נוח לו לאדם שיבא על ספק אשת איש ואל ילבין פני חבירו ברבים מנ"ל מדדרש רבא דדרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים לה, טו) ובצלעי שמחו ונאספו קרעו ולא דמו אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע גלוי וידוע לפניך שאם היו מקרעים בשרי לא היה דמי שותת לארץ ולא עוד אלא אפילו בשעה שעוסקין בנגעים ואהלות אומרים לי דוד הבא על אשת איש מיתתו במה ואני אומר להם מיתתו בחנק ויש לו חלק לעוה"ב אבל המלבין את פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעוה"ב (ואמר) מר זוטרא בר טוביה אמר רב ואמרי לה אמר רב חנא בר ביזנא אמר ר"ש חסידא ואמרי לה א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י נוח לו לאדם שיפיל עצמו לכבשן האש ואל ילבין פני חבירו ברבים מנ"ל מתמר דכתיב (בראשית לח, כה) היא מוצאת והיא שלחה אל חמיה אמר רב חננא בריה דרב אידי מאי דכתיב (ויקרא כה, יז) ולא תונו איש את עמיתו עם שאתך בתורה ובמצות אל תונהו אמר רב לעולם יהא אדם זהיר באונאת אשתו שמתוך שדמעתה מצויה אונאתה קרובה א"ר אלעזר מיום שנחרב בית המקדש ננעלו שערי תפלה שנאמר (איכה ג, ח) גם כי אזעק ואשוע שתם תפלתי ואע"פ ששערי תפלה ננעלו שערי דמעות לא ננעלו שנאמר (תהלים לט, יג) שמעה תפלתי ה' ושועתי האזינה אל דמעתי אל תחרש ואמר רב כל ההולך בעצת אשתו נופל בגיהנם שנאמר (מלכים א כא, כה) רק לא היה כאחאב וגו' א"ל רב פפא לאביי והא אמרי אינשי איתתך גוצא גחין ותלחוש לה לא קשיא הא במילי דעלמא והא במילי דביתא לישנא אחרינא הא במילי דשמיא והא במילי דעלמא אמר רב חסדא כל השערים ננעלים חוץ משערי אונאה שנאמר (עמוס ז, ז) הנה ה' נצב על חומת אנך ובידו אנך א"ר אלעזר הכל נפרע בידי שליח חוץ מאונאה שנאמר ובידו אנך א"ר אבהו ג' אין הפרגוד ננעל בפניהם אונאה וגזל וע"ז אונאה דכתיב ובידו אנך גזל דכתיב (ירמיהו ו, ז) חמס ושוד ישמע בה על פני תמיד ע"ז דכתיב (ישעיהו סה, ג) העם המכעיסים אותי על פני תמיד [וגו'] אמר רב יהודה לעולם יהא אדם זהיר בתבואה בתוך ביתו שאין מריבה מצויה בתוך ביתו של אדם אלא על עסקי תבואה שנאמר (תהלים קמז, יד) השם גבולך שלום חלב חטים ישביעך אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי כמשלם שערי מכדא נקיש ואתי תיגרא בביתא ואמר רב חיננא בר פפא לעולם יהא אדם זהיר בתבואה בתוך ביתו שלא נקראו ישראל דלים אלא על עסקי תבואה שנאמר (שופטים ו, ג) והיה אם זרע ישראל וגו' וכתיב (שופטים ו, ד) ויחנו עליהם וגו' וכתיב (שופטים ו, ו) וידל ישראל מאד מפני מדין (וא"ר) חלבו לעולם יהא אדם זהיר בכבוד אשתו שאין ברכה מצויה בתוך ביתו של אדם אלא בשביל אשתו שנאמר (בראשית יב, טז) ולאברם הטיב בעבורה והיינו דאמר להו רבא לבני מחוזא אוקירו לנשייכו כי היכי דתתעתרו תנן התם חתכו חוליות ונתן חול בין חוליא לחוליא ר"א מטהר וחכמים מטמאין וזה הוא תנור של עכנאי מאי עכנאי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שהקיפו דברים כעכנא זו וטמאוהו תנא באותו היום השיב רבי אליעזר כל תשובות שבעולם ולא קיבלו הימנו אמר להם אם הלכה כמותי חרוב זה יוכיח נעקר חרוב ממקומו מאה אמה ואמרי לה ארבע מאות אמה אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מן החרוב חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי אמת המים יוכיחו חזרו אמת המים לאחוריהם אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מאמת המים חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי כותלי בית המדרש יוכיחו הטו כותלי בית המדרש ליפול גער בהם רבי יהושע אמר להם אם תלמידי חכמים מנצחים זה את זה בהלכה אתם מה טיבכם לא נפלו מפני כבודו של רבי יהושע ולא זקפו מפני כבודו של ר"א ועדיין מטין ועומדין חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי מן השמים יוכיחו יצאתה בת קול ואמרה מה לכם אצל ר"א שהלכה כמותו בכ"מ עמד רבי יהושע על רגליו ואמר (דברים ל, יב) לא בשמים היא מאי לא בשמים היא אמר רבי ירמיה שכבר נתנה תורה מהר סיני אין אנו משגיחין בבת קול שכבר כתבת בהר סיני בתורה (שמות כג, ב) אחרי רבים להטות אשכחיה רבי נתן לאליהו א"ל מאי עביד קוב"ה בההיא שעתא א"ל קא חייך ואמר נצחוני בני נצחוני בני אמרו אותו היום הביאו כל טהרות שטיהר ר"א ושרפום באש ונמנו עליו וברכוהו ואמרו מי ילך ויודיעו אמר להם ר"ע אני אלך שמא ילך אדם שאינו הגון ויודיעו ונמצא מחריב את כל העולם כולו מה עשה ר"ע לבש שחורים ונתעטף שחורים וישב לפניו ברחוק ארבע אמות אמר לו ר"א עקיבא מה יום מיומים אמר לו רבי כמדומה לי שחבירים בדילים ממך אף הוא קרע בגדיו וחלץ מנעליו ונשמט וישב על גבי קרקע זלגו עיניו דמעות לקה העולם שליש בזיתים ושליש בחטים ושליש בשעורים ויש אומרים אף בצק שבידי אשה טפח תנא אך גדול היה באותו היום שבכל מקום שנתן בו עיניו ר"א נשרף ואף ר"ג היה בא בספינה עמד עליו נחשול לטבעו אמר כמדומה לי שאין זה אלא בשביל ר"א בן הורקנוס