. Cattle herders were generally simple individuals who were not familiar even with ordinary matters, and certainly not with halakha. Rabbi Akiva said to him with characteristic modesty: And I have not even reached the level of shepherds, who are considered even worse than cattle herders, as they are unfit for giving testimony. § Since the halakhot of the prophet Haggai were mentioned, the Gemara discusses them here. Haggai said that Ammon and Moab tithe the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year, as the Master said: Many cities were conquered by those who returned from Egypt, and were not conquered by those who returned from Babylonia after the destruction of the First Temple. And the initial consecration of Eretz Yisrael, by those who returned from Egypt, sanctified it for its time and did not sanctify it forever, as the future sanctification of Eretz Yisrael depended on the renewed conquest of the land by the Jewish people. And those who returned from Babylonia left those places aside and did not consider them part of Eretz Yisrael even after Jewish settlement was renewed there. They would plow and harvest in these places in the Sabbatical Year and tithe the poor man’s tithe so that the poor of Eretz Yisrael who did not have sufficient income from the previous years could rely upon them. Consequently, in the Sabbatical Year the poor received help from this tithe. § Haggai also declared: And one accepts converts from the Karduyim and the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach in a baraita: One does not accept converts from the Karduyim? Rav Ashi said: Kartuyim, not Karduyim, was stated by Rami bar Yeḥezkel. As people say in common discourse: The Kartuyim are unfit. And there are those who say a slightly different version of this discussion. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: One does not accept converts from the Kartuyim. What, is it not the case that Kartuyim is the same as Karduyim? If so there is a contradiction between the baraita of Rami bar Yeḥezkel and the statement of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas. Rav Ashi said: No; the Kartuyim are one discrete category and the Karduyim are another discrete category, as people say: Kartuyim are unfit. Rabbi Yoḥanan and the Elders both say: One does not accept converts from the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that one does not accept converts from the Tarmodim due to a concern that Jews may have intermingled with them? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: All clothing with stains of blood that might be from a menstruating woman and that come from the city on the border of Eretz Yisrael called Rekem are ritually pure, as it can be assumed that they belong to gentiles, and the blood of a menstruating gentile woman is not ritually impure. And Rabbi Yehuda deems it ritually impure because those residents of that place are converts and are in error. In other words, some of the inhabitants of Rekem assimilated and no longer observe the halakhot of the Torah, and therefore one must be wary lest the stains are in fact from a Jewish menstruating woman. Stains that came from among the gentiles, however, are ritually pure. And we discussed the following problem: The tanna concluded and taught: All stains from among the gentiles are pure, from which it may be inferred: And even from Tarmod. This indicates that in all places inhabited by gentiles there is no need to be concerned about stains. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is to say, one accepts converts from Tarmod without concern that they might be Jewish, albeit mamzerim. This contradicts the previous opinion attributed to Rabbi Yoḥanan that converts from the Tarmodim are not accepted. And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan specifically emphasized: That is to say, i.e., he meant that this conclusion may be logically inferred from the mishna, and yet he himself does not hold by this opinion, but didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, as is the case here? The Gemara answers: They are amora’im, and they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Some Sages said in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that the Tarmodim are unfit, while others maintain that they are fit. § The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that the Sages do not accept converts from Tarmod? Rabbi Yoḥanan and the Elders disagree about this matter. Although they concur that converts from Tarmod are not accepted, they disagree with regard to the reason. One of them said that it is due to the servants of King Solomon. Solomon built a city in Tarmod (see I Kings 9:18), and his gentile servants, taking advantage of their status and power, married Jewish women unlawfully. Therefore, it is possible that the inhabitants of Tarmod and their descendants are mamzerim. And the other one said that it is due to the daughters of Jerusalem, who were taken captive and raped and gave birth to children among the gentiles. The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said that it is due to the servants of Solomon, this is logical, as he holds that in the case of a gentile or a slave who had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the offspring is a mamzer. Accordingly, as the servants of Solomon were slaves and they engaged in intercourse with Jewish women, their children are considered mamzerim. However, according to the one who said that it is due to the daughters of Jerusalem, what is the reason that the concern applied specifically to Tarmod and no other cities? Rav Yosef and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this question, and both stated their opinions in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana. The Gemara elaborates: One of them said that twelve thousand men and six thousand archers came from Tarmod, and the other one said that there were twelve thousand men, of whom six thousand were archers. When the gentiles entered the Sanctuary during the conquest of Jerusalem, they all turned to