Kiddushin #12 - Women's Exemption from Time-Bound Commandments

§ The mishna teaches that women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot. The Sages taught: What is a positive, time-bound mitzva? Examples include residing in a sukka, and taking the lulav, and blowing the shofar on Rosh HaShana, all of which can be performed only at specific times of the year. And another example is donning ritual fringes, as the mitzva applies only during the daytime due to the verse which states: “Fringes, that you may look upon them” (Numbers 15:39), indicating that the fringes should be seen.

And the donning of phylacteries (Deuteronomy 6:8), which are not worn at night or on Shabbat and Festivals, is also a positive, time-bound mitzva. And what is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? Examples include the affixing of a mezuza (Deuteronomy 11:20), the construction of a parapet on a roof (Deuteronomy 22:8), returning a lost item (Deuteronomy 22:1–3), and the release of the mother bird from the nest, i.e., the mitzva of sending away a mother bird when one finds it sitting on chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7). The Gemara asks: But is this an established principle? But there are the mitzvot of eating matza on the first night of Passover (Exodus 23:15), of rejoicing on a Festival (Deuteronomy 16:9–11), and assembly on Sukkot following the Sabbatical Year (Deuteronomy 31:10–13). And each of these is a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are obligated in them. And furthermore, one can raise a difficulty as follows: But there are the mitzvot of Torah study (Deuteronomy 6:7), procreation (Genesis 1:28), and redemption of the firstborn (Exodus 13:12–13), each of which is not a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are exempt from them. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One does not learn practical halakhot from general statements, i.e., when a general statement appears in a mishna and uses the term: All, it is not to be understood as an all-inclusive statement without exceptions. This is the case even in a place where it says: Except, to exclude a specific matter. A proof for this is as we learned in a mishna (Eiruvin 26b): One can establish a joining of houses in courtyards [eiruv ḥatzerot] and a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv teḥumin], and similarly, one can merge courtyards to permit carrying in a joint alleyway on Shabbat. This can be done with all types of food except for water and salt. This is stated as a halakha with specific exceptions, and yet one can ask: Is there nothing else that cannot be used for an eiruv? But there are truffles and mushrooms, which also cannot be used for an eiruv, because they do not offer nourishment. Rather, conclude from this that one may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says: Except. § The Gemara turns to the sources of this principle. From where do we derive that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot? It is derived by juxtaposition from the mitzva of phylacteries: Just as women are exempt from donning phylacteries, so too, women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot. And the exemption of women from donning phylacteries is derived from their exemption from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, as derived from Deuteronomy 11:19, so too women are exempt from donning phylacteries, as the two issues are juxtaposed in the Torah (Deuteronomy 6:7–8). The Gemara asks: And let us say the opposite and juxtapose phylacteries to mezuza, which is also mentioned in that passage. Mezuza is a mitzva in which women are also obligated. Based on this comparison, women would be obligated in phylacteries as well. The Gemara answers: Phylacteries are juxtaposed to Torah study in both the first paragraph and in the second paragraph of Shema, whereas phylacteries are not juxtaposed to mezuza in the second paragraph. It is therefore preferable to compare phylacteries to Torah study. The Gemara says: But if so, let us juxtapose mezuza to Torah study and say that women are also exempt from the obligation of a mezuza. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This could not enter your mind, as it is written with regard to the mitzva of mezuza: “That your days may be multiplied” (Deuteronomy 11:21). Can it be said that men need life but women do not need life? Since the reward for the performance of the mitzva of mezuza is extended life, this mitzva applies to women as well. The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of residing in a sukka, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva, as it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), referring to seven specific days of the year. Nevertheless, the reason women are exempt from this mitzva is that the Merciful One writes in the continuation of the verse: “All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot.” The definite article “the” is an exclusion, and serves to exclude the women from the obligation to reside in a sukka. It may be derived from here that if that was not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women do not receive a blanket exemption from every positive, time-bound mitzva. Abaye said: In the case of residing in a sukka a special verse was necessary to exempt women, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside,” this means that you should reside as you dwell in your permanent home: Just as a man and his wife live together in a residence, so too, a man and his wife are obligated to reside together in a sukka. And Rava said:

It is necessary to state this verse for another reason, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), from Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6). One would then say that just as there women are obligated to eat matza on the first night of Passover, despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of residing in the sukka, women are obligated. Therefore it was necessary for the verse to use the term “the homeborn” to exclude women from the obligation to reside in a sukka. The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to bring a burnt-offering on pilgrimage Festivals, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva. And the reason women are exempt from this obligation is that the Merciful One writes, with regard to this mitzva: “Three times in the year all of your males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), which serves to exclude women. It may be derived from here that if that were not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women are not necessarily exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to teach the halakha in this case as well, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to appearance, where the verse states: Three times in the year all of your males shall appear,” from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, about which the verse states: “When all of Israel come to appear before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 31:11). One would then say that just as women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, so too they should be obligated to appear on a pilgrimage Festival. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to state explicitly that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance on a pilgrimage Festival. With regard to the primary proof for the principle that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, the Gemara asks: But before deriving the halakha from phylacteries, to exempt women from all positive, time-bound mitzvot, derive it from the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, in which women are obligated, to obligate women in all these mitzvot. Abaye said: The mitzva of rejoicing does not apply directly to women. Rather, a woman is rendered joyful by her husband, i.e., the mitzva is for him to gladden her on a Festival. The Gemara asks: What can be said with regard to a widow, who no longer has a husband but is nevertheless obligated to be joyful on a Festival, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you…and the widow” (Deuteronomy 16:11)? The Gemara answers that the mitzva does not apply directly to a widow; rather, it applies to the men with whom she is present, i.e., they have an obligation to ensure that widows rejoice on the Festivals. The Gemara asks: But why not derive that women are obligated in all positive, time-bound mitzvot from the mitzva of assembly, in which women are explicitly obligated despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive in this manner, because the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, that women are obligated in these mitzvot despite the fact that these are positive, time-bound mitzvot. And there is a principle that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases. Rather, the two instances are considered exceptions. The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning phylacteries and appearance are also two verses that come as one, as they both indicate that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, and therefore the verses do not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: These are not considered as two verses that come as one, as both are necessary, each for its own reason. As, if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from donning phylacteries and had not written that they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy to obligate women from the verse stated with regard to appearance from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to teach that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance. And if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from appearance, and had not written that they are exempt from donning phylacteries, I would say: I will compare phylacteries to mezuza, which would mean that women are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries. Therefore, it is necessary to state this halakha for both phylacteries and appearance, and they are not two verses that come as one. The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning matza and assembly are also necessary, each for its own reason, and they are not two verses that come as one either. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: For what purpose are both of them necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written that women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly but had not written that they are obligated in eating matza, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6), from Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), teaching that women are exempt from eating matza, just as they are exempt from residing in a sukka. Therefore, it is necessary for a verse to teach that women are obligated in eating matza. But let the Merciful One write that women are obligated in eating matza, and it would not be necessary to state the same halakha with regard to assembly, and I would say on my own: If children are obligated in assembly, as is stated explicitly in the verse “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the children” (Deuteronomy 31:12), are women not all the more so obligated? Therefore, as it is explicitly stated that women are obligated in assembly, the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, and consequently do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says as a principle that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? And furthermore, one can ask: From where do we derive that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time bound? The Gemara answers that one derives this from the mitzva of fearing one’s mother and father: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of fear (Leviticus 19:3), so too, women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound. The Gemara asks: But why not derive the opposite from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, so too they should be exempt from all positive mitzvot that are not time bound. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive an exemption for women from their exemption from Torah study, because Torah study and procreation are two verses that come as one, as in both cases women are exempt, despite the fact that these are not time-bound mitzvot. And any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says that with regard to both of them, men and women, the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what can be said? According to his opinion, women are exempt from only one positive mitzva that is not time bound, Torah study; why not derive other mitzvot from this case? The Gemara answers: The reason this is not a difficulty is because Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son, from which women are also exempt, are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka as well, let procreation, which he maintains applies to women, and fear of one’s mother and father be considered two verses that come as one and they should not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in fear of their parents, and had not written that they are obligated in procreation, I would say that as the Merciful One states: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), this leads to the conclusion that women are exempt from procreation, by the following reasoning: As it is the manner of a man to go to war and to conquer, yes, he is obligated in procreation, but as it is not the manner of a woman to conquer, she is not obligated in procreation. And if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, and had not written that they are obligated to fear their parents, I would say: With regard to a man, as it is in his power to perform this mitzva, yes, he is obligated to fear his mother and father, but with regard to a woman, as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, since her obligations to her husband may prevent her from doing so, she is not obligated. And as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, perhaps women should not be obligated at all and there should be no difference between a married and an unmarried woman. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to state that women are obligated in both procreation and the fear of parents, and these are not considered two verses that come as one. The Gemara notes that the earlier question remains difficult: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? According to this opinion it can be derived that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot from matza and assembly, and that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time bound, from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son. Rava said: The Sages of Pafunya know the reason for this matter. The Gemara comments: And who is the scholar called by the nickname: The Sages of Paphunya? It is Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states with regard to phylacteries: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). In this manner the entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt from it, so too are women exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva in the Torah. And from the fact that women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva, one can learn by inference that women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the mitzva of donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva. But according to the one who says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, as it is applicable the entire year, day and night, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Who did you hear who said that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? It is Rabbi Meir, and he holds that matza and assembly are verses that come as one, and he further maintains that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and who also says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, what can be said? The Gemara answers: It is not derived from here that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot because the verses that mention matza, rejoicing, and assembly are three verses that come as one, and everyone agrees three verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