עמד על רגליו ואמר רבונו של עולם גלוי וידוע לפניך שלא לכבודי עשיתי ולא לכבוד בית אבא עשיתי אלא לכבודך שלא ירבו מחלוקות בישראל נח הים מזעפו אימא שלום דביתהו דר"א אחתיה דר"ג הואי מההוא מעשה ואילך לא הוה שבקה ליה לר"א למיפל על אפיה ההוא יומא ריש ירחא הוה ואיחלף לה בין מלא לחסר איכא דאמרי אתא עניא וקאי אבבא אפיקא ליה ריפתא אשכחתיה דנפל על אנפיה אמרה ליה קום קטלית לאחי אדהכי נפק שיפורא מבית רבן גמליאל דשכיב אמר לה מנא ידעת אמרה ליה כך מקובלני מבית אבי אבא כל השערים ננעלים חוץ משערי אונאה תנו רבנן המאנה את הגר עובר בשלשה לאוין והלוחצו עובר בשנים מאי שנא מאנה דכתיבי שלשה לאוין (שמות כב, כ) וגר לא תונה (ויקרא יט, לג) וכי יגור אתך גר בארצכם לא תונו אותו (ויקרא כה, יז) ולא תונו איש את עמיתו וגר בכלל עמיתו הוא לוחצו נמי שלשה כתיבי (שמות כב, כ) ולא תלחצנו (שמות כג, ט) וגר לא תלחץ (שמות כב, כד) ולא תהיה לו כנושה וגר בכלל הוא אלא אחד זה ואחד זה בשלשה תניא רבי אליעזר הגדול אומר מפני מה הזהירה תורה בל"ו מקומות ואמרי לה במ"ו מקומות בגר מפני שסורו רע מאי דכתיב וגר לא תונה ולא תלחצנו כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים (תנינא) רבי נתן אומר מום שבך אל תאמר לחברך והיינו דאמרי אינשי דזקיף ליה זקיפא בדיותקיה לא נימא ליה לחבריה זקיף ביניתא: מתני׳ אין מערבין פירות בפירות אפי' חדשים בחדשים
It is preferable for a person to engage in intercourse with a woman whose married status is uncertain and not humiliate another in public. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: It is from that which Rava interpreted, as Rava interpreted: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And when I limped they rejoiced and gathered…they tore and did not cease [damu]” (Psalms 35:15)? The term “damu” can also be understood as a reference to blood. Concerning the fasting he undertook to atone for his sin with Bathsheba (see II Samuel, chapters 11–12), David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, it is revealed and known before You that if my tormenters were to tear my flesh, my blood [dami] would not flow to the ground, due to excessive fasting. And moreover, they torment me to the extent that even at the time when they are engaged in the public study of the halakhot of leprous sores and tents in which there is a corpse, i.e., halakhic matters that have no connection to my sin, they say to me: David, one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, his death is effected with what form of execution? And I say to them: One who engages in intercourse with a married woman before witnesses and with forewarning, his death is by strangulation, but he still has a share in the World-to-Come. But one who humiliates another in public has no share in the World-to-Come. The transgression of you, who humiliate me, is more severe than my transgression. And Mar Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says; and some say Rav Ḥana bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says; and some say Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: It is more comfortable for a person to cast himself into a fiery furnace, than to humiliate another in public to avoid being cast into the furnace. From where do we derive this? From Tamar, daughter-in-law of Judah. When she was taken out to be burned, she did not reveal that she was pregnant with Judah’s child. Rather, she left the decision to him, to avoid humiliating him in public, as it is written: “And Judah said: Bring her forth, and let her be burnt. When she was brought forth, she sent to her father-in-law, saying: I am pregnant by the man to whom these belong. And she said: Examine these, whose are these, the signet, and the cords, and the staff?” (Genesis 38:24–25). § Rav Ḥinnana, son of Rav Idi, says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And you shall not mistreat each man his colleague [amito]” (Leviticus 25:17)? The word amito is interpreted as a contraction of im ito, meaning: One who is with him. With one who is with you in observance of Torah and mitzvot, you shall not mistreat him. Rav says: A person must always be careful about mistreatment of his wife. Since her tear is easily elicited, punishment for her mistreatment is immediate. Rabbi Elazar says: Since the day the Temple was destroyed the