plunder the silver and the gold they saw there, but the warriors of Tarmod turned to the daughters of Jerusalem, as it is stated: “They have ravished the women in Zion, the maidens in the cities of Judah” (Lamentations 5:11). According to the opinion that children born of relations between gentiles and Jewish women are mamzerim, all the children born to these women are mamzerim. § In relation to a verse cited earlier, Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: This verse was stated by the ministering angel appointed over the world: “I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread” (Psalms 37:25). Who said this? If we say that it was the Holy One, Blessed be He, is there old age before Him? Could God possibly say: “I have been young, and now am old”? And rather, one could say that David himself said it, from his own experience; but was he indeed so old? After all, David died at the age of seventy. Rather, conclude from this that the ministering angel appointed over the world said it, as he can speak both of youth and old age, and it is he who reported his observations from around the world. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani further said that Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The adversary has spread out his hand upon all her treasures; for she has seen that the heathens have entered into her Temple, concerning which You commanded that they should not enter into Your congregation” (Lamentations 1:10)? This is referring to Ammon and Moab. How so? When the gentiles entered the Sanctuary, all turned to plunder the silver and the gold, and the soldiers from Ammon and Moab turned to the scrolls of Torah to destroy them. They said: Is this the scroll in which it is written: “An Ammonite and a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:4)? Let it be burnt by fire. With regard to the Ammonites, the Gemara cites another verse: “The Lord has commanded against Jacob that they who are round about him should be his adversaries” (Lamentations 1:17). Rav said: For an example of this, there is the city Homanya in relation to the city Pum Nahara, as the descendants of the Ammonites live in Homanya, and they harass the Jews of Pum Nahara. § Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: With regard to a gentile who betrothed a Jewish woman nowadays, we are concerned that the betrothal might be valid, despite the fact that a betrothal of a gentile is meaningless, lest he be from the ten tribes of Israel who intermingled with the gentiles. The Gemara raises an objection: But there is an important principle in halakha that any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority. In this case, it can be assumed that any individual singled out from the gentiles belongs to the majority of gentiles and has no Jewish roots at all. The Gemara responds: Rav Yehuda means that there is a concern only with regard to those who came from the permanent dwelling places of the ten tribes. As Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said that the verse states about those exiled from Samaria: “And he put them in Halah, and in Habor, on the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes” (II Kings 18:11). Rabbi Abba bar Kahana proceeded to identify these places. Halah; this is the place called Ḥalzon. And Habor; this is Ḥadyab. The river of Gozan; this is Ginzak. And the cities of the Medes; this is Ḥamadan and its surroundings. And some say: This is Nihar and its surroundings. The Gemara asks: Which are its surroundings? Shmuel said: Kerakh, Mushkhei, Ḥidkei, and Domakya are the surroundings of Ḥamadan. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And all of them are for disqualification. In other words, if someone from one of these places wishes to convert, there is concern that he might be a descendant of a Jew and therefore a mamzer. Consequently, they all are disqualified. Rav Yehuda continued his recounting: When I said this halakha, that there is a concern about the betrothal of gentiles nowadays, before Shmuel, he said to me: One need not worry about this, as your son from a Jewish woman is called your son, i.e., he inherits his lineage from you, and your son from a gentile woman is not called your son, but rather her son. Consequently, all children born to Jews from gentile women are not considered Jews, as their lineage is determined by their gentile mothers. The Gemara asks: Aren’t there Jewish girls who were captured by gentiles, whose children are considered to be Jews? And Ravina said: Learn from this that the son of your daughter from a gentile is called your son. If so, the descendants of Jewish women captured by gentiles would indeed be Jews. The Gemara answers: This is no concern, as it is learned as a tradition that the girls from the ten tribes of that generation became barren and did not give birth to any offspring, whereas some of the exiled men of the ten tribes married gentile women. Consequently, all of the children born there were gentiles. There are those who say that Rav Yehuda actually related the following: When I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said to me: They did not move from there, the place where they deliberated on this matter, until they rendered all of them, including those who intermingled with the ten tribes in different locations, full-fledged gentiles. Consequently, there is no concern that their betrothals might be of any effect, as it is stated: “They have dealt treacherously against the Lord, for they have begotten strange children” (Hosea 5:7). § The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef sat behind Rav Kahana, and Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehuda, and he sat and he said this tradition: In the future, the Jews will establish a Festival day when Tarmod is destroyed. The Gemara asks: But it has already been destroyed. The Gemara answers: That place that was destroyed was Tamud, not Tarmod. Rav Ashi said: Tarmod is the same as Tamud. However, the city is doubled. In other words, when it is destroyed from this side it