§ The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to circumcise his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac” (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: And in a case where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him, i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. And in a case where the court did not circumcise him the son is obligated to circumcise himself when he reaches adulthood, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Genesis 17:14). From where do we derive that his mother is not obligated to circumcise her son? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God commanded him” (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded him, and not her. We found a source for this mitzva immediately, i.e., when it was given to Abraham; from where do we derive that this is the halakha for the men of all generations? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that any place where it is stated: “Command,” it is nothing other than an expression of galvanization both immediately and for generations. The mitzva of circumcision is presented by means of this term. The Gemara elaborates: From where is it derived that the term “command” indicates a galvanization? As it is written: “And command Joshua, and encourage him and strengthen him” (Deuteronomy 3:28). In this context, the term “command” is not referring to a specific command but is a general expression of galvanization. From where is it derived that this applies immediately and for generations? As it is written: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). This shows that whenever the word “command” is used it is referring to that day onward for all generations.

and from phylacteries, but they are obligated in the mitzvot of prayer, mezuza, and Grace after Meals. The Gemara explains the rationale for these exemptions and obligations. GEMARA With regard to the mishna’s statement that women are exempt from the recitation of Shema, the Gemara asks: That is obvious, as Shema is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and the halakhic principle is: Women are exempt from any time-bound, positive mitzva, i.e., any mitzva whose performance is only in effect at a particular time. Shema falls into that category as its recitation is restricted to the morning and the evening. Why then did the mishna need to mention it specifically? The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since Shema includes the acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, perhaps women are obligated in its recitation despite the fact that it is a time-bound, positive mitzva. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that, nevertheless, women are exempt. We also learned in the mishna that women are exempt from phylacteries. The Gemara asks: That is obvious as well. The donning of phylacteries is only in effect at particular times; during the day but not at night, on weekdays but not on Shabbat or Festivals. The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since the mitzva of phylacteries is juxtaposed in the Torah to the mitzva of mezuza, as it is written: “And you shall bind them as a sign upon your hands and they shall be frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), followed by: “And you shall write them upon the door posts of your house and on your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9), just as women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza, so too they are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that nevertheless, women are exempt. We also learned in the mishna that women, slaves, and children are obligated in prayer. The Gemara explains that, although the mitzva of prayer is only in effect at particular times, which would lead to the conclusion that women are exempt, nevertheless, since prayer is supplication for mercy and women also require divine mercy, they are obligated. However, lest you say: Since regarding prayer it is written: “Evening and morning and afternoon I pray and cry aloud and He hears my voice” (Psalms 55:18), perhaps prayer should be considered a time-bound, positive mitzva and women would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that, fundamentally, the mitzva of prayer is not time-bound and, therefore, everyone is obligated.

and from phylacteries, but they are obligated in the mitzvot of prayer, mezuza, and Grace after Meals. The Gemara explains the rationale for these exemptions and obligations. GEMARA We also learned in the mishna that women, slaves, and children are obligated in prayer. The Gemara explains that, although the mitzva of prayer is only in effect at particular times, which would lead to the conclusion that women are exempt, nevertheless, since prayer is supplication for mercy and women also require divine mercy, they are obligated. However, lest you say: Since regarding prayer it is written: “Evening and morning and afternoon I pray and cry aloud and He hears my voice” (Psalms 55:18), perhaps prayer should be considered a time-bound, positive mitzva and women would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that, fundamentally, the mitzva of prayer is not time-bound and, therefore, everyone is obligated.

(2) Therefore, women and slaves are obligated in prayer because it is a positive commandment lacking a fixed time, but the obligation of this commandment is as follows: a person should supplicate and pray every day and relate the praise of God, and afterwards ask for their needs as a request and a supplication, and afterwards give praise and thanks to God for the good that has been bestowed upon them, each person according to their ability.

§ The mishna further teaches: One need not prevent children from sounding the shofar on Rosh HaShana. The Gemara infers: If women wish to sound the shofar, one indeed prevents them from doing so. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that one does not prevent women or children from sounding the shofar on a Festival? The Gemara answers that Abaye said: This is not difficult: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a baraita: “Speak to the children of Israel…and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The phrase “children of Israel” literally means sons of Israel, and this teaches that the sons of Israel place their hands upon offerings, but the daughters of Israel do not place their hands upon offerings; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: It is optional for women to place their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered, although they are not obligated to do so. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, if a woman wishes to perform any mitzva that is not obligatory for her, she is permitted to do so. Here too, one does not prevent a woman from sounding the shofar.

However we do prevent women -- Because they are completely exempt from positive time-bounded commandments, were they to blow the shofar, they would be transgressing "You may not add [to the Torah]!"