gates of prayer were locked, and prayer is not accepted as it once was, as it is stated in lament of the Temple’s destruction: “Though I plead and call out, He shuts out my prayer” (Lamentations 3:8). Yet, despite the fact that the gates of prayer were locked with the destruction of the Temple, the gates of tears were not locked, and one who cries before God may rest assured that his prayers will be answered, as it is stated: “Hear my prayer, Lord, and give ear to my pleading, keep not silence at my tears” (Psalms 39:13). And Rav says: Nevertheless, anyone who follows the counsel of his wife descends into Gehenna, as it is stated: “But there was none like Ahab, who did give himself over to do that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, whom Jezebel his wife incited” (I Kings 21:25). Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But don’t people say a popular proverb: If your wife is short, stoop and whisper to her and consult with her? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of Rav instructs that one not follow her counsel in general matters; and that proverb instructs that one follow her counsel in household matters. The Gemara presents another version of this distinction: This statement of Rav maintains that one should not follow her counsel in divine matters; and that proverb maintains that one should follow her counsel in general matters. Rav Ḥisda says: All the gates of Heaven are apt to be locked, except for the gates of prayer for victims of verbal mistreatment, as it is stated: “And behold, the Lord stood upon a wall built with a plumb line, and a plumb line in His hand” (Amos 7:7). God stands with the scales of justice in His hand to determine if one has been subjected to injustice. Rabbi Elazar says: In response to all transgressions, God punishes the perpetrator by means of an agent, except for mistreatment [ona’a], as it is stated: “And a plumb line [anakh] in His hand.” The term for mistreatment and the term for plumb line are spelled in a similar manner, indicating that God Himself inflicts retribution. Rabbi Abbahu says: There are three sins before whose transgressors the curtain [hapargod] between the world and the Divine Presence is not locked; their sins reach the Divine Presence. They are: Verbal mistreatment, robbery, and idol worship. Mistreatment, as it is stated: “And a plumb line in His hand”; robbery, as it is stated: “Violence and robbery are heard in her, they are before Me continually” (Jeremiah 6:7); idol worship, as it is stated: “A people that angers Me before Me continually; that sacrifice in gardens, and burn incense upon bricks” (Isaiah 65:3). Apropos the topic of how man should approach his household, Rav Yehuda says: A person must always be careful about ensuring that there is grain inside his house, as discord is found in a person’s house only over matters of grain, as it is stated: “He makes your borders peace; He gives you plenty with the finest wheat” (Psalms 147:14). If there is the finest wheat in your house, there will be peace there. Rav Pappa said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: When the barley is emptied from the jug, quarrel knocks and enters the house. And Rav Ḥinnana bar Pappa says: A person must always be careful about ensuring that there is grain inside his house, as the Jewish people were characterized as poor only over matters of grain, as it is stated: “And it was, if Israel sowed, and Midian and the children of the east ascended” (Judges 6:3); and it is written: “And they encamped against them and they destroyed the crops of the land” (Judges 6:4); and it is further written: “And Israel was greatly impoverished due to Midian” (Judges 6:6). And Rabbi Ḥelbo says: A person must always be careful about sustaining the honor of his wife, as blessing is found in a person’s house only because of his wife, as it is stated in allusion to this: “And he dealt well with Abram for her sake, and he had sheep and oxen” (Genesis 12:16). And that is what Rava said to the residents of Meḥoza, where he lived: Honor your wives, so that you will become rich. § Apropos the topic of verbal mistreatment, we learned in a mishna there (Kelim 5:10): If one cut an earthenware oven widthwise into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, Rabbi Eliezer deems it ritually pure. Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, as it is functionally a complete oven. And this is known as the oven of akhnai. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake, which often forms a coil when at rest, and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day, when they discussed this matter, Rabbi Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. After failing to convince the Rabbis logically, Rabbi Eliezer said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward and began flowing in the opposite direction. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? The Gemara relates: The walls did not fall because of the deference due Rabbi Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due Rabbi Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with Rabbi Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: It is written: “It is not in heaven” (Deuteronomy 30:12). The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase “It is not in heaven” in this context? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai, in the Torah: “After a majority to incline” (Exodus 23:2). Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara relates: Years after, Rabbi Natan encountered Elijah the prophet and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time, when Rabbi Yehoshua issued his declaration? Elijah said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. The Sages said: On that day, the Sages brought all the ritually pure items deemed pure by the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the oven and burned them in fire, and the Sages reached a consensus in his regard and ostracized him. And the Sages said: Who will go and inform him of his ostracism? Rabbi Akiva, his beloved disciple, said to them: I will go, lest an unseemly person go and inform him in a callous and offensive manner, and he would thereby destroy the entire world. What did Rabbi Akiva do? He wore black and wrapped himself in black, as an expression of mourning and pain, and sat before Rabbi Eliezer at a distance of four cubits, which is the distance that one must maintain from an ostracized individual. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, what is different about today from other days, that you comport yourself in this manner? Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, it appears to me that your colleagues are distancing themselves from you. He employed euphemism, as actually they distanced Rabbi Eliezer from them. Rabbi Eliezer too, rent his garments and removed his shoes, as is the custom of an ostracized person, and he dropped from his seat and sat upon the ground. The Gemara relates: His eyes shed tears, and as a result the entire world was afflicted: One-third of its olives were afflicted, and one-third of its wheat, and one-third of its barley. And some say that even dough kneaded in a woman’s hands spoiled. The Sages taught: There was great anger on that day, as any place that Rabbi Eliezer fixed his gaze was burned. And even Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi of the Sanhedrin at Yavne, the head of the Sages who were responsible for the decision to ostracize Rabbi Eliezer, was coming on a boat at the time, and a large wave swelled over him and threatened to drown him. Rabban Gamliel said: It seems to me that this is only for the sake of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, as God punishes those who mistreat others. Rabban Gamliel stood on his feet and said: Master of the Universe, it is revealed and known before You that neither was it for my honor that I acted when ostracizing him, nor was it for the honor of the house of my father that I acted; rather, it was for Your honor, so that disputes will not proliferate in Israel. In response, the sea calmed from its raging. The Gemara further relates: Imma Shalom, the wife of Rabbi Eliezer, was the sister of Rabban Gamliel. From that incident forward, she would not