is settled on that side, and when it is destroyed from that side it is settled on this side. Consequently, it has not yet been entirely destroyed. The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna sat before Ulla and was engaged in the study of halakha. Ulla said about him: What a man; what a man. In other words: What a great man this Rav Hamnuna is. If only Harpanya were not his city, as the inhabitants of that place are all of flawed lineage, which indicates that the lineage of Rav Hamnuna is likewise impaired. Rav Hamnuna was ashamed. Ulla said to him: Where do you give the money for payment of the poll tax? He said to him: I pay it to the city of Pum Nahara, as my city is subject to taxation by that city. He said to him: If so, you are from Pum Nahara, not Harpanya, and your lineage is evidently not flawed. § The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the name Harpanya? Rabbi Zeira said: It means the mountain to which all turn [har shehakol ponin bo]. In other words, it is the destination for all those who could not find wives anywhere else, as most of its population is of flawed lineage. It is taught in a baraita: All those who do not know their family or tribe turn there. Rava said: This type of flaw is appalling and is deeper than the netherworld, as is stated: “Shall I ransom them from the power of the netherworld? Shall I redeem them from death?” (Hosea 13:14). This verse indicates that it is possible to be ransomed and released from the netherworld, whereas their disqualification cannot be rectified. The Gemara comments: Those who are disqualified from Harpanya are unfit due to the disqualification of the inhabitants of nearby Meishon, who were unfit and intermarried with the residents of Harpanya. Those disqualified from Meishon are unfit due to those disqualified from Tarmod, and those disqualified from Tarmod are disqualified due to the servants of Solomon. The Gemara comments: And this explains the folk saying that people say in this regard: A large ephah and a small ephah, which are both inaccurate utensils that may not be used for measuring, roll onward to the netherworld, and from the netherworld to Tarmod, and from Tarmod to Meishon, and from Meishon to Harpanya. The same idea expressed by the Sages with regard to the disqualification of lineage was also incorporated into a well-known adage among commoners.

The Sages said: On that day, the Sages brought all the ritually pure items deemed pure by the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the oven and burned them in fire, and the Sages reached a consensus in his regard and ostracized him. And the Sages said: Who will go and inform him of his ostracism? Rabbi Akiva, his beloved disciple, said to them: I will go, lest an unseemly person go and inform him in a callous and offensive manner, and he would thereby destroy the entire world. What did Rabbi Akiva do? He wore black and wrapped himself in black, as an expression of mourning and pain, and sat before Rabbi Eliezer at a distance of four cubits, which is the distance that one must maintain from an ostracized individual. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, what is different about today from other days, that you comport yourself in this manner? Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, it appears to me that your colleagues are distancing themselves from you. He employed euphemism, as actually they distanced Rabbi Eliezer from them. Rabbi Eliezer too, rent his garments and removed his shoes, as is the custom of an ostracized person, and he dropped from his seat and sat upon the ground. The Gemara relates: His eyes shed tears, and as a result the entire world was afflicted: One-third of its olives were afflicted, and one-third of its wheat, and one-third of its barley. And some say that even dough kneaded in a woman’s hands spoiled. The Sages taught: There was great anger on that day, as any place that Rabbi Eliezer fixed his gaze was burned. And even Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi of the Sanhedrin at Yavne, the head of the Sages who were responsible for the decision to ostracize Rabbi Eliezer, was coming on a boat at the time, and a large wave swelled over him and threatened to drown him. Rabban Gamliel said: It seems to me that this is only for the sake of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, as God punishes those who mistreat others. Rabban Gamliel stood on his feet and said: Master of the Universe, it is revealed and known before You that neither was it for my honor that I acted when ostracizing him, nor was it for the honor of the house of my father that I acted; rather, it was for Your honor, so that disputes will not proliferate in Israel. In response, the sea calmed from its raging. The Gemara further relates: Imma Shalom, the wife of Rabbi Eliezer, was the sister of Rabban Gamliel. From that incident forward, she would not allow Rabbi Eliezer to lower his head and recite the taḥanun prayer, which includes supplication and entreaties. She feared that were her husband to bemoan his fate and pray at that moment, her brother would be punished. A certain day was around the day of the New Moon, and she inadvertently substituted a full thirty-day month for a deficient twenty-nine-day month, i.e., she thought that it was the New Moon, when one does not lower his head in supplication, but it was not. Some say that a pauper came and stood at the door, and she took bread out to him. The result was that she left her husband momentarily unsupervised. When she returned, she found him and saw that he had lowered his head in prayer. She said to him: Arise, you already killed my brother. Meanwhile, the sound of a shofar emerged from the house of Rabban Gamliel to announce that the Nasi had died. Rabbi Eliezer said to her: From where did you know that your brother would die? She said to him: This is the tradition that I received from the house of the father of my father: All the gates of Heaven are apt to be locked, except for the gates of prayer for victims of verbal mistreatment.