allow Rabbi Eliezer to lower his head and recite the taḥanun prayer, which includes supplication and entreaties. She feared that were her husband to bemoan his fate and pray at that moment, her brother would be punished. A certain day was around the day of the New Moon, and she inadvertently substituted a full thirty-day month for a deficient twenty-nine-day month, i.e., she thought that it was the New Moon, when one does not lower his head in supplication, but it was not. Some say that a pauper came and stood at the door, and she took bread out to him. The result was that she left her husband momentarily unsupervised. When she returned, she found him and saw that he had lowered his head in prayer. She said to him: Arise, you already killed my brother. Meanwhile, the sound of a shofar emerged from the house of Rabban Gamliel to announce that the Nasi had died. Rabbi Eliezer said to her: From where did you know that your brother would die? She said to him: This is the tradition that I received from the house of the father of my father: All the gates of Heaven are apt to be locked, except for the gates of prayer for victims of verbal mistreatment. § The Sages taught: One who verbally mistreats the convert violates three prohibitions, and one who oppresses him in other ways violates two. The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to verbal mistreatment, that three prohibitions are written concerning it: “And you shall neither mistreat a convert” (Exodus 22:20); “And when a convert lives in your land, you shall not mistreat him” (Leviticus 19:33); “And you shall not mistreat, each man his colleague” (Leviticus 25:17), and a convert is included in the category of colleague? With regard to one who also oppresses a convert as well, three prohibitions are written: “And you shall neither mistreat a convert, nor oppress him” (Exodus 22:20); “And you shall not oppress a convert (Exodus 23:9); “And you shall not be to him like a creditor” (Exodus 22:24). This last prohibition is a general prohibition, in which converts are included. Consequently, it is not correct that one who oppresses a convert violates only two prohibitions. Rather, both this one, who verbally mistreats a convert, and that one, who oppresses him, violate three prohibitions. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: For what reason did the Torah issue warnings in thirty-six places, and some say in forty-six places, with regard to causing any distress to a convert? It is due to the fact that a convert’s inclination is evil, i.e., he is prone to return to his previous way of living. What is the meaning of that which is written: “And you shall not mistreat a convert nor oppress him, because you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Exodus 22:20)? We learned in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: A defect that is in you, do not mention it in another. Since the Jewish people were themselves strangers, they are not in a position to demean a convert because he is a stranger in their midst. And this explains the adage that people say: One who has a person hanged in his family [bidyotkei], does not say to another member of his household: Hang a fish for me, as the mention of hanging is demeaning for that family. MISHNA: One may not intermingle produce bought from one supplier with other produce, even if he intermingles new produce with other new produce and ostensibly the buyer suffers no loss from his doing so.
(א) ועשית על פי הדבר אשר יגידו לך מן המקום ההוא אשר יבחר ה'. על הוראת בית דין הגדול שבירושלים חייבים מיתה, ואין חייבים מיתה על הוראת בית דין שביבנה.
(ב) על פי התורה אשר יורוך. על דברי תורה חייבים מיתה, ואין חייבים מיתה על דברי סופרים.
(ג) ועל המשפט אשר יאמרו לך תעשה. זו מצות עשה.
(ד) לא תסור מן הדבר אשר יגידו לך. זו מצות לא תעשה.
(ה) ימין ושמאל. אפילו [נראים בעיניך על שמאל שהוא ימין, ועל ימין שהוא שמאל - שמע להם.
(1) (Devarim 17:11) "And you shall do according to the thing that they tell you from that place which the L-rd chooses": By the ruling of the great beth-din in Jerusalem (i.e., the Sanhedrin) the death penalty obtains, and not by the ruling of the beth-din in Yavneh.
(2) (Ibid. 12) "According to the Torah that they teach you": This teaches us that (a rebellious elder) incurs the death penalty only for (controverting) words of Torah (i.e., the Written Law), but not for (controverting) the words of the scribes (i.e., the Oral Law).
(3) "and the judgment that they tell you to do": This is a positive commandment (i.e., the rebellious elder transgresses a positive commandment).
(4) "You shall not turn aside from the thing that they tell you": This is a negative commandment.
(5) "right or left": Even if it seems in your eyes (that they are telling you) left is right and right is left, listen to them.
וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דרשב"ג והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין גברא אגברא קא רמית גופא א"ר אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין איתיביה רבי אבא לרבי אבהו דן את הדין וזיכה את החייב וחייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי ומשלם מביתו הכא במאי עסקינן דקיבלוהו עלייהו אי הכי אמאי משלם מביתו דאמרו ליה דיינת לן דין תורה א"ל רב ספרא לרבי אבא דטעה במאי אילימא דטעה בדבר משנה והאמר רב ששת א"ר (אמי) טעה בדבר משנה חוזר אלא דטעה בשיקול הדעת היכי דמי בשיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי ותרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר וסוגיין דעלמא אליבא דחד מינייהו ואזל איהו ועבד כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי ר"מ וחכ"א פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכ"ע מקשינן פשרה לדין מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכ"ע דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי אמר רב אשי ש"מ פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למ"ד צריכה תלתא ל"ל תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה נגמר הדין אי אתה רשאי לבצוע: סרמ"ש בנק"ש סימן: ר"א בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע וכל הבוצע ה"ז חוטא וכל המברך את הבוצע הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר (תהלים י, ג) בוצע ברך נאץ ה' אלא יקוב הדין את ההר שנאמר (דברים א, יז) כי המשפט לאלקים הוא וכן משה היה אומר יקוב הדין את ההר אבל אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום ומשים שלום בין אדם לחבירו שנאמר (מלאכי ב, ו) תורת אמת היתה בפיהו ועולה לא נמצא בשפתיו בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי ורבים השיב מעון ר' אליעזר אומר הרי שגזל סאה של חטים וטחנה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה כיצד מברך אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה' רבי מאיר אומר לא נאמר בוצע אלא כנגד יהודה שנאמר (בראשית לז, כו) ויאמר יהודה אל אחיו מה בצע כי נהרוג את אחינו וכל המברך את יהודה הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה' רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע וכן בדוד הוא אומר (שמואל ב ח, טו) ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וצדקה אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה הוי אומר זה ביצוע אתאן לת"ק דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו (וכן בדוד הוא אומר ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו משפט לזה שהחזיר לו את ממונו וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו) קשיא ליה לרבי האי לכל עמו לעניים מיבעי ליה אלא (רבי אומר) אע"פ שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתחת ידו רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר שנים שבאו לפניך לדין עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו שנאמר (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון ולפני התגלע הריב נטוש קודם שנתגלע הריב אתה יכול לנטשו משנתגלע הריב אי אתה יכול יכול לנטשו (וריש לקיש) אמר שנים שבאו לדין אחד רך ואחד קשה עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להם אין אני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב חזק ונמצא חזק רודפו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה יכול לומר להן איני נזקק לכם שנא' (דברים א, יז) לא תגורו מפני איש ר' יהושע בן קרחה אומר מניין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו וראה זכות לעני וחובה לעשיר מניין שלא ישתוק שנאמר לא תגורו מפני איש רבי חנין אומר לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש ויהו עדים יודעים את מי הן מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה' ויהו הדיינין יודעין את מי הן דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (תהלים פב, א) אלקים נצב בעדת אל וכן ביהושפט הוא אומר (דברי הימים ב יט, ו) ויאמר אל השופטים ראו מה אתם עושים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי (אם) לה' שמא יאמר הדיין מה לי בצער הזה ת"ל עמכם בדבר משפט אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות היכי דמי גמר דין אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש פלוני אתה חייב איש פלוני אתה זכאי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה איני והא רב הונא תלמידיה דרב הוה כי הוה אתו לקמיה דרב הונא אמר להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו מאי מצוה נמי דקאמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה
And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding. § Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment. The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable. Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation. § The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process. What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise. Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms. § The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges. Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3). Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6). The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord. Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation. The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity. The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house. This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off. And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17). And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else. Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?