MISHNAH: These are of the practices which were pronounced at the upper floor of Ḥananiah ben Ḥizqiah ben Garon, when they came to visit him. They voted and the House of Shammai had the majority over the House of Hillel; eighteen items they decided on that day. HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “These are of the practices which were pronounced at the upper floor of Ḥananiah ben Ḥizqiah ben Garon, when they came to visit him,” etc. “This day was hard for Israel like the day on which the Golden C alf was made. Rebbi Eliezer said, on that day they filled the bushel to overflow. Rebbi Joshua said, on that day they filled the bushel to the rim. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, if it was deficient and they filled it it would have been reasonable, as with an amphora full of nuts; if you fill it with sesame seeds it will be strengthened. Rebbi Joshua said to him, if it had been full and they diminished it, it would have been reasonable, as with an amphora filled with oil; if you add water to it it dilutes the oil.” Rebbi Joshua from Ono stated: The students of the House of Shammai were standing downstairs and killing the students of the House of Hillel. It was stated, six of them went up; the rest were standing around them with swords and lances.

The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Akiva learn these halakhot from Rabbi Yehoshua? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer took ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him. He was sitting on his canopied bed [bekinof ], and they were sitting in his parlor [biteraklin]; they did not know if he would be able to receive them, due to his illness. And that day was Shabbat eve, and Rabbi Eliezer’s son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries, as phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat. His father berated him, and he left reprimanded. Hyrcanus said to his father’s colleagues: It appears to me that father went insane, since he berated me for no reason. Rabbi Eliezer heard this and said to them: He, Hyrcanus, and his mother went insane. How can they neglect Shabbat preparations with regard to prohibitions punishable by stoning, such as lighting the candles and preparing hot food, and engage in preparations concerning prohibitions by rabbinic decree, such as wearing phylacteries on Shabbat? Since the Sages perceived from this retort that his mind was stable, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits, as he was ostracized (see Bava Metzia 59b). It is forbidden to sit within four cubits of an ostracized person. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Why have you come? They said to him: We have come to study Torah, as they did not want to say that they came to visit him due to his illness. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And why have you not come until now? They said to him: We did not have spare time. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: I would be surprised if these Sages die their own death, i.e., a natural death. Rather, they will be tortured to death by the Romans. Rabbi Akiva said to him: How will my death come about? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death will be worse than theirs, as you were my primary student and you did not come to study. Rabbi Eliezer raised his two arms and placed them on his heart, and he said: Woe to you, my two arms, as they are like two Torah scrolls that are now being rolled up, and will never be opened again. I have learned much Torah, and I have taught much Torah. I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers, i.e., I have not received from their wisdom, even like a dog lapping from the sea. I have taught much Torah, and my students have taken away from me, i.e., they have received from my wisdom, only like the tiny amount that a paintbrush removes from a tube of paint. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot with regard to a snow-white leprous mark [bebaheret], but no person has ever asked me anything about them. He could not find a student who could fully understand him in those matters. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot, and some say that Rabbi Eliezer said three thousand halakhot, with regard to the planting of cucumbers by sorcery, but no person has ever asked me anything about them, besides Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Eliezer described the incident: Once he and I were walking along the way, and he said to me: My teacher, teach me about the planting of cucumbers. I said one statement of sorcery, and the entire field became filled with cucumbers. He said to me: My teacher, you have taught me about planting them; teach me about uprooting them. I said one statement and they all were gathered to one place. After these comments, the Sages asked him questions of halakha: What is the halakha, with regard to ritual impurity, of a ball made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise a last, the frame on which a shoe is fashioned, which is made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise an amulet wrapped in leather, and a pouch for pearls, wrapped in leather, and a small weight, which is wrapped in leather? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: They are susceptible to impurity, and their purification is effected by immersing them in a ritual bath as they are, as there is no need to open them up. They asked him further: What is the halakha with regard to a shoe that is on a last? Is it considered a complete vessel, which needs no further preparation, and is therefore susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is pure, and with this word, his soul left him in purity. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow is permitted; the vow is permitted; i.e., the ostracism that was placed on Rabbi Eliezer is removed. Rabbi Akiva was not present at the time of his death. At the conclusion of Shabbat, Rabbi Akiva encountered the funeral procession on his way from Caesarea to Lod. Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh in terrible anguish and regret until his blood flowed to the earth. He began to eulogize Rabbi Eliezer in the row of those comforting the mourners, and said: “My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen” (II Kings 2:12). I have many coins, but I do not have a money changer to whom to give them, i.e., I have many questions, but after your death I have no one who can answer them.

The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Akiva learn these halakhot from Rabbi Yehoshua? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer took ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him. He was sitting on his canopied bed [bekinof ], and they were sitting in his parlor [biteraklin]; they did not know if he would be able to receive them, due to his illness. And that day was Shabbat eve, and Rabbi Eliezer’s son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries, as phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat. His father berated him, and he left reprimanded. Hyrcanus said to his father’s colleagues: It appears to me that father went insane, since he berated me for no reason. Rabbi Eliezer heard this and said to them: He, Hyrcanus, and his mother went insane. How can they neglect Shabbat preparations with regard to prohibitions punishable by stoning, such as lighting the candles and preparing hot food, and engage in preparations concerning prohibitions by rabbinic decree, such as wearing phylacteries on Shabbat? Since the Sages perceived from this retort that his mind was stable, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits, as he was ostracized (see Bava Metzia 59b). It is forbidden to sit within four cubits of an ostracized person. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Why have you come? They said to him: We have come to study Torah, as they did not want to say that they came to visit him due to his illness. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And why have you not come until now? They said to him: We did not have spare time. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: I would be surprised if these Sages die their own death, i.e., a natural death. Rather, they will be tortured to death by the Romans. Rabbi Akiva said to him: How will my death come about? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death will be worse than theirs, as you were my primary student and you did not come to study. Rabbi Eliezer raised his two arms and placed them on his heart, and he said: Woe to you, my two arms, as they are like two Torah scrolls that are now being rolled up, and will never be opened again. I have learned much Torah, and I have taught much Torah. I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers, i.e., I have not received from their wisdom, even like a dog lapping from the sea. I have taught much Torah, and my students have taken away from me, i.e., they have received from my wisdom, only like the tiny amount that a paintbrush removes from a tube of paint. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot with regard to a snow-white leprous mark [bebaheret], but no person has ever asked me anything about them. He could not find a student who could fully understand him in those matters. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot, and some say that Rabbi Eliezer said three thousand halakhot, with regard to the planting of cucumbers by sorcery, but no person has ever asked me anything about them, besides Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Eliezer described the incident: Once he and I were walking along the way, and he said to me: My teacher, teach me about the planting of cucumbers. I said one statement of sorcery, and the entire field became filled with cucumbers. He said to me: My teacher, you have taught me about planting them; teach me about uprooting them. I said one statement and they all were gathered to one place. After these comments, the Sages asked him questions of halakha: What is the halakha, with regard to ritual impurity, of a ball made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise a last, the frame on which a shoe is fashioned, which is made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise an amulet wrapped in leather, and a pouch for pearls, wrapped in leather, and a small weight, which is wrapped in leather? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: They are susceptible to impurity, and their purification is effected by immersing them in a ritual bath as they are, as there is no need to open them up. They asked him further: What is the halakha with regard to a shoe that is on a last? Is it considered a complete vessel, which needs no further preparation, and is therefore susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is pure, and with this word, his soul left him in purity. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow is permitted; the vow is permitted; i.e., the ostracism that was placed on Rabbi Eliezer is removed. Rabbi Akiva was not present at the time of his death. At the conclusion of Shabbat, Rabbi Akiva encountered the funeral procession on his way from Caesarea to Lod. Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh in terrible anguish and regret until his blood flowed to the earth. He began to eulogize Rabbi Eliezer in the row of those comforting the mourners, and said: “My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen” (II Kings 2:12). I have many coins, but I do not have a money changer to whom to give them, i.e., I have many questions, but after your death I have no one who can answer them.

The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Akiva learn these halakhot from Rabbi Yehoshua? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer took ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him. He was sitting on his canopied bed [bekinof ], and they were sitting in his parlor [biteraklin]; they did not know if he would be able to receive them, due to his illness. And that day was Shabbat eve, and Rabbi Eliezer’s son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries, as phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat. His father berated him, and he left reprimanded. Hyrcanus said to his father’s colleagues: It appears to me that father went insane, since he berated me for no reason. Rabbi Eliezer heard this and said to them: He, Hyrcanus, and his mother went insane. How can they neglect Shabbat preparations with regard to prohibitions punishable by stoning, such as lighting the candles and preparing hot food, and engage in preparations concerning prohibitions by rabbinic decree, such as wearing phylacteries on Shabbat? Since the Sages perceived from this retort that his mind was stable, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits, as he was ostracized (see Bava Metzia 59b). It is forbidden to sit within four cubits of an ostracized person. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Why have you come? They said to him: We have come to study Torah, as they did not want to say that they came to visit him due to his illness. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And why have you not come until now? They said to him: We did not have spare time. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: I would be surprised if these Sages die their own death, i.e., a natural death. Rather, they will be tortured to death by the Romans. Rabbi Akiva said to him: How will my death come about? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death will be worse than theirs, as you were my primary student and you did not come to study. Rabbi Eliezer raised his two arms and placed them on his heart, and he said: Woe to you, my two arms, as they are like two Torah scrolls that are now being rolled up, and will never be opened again. I have learned much Torah, and I have taught much Torah. I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers, i.e., I have not received from their wisdom, even like a dog lapping from the sea. I have taught much Torah, and my students have taken away from me, i.e., they have received from my wisdom, only like the tiny amount that a paintbrush removes from a tube of paint. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot with regard to a snow-white leprous mark [bebaheret], but no person has ever asked me anything about them. He could not find a student who could fully understand him in those matters. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot, and some say that Rabbi Eliezer said three thousand halakhot, with regard to the planting of cucumbers by sorcery, but no person has ever asked me anything about them, besides Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Eliezer described the incident: Once he and I were walking along the way, and he said to me: My teacher, teach me about the planting of cucumbers. I said one statement of sorcery, and the entire field became filled with cucumbers. He said to me: My teacher, you have taught me about planting them; teach me about uprooting them. I said one statement and they all were gathered to one place. After these comments, the Sages asked him questions of halakha: What is the halakha, with regard to ritual impurity, of a ball made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise a last, the frame on which a shoe is fashioned, which is made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise an amulet wrapped in leather, and a pouch for pearls, wrapped in leather, and a small weight, which is wrapped in leather? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: They are susceptible to impurity, and their purification is effected by immersing them in a ritual bath as they are, as there is no need to open them up. They asked him further: What is the halakha with regard to a shoe that is on a last? Is it considered a complete vessel, which needs no further preparation, and is therefore susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is pure, and with this word, his soul left him in purity. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow is permitted; the vow is permitted; i.e., the ostracism that was placed on Rabbi Eliezer is removed. Rabbi Akiva was not present at the time of his death. At the conclusion of Shabbat, Rabbi Akiva encountered the funeral procession on his way from Caesarea to Lod. Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh in terrible anguish and regret until his blood flowed to the earth. He began to eulogize Rabbi Eliezer in the row of those comforting the mourners, and said: “My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen” (II Kings 2:12). I have many coins, but I do not have a money changer to whom to give them, i.e., I have many questions, but after your death I have no one who can answer them.