לא יהיה בך אביון שלך קודם לשל כל אדם אלא לזקן ואינו לפי כבודו אמר רבה הכישה חייב בה אביי הוה יתיב קמיה דרבה חזא להנך עיזי דקיימו שקל קלא ושדא בהו א"ל איחייבת בהו קום אהדרינהו איבעיא להו דרכו להחזיר בשדה ואין דרכו להחזיר בעיר מהו מי אמרינן השבה מעליא בעינן וכיון דלאו דרכיה להחזיר בעיר לא לחייב או דלמא בשדה מיהת הוא דאיחייב ליה וכיון דאיחייב ליה בשדה איחייב ליה בעיר תיקו אמר רבא כל שבשלו מחזיר בשל חבירו נמי מחזיר וכל שבשלו פורק וטוען בשל חבירו נמי פורק וטוען רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי הוה קאזיל באורחא פגע ביה ההוא גברא הוה דרי פתכא דאופי אותבינהו וקא מיתפח א"ל דלי לי אמר ליה כמה שוין א"ל פלגא דזוזא יהיב ליה פלגא דזוזא ואפקרה הדר זכה בהו הדר יהיב ליה פלגא דזוזא ואפקרה חזייה דהוה קא בעי למיהדר למזכיה בהו א"ל לכולי עלמא אפקרנהו ולך לא אפקרנהו ומי הוי הפקר כי האי גוונא והתנן בש"א הפקר לעניים הפקר וב"ה אומרים אינו הפקר עד שיהא הפקר לעניים ולעשירים כשמיטה אלא רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לכולי עלמא אפקרינהו ובמלתא בעלמא הוא דאוקמיה והא רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי זקן ואינו לפי כבודו הוה ר' ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לפנים משורת הדין הוא דעבד דתני רב יוסף (שמות יח, כ) והודעת להם זה בית חייהם את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים [(אשר) ילכו זה ביקור חולים בה זו קבורה ואת המעשה זה הדין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין: אמר מר (אשר) ילכו זה ביקור חולים היינו גמילות חסדים לא נצרכה אלא לבן גילו דאמר מר בן גילו נוטל אחד מששים בחליו ואפי' הכי מבעי ליה למיזל לגביה בה זו קבורה היינו גמילות חסדים לא נצרכה אלא לזקן ואינו לפי כבודו אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין: מתני׳ אי זו היא אבידה מצא חמור או פרה רועין בדרך אין זו אבידה חמור וכליו הפוכין פרה רצה בין הכרמים הרי זו אבידה החזירה וברחה החזירה וברחה אפי' ארבעה וחמשה פעמים חייב להחזירה שנאמר (דברים כב, א) השב תשיבם היה בטל מסלע לא יאמר לו תן לי סלע אלא נותן לו שכרו כפועל אם יש שם בית דין מתנה בפני ב"ד אם אין שם ב"ד בפני מי יתנה שלו קודם: גמ׳ אטו כל הני דאמרינן לאו אבידה הוו אמר רב יהודה הכי קאמר אי זו היא כלל אבידה שהוא חייב בה מצא חמור ופרה רועין בדרך אין זו אבידה ולא מיחייב בה חמור וכליו הפוכים פרה ורצה בין הכרמים הרי זו אבידה ומיחייב בה ולעולם אמר רב יהודה אמר רב עד שלשה ימים היכי דמי אי בלילותא אפי' חדא שעתא נמי אי ביממא אפי' טובא נמי לא לא צריכא דהוה חזי לה בקדמתא ובחשכתא תלתא יומי אמרינן איתרמויי אתרמי לה ונפקא טפי ודאי אבידה היא תניא נמי הכי מצא טלית וקרדום
there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item. Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabba said to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless. The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you. The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood? Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help. The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law. The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him. It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law. MISHNA: Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item. GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tanna is saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it. With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost. The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item. This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax